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Dear Professor Nanda,
I wish to thank you for your letter of 13 September
1976 concerning the forthcoming Conference on Water Needs
for the Future, to be held at the University of Denver on
8 and 9 October 1976.
The subjects which you are tackling
in the regional, national and international contexts are
those that will underlie the United Nations Water Conference,
which is to be convened at Mar del Plata, Argentina, from
14 to 25 March 1977.
The Conference will be concerned with the problem of
ensuring that the world manages its water supply so as to
ensure that this vital resource is available in sufficient
quantities and of sufficiently good quality to meet the
mounting needs of a world population which is not only
growing, but is seeking improved economic and social
conditions for all. The Conference will, for example,
take up the challenge of the recent United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, which called for action to
provide all the-world's peoples with safe water supplies
and hygienic waste disposal by 1990 if possible. It will
also consider the actions necessary in the water sector to
meet the targets set by the World Food Conference in Rome.
These problems will be considered in the broad context of
the management of water as a resource essential to life
itself.
Conferences such as your own, which focus public
attention on the vast array of global problems, can make
a significant and valuable contribution to the understanding
of such crucial questions.
I would like to take this
opportunity to send you my best wishes for a successful
Conference.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,

Avw IKL-L
Kurt Waldheim
Professor Ved P. Nanda
Director, International Legal Studies Program
University of Denver
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Water Needs for the Future
VED P. NANDA*

Water is crucial to every type of human endeavor, indeed
to human life itself. Water resources, while renewable, are limited. The drought situations in the Sahel in the early 1970s, in
Western Europe in 1976, and in the United States in 1977 have
merely accentuated the long-term problems of imbalance
caused by short supply and increasing demand for water. These
problems are likely to become critical unless urgent and immediate action is taken both to increase and to conserve existing
supplies of water resources.
A desirable first step is the recognition that problems of
water resources are not merely of regional or national concern
but are of worldwide concern. For example, the recent United
Nations conferences on global issues, especially those on the
environment, food, and human settlements have emphasized
the crucial role of water in the quality of life of all the world's
inhabitants. The 1977 U.N. Water Conference has further focused world attention on the need for safe drinking water, for
irrigation water, and for coordinated regional and global policies, planning, and action to meet the water demands of a
growing world population.
As the population grows and the demand for clean water
accelerates, choices must be made as to how to allocate, distribute, conserve, and augment existing water resources. Since
the choices that are made will directly affect the lives and
livelihoods of all citizens of the world community, these choices
should be made by a public which is informed and knowledgeable about the nature of competing claims, interests, and values,
and is aware of the complex issues which need to be intelli* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Chairman, Water Needs
for the Future Conference, University of Denver, Oct. 8-9, 1976.
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gently considered and weighed before policies are formulated
and action is undertaken.
Water Needs for the Future is designed to stimulate interest in these issues, to broaden the focus of discussion to a full
range of legal, political, economic, social, technological, and
ethical considerations, to increase the body of knowledge upon
which future choices will be made, and to serve as a starting
point for ongoing discussion among all sectors of the public.
Most of the essays in this volume were originally presented
at the conference, "Water Needs for the Future: Colorado, the
United States and the World," sponsored by the University of
Denver College of Law in October 1976. Nearly 500 attorneys,
engineers, planners, public officials, academicians, and concerned citizens assembled in Denver to discuss the local,
regional, national, and international aspects of water problems. The conference brought together participants with diverse backgrounds, skills, and disciplines, and the outcome of
the various panels, workshops, and informal sessions was a
heightened understanding and awareness of the full range of
social, political, economic, legal, and ethical considerations
which affect decisionmaking in water resource management.
A number of highly qualified experts contributed papers
and commentaries which provide the necessary framework for
the discussion of these issues. Thomas Oliver, the Executive
Secretary of the U.N. Water Conference, sets the stage for such
discussion. He makes a strong plea for identification and clear
understanding of the underlying issues of the global water crisis
and for rational conduct and behavior on the part of nation
states in the management of water resources.
Papers, case studies, and commentaries which follow Mr.
Oliver's presentation are conveniently divided into three parts:
(1) legal; (2) political and economic; and (3) technological.
In setting the legal framework, the first paper surveys the
emerging trends in the international legal and institutional
contexts in which water resource questions are being addressed. An appraisal of the trends in decision leads the author
to conclude that "[tihe common interest in the optimal utilization of international waters demands a definite worldwide
move toward integrated basin management, administration,
and development." Professors Frank Trelease and George
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Radosevich have made valuable contributions in their studies
of the various national legal systems throughout the world.
Jerome Muys addresses the question of interstate allocation
of water, concluding that the federal-interstate compact concept provides the greatest efficiency and equity in allocation
amongst states. Raphael Moses examines the important issue
of transmountain diversion, concluding that such interbasin
transfers, while often of great value in distributing sorely
needed water resources, face serious obstacles. The commentaries by Michael White and Robert Emmet Clark reflect the
consensus position of the conference that legal and institutional mechanisms must be developed to allow for greater
public input in the decisionmaking process and increased public management of scarce water resources.
The next section offers a detailed study of the political and
economic contexts in which decisions regarding allocation of
water are made. Senator Gary Hart presents an overview of the
political and economic aspects of water problems, calling for
greater public participation in the decisionmaking process.
Federal-state relations are examined by Professor Henry Caulfield, a former federal official, who concludes that much of the
federal apparatus should be dismantled, leaving the bulk of
water development to the states. Professor Timothy Tregarthen then analyzes the economics of water allocation, recommending changes to increase the efficiency of the allocation
system. A nonmarket model for evaluating the social impacts
of resource decisions, which often go unevaluated for lack of a
means to do so, is suggested by Professor David Freeman.
A series of case studies further elaborates the political and
economic issues of resource management. David Lavender examines the historical development of water law and systems in
the western United States, while Ival Goslin details the impact
on Colorado of equitable apportionment with sister states.
Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado further analyzes the need
for comprehensive planning of water use and development and
the interrelationship of water planning to land use and other
resource planning. The relationship of surface to groundwater,
one of the key questions facing water planners, is examined by
C.J. Kuiper, the Colorado State Engineer. Comments by representatives of municipal, industrial, energy, and agricultural
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interests round out the discussion on conflicting political and
economic demands for allocation of water.
The technological context often determines what may or
may not be accomplished in the legal and political spheres. Dr.
Gordon Milliken, and Professor Lewis Grant and Kelvin
Danielson evaluate the various technological approaches to
increasing the supply of water. While Dr. Milliken examines
ten specific alternatives for increasing water supplies, Messrs.
Grant and Danielson concentrate on the techniques of water
augmentation and watershed management. The controversial
subject of weather modification and the ramifications of present laws to this new source of augmentation are studied by
Messrs. Danielson, Sherk, and Grant, who conclude that new
laws will be necessary to adequately provide for such projects.
Case studies include the Sahel and Denver, Colorado. Dr.
Michael Glantz's paper plays the valuable role of pinpointing
the limitations on "technological fixes" by analyzing the problem of "inappropriate technologies" in the context of the Sahel,
while Kenneth Miller outlines the attempts of Denver, Colorado-one of the leaders in the United States-in municipal recycling efforts.
In his incisive comments, Glenn Saunders, a leading U.S.
water lawyer, briefly summarizes the various issues presented
at the conference and places them in perspective for the workshop participants. Workshops on selected subjects and their
summarized discussions conclude the proceedings. These workshops included such areas as: (1) Water, Growth, and Planning; (2) Water and Technology; (3) Allocation and Conflicting
Needs; (4) Water and the Environment; (5) Comparative Legal
Systems; and (6) Interstate Allocation Systems.
One theme that clearly emerges even after a cursory glance
at these papers and commentaries is the interrelatedness of
water problems cutting across various disciplines and various
geographical and ideological boundaries of the world and the
resulting need for coordinated action. It is imperative that a
recent warning by the U.N. Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, be heeded:
[W]ater [is] a vulnerable resource that must be protected and
developed through international cooperation to avoid disastrous
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shortages when the world's population reaches six billion to seven
billion people by the end of this century.,

The conference "Water Needs for the Future" owes its
success to a large number of individuals. As the chairman of
the conference and the special editor of this volume, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Board of Editors and
staff of the DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY,
the officers and members of the Denver International Law Society, my colleagues at the College of Law, and my secretary,
Jackie Mijares. The Colorado Humanities Program was of
immense help in providing a matching grant which considerably eased the financial demands of such an undertaking.
I am especially indebted to Dr. Maurice Mitchell, Chancellor of the University of Denver, Dean Robert B. Yegge and
Professor John A. Carver, Jr. of the College of Law, and my
students and friends: Ian Bruce Bird, former managing editor;
Mark S. Caldwell, former business editor; Gilbert D. Porter,
managing editor; and Douglas G. Scrivner, editor-in-chief of
the JOURNAL and conference coordinator, whose invaluable advice, help, and understanding not only made my task easier
and more enjoyable but also contributed significantly to the
success of the conference.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1977, at 3, cols. 1-2.

Spaceship Earth and Water for the Future
THOMAS OLIVER*

A discussion of water problems reminds me of my favorite
water man-the late Sextus Frontinius-who was appointed
Rome's water commissioner in the first century, A.D. He found
himself in the position classic to water managers; he was told,
"We need more water, go and get it-and by the way, you
cannot have any more money." So, being a man of ingenuity,
he looked around and decided to find out where the water went.
He found that it mostly went to waste. He thought of various
ways to overcome the waste and is today known as being the
first to enunciate the great principle: halving the demand is the
equivalent of doubling the supply. He did very well; he did not
have to build any more aqueducts, and one would have thought
he was destined for glory. Unfortunately there is a sad end to
the story-he eventually committed suicide in order to avoid
being put to death by Nero. One only hopes that those who are
tackling similar problems in the United States, and elsewhere,
will not find themselves as hard pressed.
I must confess that the title of the talk has caused me a
certain degree of anguish. The analogy of Spaceship Earth is
somewhat disturbing. It is perhaps seductive, but certainly
misleading, for two reasons. In the first place the spaceship
concept suggests the totally false premise that we are careening
through space in this purpose-built object with a mission-knowing what we are going to do. But the problems faced
by this conference, and the United Nations Water Conference
at Mar del Plata are decidedly different. Certainly we are careening through space, but do not quite know why. We do not
even know what we are trying to do as we careen through space,
and the whole process is a disorderly, fascinating, potentially
productive and exciting one.
A second point also troubles me about the analogy. As the
Apollo astronauts sat in their capsule atop the rocket at Cape
Kennedy, they could be certain of one thing: they knew that
they numbered three at lift-off, and that there would be no
* Executive Secretary, U.N. Water Conference at Mar del Plata, Argentina,
March 14-25, 1977.
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more than three when the thing splashed down again. We in
Spaceship Earth, if it is a spaceship, can not be sure of that.
As we whirl through space, we simply do not know how many
of us there will be tomorrow, the next day, or the next week.
We do know that every time the planet spins around there are
more people, there are more people demanding more water and
demanding better water; each new person needs more water in
order to stay alive and enjoy the blessings of the civilization
that he has grown accustomed to-and to which he is entitled.
This is the kind of problem that one does not have in a spaceship.
Our concerns demonstrate the failure of the spaceship
analogy. The conference at Mar del Plata is but one of the
series of conferences that have been organized under the auspices of the United Nations to deal with what Lady Jackson
(Barbara Ward) has come to call global housekeeping. We are
concerned with one central issue: How do we, inhabitants of
this planet and the governments that represent us, so arrange
our affairs as to ensure that there will be no water crisis-or
rather, no serious, recurring, or more rapidly recurring water
crisis-before the end of this century. It is a big job, but one
the conference can successfully handle.
In this perspective, the conference falls into the long series
of conferences organized by the United Nations. The first was
the conference on the conservation and utilization of resources
which was convened in the mid-1940s. That conference was
convened as a result of a very imaginative initiative by the
then-U.S. Secretary of the Interior. It brought together with
great success a very large number of scientists, technologists,
and administrators to consider how the world could best use
and conserve its resources. It preceded the environmentalists,
but was a successful attempt to deal with one of the vital
housekeeping problems that arises in the course of managing
this one earth that we all occupy.
A number of conferences have followed. There has been,
for example, a conference on the application of science and
technology to development. There have been conferences on
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, on the peaceful uses of outer
space, on the environment (Stockholm), on population (Bucharest), and on women (Mexico City), each of which attempted

1976

WATER FOR SPACESHIP EARTH

to deal with one of the problems faced by the majority of the
occupants of Spaceship Earth. In addition, there was the recent human settlements conference in Vancouver, the food conference in Rome, and the water conference at Mar del Plata.
Down the road is a conference, to be held in Nairobi, on the
problems of desertification-how you create deserts by applying water to them, and how you eliminate deserts by applying
water more intelligently.
At the Mar del Plata water conference, we have attempted
to bring to the attention of governments the specific water and
water-related problems that stem from the earlier conferences.
For example, it is quite obvious that if the world is to achieve
the ambitious food goals set in Rome there will have to be an
almost frightening array of activities affecting water. I do not
mean that the rich countries will merely have to dig into their
pockets, but that there will have to be improvements in irrigation, in the use of water in agriculture, and in other vital water
uses. Similarly, at the human settlements conference, the participants agreed that there should be action taken between now
and 1990 to provide safe drinking water and reasonably adequate waste disposal facilities to the vast majority of the
world's population, who now have neither. What is needed is a
practical program-a set of commitments by developed countries to give those problems priority, to provide some of the
finances and some of the technical cooperation that will be
necessary to achieve the habitat goal.
The Mar del Plata conference was preceded by a very successful period of regional preparatory meetings; the first of
these was held in Bangkok in July 1976, the second at Lima
during August 1976, the third at Addis Ababa at the end of
September 1976, and the fourth in Geneva at the beginning of
October 1976. At each of these preparatory conferences the
member governments produced reports on water problems in
their countries and the likely demands, problems, and solutions considered by the governments. These reports have been
collated in a set of regional reports which are to be published.
During the regional meetings the governments considered
recommendations to be proposed at the Mar del Plata conference. These recommendations vary in style from region to region. For example, the African region placed a great deal of
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emphasis on measures to improve net worth-the assessment
of water resources. They did so for two reasons: partly because
Africa needs significant development in that area, and partly
because its regional meeting was preceded by a meeting of
hydrologists.
Nonetheless, the general contents of these recommendations are generally uniform. An example might be the Latin
American recommendations. They cover a fairly obvious set of
topics: planning; water management; institutions for water
management, laws, and regulations; assessment of supply and
demand; efficiency in water use; community water supplies;
use of water for agriculture, energy, recreation, and navigation;
technology, conservation, and the environment; floods and
droughts, cooperation in hydrological studies, and international rivers.
On each of these subjects, the recommendations note what
would be nice to do, but contain no stirring call for action. In
the case of international rivers, a very large element of compromise is evident. The proposal adopted in Latin America is virtually the same as the one adopted in Bangkok, and it is obvious that a recommendation adopted, by consensus, by a
group that includes a downriver country like Bangladesh and
an upriver country like India, is likely to be a meek proposal.
However, international agreement on difficult political
and economic questions, such as those of international rivers
and the use of shared water resources, cannot be resolved in a
one or two week meeting. The resolution will take place
through the normal processes of treaty-making, and of lawmaking at the international level. Hopefully, the International
Law Commission will draft appropriate legal texts.' The scholarly and professional communities, through organizations like
the International Law Association, will also, hopefully, continue their efforts to propose the sort of formulae that governments might eventually accept.'
When agreement does come it will come because the force
of circumstances propels people in that direction. I know of one
1. A brief sketch of the current activities of the International Law Commission
on the legal aspects of international water-courses is contained in Nanda, infra.
2. For a summary report on the legal norms recommended by these organizations
see Nanda, id.

1976

WATER FOR SPACESHIP EARTH

developing country which has a somewhat successful treaty for
the common use of an international river with one of its neighbors. It is trying unsuccessfully, however, to establish a similar
arrangement with another neighbor. The reason the arrangement can not be brought to fruition, I am told, is not political,
but is because the other neighbor has not yet reached a point
of development where it needs to make use of that water; until
that time it is not going to enter into commitments whose
outcome it can not foresee. Nevertheless, we can be sure that
the discussions and decisions taken at Mar del Plata and regional conferences will propel the international community
further along the road to agreement.
A major issue affecting the management of water is conservation, and the resulting set of environmental considerations,
with which environmental programs are concerned. The U.N.
Environment Program has therefore been most generous in
helping us to organize the regional meetings, and in the case
of the Mar del Plata meeting it assisted the neediest among the
developing countries to send representatives.
An additional important contribution made by the conference is certainly the series of reports and papers submitted by
governments and discussed at the conference. Earlier we had
asked governments to present papers at the conference relating
to their national experiences in broad problems of water management. The compilation of these papers and the preparation
and analysis involved in each were invaluable in creating a
new-found awareness of water management concerns on both
the national and international levels.
There is no guarantee that the Mar del Plata conference
or a similar intergovernmental conference would bring about
what Barbara Ward considers necessary to make Spaceship
Earth a flyable object: "Rational behavior is the condition of
survival. Rational rules of behavior are what we largely lack,"
or what Buckminster Fuller wants everybody to do, "to think
clearly." However, as the preamble to the Latin American proposal has aptly stated, the conference at Mar del Plata has
provided a magnificent opportunity, "to raise problems, to exchange experience, and to identify techniques and solutions
that may help governments to take decisions in this matter,
focusing their attention on the major issues in the water sector
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which demand the attention of the world community." If even
half of the delegations to Mar del Plata sensed that we should
focus our efforts in these directions, the conference will have
achieved something worthwhile.

I.

LEGAL

Emerging Trends in the Use of International
Law and Institutions for the Management of
International Water Resources*
VED

P.

NANDA**

I. THE PROBLEM
A recent United Nations study' notes that presently at
least 20 percent of the world's urban population and 75 percent
of the rural population (in many countries the number is as
high as 50 percent of the urban population and 90 percent of
the rural population) suffer from a lack of reasonably safe supplies of drinking water.2 The quality of water supplies, and in
turn the quality of life and environmental health, suffers for
many reasons, including: (1) the increasing and unplanned
concentration of population and industry in large urban areas;
(2) the increase of toxic compounds and other pollutants
caused by the proliferation of industrial processes, greater use
of energy, and increased agricultural activity; (3) water-logging, salinization and erosion, exhaustion of groundwater supplies, and deterioration of both ground and surface water
sources in many regions; (4) needlessly inefficient and wasteful
water use; and (5) intensified conflicts about rights 3and priorities as the demand for available water accelerates.
Since there is a fixed total stock of water 4-even though it
may be potentially inexhaustible-the future worldwide accelerating demand is likely to strain water resources not only in
several countries but also in several regions of the world. Thus
* This paper is an adaptation of the author's remarks made at the Water Resources Conference at the University of Denver on Oct. 9, 1976.
** Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law; Chairman, Water Needs for the Future Conference, University of Denver, Oct. 8-9, 1976.
1. U.N. Water Conference, Resources and Needs: Assessment of the World Water
Situation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 70/CBP/1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Assessment of the World Water Situation].
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
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the study concludes that there exists a potential world water
crisis even though "globally there may be potentially enough
water to meet forthcoming needs. But, frustratingly, it tends
to be available in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or with
the wrong quality."5 Consequently, all societies, rich and poor,
are likely to be affected.
A recent study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has concluded that water resources are inadequate to meet current needs in five European countriesCyprus, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Malta,
and the Ukrainian S.S.R.-and that seven more countriesBelgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
and Turkey-will face similar problems by the year 2000.6
In September 1976, United Nations Secretary-General
Kurt Waldheim described the main concern of the 1977 U.N.
Water Conference: "[to ensure] that the world manages its
water supply [so that] this vital resource is available in sufficient quantities and of sufficiently good quality to meet the
mounting needs of a world population which is not only growing, but is seeking improved economic and social conditions for
all."' Subsequently, in November 1976, the consensus adopted
by the General Assembly on the dispute between India and
Bangladesh pertaining to the use of waters of the Ganges
River" highlighted the world community's interest in avoiding
conflicts and in seeking cooperative action in the management
of international water resources.
Invoking Article 14 of the U.N. Charter, Bangladesh
brought the dispute before the Assembly, stating that
"[flailure to resolve this issue expeditiously and satisfactorily
carries with it the potential threat of conflict affecting peace
and security in the area and the region as a whole." 9
5. Id. at 5.
6. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Problems of Europe's Water
Suppliers, Press Release ECE/GEN/F/4, ECE/ENV/9 (1976), cited in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its 28th Session, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
10, at 384, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Report of the 28th Session
of Int'l L. Comm'n].
7. In a letter to the author, supra at 225.
8. 13 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Dec. 1976, at 35.
9. Id. at 35-36. See also U.N. Doc. A/31/195 & Add. 1, 2 (1976).
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Bangladesh contended that India's construction of a barrier on the Ganges River at Farakka, a few miles from the
Bangladesh-India border, for the purpose of diverting the river
into the Hooghly River in India, and India's continued unilateral withdrawal of a large volume of water from the Ganges had
a devastating impact on Bangladesh, causing "cumulative and
permanent" damage. 0 India expressed "serious misgivings
about the desirability of involving the Assembly in an issue
which was intrinsically bilateral."" It considered Bangladesh's
insistence on the continued natural flow of an international
river to be inconsistent with the concept of "equitable utilization."' Asserting that India "had always subscribed to the
view that each riparian State was entitled to a reasonable and
equitable share of the waters of an international river," it
showed willingness not only to consult with Bangladesh on
finding a short-term solution "to avoid the common hardship
that might be caused by a shortage of water during the lean
months, but also to co-operate in the search for a long-term
solution by augmenting the flow.' '

3

Accordingly, the parties

"decided to meet urgently at Dacca at the ministerial level for
negotiations with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious
settlement.""
If the Assembly involvement in the Ganges waters dispute
were to be construed to be an emerging trend toward the
internationalization of bilateral water management issues, or
at least some of them, it would be a trend I would consider
desirable, necessary, and long overdue; critical questions pertaining to water management and their proposed solutions
have been traditionally considered primarily as local, regional,
and national issues. These issues include the setting of priorities among multiple and often competing uses of water; the
allocation, distribution, conservation, augmentation, and optimization of existing water resources; and the prevention of
pollution and exhaustion. Obviously, experience of water resource management accrued at all these. levels can be benefi10. 13 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Dec. 1976, at 36.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 35. Negotiations, however, were stalled in January 1977. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1977, at 12, col. 2.
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cially shared by others. Similarly, experience in integrated development and management of international river basins'5 can
be helpful both in the devising of new plans and in their implementation. A brief inquiry into the role of international law and
institutions in facilitating the management of international
river resources, primarily for non-navigational uses, will be attempted in the following sections.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Unilateral attempts by states to solve water problems are
likely to produce limited results for at least two reasons: (1)
many nations lack adequate scientific data about water supply
and its rational use, and adequate technical know-how and
resources to develop local water systems and to appraise their
long range effects and implications, and (2) there is likely to
be unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort.'" Efficient,
rational development and use of water resources demands cooperative, concerted efforts by nation states.
The need for such concerted efforts is especially striking
where internationally interconnected water resources-surface
or underground-are involved. The emergence of the international drainage basin concept and its wide acceptance, contrasted with the "international river" and "international river
system," can be attributed to a better understanding of hydrologic facts.' 7 This development has created expectations that
15. The concept of "international drainage basin" is used in article 2 of the
INT'L LAW ASS'N, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF

Helsinki Rules,

art. 1i (1967). For a discussion of various aspects of this concept
see L. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN I HISTORY AND LAW (1967); U.N., Integrated River
Basin Development, U.N. Doc. E/3066/Rev. 1 (1970); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS

DRAINAGE BASINS (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967); Developments

in the Field of Natural Resources-Water, Energy and Minerals-Technicaland Economic Aspects of International River Basin Development, U.N. Doc. E/C.7/35 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as The 1972 U.N. Report]; U.N. Secretary-General's Supplementary Report, Legal Problems Relating to the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/274 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1-2 The 1974 Supplementary Report of the Secretary-General]; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Legal
and Institutional Aspects of International Water Resources Development,
Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Legal Aspects, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The 1975 U.N. Panel of Experts Report];
Boume, The Development of International Water Resources: The "Drainage Basin
Approach", 47 CAN. B. REv. 62 (1969); Menon, Water Resources Development of International Rivers With Special Reference to the Developing World, 9 INT'L LAW 441
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Menon].
16. U.N. Assessment of the World Water Situation at 6.
17. The 1975 UN. Panel of Experts Report at 9.
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when two or more states, sharing uses of international water
resources, establish a regime to regulate or govern such uses,
the scope of such a regime would, barring special agreements,
extend to the entire basin."5
The next step beyond the international drainage basin
concept is the international water resources system concept.
The latter concept allows the optimal utilization of all water
resources, for the concept encompasses "a complete transnational, non-maritime hydrosystem"' 9 by recognizing: (1) the
value and functioning of all portions of the hydrologic
cycle-surface water, groundwater, and atmospheric water; (2)
international frozen water resources including glaciers and
polar ice; and (3) the many interrelationships which exist
among various natural and human resources affected by such
a system.'
Figure I. Hydrologic cycle

,_,

,,, _/j/

r~f

-.

Source: THE WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA: COMPENDIUM OF USEFUL INFORMATION ON
WATER RESOURcES 59 (D. Todd ed. 1970), cited in U.N. Doc. St/ESA/5, at 13 (1975).

18. Id. For an illustration of special agreements see id. at 48-54. But see Bourne,
supra note 15, at 83-87.

19. The 1975 U.N. Panel of Experts Report at 12.
19.1. Id. at 12-15. Figure 1 illustrates the hydrologic cycle.
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The major impetus for evolving legal norms and institutional structures on the uses of international watercourses can
be traced to the growing awareness and realization among
states sharing international watercourses of their common interest in rational utilization and optimal development of these
water resources.0 In turn, these norms and institutions influence and shape policies affecting (1) water balance efficiency,
and (2) mechanisms for regulating a balanced demand/supply
relationship when supply is scarce.'
However, despite a significant trend toward cooperative
action by states on international watercourses, which has
already "reached international solutions in about 20
[international river] basins" and in about 300 related bilateral
and multilateral treaties," states are still split on the appropriate scope of the definition of an international watercourse for
the purpose of studying the legal aspects of the uses and pollution of such waters. 3 In reply to a recent International Law
Commission questionnaire, several states expressed opposition to the use of an international drainage basin concept as the
appropriate basis for a study of the legal aspects both of nonnavigational uses and the pollution of international watercourses. 5 Poland suggested that "from the legal point of view
one cannot speak of the unity of the international drainage
basin extending on the territory of more than one State until
the States of this basin will not recognize the restriction of their
26
territorial sovereignty on internal waters under their control.
20. Such a growing awareness and realization is reflected in a large number of
recent agreements on the subject among nation states. See, e.g., 1 The 1974 Supplementary Report of the Secretary General at 79-183; U.N. Secretary-General's Report,
Legal Problems Relatingto the Utilization and Use of InternationalRivers, Pt. II, U.N.
Doc. A/5409 (1963), which is conveniently contained in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N Pt. II,
at 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part 2) (1974) [hereinafter cited as The
1963 Report of the Secretary-General, citation to pages being to the 1974 INT'L L.
COMM'N YEARBOOK]; U.N., Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the
Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963).
21. U.N. Assessment of the World Water Situation at 52-53.
22. Supra note 20; The 1972 UN. Report at 13.
23. Report of the 28th Session of Int'l L. Comm'n at 376-78.
24. The Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of International Watercourses at 8-9,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/294 (1976).
25. Id. at 14 (Austria); 15-16, 35, 42 (Brazil); 17, 35 (Columbia); 18, 36, 42-43
(Ecuador); 27-28, 39-40, 45 (Poland); and 28-29 (Spain).
26. Id. at 39.
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Acknowledging that the existence of a clear trend is
"manifest in the legalizing of the river basin as the basis for
cooperation" between the member basin states,2 7 a commentator has recently noted that most existing international river
institutions "have authority only to advise and supervise the
execution of waterworks already approved," 28 and are unable to
initiate water resource projects.
What legal norms and what kind of institutions can encourage, facilitate, and accelerate integrated aproaches to international watercourse management and development is a
useful inquiry. The first step which will be attempted here is
to outline in the next section the trends in decision; this will
be followed by an appraisal of these trends and a few concluding recommendations.

III.

TRENDS IN DECISION

Although legal rules to regulate and govern the use of
water have existed since ancient times and civilizations,29 the
development of international water law can be traced back only
to the end of World War I when peace treaties declared many
European rivers to be international. 30 These treaties in many
instances contained provisions concerning the regimes not only
for the regulation of navigational uses of such rivers but also
for their non-navigational uses. 3 1 However, during the last 50
years, international law has played an increasingly influential
role in dealing with questions pertaining to water resources. A
brief sketch of this more recent development follows.
A. General Conventions
The first treaty on the subject was adopted by a General
Conference on Freedom of Communications and Transit, convened in 1921 at Barcelona under the auspices of the League
of Nations.2 The Conference also adopted a Statute on the
regime of navigable waterways of international concern.3 3 Al27. Teclaff, The Influence of Recent Trends in Water Legislation on the Structure
and Functions of Water Administration, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 2 (1974).
28. Id. at 3.
29. Menon at 443 n. 4-9.
30. The 1975 U.N. Panel of Experts Report at 21-22.
31. The 1963 Report of the Secretary-General at 57-61.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id.
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though both the Convention and the Statute, which entered
into force in 1922, are primarily concerned with navigation,
they contain provisions regarding the utilization and use of
34
rivers for non-navigational purposes as well.
The following year, the League of Nations convened the
Second General Conference on Freedom of Communications
and Transit which adopted a convention on the development
of hydraulic power affecting two or more states. 35 The convention formulated principles to accomplish the goal of
"facilitating the exploitation and increasing the yield of hydraulic power. ' 36 Although the Conference did not require a
state party to reach agreement with other states to ensure the
hydroelectric development of an international river, it did provide "principles by means of which the interested States may
negotiate and come to an agreement with a view to developing
international rivers for the generation of hydro-electric
37
power."
B. Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Conventions
The latest United Nations reports 3 list more than 300
agreements between and among states. However, more than
half the treaties listed are in Europe and, while 23 of a total of
45 European basins are covered by treaties, only 38 of the 155
basins located in Africa, the Americas, and Asia have become
39
the subject of international compacts.
One can surmise that this lopsided development in Europe
is to a large measure attributable to industrialization and the
resulting common interest and need perceived by European
nations to enter into cooperative agreements, initially on navigational aspects of international rivers and subsequently on
non-navigational uses of international water resources. With
industrialization, a similar pressure for more extensive use and
development of international water resources is likely to be felt
in other regions as well. As a result, the need will be increasingly felt to enter into cooperative agreements both on regional
34. Id. at 60-61.
35. Id. at 57.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id.
38. Supra notes 20-21.
39. The 1972 U.N. Report, Annex VI, at 21. For a discussion of selected bilateral
and regional agreements see Nanda, The Establishment of InternationalStandardsfor
TransnationalEnvironmental Injury, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1089, 1101-08 (1975).
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and bilateral levels. Three recent developments portend this
direction: (1) in the post-World War II period, especially during the last two decades, a large number of multilateral treaties
have been signed in Africa, the Americas, and in Europe; 0 (2)
many recent multilateral conventions extend the scope of their
coverage to the entire basins of international water resources
in question; 4 and (3) at least a few such conventions, such as
the Senegal River Basin Authority, have set up institutions
capable not only of settling disputes but also of providing the
needed initiative and leadership in the management of interna2
tional water resources.
C. Intergovernmental Organizations
A large number of intergovernmental organizations have
been actively associated with various aspects of the uses of
international watercourses. These organizations include the
United Nations under whose auspices several international
conferences, such as the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment,43 the 1976 Conference on the Habitat," and the 1977
Water Conference,45 have studied various aspects of the problem. The United Nations Economic and Social Council and its
subsidiary bodies have prepared several useful studies and reports regarding the development and utilization of water resources.4
The U.N. Secretariat itself took the lead in 1968 in assembling an interdisciplinary panel of experts to study the legal
and institutional aspects of international water resources development. 47 The Panel, which was composed of economists,
engineers, lawyers, public administration specialists, and exec40. Supra note 20.
41. Treaties on the Senegal River basin, the Niger basin, the Chad basin, and the
River Plate basin provide recent examples. See 1 The 1974 Supplementary Report of
the Secretary-General at 79-83, 87-88.
42. See generally Parnall & Utton, The Senegal Valley Authority: A Unique Experiment in InternationalRiver Basin Planning, 51 IND. L.J. 235 (1976).
43. See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).
44. The Conference met in Vancouver, Canada, from May 31 to June 11, 1976.
For a report of the Conference see U.N. Doc. A/CONF./70/15 (1976).
45. The Conference took place from March 14-25, 1977. The Work Programme of
the Conference is contained in U.N. Doc. E/C.7/SR.96 (1976).
46. 2 The 1974 Supplementary Report of the Secretary-Generalat 190-212.
47. The 1975 UN. Panel of Experts Report at iii.
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utives from different parts of the world, held sessions in 1968
and 1969.11 These sessions were also attended by participants
from interested U.N. agencies. 49 The resulting Panel Report is
an impressive document containing specific proposals.Y° Countries seeking help on the issue of international water resources
planning will find the report of considerable assistance.
Among the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)5 ' and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO)52 have shown special concern for the problem. In 1972 the FAO legal office prepared a
draft agreement on water utilization and conservation in the
Lake Chad Basin.5 3 WMO is presently conducting two studies:
(1) on the effects of salinity caused by the erection of dams and
other watercourse structures; and (2) on the thermal pollution
of waters caused by effluents from energy-producing installations.5 4 Additionally, the World Health Organization has conducted a comparative survey of health legislation on the control of water pollution,55 and, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency, it convened in 1969 a panel of
experts which prepared a report on the pollution of fresh waters
by radioactive material." The report makes specific recommendations to "control the quantities of radioactive materials
passing from one country to another." 57
As early as 1933, the American states adopted the Declaration of Montivideo on the industrial and agricultural use of
international rivers at the Seventh Inter-American Conference. 8 The Declaration, applicable to both contiguous and successive rivers, conditions the exercise of a state's "right to exploit, for industrial or agricultural purposes, the margin which
is under their jurisdiction of the waters of international rivers
. . . upon the necessity of not injuring the equal right due to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 3.
Id., Annex I, at 187.
Specific proposals are contained in id. at 181-84.
See 2 The 1974 Supplementary Report of the Secretary-Generalat 216-22.
See id. at 223.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223-25.
Id. at 225.
The 1963 Report of the Secretary-General,Annex I(A) at 212.
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the neighboring State on the margin under its jurisdiction." ' ,
Thus no state "may, without the consent of the other riparian
State, introduce into watercourses of an international character, for the industrial or agricultural exploitation of their waters, any alteration which may prove injurious to the margin
of the other interested State."10 It provides for joint action pertaining to studies regarding the utilization of such waters,"'
prior consultation between and among riparian states on the
projects contemplated on these waters,"2 reparation and compensation,6 and dispute settlement mechanisms.64 Subsequent
reports, declarations, and resolutions adopted in the Western
Hemisphere on the use of international watercourses include:
(1) a 1941 resolution concerning the establishment of joint
technical commissions to study the hydrographic system of the
River Plate; 5 (2) a 1965 draft convention on the industrial and
agricultural use of international rivers and lakes, prepared by
the Inter-American Judicial Committee; 6 (3) a 1966 resolution
on control and economic utilization of hydrographic basins and
streams in Latin America, adopted by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council;67 and (4) various declarations and
resolutions adopted by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay pertaining to their joint efforts for the development of the Plate Basin, including the 1971 Act of Asuncion.8
The Inter-American practices may be highlighted by noting a few provisions from the 1965 draft convention and the
1971 Act of Asuncion. Articles 5 and 6 of the draft convention
read:
5. The utilization of the waters of an international river or lake
for industrial or agricultural purposes must not prejudice the free
navigation thereof in accordance with the applicable legal rules,
or cause substantial injury, according to international law, to the
riparian States or alterations to their boundaries.
59. Id. art. 2.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 6.
62. Id. arts. 7-8.

63. Id. art. 3.
64. Id. arts. 9-10.

65. See The 1963 of the Secretary-General,Annex I(B) at 212.
66. See 2 The 1974 Supplementary Report of the Secretary-Generalat 264.
67. See id. at 267.
68. See 1 id. at 173-79.
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6. In cases in which the utilization of an international river or
lake results or may result in damage or injury to another interested State, the consent of that interested State shall be required,
as well as the payment or indemnification for any damage or
harm done, when such is claimed."

Articles 1 and 2 of the Act of Asuncion provide:
1. In contiguous international rivers, which are under dual sovereignty, there must be a prior bilateral agreement between the
riparian States before any use is made of the waters.
2. In successive international rivers, where there is no dual sovereignty, each State may use the waters in accordance with its
needs provided that it causes no appreciable damage to any other
State of the Basin. 0

Intergovernmental efforts in Africa and Asia have resulted
in (1) a 1961 report, adopted at the first Inter-African Conference on Hydrology in Nairobi,' which called for the establishment of effective consultation mechanisms, especially regarding the River Niger and Lake Chad," and (2) the 1973 draft
propositions on the law of international rivers formulated
under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee,7 3 which accepted the concept of an international
drainage basin "except as may be provided otherwise by convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin
states."' The draft propositions define the international drainage basin area as "a geographical area extending over two or
more states determined by the watershed limits of the system
of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing
' They
into a common terminus."75
accept the principle of equitable utilization, require a state to "act in good faith in the
exercise of its rights on the waters of an international drainage
basin in accordance with the principles governing good
neighbourly relations, ' 77 prefer consumptive uses over other
competing uses, 7 provide for prior consultation, and for inter69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Supra note 66, at 265-66.
Supra note 68, at 179.
See The 1963 Report of the Secretary-Generalat 217.
Id. at 218.
See supra note 66, at 226.

74. Proposition I, id. at 227.
75. Proposition 11(1), id. at 228.

76. Proposition

m, id.

77. Proposition IV(1), id. at 228-29.
78. Proposition V, id. at 229.
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national arbitration and adjudication as dispute settlement
mechanisms, 9 and impose state responsibility on violating
states with injunctive and compensatory remedies.8
European efforts, which have centered around water pollution problems, include: (1) the report of the 1961 Geneva Conference on Water Pollution Problems in Europe; 81 (2) a 1965
report on fresh water pollution control in Europe submitted to
the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, 2 and a resulting recommendation adopted by the Assembly, calling upon
member states to undertake joint action;81 (3) the 1967 European Water Charter, 4 which calls for international cooperation
"to conserve the quality and quantity of water," since water
"knows no frontiers," and calls for the management of water
resources to be based on their natural drainage basins rather
than on political and administrative boundaries;" and (4) a
1969 draft European Convention on the Protection of Fresh
Water against Pollution, 7 which has been further refined in a
1974 draft." It should be noted that the 1974 draft defines an
international watercourse as "any watercourse, canal or lake
which separates or passes through the territories of two or more
States,"89 and prohibits or restricts the "discharge into the waters of international hydrographic basins of any of the
[enumerated] dangerous or harmful substances."90 It contains
elaborate provisions on joint action including negotiations, 9"
joint agreements, 2 the setting of standards, 3 the establishment

of appropriate commissions," and dispute settlement
mechanisms." Finally, the 1971 recommendation of the Con79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Proposition X, id. at 230.
Proposition IX, id.
Supra note 71, at 218.
Supra note 66, at 230-34.
Id. at 235-39.
Id. at 239-42.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 243-50.
Id. at 251-61.
Art. 1(a), id. at 252.
Art. 5(1), id. at 253.
Art. 12, id. at 255.
Arts. 12, 14, id. at 255-56.
Art. 4(1)(b), Appendix I, id. at 253, 259.
Arts. 15, 16, id. at 256-57.
Arts. 20, 22, Appendix A, id. at 258, 260-61.
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sultative Assembly, calling for urgent action by all the countries bordering on the River Rhine, concerning the pollution of
the Rhine Valley watertable should be noted."
D. Nongovernmental Organizations
Among scholarly and professional associations which have
studied the uses of international watercourses, perhaps the one
most widely known for its work in this field is the International
Law Association." The Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers adopted at the Fifty-Second Conference
of the Association at Helsinki in 1966,11 known as the Helsinki
Rules, contain the "key principle" that "[elach basin State
is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international
drainage basin."" What is a "reasonable and equitable share
: . . is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors
in each particular case."' 00 Some relevant factors are enumerated for illustrative purposes.10' According to the Rules, a "use
or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference
over any other use or category of uses.' ' 02 In addition to providing rules for the equitable utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin,' 3 the Helsinki Rules cover many other
areas such as pollution,'' navigation,'05 and timber floating.' 6
They also provide for dispute settlement mechanisms.'0 Since
the Helsinki Conference, the Association has been actively
pursuing the study of
certain selected aspects of water resources law [such as] underground waters; the relationship of water to other natural resources; domestic uses of water; hydraulic uses of water, including the generation of power and irrigation; flood control and silta96. See id. at 262-63.
97. For a summary of the work of the International Law Associaton in this field
see supra note 71, at 202-208; supra note 66, at 287-304.
98. INT'L LAW ASS'N, HELSINKI RuLEs ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL
RIvERS (1967). The Helsinki Rules are contained in supra note 66, at 288-94.
99. Art. IV, supra note 66, at 288.
100. Art. V(1), id.
101. Art. V(2), id. at 288-89.
102. Art. VI, id. at 289.
103. Ch. 2, arts. IV-VII, id. at 288-90.

104. Ch. 3, arts. IX-XI, id. at 290.
105. Ch. 4, arts. XH-XX, id. at 290-91.
106. Ch. 5, arts. XXI-XXV, id. at 291.
107. Ch. 6, arts. XXVI-XXXVII, id. at 292-94.
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tion; regulation of water flow; detailed rules on the navigation of
rivers; and further consideration of the subject of pollution of
coastal areas and enclosed seas.'"

The work is being done by the Association's Committee on
International Water Resources Law. 109 One of the Committee's
six working groups, the Working Group on Management of
International Waters, was set up to study legal aspects concerning: (1) obligation (if any) to establish international administration; (2) functions, powers, and composition of international management; (3) economic and financial problems of
international management; (4) questions concerning the constitutional requirements of certain states to accept the binding
force of the decisions of international management; and (5)
national water legislation of the co-basin states regarding the
use of water under international management."' Earlier, in
1958, the Committee on the Uses of Waters of International
Rivers of the American Branch of the Association asserted a
principle of law that a riparian "is under a duty to refrain from
increasing the level of pollution of a system of international
waters to the substantial detriment of a co-riparian."'
Among other similar groups, the Institute of International
Law and the Inter-American Bar Association have also studied
the questions pertaining to the uses of international waterways
and have made specific recommendations." 2 For instance, the
Institute of International Law decided as early as 1910 to study
the question of "determining the rules of international law relating to international rivers from the point of view of the utilization of their energy.""' The following year, the Institute
adopted a resolution on "international regulations regarding
the use of international watercourses.""' Fifty years later, in
108. Id. at 295.
109. For a report on the work of the Committee see id. at 294-304.

110. Id. at 300-02.
111. COMMITrEE ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INT'L RIVERS OF THE AMERIcAN
BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USES
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVEs xii (1958).
112. For a summary of the work of these organizations see 3 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 921-24, 929-30 (1964); supra note 71, at 199-202, 208-09; supra

note 66, at 283-86.
113. Supra note 71, at 199.
114. Id. at 200.
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1961, at its Salzburg session the Institute adopted a resolution
on utilization of non-maritime international waters (except for
navigation)."" The principle of equitable utilization is recognized' 5 and provisions are contained (1) for prior notice before
undertaking "works or utilizations of the waters of a watercourse or hydrographic basin which seriously affect the possibility of utilization of the same waters by other States,"'"1 6 (2)
for adequate compensation for any loss or damage," 7 and (3)
for settlement of disputes."' Similar principles are outlined in
9
a 1957 resolution of the Inter-American Bar Association,'
which also created a Permanent Committee on the Law Governing the Uses of International Rivers.2 0 At the 16th Conference of the Association, held at Caracas in November 1969, the
Association adopted a resolution recommending that "the laws
of the American countries on the industrial and agricultural
utilization of rivers and lakes be unified or harmonized in order
' 2
to avoid international controversies." ' '
E. The InternationalLaw Commission Study
Pursuant to a General Assembly resolution of December 8,
1970,' that the International Law Commission should study
the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses with a view to its progressive development and codifi'
cation, and the Assembly resolution of December 3, 1971, 23
recommending that the Commission give priority to the topic,
the Commission appointed a Subcommittee and subsequently
24
a special rapporteur to deal with the question.'
In its report to the Commission,' 25 the Subcommittee
noted that the recent studies on the subject, as well as the more
recent treaties and state practices, showed the use of varying
114.1. Id. at 202.
115. Arts. 2-4, id.
116. Arts. 4-5, id.
117. Art. 4, id.
118. Arts. 6-9, id.
119. See id. at 208.
120. See id. at 208-09.
121. Supra note 66 at 286.
122. G.A. Res. 2669, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 127, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
123. G.A. Res. 2780, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
124. For a report on the Commission's response to the General Assembly's recommendations see Report of the 28th Session of Int'l L. Comm 'n at 367-69.
125. See [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N Pt. 1, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.
A/1974/Add.1 (Part 1) (1974).

1976

INT'L LAW AND

ORGANIZATIONS

terms to determine the scope of "international watercourses."
These terms include "river basin," "drainage basin,"
"international drainage basin," "hydrographic basin," and
"successive and contiguous international rivers" as a basis for
the solution of legal problems.' In view of these variations in
practice and theory, showing that the term "international watercourses" lacks "a sufficiently well-defined meaning to delimit, with any degree of precision, the scope of the work which
the Commission should undertake on the uses of fresh
water,"'' 7 the Subcommittee proposed that the Commission
request states to comment on the questions pertaining to: (1)
"the appropriate scope of the definition of an international
watercourse, in a study of the legal aspects" of fresh water uses
and of fresh water pollution; and (2) the geographical concept
of an international drainage basin as being the appropriate
basis for a study of the legal aspects of non-navigational uses,
2
as well as the pollution of international watercourses.' 1
State responses confirmed the Subcommittee's initial conclusion that there is a lack of consensus on the subject. 29 Several states preferred the traditional definition of an international river, as contained in the Final Act of the Congress of
Vienna of June 9, 1815-that international watercourses are
those which separate or cut across the territory of two or more
states.13 However, several states supported the Commission's
adoption of the concept of the drainage basin to determine the
32
scope of its work,'"' while others expressed some reservations.'
A similar variation in the view of states was evident during
the course of the subsequent discussion of the subject in July
1976 at the Commission's 28th Session.13 While many members supported the traditional definition of an international
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
Id.
The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 13-47,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/294 (1976).
130. See, e.g., id. at 15 (Brazil); 17 (Columbia); 20 (Federal Republic of Germany); and 27 (Poland).
131. Id. at 13-14 (Argentina); 15 (Barbados); 19 (Finland); 26 (Pakistan); 26 (Philippines); 30 (Sweden); and 30-31 (United States of America).
132. Id. at 21-25 (Hungary); and 31-32 (Venezuela).
133. See Report of the 28th Session of Int'l L. Comm'n at 385-87.
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river embodied in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 3 1
one member suggested that the subject was not yet "ripe for
codification because experience was rapidly accumulating and
scientific progress was opening many doors, with the result that
it was impossible to predict new developments in irrigation and
the proper economic uses of water."' 1 5 He warned against making generalizations at this stage. Another member suggested
that since river basins varied considerably-encompassing very
limited or very large portions of the territory of a state or parts
of the territory of different states, some of them covering areas
as huge as the Amazon Basin and the River Plate Basin, which
cover areas of 4,787,000 square kilometers and 2.4 million kilometers respectively-there could not be a serious contention
"that the Commission had the authority to formulate rules
that would be valid for the whole of such huge areas, imposing
a kind of dual or multiple sovereignty."'' 6
In its deliberations the Commission was influenced by the
following comments contained in the Subcommittee report:
Almost all of the States responding recognized, either expressly or implicitly, that the purpose of a definition of international watercourses should be to provide a context for examination of the legal problems that arise when two or more States are
present in the same fresh water system and that a definition
should not ineluctably bring with it corollary requirements as to
the manner in which those legal problems should be solved. Thus
some States objected to use of the drainage basin concept because they considered that its use implied the existence of certain
principles, especially in the field of river management. Other
States considered that traditional concepts such as contiguous
and successive waterways would be too restricted a basis on
which to carry out the study in view of the need to take account
of the hydrologic unity of a water system.
Consequently, it would seem wise for the Commission to
follow the advice proffered by a number of the commenting
States that the work on international watercourses should not be
held up by disputes over definitions. This approach is, of course,
in line with the customary practice of the Commission in deferring the adoption of definitions, or at the most adopting them on
134. Id. at 385.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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a provisional basis, pending the development of substantive provisions regarding the legal subject under review. 3 7

The Commission reached a general agreement that it need not
determine the range of the term "international watercourses"
at the outset of the work, and that, instead, it should begin
formulating general principles applicable to legal aspects of the
uses of these watercourses. 3 8 On the nature of these principles
it was agreed that
every effort should be made to devise rules which would maintain
a delicate balance between those which were too detailed to be
generally applicable and those which were so general that they
would not be effective. Further, the rules should be designed to
promote the adoption of regimes for individual international rivers and for that reason should have a residual character. Effort
should be devoted to making the rules as widely acceptable as
possible and the sensitivity of States regarding their interests in
water must be taken into account.'"

On the Subcommittee's recommendation, the Commission
had also sought state responses to the question of what uses
should be included in the study. 4 " The suggested Subcommittee outline, containing the following three items, was generally
endorsed: (1) agricultural uses-irrigation, drainage, waste disposal, and aquatic food production; (2) economic and commercial uses-energy production, manufacturing, construction,
transportation other than navigation, timber floating, waste
disposal, and extractive; and (3) domestic and social
uses-consumptive, waste disposal, and recreational.' However, the list was supplemented by proposals to include commercial fishing, gravel extraction, aquatic food control, stockraising, pollution from inland shipping, sediment discharge,
forestry, and heat dissipation.' There was general agreement
that (1) flood control, erosion problems, and sedimentation be
included in the Commission study4 3 and (2) the interaction
between the uses of international watercourses for navigational
and other purposes had to be taken into account.' Thirteen
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Cited in id. at 382.
See id. at 387.
Id.
See id. at 373-74.
Id. at 378, 388.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 388.

Id.

258

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:239

out of twenty states responding to the question whether the
Commission should give priority to the problem of pollution
answered that the question of uses should be taken up first;'
six suggested that pollution problems should be taken up
first;' 6 while suggestions were made to study these problems
simultaneously." 7 The Commission decided to study the pollution problems to the extent possible in connection with the
particular uses that give rise to the pollution." 8
IV. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It seems that although the interplay over a period of the
last several decades between customary practices and specific
multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaties has resulted in
some broad, general guidelines on the use of international
watercourses, no cohesive body of rules has yet been widely
accepted by states. At the basis of these guidelines lies the
Roman maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (one must
so use his own not to do injury to others). Implicit in the acceptance of this maxim is the rejection of the absolute territorial sovereignty theory," 9 a classical example of which is
United States Attorney-General Harmon's assertion in 1895 of
U.S. claims against Mexico in a conflict concerning the utilization of the Rio Grande.'" According to this theory, a state's
rights as an upper riparian over water within its jurisdiction are
unlimited since it has absolute territorial sovereignty under
international law. Thus it would be held to be unaccountable
to the co-riparian for the use of those waters in a manner that
adversely affected the latter. Additionally, the generally accepted guideline-reasonable and equitable utilization of waters-implicitly rejects the territorial integrity theory,' 5' according to which a lower riparian is entitled to demand the
continuation of the natural flow of waters from upstream.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 379.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 388.
For a discussion of the various theories see Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAiNAGE BASINs, supra note 15, at 18; Menon at 445-46.
See also Witaschek, International Control of River Water Pollution, 2 DENVER J. INT'L
L. & POL. 35 (1972).
150. The statement is contained in 21 Op. Ayr'y GEN. 274, 283 (1895).
151. Supra note 149.
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Under this theory, no interruption, augmentation, or diminution of the flow would be permitted.
However, while there seems to be consensus that territorial
sovereignty and integrity have to be limited, no generally
agreed formulation exists of the criteria to be used in weighing
and balancing the co-riparian's interests. The often-used prescription-prohibition from causing substantial damage or injury to a co-riparian 'l-is negative, again lacking precision.
A recommendation that the community interest be a guiding principle in determining the use of international waterways
was made by a member of the International Law Commission
at the most recent discussion of the subject by the Commission.
The member reportedly
stressed that sovereignty was not a basis for dealing with the uses
of international watercourses. The Commission must realize that
there was another principle of international law to which it
should attach greater importance, namely, the principle of the
development of international law in the direction of a social law
dealing with the delimitation of competence and sovereignty and
with the interests of the international community as a whole in
using all natural resources for the benefit of all mankind.In

The Commission felt the need to further explore legal concepts,
such as abuse of rights, good faith, good neighborliness, and
humanitarian treatment, in the elaboration of legal rules for
water use. 54
If the community approach to international watercourses
were to be generally accepted, adequate institutional arrangements would be needed to give effect to this approach. Clearly,
the nature of the institutional structures which would bring
about integrated management of international water resources
will vary with their purposes, states' capabilities, and various
economic, political, and social factors. However, there are
many similarities and general patterns in several experiments
to date which could offer lessons for future development. Examples both among developed and developing states where
152. The prescription prohibiting "substantial injury" in the territory of a cobasin state is contained in art. X(1)(a) of the Helsinki Rules, supra note 66, at 290.
The term "substantial damage" is used in Proposition VIII of the draft propositions
prepared by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, id., at 229.
153. Supra note 133, at 387.
154. Id.
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agreements have been reached on the utilization of water re-

sources include the following international watercourses: the
Danube, Rhine, Indus, Moselle, Niger, Senegal, Columbia,
Chad, Plate, the Great Lakes, and
Nile, Mekong, Rio Grande,
55
St. Lawrence waters.

In commenting recently on the inadequacy of the many
existing institutional arrangements to provide for a rational
and coordinated development of water resources, Professors
Parnall and Utton have noted that "the inability of river basin
organizations to make decisions and to draw up resource management plans that have at least some binding effect on the
member basin states is probably the single most important
weakness of the majority of international river organiza-

tions."''

6

They relate the example of an international water-

course institution which is modeled on the concept of inte-

grated river basin development, l'Organisation Pour la Mise en
Valeur du Fleuve Senegal (OMVS).' 57 An appraisal of the
structure of the OMVS has led them to suggest that
"[p]erhaps uniquely, the OMVS is endowed with [the]
5 8
highly desirable planning and management authority,'

1

which is a prerequisite for the optimal management of the international watercourse resources within the jurisdiction of
such an authority. Of course such development presumes joint
action by states treating the basin as a geoeconomic unit. And
the establishment of an institution with the kind of jurisdiction, functions, and authority enjoyed by the OMVS presumes
that basin states have balanced their interests between following the traditional notion of national sovereignty and opting for
rational utilization and optimal development of the international basin resources, and have chosen the latter.
To accomplish the objective of optimal development and
155. Institutional arrangements of multipartite and bipartite commissions established for some of these watercourses are contained in supra note 66, at 270-81. See

also Israel & Zupkus, Model Statute: InternationalDrainageBasin Pollution Control,
2 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 89 (1972).
156. Parnall & Utton, supra note 42, at 236. See also Menon, The Lower Mekong
River Basin-Some Proposalsfor the Establishment of a Development Authority, 6
INT'L LAW. 796 (1972); Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13 NAT. RES. J. 382
(1973); Israel & Zupkus, supra note 155.
157. Supra note 42.
158. Id. at 253-54.
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utilization, it is essential to investigate the basin resources, to
collect scientific data, and to know the potential benefits before
any planning is undertaken for joint, coordinated action. These
joint actions will usually take the form of basin-wide programs
and multi-purpose projects.' Of course, at the basis of such
efforts lies the concept of community interest, which implies
the equality of all basin states in the use of the whole of the
course of the river, without any discrimination or preference of
any one state in relation to others. To finance specific projects
the assistance of U.N. organizations, such as the U.N. Development Program and various U.N. specialized agencies, regional
and bilateral economic commissions, and financing institutions, should be actively explored.
The building of new institutional arrangements or the upgrading of existing ones requires taking into account necessary
technical information and the political and legal framework.
Beginning with the establishment of consultation mechanisms,
nations may create permanent joint agencies, undertake joint
construction programs, and reach agreements on many important issues such as customs, immigration, labor, taxation, and
dispute settlement mechanisms.10 Such joint agencies could be
linked with the United Nations and its various specialized
agencies and commissions. The common interest in the optimal utilization of international waters demands a definite
worldwide move toward integrated basin management, administration, and development. The development of appropriate
legal norms by the International Law Commission and the establishment of more institutional structures on the model of
the OMVS will facilitate and accelerate this desirable trend.
159. See generally The.1975 UN. Panel of Experts Report, at 92-143, 174-84.
160. Id.

Global Water Law Systems and Water Control
GEORGE E. RADOSEVICH*
I.

WATER LAW

Water is a fundamental natural resource with complex
characteristics. The ability to apply water for beneficial uses
is as much subject to natural laws of the physical universe as
the laws of human institutions. The greatest benefit from water
is derived when it is used in combination with other natural
resources (soil, mineral, or vegetative) and economic resources
(labor and capital). The more efficiently it can be used in combination with other resources, whether by technological or institutional innovation, the greater the benefit to the water user
and to society.
A quick review of water activities around the globe clearly
indicates that this resourse has rapidly become one of the critical elements in determining local, national, and regional
growth. In the past three decades, particularly the last five
years, the trend has been away from treating water as a free
good, subject to nearly unrestricted control, to a recognition of
the resource as a capital commodity whose spatial and temporal availability dictate policy formulation and new directions
in both macro and micro planning and development. Nations
in all stages of development have accorded control and management of water resources a high priority.
Water laws are an expression of policy. Substantive provisions dealing with the use and development of water resources
are the basis for establishing rules and regulations to implement the law. The underlying philosophy of each particular
system of water law has a direct connection to the surrounding
physical factors of its origin. Where water is plentiful, regulation is aimed at ameliorating the harmful effects of water
(floods, salination, etc.). Where water is scarce, however, regulation is aimed at ensuring an adequate supply by providing,
for example, that water is not owned by any one individual,
* Associate Professor of Water Law & Economics, Colorado State University;
Director, International Conference on Global Water Law Systems, Valencia, Spain,
Sept. 1975.
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but, rather, is owned collectively so that all might use what is
available.
Over time distinct regional or national systems emerged
which reflect particular physical conditions and social goals.
Elaborate water laws and administrative systems evolved
where the greatest needs and most serious natural constraints
existed. Through adoption or imposition many of these sytems
have also influenced or directed water use and control in other
countries or regions. While retaining many of the basic characteristics of the original system, these variations have incorporated modifications to meet indigenous conditions. (See
figure 1.)

~p

Figure I

A Descriptive Map of Proposed Examination of Major
and Their Variations or Paths of Influence(-- ,. (This
Description but Only Indicative Categorizations.)

)
Legal Systems (C
is not an Exhaustive

Water laws must be dynamic and should be the product
of evolutionary processes. However, the water laws and organizational structures that at one point in time were designed to
be solutions to particular problems often become the problem
at a later time. Through inflexibility-lack of explicit policy
provisions and gaps in subjects included-constraints to the
introduction of new technologies and improved water management practices frequently emerge. Three key issues, in light of
needed changes in the law, impede water resources optimization: (1) allocation and reallocation of water supplies; (2) integration of water quantity and quality control; and (3) management and conjunctive use of ground and surface waters.

1976

GLOBAL WATER LAW SYSTEMS

Past practices have, in many countries, created vested
rights in the continued use of a source of water. In most cases,
efficiency in transmission by the purveyor of water (which may
be the sovereign) or the user of the supply is low, due to costs
of reducing seepage, evapotranspiration, percolation, and other
system losses. The tasks facing most water decision makers are
now more related to water reallocation than allocation, and
how this can be done with a minimum of social disruption.
The problems and pressures are not only at the micro levels, but exist at the macro (policy and program) levels as well.
Policies toward development and water resource use of one
nation have a consequence upon its neighbors where such
neighbors are hydrologically connected. A well-known example
is the impact on Northwestern Mexico from the western reclamation policies of the United States. Further, technology has
not only provided more efficient and effective means for using
water in or out of the natural basin regime, but has also placed
an additional task upon decision makers to prepare programs
and promulgate laws and regulations with scientific awareness.
Projections in water demands, as many proclaim, should
not remain bleak if rational remedial action is taken. It is not
a matter of reaching a plateau of subsistence with our water
supply. There is little reason why the development, use, and
management of available resources cannot take place harmoniously with an enhanced quality of life if decisions executed and
legal controls enacted are systematically made.
Water law and administration consist of a wide variety of
alternative approaches which have evolved over time and
under different demand situations. Identifying a set of these
major systems provides the decision maker with a spectrum of
alternative doctrinal and organizational approaches. These can
be of value in preparing proposed legal machinery or evaluating
present effectiveness in light of potential changes.
In September 1975, a conference was convened in Valencia, Spain to systematically describe and analyze the major
systems of water law in the world. Among the water law systems reviewed were the Spanish, French, British, Italian, Soviet, Hindu-Bali, Moslem, Latin American, Israeli, and the
variations found in both the United States and selected Asiatic
countries. The relationship of water law to the human and
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physical environment was discussed from the social, economic,
and technical perspectives. Presentations concerning national
water planning, drafting water codes, and bilateral and multilateral assistance available to developing countries in preparing or revising water codes and administrative arrangements
concluded the conference.
The following summary of selected systems of water law
and administration is based upon the reports prepared for the
conference.' These systems have been arranged into three categories: customary, traditional, and modern water law systems.

II.

SYSTEMS OF CUSTOMARY-RELIGIOUS BASE

These systems are represented by the Moslem system of
water law and the Subak system for water administration in
Bali, Indonesia. Both systems have in common their religious
origin. In both, water is treated as part of man's cosmogony.
Water is not subject to private appropriation in either system.
Water is the object of a right to use, not own, the corpus, with
the exception of the cases in which the Islamic law recognizes
private rights in waters. This recognition is limited to small
volumes of water contained in well-defined boundaries, such as
the water contained in a cistern.
The Islamic water law is not a national system of water law
in the western style.2 Rather, it is a system of religious and
traditional doctrines and uses. It goes beyond country boundaries pervading local customs. In turn, the religious element
which gives commonality to the system is influenced by the
particular uses of each place and locality. In this respect, it
should be stressed that Islam did respect local practices, as
long as they were not in opposition to the basic set of religious
rules. The basic egalitarian concept of Islam prevails throughout all aspects of Moslem water law and is easily identified in
the common water ownership and equitable apportionment
principles of the law. Water is spread, for example, to enable
all farmers to irrigate the maximum possible area of land. An1. For the complete text prepared by specialists in the various water law systems,
see 1-4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL WATER LAW SYSTEMS
(G. Radosevich, V. Giner, D. Daines, G. Skogerboe & E. Vlachos eds. 1976) (Colorado
State University, Fort Collins) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].

2. Maktari, Islamic Water Law, in 1 PROCEEDINGS at 295-308.
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other reason is that taxes are based on irrigated land. Water
rights are also attached to the land. With the spread of Islam,
concepts of common ownership, and equitable apportionment,
the appurtenancy principle and local administration spread to
Spain and to regions of North and South America.
Great rivers are absolutely common property. Small natural rivers are predominantly for the use of the riparian, and
artificial rivers are for the common use of those who dig them.
Surplus waters are to be always offered for the use of other
persons.
Water for irrigation is to be allocated on the basis of: (1)
the crops; (2) the season; and (3) the local customs and the
quality of the water. It is allocated by time and volume and the
order of preference is: (1) thirst; (2) domestic uses; (3) irrigation and commerce; and (4) industry.
Rules against abuse and waste pervade the use of the waters. Any member of the community can claim judicial redress
to establish or protect a water right. The most rational use of
wells is restricted because every person does have the right to
drill a well on his land, even when it affects the rights of other
water users.
Islamic principles on national or provincial water administration are not very relevant in that the law says very little
about high levels of administration. The Islamic law, as a prevailing system of belief and tradition, does not offer solutions
for centralization of water management; but it has had a fundamental influence at local levels, where it results in a local
authority controlling water rights. The administration and organization that does exist results from ancient customs. Local
water masters carry out water administration.
Another system of customary-religious based law that is
significant to local water use is the Subak.3 The Subak is the
traditional water management technique of Bali in the Indonesian Archipelago. It is based on the Hindu cosmogony. It survived the brief domination of Buddhist dynasties and was
modified only slightly by Islam, which reduced the unit for
water administration to the level of the village. The Subak
3. Wohlwend, Hindu Water Law and Administration, in 2 PROCEEDINGS at 536-
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included not only one, but several villages for the purpose of
water administration.
The Subak is basically a community of farmers that
irrigates. The common bond is irrigation, and, for this reason,
it encompasses several villages. The limits are not set by the
village boundaries but by the irrigated lands. It is governed by
rules of customary law.
Administration is through a Subak meeting (assembly)
which has sovereign water jurisdiction and whose decisions
are implemented by a chief water master. The latter is assisted
by deputies, by assistants, and by criers, who control, respectively, each subunit of the water network, the end of the
water network, and the distribution of water to individual
users.
Water can never become an element of appropriation. It
is subject only to the rights of use and is distributed in proportion to crop needs.
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN SYSTEMS
In Latin America there are two systems of water law.' The
first is the traditional system, influenced by the riparian system of France and by the system of the Spanish Water Law of
1879.
Second are the modern water laws, inspired by the principles of comprehensive water management under the control of
the state. These laws have attempted to translate principles of
water management into principles of water law. They are the
laws of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile.
The laws of each country in this vast region are easily the
topic of a regional conference, so it is preferable to quote part
of the abstract from the report by Dr. Joaquin Lopez to illustrate the range of differences that exist. It must be said that
Dr. Lopez did not feel comfortable with his description of the
Latin American systems even in a three hundred page report
because there are still topics of importance that were not included.
The countries of South and Central America which were
colonized by Spain and Portugal have a system of water law with
4. Lopez, Water Law and Water Administration in Latin America, in 3
PROCEEDINGS at

699-848.
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particular features. The judicial regulations of these countries
have similarity of principles, norms, institutions, origins and customary uses respect[ing] waters. The system was influenced by
the colonial legislation, the metropolitan legislation, the Civil
Code of France and the Constitution of the United States. The
laws for Indians, the laws of the "Siete Partidas" and the Spanish
water law of 1866 were also influential. In Brazil the metropolitan
legislation was constituted of several ordinances: the Alfonsianas
of 1447; the Manoelinas of 1521; and the Philipinas of 1603.
The different legal criteria between the Spanish and Brazilian legislations determined the existence of marked differences
between the system of the water law of Brazil and the system of
the water law of the other Iberoamerican countries.
In the former colonies of Spain prevailed the principle by
virtue of which the waters were common to all the people, modified in some degree by the principles of the French Civil Code;
in Brazil, instead, the riparian system, of French and Anglosaxon
ascendancy was followed.
Regarding their constitutional organization, some countries
adopted a federal regime, while others adopted unitarian systems
of government. Among the former, despite their federal systems,
there are some countries in which the domain of the waters and
the jurisdiction to regulate their use appertains to the Federal
Government; and there are other countries in which these attributions correspond to the provinces.
The administration in the unitarian countries is carried out
by decentralized national organisms, by autarchical entities, or
by the central government. In the federal countries there are
some which maintain centralized systems of legislation and administration of the waters; while in others the provinces are attributed broad faculties regarding water.5

The greatest problem in Latin America is the system for
the administration of water resources which, in most countries,
is highly fragmented. There are problems of interference and
duplication of functions. The problem is twofold: on the one
hand, lack of united decisionmaking processes; and, on the
other, lack of adequate input from the water users. There is a
significant lack of effective channels of communication from
the users to the highest levels of administration. In most of the
countries there is a lack of general coherent policies which,
translated to the water resources field, would give criteria for
5. Abstracts, in 1 PROCEEDINGS at 45.
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the guidance of the particular activities of each national water
agency.
Significant attempts to overcome these constraints are
represented in Mexico by united decisionmaking which is combined with the maximum possible user participation, in Cuba,
where there is an autonomous institute for water administration, and in Ecuador, which has implemented a comprehensive
scheme for water administration.
Water administration can be carried out by federal and
state agencies, as in Argentina, or at a centralized center of
autonomous decisions, as in Mexico. Attempts of regional
structures for water administration are carried out in Brazil,
where the input of the central government is very significant.
In Venezuela, an attempt for comprehensive planning and
management is at present being carried out. Peru has most of
the responsibility for water management delegated to the
General Directorate of Waters and Irrigation.
Examples of countries in which water administration is
divided among several institutions are Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In Chile, there is a proposal for the creation of an Institute
of Water Resources which would be charged with the coordination of all water resources activities.
There is a growing awareness in South America of the
importance of water resources for the developmental process.
There are serious attempts at implementation of new legal systems for the most correct management of the resource. There
are, however, difficulties created by the particular socioeconomic structures of the Latin American countries. The subject deserves special attention, for new legal codes cannot be
severed from the conditions of each country. If abstraction is
made of the facts, the seeds for failure will accompany any
intent of legal change. The law is not only an instrument for
the change of a particular socio-economic milieu, it is also a
consequence of it.
6
SELECT SYSTEMS OF WATER LAW IN EUROPE AND THE MID-

IV.

EAST

A brief summary follows of the system of water law in the
6.

For an analysis of the legal aspects of water quality management in Europe,

see R. JOHNSON & G. BROWN, CLEANING UP EUROPE'S WATERS (1976).
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United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, the Soviet Union, and
Israel. These systems were selected due to their global influence or unique and potentially transferable features. They
range from traditional to modern systems of water law.
In the United Kingdom statutory regulations have been
enacted in the public interest.7 England has placed a high
premium on water as resource needs have transformed the
plentiful commodity into an item of scarcity.
For this reason, common law has been substituted by
statutory law. The provisions which have evolved from traditional common to modern laws have been designed: (1) to
secure an adequate supply of water both in quantity and quality; (2) to satisfy all needs and prevent waste; (3) to secure
water quality and pollution control; (4) to promote flood control and land drainage; (5) to clean the rivers of the country;
(6) to assure recreational, wildlife, and fisheries opportunities;
and (7) to protect the interests of affected water users.
Under common law the rivers are considered in the public
domain and cannot be owned. Ownership is significant only in
relation to waterbeds. The beds of tidal rivers are owned by the
Crown. The use of water in riparian land is an incident of the
right of ownership. The quality and quantity of the water cannot be diminished, unless authorized by grant, statute, or prescription. Rights regarding artificial watercourses are always
acquired by grant or arrangement. Underground water can be
freely used, according to the English absolute-ownership rule.
Many changes were made in the common law after the enactment of the Water Resources Act of 1963 and its coming into
operation on July 1, 1965. It is now necessary to obtain a license
for the use of inland underground waters. Exceptions are given
for small abstractions, riparian domestic or agricultural uses,
and abstraction of underground water for household use. The
Act has substituted for the common law rights of the riparians
a system of compulsory licensing. Rights to the use of waters
are legally protected and administered. Water authorities are
given broad powers for the control of the use and abuse of water
rights. Under the common law, water was not to be impaired
7. Richardson, Systems of Water Law and Organizationin the United Kingdom,

in 2 PROCEEDINGS at 309-408.

272

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:263

in quality. Water pollution control laws have been enacted
which strengthen and further define the common law concept
in the context of new and projected uses.
The evolution of water administration in the United Kingdom is important in that it illustrates the dynamic growth and
maturation process of a national system of water law. From the
1945 and 1963 Water Resources Acts to the present 1973 and
1974 Acts, the concept of the river basin authorities has been
developed and tested under centralized to decentralized control. All functions associated with the water cycle are under the
control of a single authority in any one region which attempts
to closely correlate to a natural hydrological unit. This leads to
an integrated system of water management combining water
quantity and quality control and conjunctive use of ground and
surface waters. The guidelines of these control and management activities are set by water policies elaborated by the Secretary of State and by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries,
and Food. The intent is to jointly promote a water policy for
water management in England and Wales. The regional authorities execute the policy.
There is a National Water Resources Council which consists of a chairman appointed by the Secretary of State, the
chairman of the water authorities and other members appointed by the Secretary of State, and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food. The Council assists and gives advice
in water-related matters to the Ministers requiring it, assists
and controls in the effective performance of duties of the water
authorities, and must elaborate a scheme for training and education in water-related functions.
There are nine regional water authorities in England and
one in Wales. The area of a water authority may be different
for the performance of different functions, but the intent is to
organize around natural watersheds where possible, with, however, alterations in the boundaries where social and economic
reasons prevail. Water authorities are presided over by a chairman appointed by the Secretary of State, and consist of two or
four members appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture, and a
variable number of representatives of the local population. The
water authorities provide an integrated control system for
water within the confines of national policy laid down by the
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ministries, and can take every necessary action to insure the
best use and administration of the water.
In France the waters are considered a source of life, and
the legislature has recognized, with reluctance, private appropriation.' Common rights have been readily recognized in favor
of the riparian owners of watercourses. The need to legislate
pollution control has produced a deep change in the system of
water law, as well as in the system for water administration.
France has abandoned the old system of water classification
which was based on the navigability or floatability of the waters. Waters were public that were navigable or floatable. At
present, water resources can be declared public because of their
utility or importance for uses considered vital by the state for
the socioeconomic well-being of the population. Waters can be
declared public because of their relevance to agriculture, industry, domestic uses, and navigation as well as for their damaging potential, as when the waters can produce dangerous
floodings, according to the Law of December 16, 1964. This new
classification includes the waters that were considered public
in the old system; and, at the same time, broadens the category
to include waters that, even when not navigable or floatable,
do have public importance, either for their utility or for their
dangerous potential.
There are also "mixed" watercourses in which the waters
are public and the beds are private. Public and mixed watercourses are part of the general category of public waters. Private waters are a residual category. They are what is left after
the former two categories have been determined.
Private property rights are recognized over springs and
underground waters, but with important limitations. These
limitations derive from several facts. For example, a landowner
cannot make free use of spring water that, even when arising
on his land, is used by towns or other domestic needs. The use
of underground water is subject to health regulation. The right
to underground water is only acquired in the abstracted water.
The consequences are quite similar to the application of the
English rule. Flowing, nonpublic waters are common waters
8.

Depox, The French Water Law, in 2
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at 409-15.
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subject to common use. For the use of public waters authorization is required. Navigation always has preference.
France has also developed an extensive system for the protection of water against pollution. Water administration at the
national level is spread among several ministries due to the
public or nonpublic nature of the waters according to the uses
to which they are dedicated. For concrete management, it is

unified at basin level. The interministerial coordination is carried out by the Ministry of the Quality of the Human Life
under the Decrees of March 2, 1971 and June 1975. The important decisions are taken by the interministerial Committee for
the Action for Environment. Final decisions or arbitrations are
taken up by the Prime Minister. At the basin level, water administration is carried out by basin agencies in which local
interests have representation.
Spanish water law proclaims all water flowing in natural
beds as being public property. 9 The category of flowing waters
is interpreted broadly to include large as well as small rivers
and arroyos. Spring waters flowing in natural beds are also
considered public. Also classified as public waters, flowing or
not, are waters located on lands of the public domain, or lands
affected by public water works. The waters, which do not flow
in natural waterbeds and which are located in private lands,
are private property. The Spanish water law thus combines two
criteria: (1) waters flowing in natural waterbeds are public;
and (2) if the waters do not flow in natural waterbeds, their
condition depends upon the legal conditions of the lands in
which they are located.
The allocation of public waters for individual or private
uses is by concession from the Ministry of Public Works. These
concessions are not required for limited domestic or natural
uses such as water for thirst and washing, but are a necessary
prerequisite to uses of "special developments." A priority in
allocation is set out in Article 160 of the Water Act of 1879,
placing uses in the following order-towns, railways, irrigated
agriculture, navigation channels, mills and other factories, and
aquatic life and habitats. Public waters are totally administered by the Ministry of Public Works through the Directorate
9. Arrieta, Spain's Legal Water OrdinanceSystem, in 1 PROCEEDINGS at 234-94.
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of Water Works. The country is divided into ten basin administration entities which provide logical management consistent
with the natural flow regime.
The agencies for water administration at basin level are:
the Water Commissioner and the Hydrographic Confederation,
integrated by the individual users; Communities of Irrigators;
and Central Syndicator of the Basin. It can be said that,
through this sytem of organization, Spain has greatly harmonized the need for unified decisionmaking at central level with
the requirement of participation of the local water users. Central decisions are conveyed in each river basin through the
Water Commissioner. User and local institutional inputs are
furnished through the Hydrographic Confederation. The disputes on water can be solved by Special Administrative Courts,
by the Civil Courts, or by the Criminal Courts, depending on
the kind of issue. 0
In spite of a very workable system for water allocation and
management, it is important to take note of changes in the
Spanish law. Conditions and demands have so significantly
developed in the country that, with the advances of technology,
the law is required to evolve to a new plateau. Presently, a draft
of a modern Spanish water code is being discussed which places
emphasis upon the two major deficiencies under the old
law-conjunctive use of both ground and surface water and
integration of water quantity and quality control. Thus, Spain
is rapidly moving toward a more modem system of water law.
Italy defines as public all the waters which have or can
have qualities useful for satisfaction of needs of the public and
general interest." This classification is influenced by the magnitude, volume, flow, or width of the waters, as well as by their
relationship to the hydrological system of which they form a
part. The administrative authority determines the particular
condition of each corpus of water, trying to assure adequate
protection to pre-existing water rights.
The public waters are listed in registers of public waters.
Nonpublic (private) waters are a residual category whose use
10. Fairen-Guillen, The Process of the Tribunal of Water of Valencia, in 1 PROCEEDINGS at 136-58.
11. Caponera & Burchi, Italian Water Law System, in 1 PROCEEDINGS at 193-233.
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is also regulated by the laws. These waters are springs or waters
wholly within lands under private ownership. Public waters are
allocated to use through a permit system which includes an
elaborate review of the application to determine the appropriateness of the use and quantity requested.
Water administration is delegated throughout several different levels: national, regional, provincial, and municipal.
The centralized administration of prewar Italy gave way to a
more fragmented system. Nevertheless, a resources approach
has been retained in the juridical arena. Italy's water courts are
composed of a Supreme Tribunal for Public Waters and eight
regional courts.
It was pointed out by Dr. Caponera that even though the
Italian water law functions well, the lack of continuity between
basins as physical units for water control and the political entities of water administration act as a constraint on the best use
of the water. This constraint remains even though the existence
of a Ministry of Public Works offers a unitary center of decision.
The basic principles of Soviet water law are contained in
the Fundamentals of Water Legislation of the U.S.S.R.,' in
force since September 1, 1971.12 They contain the basic concepts and conditions for water use and control. In their elaboration, water codes have been adopted by each of the 15 Republics of the Union. There are, in addition, many subsidiary normative acts.
The law regulates state agencies, state and public enterprises, organizations, and individual citizens in connection
with water ownership, management, use, conservation, control,
and protection against the harmful effects of the waters. Thus,
regulation refers only to water resources available as separate
natural water bodies. When waters are no longer part of the
environment, they are regulated by other bodies of law.
The policies are to ensure the most rational and economical use of the waters; to preserve, maintain, and improve water
bodies; and to prevent the harmful effects of the waters. The
basic principles of the law are: (1) exclusive state ownership;
12. Kolbasov, Soviet System of Water Law, in 2 PROCEEDINGS at 416-52.
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(2) national and comprehensive use; (3) priority of domestic
uses; (4) strict requirement of water pollution control; (5) development of technology for water conservation; (6) registration and control of water uses; (7) adoption of the basin as the
hydrologic unit for water administration; and (8) active participation of the population in water uses. It is considered fundamental that water resources, within basins, form a definitive
and economical unit. Water administration is carried out
through several levels of government and through agencies of
general state administration, agencies of special state administration, and agencies of branch administration.
An examination of the water laws and administrative organisms of Israel provides an excellent opportunity to observe
the dynamic role and process of change served by a legal resources control system placed under extreme needs to optimize
scarce water supplies.' 3 Many other examples exist in national
or subgovernmental jurisdiction in the case of federated systems, but the laboratory process of developing water laws
found in Israel illustrates the ultimate role in extensive and
intensive water control through formalized laws and regulations. All waters, regardless of their form or location, are under
the strict control and jurisdiction of the state. The state holds
the water in trust for the citizens of Israel and is dutybound to
allocate and administer this limited resource in the most beneficial and efficient manner possible. This power and duty is
placed with the Ministry of Agriculture and under the specific
jurisdiction of the Water Commissioner.
The general proposition that water is public property entitles every citizen of the country to the right to use the resource.
However, an important feature of this right is the set of conditions placed upon its exercise. Water is allocated for use by
term and reviewable permit. The process of application and
final actions for water use insure that the proposed use is beneficial to the individual and country. The results of the use must
be within the range of maximum output, and other users
should not be unreasonably affected if the proposed use is approved. All water rights are registered, which enables effective
13. Tamir, Legal and Administrative Aspects of the Water Laws of Israel, in 3
849-911.
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administration and the ability to prepare appropriate water
plans and projections. The important feature of this modern
code is the policy declaration that provides the basis for subsequent administrative operation. The policy reflects the national goals, just as water serves as an input to achieving them.
Administratively, the law empowers the Water Commissioner or his agents with the right of exclusive control over
withdrawals as provided in the permits. The Commissioner
can cancel or amend any permit and permanently or temporarily alter or suspend uses under it. All water use is metered
and water fees charged according to volumetric uses, with
rates varying throughout the country to reflect different uses
and use conditions. The Water Commissioner also has full
power to prevent degradation to the nation's water quality.
Water pollution control is imperative and infractions are dealt
with quickly.
In addition to the Water Commissioner, there are numerous boards and authorities to provide advice and assistance in
water matters. Water users play an important role as members
of many of the entities. Disputes are under the jurisdiction of
a Special Tribunal for Water Affairs. Any person who feels
aggrieved by the actions of a government official or of another
water user can bring his case before this Tribunal.
V.

WATER LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Although many other papers in this work describe the legal
aspects of water control in the United States, their focus is
upon particular issues or problem areas. Thus, a brief overview
is provided here to enable some comparison between the other
major systems discussed.
Water law in the United States is a federated system of
complex proportions. 4 Federal (national) and state water laws
exist in both the water quantity and quality aspects of this
resource. At the federal level, jurisdiction over water originates
with the Constitution. The property, commerce, general
welfare, treaty, and compact clauses provide the basis for federal involvement in navigation, pollution abatement, and allocation and management of water resources. Particular laws
14. Radosevich & Daines, Water Law and Administration in the United States,
in 2 PROCEEDINGS at 453-502.
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have been enacted to provide the substantive control and organizational structures to carry out federal policies and programs.
State water laws are less cognizant of the hydrologic aspects of water resources. Each state, being an autonomous political entity, has rights to develop policies, laws, and organizations according to local and state needs. Thus, there are virtually 50 separate water law systems for quantity and quality
control, often with lack of uniformity between states causing
interstate conflicts. The states are primarily concerned with
methods of allocation, distribution, and administration of
ground and surface waters given the wide variety of geographical conditions in the country.
Ownership of water is either public, as in the case of the
federal government jurisdiction over certain classes of water, or
public or state in the case of rights over water vested in state
control. The use of water depends upon the state systems of
water law and ranges from common law right in the riparian
system to a permit, license, or decree under the appropriation
system. A form of contract water rights is becoming increasingly popular.
The past 10 years have witnessed the emergence of federal
involvement from water development to management in the
national and regional interests. Population shifts in a mobile
society, industrialization, energy development, increased needs
for food and fiber, conflicts and complementarities of water use
with the interface of economic sectors, and new technologies
have brought about this involvement. States, faced with the
same issues at a more concentrated and grassroots level, have
likewise been experiencing a significant evolution in their
quantity and quality control laws with an emphasis upon developing planning and management capabilities to make conscious decisions based upon an evaluation of alternatives, impacts, and opportunity costs.
Water administration at the federal level is under the jurisdiction of the Water Resources Council and a multitude of
ministerial land departments and departmental agencies, bureaus, and authorities. State administration is hierarchical
from central control at the political jurisdictional level down to
the level of hydrologic units within the state. Normally, water
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quantity and quality control is vested in different agencies. The
water law systems in the United States are in a dynamic and
evolutionary process brought about by changing conditions and
can constantly benefit by an awarness of experiences of other
nations.

VI.

ASIATIC SYSTEMS

Professor Clark, a well-known expert in water law systems
of Oceania and Asiatic regions, has repeatedly proclaimed the
difficulty of summarily discussing this topic due to the great
diversity that exists between countries in the region. 5 This
single topic was the subject of a meeting of experts in the field
held in Bangkok, Thailand in 1967, convened by the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East.
To summarize the complexity of these systems, Mr. Clark
states in the abstract to his report:
Water legislation in Asia has been profoundly influenced by
Common Law, Civilian and Roman-Dutch models. There is thus
great diversity in the theoretical bases for water administration,
but a common pattern of relying on administrative bodies to
allocate and adjust private rights to use water. In this sense,
systems of judicial apportionment of rights, through litigation,
are most uncommon.
There is remarkable similarity in the techniques used for
granting and controlling rights to water, although the primary
emphasis of the legislative schemes naturally differs with the
hydrological problems encountered. There is increasing reliance
on techniques of multi-objective planning, but care must be
taken in adapting systems of environmental planning to the different economic and social goals of developing countries."8

The range of features in the law extend ownership from
state to public to private; acquisition of rights according to
custom without administrative intervention to systems granting permits or concessions; allocations according to a nonpreference or to limited preference of user classes; and administration under centralized to decentralized systems. A major concern of many systems is with water removal, as in flood and
drainage programs, rather than water allocation.
VII.

SUMMARY

In summary, the water law systems illustrate a wide range
of approaches in control of allocation, distribution, and regula15. Clark, The Asian Region, in 2 PROCEEDINGs at 503-35.
16. Abstracts, in 1 PROCEEDINGs at 39.
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tion of the resource under diverse conditions. Ownership of the
resource extends from state ownership in the U.S.S.R., to public ownership in the vast majority of countries, to some private
ownership, as found in Spain and other countries. Often the
lack of a water policy inhibits the control and management of
the government agency administering the laws. It is recommended that the "policy" should be given serious attention in
any attempt to stimulate water-use efficiency and promote formation of collaborative efforts among water users.
Allocation of water likewise varies considerably, extending
from: no evidence of a right; to customary rights; to government concessions, permits or titles; to court decrees. The success of public irrigation programs will partly depend upon the
assurance of continued water availability to the water users in
order to elicit their willingness to invest time and money beyond the present practice. While the assurance of right or privilege should be definable and dependable, it must also be flexible to react to changing demands and technologies.
From an examination of the systems, the following statements can be made:
1. There is a clear tendency towards the public ownership of all water. This tendency is dramatically exemplified by
the legislative amendments of France and the United Kingdom. The public character of the waters has always been a
strong component of the Spanish, North American, and Israeli
systems. As water resources become relatively scarce, public
pressures for regulation demand more state activity in the
field. The opposite of public ownership of water in the realm
of state activity is state ownership, as found in the Soviet
Union. The conclusion is, however, the same-a direct correlation between the degree of state control and "scarcity" of resources regardless of ownership.
2. The basin as a unit of water management is recognized
as an imperative for improved and rational management.
3. Where water users have a voice in the decisionmaking
process by means of direct input at various levels of that process, greater continuity and realism exists in resource use.
4. The value of a unitary or coordinated system.of water
decisionmaking is discernable from the documents analyzed. It
is observed that unitary decisionmaking does not imply the
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subjugation of local interests at provincial, state, or regional
levels. Adequate mechanisms for harmonic integration can be
devised.
5. Some countries, like Italy, Spain, and Israel, do have
special courts for water problems. As water conflicts become
more technical and complex and water issues involve more
people and interests, the need for special water courts becomes
increasingly apparent.
6. The increase in the role of the state in water resources
management, the increasingly public nature of water law, and
the growing relative scarcity of water demand a redefinition
of the concept of "acquired" water rights.
7. The problems of improving water-use effectiveness,
especially for developing countries, demand the development
of new forms of compensation for the condemnation of land and
water-related resources. Vested rights should not be a permanent constraint to optimum water use.
8. In light of the growing complexity and interrelatedness
of water problems, it is imperative for water law specialists to
have an interdisciplinary foundation and communication network.

Alternatives to Appropriation Law
FRANK

J.

TRELEASE*

In recent years many water laws throughout the world
have been subjected to review and reconsideration. The continued suitability of current law is questioned and a search is
made for a new and modern form of water law. Older systems
of self-generating rights-"private waters" and riparian rights
-are to be discarded; "concessions" bring ugly memories of
exploitation; and "prior appropriation" to many means some
sort of Wild West rip-off of the public domain. In the search
for a new system something called "administrative allocation
of water" is frequently advocated, although what is meant is
not always clear. In the course of a long career of teaching and
writing about water law, and of acting as a consultant to several states and developing countries, I have been exposed to
many variations on this theme. Most of them are prefaced by
a rejection of prior appropriation; it is made clear that this is
not what is wanted.
As a resident of the American West I have lived with prior
appropriation a long time. I used to think that prior appropriation was an American invention, and I have done my share of
repeating the familiar tale of how the '49ers protected their
gold claims and water ditches with Colt and Winchester, how
courts adopted these "customs" as American common law, and
how the farmers that came after them adapted the miners' law
to agriculture. But today I read in a compilation of the world's
water laws that the protection of vested rights and a preference
for the eldest rights is the most common of all systems of distribution of water, and many of these go back to antiquity and
can in no sense be said to be derived from American law.' Thus
it is natural to wonder why this prejudice against prior appropriation exists, why it is so often rejected by those who seek the
best. Since it is so widely used there must be some good to it.
As I look about and see the development that has taken place
in the western states and review their history of transition from
* B.A., L.L.B., University of Colorado; J.S.D., University of Wisconsin. The
author is Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming.
1. L. TEcLAFF, ABSTRACTION AND USE OF WATER: A COMPARISON OF LEGAL REGIMES
81, U.N. Doc. No. ST/ECA/154 (1972).
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gold rush to irrigated agriculture to great modern centers of
commerce, I cannot help but think that we must have done
something right.
What, then, are the objections to the spread of this common and proven system? Generally, they fall into two classes.
The first type is founded on observed facts. Sometimes an example of waste is cited: excessive water use in Idaho or duplicating ditches in California. Sometimes dry streambeds in
Arizona are pointed to as proving that instream uses, ecological
balances, and environmental values cannot be protected under
prior appropriation. The mistake in these cases is the assumption that because these examples of defects can be found the
defects are inherent in the system. Most of these distortions
and dislocations seem historical remnants of a pioneer system
that need not be repeated today or minor aberrations that
could be corrected by small adjustment of the system or tighter
administration of the law.
The second class of objections is based on theory. Three
recurrent reactions are voiced:
1. A dislike of the "property system"; appropriators seize
valuable interests in the public domain and enrich themselves
at the expense of the public.
2. A mistrust of the "market system"; a fear that under
prior appropriation, water rights will become "frozen in the
pioneer patterns," unsuitable for modern times and problems,
and not subject to reallocation to new uses and needs.
3. A dislike of the "priority system"; in a shortage an
"all-or-nothing" rule gives one of two essentially similarly situated water users all of his water while his neighbor gets none.
To a large extent these objections are based on lack of
understanding-a failure to appreciate the flexibility and variety of operational methods available under controlled appropriation laws.
I. CONTROL OF INITIATION OF USES
Those who object to prior appropriation as a crude pioneer
system are simply not up with the times. In the early days of
western prior appropriation the pioneers did help themselves to
water as they would "take berries from a bush or a rabbit from
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the plain."' The water was given away, but then so was the
land. Even so the pioneer was hard put to survive, and as he
broke the land to the plow and dug his ditches his "sweat
equity" generally dispelled the charge of unearned increment.
Today the water might be sold, but tradition is against it, and
most governments are still willing to let water increase the
wealth of their citizens rather than have it increase the balance
in the state coffers.
The states did place some demands on the water users.
The earliest limit on the appropriation of water was the legal
concept of "beneficial use." Most of the pioneer uses met this
test: water was used to mine the gold and silver from the hills,
to dispell the myth of the "Great American Desert" by irrigated agriculture, to provide water for cities, railroads, and all
forms of industry. By 1890 the need for more controls was seen
by the people of Wyoming, who adopted the first permit system. A person who desires water must apply to a state official,
who may deny the permit if there is no unappropriated water
in the source or if the proposed appropriation will be contrary
to the public interest. This statute became the model for most
of the West, and today fifteen states have similar laws.3 In 1910
the New Mexico court first gave the public interest concept
some real content. The court was faced with two conflicting
applications for the same water, and the first applicant to file
demanded that he receive the permit. The court, however, said
that the purpose of the statute was to secure the greatest possible benefit from the public waters for the public, and told the
state water authorities to choose the better of the two projects,
not merely the first proposal.4 This is the legal expression of
what the economist calls the efficiency principle, the notion
that we should get the maximum net benefits from the use of
our resources.
The power to control the initiation of water uses was seldom exercised, and few conflicts over unappropriated water
occurred. Most beneficial uses were also found to be in the
2. Lasky, From Prior Appropriationto Economic Distribution of Water by the
State Via IrrigationAdministration, 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161 (1929).
3. Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
4. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
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public interest, and although private initiative could be theoretically controlled by permits, in practice few were denied.
However, there were some examples. An Oregon appropriation
was denied when it was found that it could interfere with the
state's plan for development of its lands and waters.5 A limitation was placed on the height of a Wyoming dam to preserve
the canyon for a future railroad link between two areas of the
state. In Utah the Bureau of Reclamation and the state government were cooperating on a plan for a large multipurpose
project that would bring irrigation, municipal, and electric
power benefits to three counties. An entrepreneur filed an application for a smaller project that would have seriously interfered with this development. Although he had filed first, the
state authorities, backed by the courts, subordinated the small
project to the large multipurpose project.7
These cases laid the groundwork for modern water planning. Today in many states an inventory has been taken of
water resources and the alternative possibilities for their use.
The goals of the state are carefully spelled out, policies are
adopted to bring them to fruition, and the permit process is the
mechanism for effectuating the plan. Strong efforts are being
made in this direction in Wyoming, Alaska, the West Coast
States, and others. A proposed private use that does not accord
with the state plan will be denied, or brought into line by
conditions attached to its permit. This technique is spreading
eastward; the permit feature of western prior appropriation law
is the one which has been most accepted in the Eastern
States. Several of them, including Florida, Kentucky, Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey, now have very similar planning and permit processes.
II. THE DURATION OF THE WATER RIGHT
The major objective of any water law must be to achieve,
or at least promote, the efficient allocation of water resources.
Economic efficiency is the reference: that combination of labor,
capital, and resources which will produce the greatest net benefits. Social and environmental factors will be worked into the
adjustment of costs and benefits. State plans, programs, and
5. Cookinham v. Lewis, 58 Ore. 484, 114 P. 88 (1911).
6. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
7. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
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policies may determine the optima to be sought, and state
projects and agencies may play a large part in reaching them.
Yet it is clear that in most countries a very large contribution
toward optimum use of water for irrigation and industry will
come from private sources. The water law system must foster
and encourage water use and provide a climate conducive to
investment in water-using enterprises. A person will put his
capital and labor into such an enterprise if he has sufficient
assurance that he will receive a fair return on his investment
for a period long enough to make the venture worthwhile. This
is the minimum the state must offer if it is to enlist the efforts
of the private sector. The use of water by people and firms can
be guided and controlled, but it cannot be forced. The state
may screen the uses and weed out the undesirable ones to insure that state policies and plans are furthered, and it may
impose conditions and limits to prevent undesirable practices
and side effects, but it must give security to investments and
opportunities for profit. With these assurances long term ventures and stable endeavors will be undertaken. Without them
much will be lost, for if risks are great only those requiring little
capital and promising quick returns will be taken, and cheap
construction and short cuts can be expected.
In a dynamic society efficiency also requires change, if
maximum benefits are to be continually obtained. New and
better uses will arise that promise more than is being produced
by existing, perhaps outmoded, uses. Demands will increase as
population and industrialization expand, and if they can not
be economically satisfied from unused supplies, changes in use
must take place. The resulting shifts from present uses to new
uses must meet the same test applied to an original use. Each
must be another step towards maximization of the benefits
from the resource. The economist, using the "Pareto criterion,"
tells us that a change will reach or approach a new optimum if
it will make at least one person better off and if it makes no
person worse off. A change that merely shifts wealth from one
person to another does not increase economic welfare, and even
if a new use will create greater wealth, the criterion requires the
gainer to pay the loser. The person who is better off should
receive the net gain from the change, not someone else's wealth
as well.
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The problem for the lawyer, then, is to draft a law, a system of water rights, that will promote this goal of efficiency by
providing both security and flexibility of water rights. Some
people see these two desiderataas opposites, and if too much
of one is given, the other is thought to suffer. Yet they can be
reconciled, and water rights can be made both secure and flexible.
A prime element of security is the tenure of the right. Prior
appropriation rights are held "in perpetuity," although in view
of the possibilities of loss through forfeiture or condemnation
they might better be described as "of indefinite duration." The
ideal water right should last as long as it is contemplated that
the water use will last. Rights for cities, irrigation, and other
purposes of a continuing nature should last indefinitely; there
is no substantial reason to think that a need will arise in 10 or
50 years to take water from the inhabitants of a city and give
it over to another use. If irrigation water furnishes a major
component of the value of land, the titles to the land and the
water should run concurrently. On the other hand, there is
little utility in leaving a mining company with a water right
after the mine has been exhausted.
Rights that last as long as the enterprise will give security
of tenure to the water user. But how are flexibility and change
to be accommodated if rights are perpetual or for long terms?
As an analogy, consider the laws applied to another valuable
resource: land. The state has exactly the same interests in
seeing that the highest and best use of land is made and that
those uses can change when needs change. Almost universally
rights to land are as secure a form of property as there is, and
land titles run "to him and his heirs forever." Yet land use is
flexible, and a shift from a low productive use to a higher
productive use is accomplished by the simple process of a sale
of the land. A farm on the outskirts of a city may have a higher
productive use as an industrial site or as a residential area. In
either case the industrialist or the developer can afford to pay
the farmer more than the land is worth as a farm, and the one
with the best use can afford the most. Both buyer and seller
profit. In this respect water resources are not too different from
land resources.
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This is not to say that unrestricted powers of sale are recommended. Legal mechanisms can be found that will permit
economic forces to operate within a framework of government
control. The government will generally favor a change in use
that moves water to higher productivity. The government may
disapprove of a change, however, and should be able to block
a transfer of the water right that would interfere with the rights
of third persons, result in a disfavored water use, or harm the
public interest. Procedures that permit affected private persons to raise objections and the government to approve or disapprove can take the form of government confirmation of a sale
or of cancelling the old right and issuing a new permit for the
new use. On the other hand, the government may wish to force
transfers that advance the public interest when private action
does not produce the desired change. Again, consider the case
of land. If the government needs the land, it takes it by expropriation or condemnation; if a favored enterprise needs it, the
government gives those powers to it. Fair compensation is paid
if the total value is taken and should similarly be paid if the
value given by water is taken.
The desirability of this mechanism for change is not seen
by all water lawyers. In fact, it seems quite popular nowadays
to recommend that water rights should last only for fixed, fairly
short periods." The advantage is thought to be the attainment
of flexibility, since at the end of the term the state has the
power to reassign the water to new and better uses. There are
disadvantages, however, to such a system, some of which accrue to the state in departures from optimum use and some of
which impose unnecessary harm upon the water user. Most
investments take many years to amortize, and the term must
be a long one if capital is to be attracted. Repairs and replacements may be foregone by the water user towards the end of a
fixed period. Flexibility is surrendered during the life of the
right, and if an application for a new use does not coincide with
the expiration of an old permit, the new user may have to wait
a fairly long time before water becomes available. If to meet
this the right is subject to condemnation or expropriation during its life, the usual compensation offered is the unamortized
8. F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS & J. Mosms, A MODEL WATER CODE (1972).
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portion of the investment. But the holder of the right will in
many cases lose an asset more valuable than his sunk costs,
that is, the going concern value of his enterprise-the continuing opportunity to make a profit-which is presumably a contribution to the economy.
It may be wise to remember that we are speaking of laws
that affect people and that laws should be tested by thinking
through their application to practical facts. The theoretical
proposition is that water use should be flexible and that water
should move from less productive to higher and better uses.
The fact is that almost everywhere in the world irrigation of
agricultural crops produces less wealth per unit of water than
does almost any other use-hydroelectric power, food processing, raw material processing, mining, manufacturing, and
domestic and commercial consumption within municipalities.
So in practical operation a change to greater beneficial use will
mean that water now used by farmers will be shifted to large
enterprises or cities. There is nothing bad about this per se, in
fact it is almost inevitable. However, it may need to be controlled. For example, in a country where food production has a
high government priority the natural economic processes may
have to be interrupted and such changes forbidden. This would
force cities and industries to seek higher cost water not presently in use, and they might have to construct reservoirs or
bring water long distances from places where use has not yet
equalled supply.
But if these considerations do not apply and the change is
desired, a change made by fiat, without payment or compensation, will impoverish the farmer and unnecessarily enrich the
industrialist or city dweller. Inevitably the farmer is poorer
than he was before; he can produce less on his dry land. The
water he formerly used is now being used by a manufacturing
or mining company, for which the water cost would be a small
part of total operating costs and could be recouped in the price
for the product. If the water has moved to municipal uses, it is
now benefitting householders and owners of commercial establishments within the city, and the principle of requiring those
who receive the benefits to pay for them can be realized by a
simple adjustment of water rates. A very small addition to the
water bill of everyone in the city would create a fund from
which the payment could be made.
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III.

DISTRIBUTION IN TIMES OF SHORTAGE

Legal security given by tenure is only one-half the picture.
So far it has been assumed that water was available to fulfill
the right. But what if there is not enough to satisfy all rights?
What physical security does the law provide-what guarantees that the holder of a right will get water? When there is a
shortage of water, which water users get it? These questions
go to the heart of the law. Indeed, shortages are what the law
of water rights is all about. There is little need for water rights
if there is plenty of water for all.
The word "shortage" needs to be defined. It is meaningless
unless demand is considered as well as supply. On a variable
stream there may be an annual shortage if the normal or average low flows cannot support existing uses, although much high
water flows to the sea. There may be shortages induced by
drought if a usually sufficient supply fails in some years. There
may be a shortage although the stream is running full, if the
full flow is needed for fisheries, navigation, or environmental
concerns. There may be no shortage even though every drop is
used if the stream is so controlled that annual and perennial
flows are equated by storage and the smoothed-out supply is
fully, but not excessively, allocated. Such a firm right to a firm
supply puts the water user in the best of all worlds.
But for the most part the real world is not so ideal. Some
aquifers with steady recharge may present an opportunity to
limit water rights and match demand to supply, but most
streams are subject to very large annual fluctuations and to
marked variation in yearly total flows. Some are sufficiently
predictable to allow a dependable flow to be determined and

split among a fixed group of water users, but this either wastes
the excess high water if no rights are given to it or casts most
of the burden of shortage on the users of high water.
In all cases, however, the physically available supply

limits the water that can be withdrawn, and the state, if it is
to avoid chaos, must limit the claims to it. Inevitably, this
limit will have an element of temporal priority to it. When
claims equal supply, no more can be granted. New demands for
better uses must then be accommodated by some mechanism

for flexibility, as discussed above. Such a limit can be easily
fixed if the supply is fixed. When the source fluctuates and
sometimes can fill all needs but sometimes can not, some
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method of allocating or distributing the immediately available
water must be devised.
There are at least five ways of doing this. One is to enforce
strict temporal priority, as exemplified by American prior appropriation. Another is to apply equal sharing enforced by proportionate reduction, as among some riparian irrigators. A
third is to follow a statutory list of preferences, giving priority
according to a fixed ranking of the values of different uses. A
fourth is to distribute the water as determined by administrative discretion based on various economic and social factors. A
fifth is to put up the water for sale or auction, as practiced in
some Moslem communities.
Since the criterion for the law is efficiency in obtaining
maximum net benefits from water use, each of these must be
evaluated against that standard before an intelligent choice
can be made. Prima facie, each seems to have advantages and
disadvantages. Temporal priority gives security, but it may
sometimes seem to discriminate rather arbitrarily among people who are essentially similarly situated, and the earliest uses
may not be the best ones. Sharing may be equitable among
many farmers, but not if some have orchards or vineyards and
others grow annual field crops; and a variable supply may be
completely unsatisfactory for a factory or mine. Statutory lists
may reflect prevailing notions of relative values, but they may
embody obvious diseconomies or prevent the comparison of the
relative merits of individual uses. Even if they do prefer the
most efficient uses, they operate so that the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer. Bidding on the water market would seem
to insure that the water goes to those who can produce the most
from it, but it can lead to speculation and gouging, and to
enrichment of those who hold a monopoly on water rather than
those who work with it.
This leaves administrative control, and a number of water
lawyers have thought this to be the ideal. Their theory is to
place all the water in the hands of a wise administrator; let him
put it where it will do the most good, let him prorate, let him
reduce the supply or suspend the rights of some so that others
may receive the water.' I have serious reservations about this.
9. Id.; Clark, Guidelines for the Drafting of Water Codes, U.N. Water Resources
Ser. No. 43 (1973).
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We seldom give to a government official so much power over
the lives and livelihood of people. This procedure may deter
investment and development, since entrepreneurs hesitate to
engage in enterprises when success or failure depends upon
factors beyond their control. A rather ugly thought occurs the human factor could be subjected to enormous temptations
and tremendous pressures to play political favorites, yield to
political coercion, and offer and receive bribes and graft. Even
the most scrupulously honest administrators have complained
of the personal strain such decisions cause, and have disclaimed the wisdom to make them with any assurance. And
even if wisdom can be found, it must not only exist in higher
echelons where policy is decided, but it must also be spread
through all the regional subordinates and field men who must
make the actual on-the-spot decisions in individual cases.
Those who advocate administrative distribution in case of
shortage may urge that with this method the public interest,
or the environment, can be protected. But it must be remembered that all of this has been taken care of in the initial allocation of rights. To understand the workings of administrative
distribution, it must be very clearly kept in mind that all we
are talking about is water already allocated to private use, that
the state and its administrators have issued permits for its use,
that every use is beneficial, and that all the uses can be made
in times of water plenty. It must be remembered that all minimum flow requirements are met, that all other environmental
factors are protected, and that the state water plan is observed
or even furthered. The public interest stands neutral, and the
only question is: Which people get to use the water?
If each system has its good and bad features, must we then
choose the least of evils? I think not. It is possible to combine
the best features of all of these and to eliminate the bad effects
of each.
In the preferred solution, temporal priority is the starting
point, but only that. It does give security; it does mean that
the state, having granted water to A, will not later grant that
same water to B. Temporal priority is not the grant of a special
privilege. It is simply a necessary element of the description of
the water right that marks its boundaries and distinguishes it
from other rights. On a fluctuating source, it is the only way

294

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:283

that new rights can be limited to water that is available in
nature and is not already committed to existing uses. These
virtues can be combined with those of sharing, if that is desirable. This is frequently done all over the world, even in western
America, where a project or distribution scheme serves a number of irrigators who share the distributor's appropriated water
right. If that right cannot be supplied in full, the consumers
take a proportionate reduction. Much the same thing can be
done even though no works are needed and it is contemplated
that individuals will provide their own means of diversion. If a
reasonably dependable supply is available and total withdrawals are held to that limit, all of the permits, although requested
at different times, could be given the same priority date or
number. The plan would replace the project; the plan would
receive the priority. This would avoid overcrowding by too
many seeking shares and would settle the relationships between the irrigators as a group and other irrigators, industrial
users, and municipalities.
Next is the problem of seeing that the water goes to the
best uses. If the more productive and valuable users have junior
water rights, economic efficiency can still be served by using
the market, under the supervision of the administrator. We
have spoken of transfers of water rights, but there is also need
for sales of water as a commodity. The State of New Mexico
gives a good example of how this can work. A statute permits
the "leasing of the use of water" by an appropriator to any
other person, with the approval of the state authorities. 0 In a
water-short year, growers of beans who anticipate a high price
may hold junior water rights that give them no supply, while
potato growers who face a glutted market can draw water under
their senior rights. The bean growers buy water from the potato
farmers. Maximum efficiency is reached, since the high-value
crop is produced, and both water users share the profits. An
administrator could not do as well. If he were charged with
distributing the water on the basis of economic efficiency, he
would allocate the water to the bean grower, but that lucky
farmer would get all his profit while the unfortunate potato
grower would suffer a total loss. If the administrator attempted
10. N.M. Coup. LAWS, §§ 75-40-1 to -7 (1953).
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to avoid this by a criterion of equity and gave half the water to
each, the highest and best use would not be served and maximum production would not be reached.
Another example of how temporary transfers of rights or
sales of water could be of great utility is that of the city which
gambled on a junior water right and is faced with an unusual
drought. If farmers hold the priority, I would assume that an
administrator would say that the city has the better use and
would cut off the farmers' supply. The city would get the water,
but the farmer would be bankrupted. This is a social cost which
must be reckoned, and the best way to account for it is to have
the city pay for the farmers' lost crop. A country enacting a new
law could improve on the New Mexico system by allowing only
owners of permits to make purchases and by limiting quantities
to enough to make up the shortage in the permitted supply.
This would avoid the use of water by unauthorized persons or
in unauthorized quantities. The administrator could also be
given the power to force such temporary transfers and empower
preferred users who are unable to make private arrangements
to take temporary control of water rights at a fair compensation.
Up to now we have been dealing with shortages as if they
were inevitable and uncontrollable. Both annual low flows and
cyclic drought produce periods of plenty and periods of shortage, but in many areas storage of water can be used to equate
the flow, to save high water for use in the low water period.
Where storage is physically and economically available, the
rule for dividing shortage is in practical fact a rule for determining who pays for the dam and reservoir. If an open-ended
system of riparian sharing of a variable stream for irrigation
eventually were to lead to too many and too small shares, all
holders of rights might band together in some joint or communal organization to raise the dam. I think, however, that the
costs of dislocation and the difficulties of organization would
be great. If economic productivity is the criterion for determining who gets low flows, the burden of providing storage would
be cast on those least able to afford it. But if temporal priority
is the rule, the juniors who enter the field after the low water
is all spoken for must pay. Is this fair? I think so, for reasons
to be developed later. It certainly is desirable from the stand-
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point of securing the main goal, the efficient use of water. The
persons who will get the direct benefit of the storage must
consider whether it is worth the price. A large estate-a communal group of farmers, an industry, a city, or a government
multipurpose agency-which wants the water must calculate
whether its benefits will exceed its costs.
From the standpoint of equity and justice it should be
remembered that development takes place over time. The first
users take cheap, easily available, always available water.
There is no shortage. When more and more uses are made,
shortages are created as demands increase to meet or exceed
low flow supply. Additional risks are created and additional
costs must be met. It seems not unfair for the government to
place those risks and those costs on those who create them.
Justice is difficult to identify. One American writer has
said that injustice is easier to spot, that human beings hold in
common many notions of when they are being abused or
treated unfairly." One of those notions is that when a person
has taken, used, become accustomed to, and made a livelihood
from water, it becomes "his water," and that one who takes it
from him has "stolen his water." I used to think that prior
appropriation was an American invention, but now I am convinced it was simply the verbal identification of a very widespread human trait.
Teclaff, in his survey of 57 countries, tells us that seniority
in use is the most common of all bases for distributing water
among users." In its most explicit form, prior appropriation
exists not only in 19 American states, but also in four western
provinces of Canada, Taiwan, China, Iran, Rhodesia, Zambia,
and the Philippines. There are strong elements of it in several
South American countries. 3 The 1963 British Water Resources
Act creates a "protected right" indistinguishable from an appropriation, though enforced in an unusual roundabout manner."
Protection based on temporal priority is to some degree
implicit in many other laws. Before state controls came into
11. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPORENTIC VIEW OF LAW (1949).

12. L. TECLAFF, supra note 1.
13. L. TECLAFF, supra note 1, at 82-83.
14. Water Resources Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1970).
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being, customary water rights, held from time immemorial or
for prescriptive periods, were everywhere protected. When
state authority to use water was instituted, the notion that a
state should not make successive grants of the same water to
different people appeared in most such laws. Permits, licenses,
or concessions-whatever they may be called-are not to be
issued to the detriment of existing uses in most of the Spanish
American countries, in several of the eastern United States, in
Tanzania, and in Italy. Practically every new water code has
given some sort of group preference to uses in existence when
the code was adopted.
Some evidence indicates a subliminal recognition of priority even where the law is specifically to the contrary. The natural flow theory of 19th century English riparianism has been
said to have been a protection of mill owners, a law designed
to keep the wheels of the Industrial Revolution turning. 5 The
reasonable use theory of American riparian law is applied to
require several types of adjustments which enable several riparian uses to coexist, but a recent study of the cases shows
that when two uses are truly incompatible the American courts
almost invariably hold that a new use is unreasonable if it takes
the water supply of an existing user."6 Empirical studies show
the existence of a sort of "practical priority" in some American
states, where riparians with theoretical rights to share in a
stream voluntarily refrain from taking water after their neighbors have first captured the available supply. Even under modern statutes that subject the allocation and distribution of
water to administrative discretion, the administrators in Great
Britain, Kenya, and Mexico have eased their burden by issuing
permits that authorize the withdrawal of water only when there
is a surplus over the needs of existing users.

IV.

EXAMPLES

I realize that, when I state my personal precepts for a
desirable form of water rights, I take issue with a number of
colleagues. In many personal conversations and exchanges of
correspondence we have debated the merits of long term versus
15. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrineStates, 10
BUFFALO L. REV. 448 (1961).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 850B(h)(i), Notes at 115-18 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
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short term water rights, voluntary transfers versus governmental shifts of water use, and priority versus administrative distribution of shortages. I seldom lose these debates, of course, but
I seldom seem to win them either. Too often our arguments do
not meet head on because my propositions seem hard to state
and the full implications of prior appropriation seem difficult
to understand, and my opponents assume that I advocate some
kind of "robber baron" speculation in the national patrimony.
It is not difficult to show that administrative control offers
advantages over such a system. It seems very difficult to explain how a system of controlled rights-secure but transferable and limited to quantities available in the source and not
previously committed to other uses-can incorporate each advantage claimed for discretionary administration.
Perhaps the propositions here set forth can be clarified by
illustration. Two very new examples may be compared: one
represents the ultimate in discretionary control of water use by
officials, the other is based on the principles I have recommended.
Last year the President of the Philippines created a new
National Water Resources Council and empowered it to issue
rules and regulations for the exploitation and optimum utilization of water resources. 7 The superseded Irrigation Law of 1912
was modeled on an early form of American prior appropriation,
implemented by a permit system. A number of contributing
factors had made administration of the law ineffective, and
permit procedures were overwhelmed by a flood of applications
resulting from a new government program. The Council
quickly adopted interim rules designed to expedite the processing of applications for water rights, and those rules make a
fundamental departure from the nature of existing rights. The
permits under the rules will not definitely fix the quantity of
water allowed, the priority of the right, or the duration of the
right. Each will be subject to these conditions:
The Council may, after due notice and hearing, reduce at any
time the quantity of water or adopt a system of apportionment,
distribution or rotation thereof when the facts and circumstances
17. See Trelease, Current Developments in Philippine Water Law-Suggested
Interim Groundwater Regulation (1975) (prepared for MIA-UNDP/FAO Ground-water
Development Project).
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in any situation would warrant the same in the interests of legal
appropriators.
The Council may, after due notice and hearing, revoke the permit
in favor of projects for greater beneficial use or for a multipurpose
use."

As explained by the Council's staff, these conditions were
written into the permit for five reasons:
1. Wasteful uses: Some water users are wasteful, some
can get along with less water, and, as water demand increases
and technology progresses, all water users may be required to
initiate more economical methods or facilities.
2. Reduction of use: Irrigated lands are frequently subjected to changes in land use. If a water right exists to serve
an area of land and part of the land is sold for residential use,
or if the water is concentrated on one part while another is more
or less permanently devoted to a purpose such as storage or a
barnyard, the right should be reduced in quantity or terminated in part.
3. Sharing during drought: In time of drought, it is inequitable that the entire burden of shortage fall on some
farmers, while others, essentially similarly situated, get a full
supply. "We wish to abolish priority" was the statement
made.
4. Incorporationinto projects: It is expected that many
small irrigated plots will later be served by large multipurpose
projects.
5. Flexibility of use: To "keep up with progress" under
developing conditions and to permit "greater beneficial use" it
will be necessary to shift water from one enterprise to new and
different ones that will contribute more to the Philippine economy and development, and to permit multipurpose uses of
greater public benefit.
Each of these reasons has a sound basis in fact, and each
problem or need described exists. Each condition described can
be corrected and each aim accomplished by administrative action under the terms of the permit. These conditions will protect the paramount interests of the state, preserve every right
18. Philippine National Water Resources Council, Interim Rules Governing Application for Water Permit, Dec. 17, 1974.
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of the state, and subordinate private uses of water to state
control at every stage.
Contrast the new water law recommended for Swaziland. 19
The Swaziland permit is a "protected right," following British
terminology, and each permit bears the date on which the application therefor was filed. The law provides:
Every water right shall be protected from derogation by the exercise of any permit bearing a later date and shall entitle the holder
to abstract the whole amount of water specified in the permit
before any water is distributed to the holder of a permit bearing
a later date.

The permit lasts as long as water is needed:
Every permit shall state the period of its duration, as determined
by the Board in accordance with the following provisions: (a) any
permit for [domestic] use, for urban and public water supply,
for the irrigation of land and for other purposes of a continuing
nature shall be of indefinite duration, and valid until revoked,
varied or cancelled in accordance with § 23 [with compensation
except in cases of three year nonuse or violation of law]; (b) any
permit for industrial purposes shall lapse with the termination of
the use of the water for such purposes or with the. abandonment
of the mine, plant or other facility for which it was used.

These provisions give the Swaziland water user the security denied to his Philippine counterpart. Yet every objective
of the Philippine Government can be accomplished under the
Swazi law. In Swaziland, as in the Philippines, physical waste
can be found. Irrigators use large quantities of water, inefficient means of diversion, and wasteful practices. Cheap water
is used instead of expensive equipment or labor. But a Swazi
permit will be issued subject to:
Such terms, conditions, restrictions and limitations as [the
Board] deems necessary for the protection of others and the public interest including (a) any limitation whereby the quantity of
water permitted to be extracted is restricted to that amount
which may be beneficially and economically used and efficiently
applied.

If future conditions require the state to impose an increase
in efficiency, the permit is also subject to:
Any requirement for the abstraction and use of the quantity al19. Trelease, A Proposed National Water Resources Order for Swaziland, U.N.
Doc. No. OTC/SWA/73/002 (1975).

1976

ALTERNATIVE

WATER LAW SYSTEMS

lowed by the permit to be made pursuant to the regulations or
orders of the Board governing efficient water management.

These same conditions in the permit could be used to take
care of the second case that bothers the Philippine Council, in
which the amount of irrigated land is decreased and less water
is therefore needed. Since the beneficial use is decreased the
amount of water needed for the remainder of the land would
decrease. Further, the Swazi law states that:
The Board may cancel or vary any permit if the holder thereof
voluntarily fails or neglects, without sufficient cause, to apply all
or any part of the water to the use for which the permit was issued
for a period of three successive years.

Thus, if the decrease in use were temporary, the decrease
in water delivery would be temporary, but, if the decrease were
permanent, a part of the water right would cease to exist.
In the third situation, the Philippine Council reserves the
right to apportion and rotate a short supply among irrigators.
The practical problem arises from the fact that the government, seeking to improve rice yields by prolonging the growing
season with irrigation, has distributed a large number of pumps
to individual farmers in order to enable them to use whatever
water is available. Each farmer will have to apply for a permit,
and it is felt that minor differences in the time of filing should
not be the deciding factor in determining who gets the water.
In Swaziland as well, projects are being studied that call for
irrigation of small plots of new land by the Swazi people. On
some of them the water is quite accessible and may be taken
by individual works that may be initiated at different times;
on others the government will construct large works and deliver
the water to the farmers. In either type of settlement, equality
and sharing among the irrigators is thought desirable. The law
therefore states:
If a government irrigation project or scheme or an irrigation project or scheme initiated by an organization or group of water users
is to be effectuated by permits issued to individual water users,
the government, industry, department or agency, or the organization or group, may apply to the Board for an order setting aside
or reserving a specified quantity of water for the irrigation of all
irrigable lands to be served by the project or scheme, and the
Board may issue such order and thereafter all permits issued for
the irrigation of such land shall bear the date of the application
for such order.
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All permits bearing the same date shall entitle the holders thereof
to a prorata share of the source of water insufficient to supply all
such rights in full.

The fourth concern of the Philippine Council is that of the
small farm which is swallowed up by a large project. It is contemplated that the land will continue to be irrigated, and what
is actually involved is the substitution of the project's right for
the old individual right. This would be done without compensation. The farmer's facilities would be rendered useless, however, and he would bear a double burden if he must pay for his
own works and a full share of project costs as well. Contrast the
Swazi solution:
If as a result of variation or revocation the holder of the varied
or revoked permit can be supplied with water by a government
or private scheme or project, or a local authority, in favor of
which the permit was revoked or varied, damages shall be limited
to the unamortized portion of the investment in water works
rendered useless or unnecessary.

Lastly, the Philippine permit was made revocable at the
will of the Council so that it might keep up with progress and
shift water to new enterprises that will contribute more to the
country's development, or to government multipurpose projects. Such opportunities for water to move to higher and better
uses will occur in Swaziland as well. If a new government
scheme is planned, and it is found that an incompatible existing use must be ended or that the water must be acquired for
the project, then:
If the [government], a local authority, the Electricity Board, or
any ministry, department or agency of the government constructing or operating a government scheme, project or water work,
desires to acquire for its purposes any existing water right, servitude or land, it may. . . acquire such water rights, servitude or
land, or such portion thereof as may be necessary, by expropriation and the Acquisition of Property Act shall ... apply to such
expropriation and the compensation ... to be paid therefor.

Swaziland has large reserves of coal and is highly mineralized, and if a mining enterprise should in the future need a firm
supply of water it could approach any one of a number of farmers who have high priority water rights and work out a transfer:
The Board may authorize the use of all or part of the water to be
abstracted pursuant to permit to be changed or transferred to a
different use or place of use by the same or another person if a
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change or transfer is effected by a surrender of the permit and the
issuance of a new permit or permits bearing the same date.
In proceedings for obtaining approval of the Board for any change
or transfer, . . . the Board shall approve and allow changes and
transfers . . . only if it is satisfied that no injury will occur to the
water rights of other persons, that the new use or place of use will
be in the public interest and in conformity to or compatible with
a water resources plan relating to the source or area, provided,
that in appropriate cases the Board may inquire into the adequacy of the consideration paid to the person making the transfer
and as to whether permitting the transfer will be to the best
interests of such person.

The transaction would be the same as if the mining company needed the farmer's land. Since the company will in fact
produce greater wealth than does the farmer, it will be able to
afford to buy out the farmer's interest to give him a substitute
in money that will replace the foregone income from farming.
The state will control the transaction, protect its interest, and
must agree that its goals and plans are furthered by the shift.
The last proviso illustrates state retention of control over a
social factor. If the transferor is a Swazi farmer, the transaction
can be scrutinized to see that he was not overreached in the
bargaining process and that he has other opportunities he can
grasp, and has not merely sold his birthright for a mess of
pottage.
To summarize, in both countries and under either form of
law waste can be prevented, forfeiture imposed for nonuse,
shortages prorated among similarly situated irrigators, large
projects substituted for individual works, and water moved to
higher and better uses. Under the interim rules of the Philippines this is accomplished by telling the water user that the
initial quantity of water allotted to him may be reduced at any
time for someone else's benefit, and that his entire water right
may be taken from him at any time the government or someone
else needs it. This is overkill-more than is necessary for the
purpose. Though these same objectives are reached in Swaziland, there the water user, whether African farmer or mining
executive, knows he will be allowed the quantity needed for
efficient accomplishment of his use. He knows whether or not
he must share and, if he must, with how many. He knows that
if he needs a firm supply and the source is variable, he must
arrange for storage. He knows that, if the government takes
back its grant of water, it will compensate him for the loss.
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The Philippine Water Council and its staff are men of good
will, public servants seeking to advance the best interests of the
government and to wring the last benefit from water use. But
since the intent is to accomplish much of the development of
the Philippines through the private sector-by individuals,
cooperatives, and businesses engaged in food production and
processing, raw material extraction and processing,
manufacturing, and mining-the question may be asked
whether such tenuous rights may not frighten away such water
users and actually prove counterproductive in achieving the
government's objective. When the present crisis is over the
interim regulations are to be replaced with a permanent water
code. At that point, the Philippine government might well consider whether its interests may be better served and more benefits obtained by giving greater assurance to those whose energies must be enlisted in the effort to develop the nation's water
resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

I might close with an anecdote. On a mission to Jamaica
for the Food and Agriculture Organization I recommended provisions similar to those suggested for Swaziland. 2 My charge
in the assignment to Jamaica was to draft a law which would
give aid and encouragement to the developing Jamaican
economy-based largely on irrigated sugar cane with a more
recent overlay of tourism, mining, and manufacturing-and to
protect the island's cities and tropical environment. In submitting various drafts I encountered some resistance to American
language and quietly shifted from "prior appropriation" to the
British "protected right," with which the Jamaicans felt more
comfortable. During the process a counterproposal was made
for an "administrative system" of permits covering the
"expected constant yield," and for the rationing of water in
times of shortage based on "the value of the particular uses"
and "the national interest." The supposed simplicity of this,
compared to my allegedly complicated recommendations, had
a certain appeal, but eventually my proposal won out. It has
since received cabinet approval, although it has not yet been
adopted by the Parliament.
20. Trelease, A Proposed Water Resources Act for Jamaica, FAO Doc. No.
AGL:SF/JAM/12 (1973).
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During the discussion, the Jamaican codirector of the project probed into how operations would actually be conducted.
He was quick to see the type of pressures that could be brought
and the difficult decisions that would have to be made in determining the size of the "expected constant yield" and whether
one more permit could be squeezed into it. He also saw the ease
with which he could issue permits that prohibited interference
with previously issued protected rights. And he was enchanted
with the notion of handling shortages by priority coupled with
temporary transfers of water, as in New Mexico.
"I see-under the other system I might have to choose
between shutting down a new hotel or starving some cane farmers. But one or two farmers' quota would supply the hotel, and
under your law I could just notify the hotel manager to start
negotiations. Why, I might even act as broker and help them
get together."
I believe that man caught a glimpse of what water law is
all about.

CASE STUDIES
Allocation and Management of Interstate
Water Resources: The Emergence of the
Federal-Interstate Compact
JEROME C. MUYS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is appropriate in this bicentennial year that this conference is reexamining the mechanisms which the Founding Fathers built into the Constitution to deal with interstate water
problems. They obviously anticipated that a variety of regional
disputes might arise within the newly-created federal system
which would be beyond the power of a single state to deal with
and yet not within what were then thought to be the relatively
narrow powers which the states had delegated to the National
Congress. Hence the Constitution provided for the continued
use of interstate agreements or "compacts" (a device which
had been liberally used in Colonial America to resolve boundary disputes and had received acceptance in the Articles of
Confederation), subject only to the requirement of Congressional consent to such agreements. Thus, article I, section 10,
clause 3 provides that: "No state shall, without the consent of
Congress . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power."'
The second mechanism provided for the settlement of interstate disputes was original action in the Supreme Court of
the United States. 2 Both techniques have been frequently em* A.B., 1954, Princeton University; L.L.B., 1957, Stanford University; Adjunct
Professor, George Washington University National Law Center. The author is a
member of the firm of Debevoise & Liberman, Washington, D.C.
1. Although the compact clause seems to mandate Congressional consent for all
interstate agreements, the Supreme Court has stated that such consent is required only
where the compact threatens to impinge on national interests. Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 518-19 (1893); New Hampshire v. Maine, 96 S.Ct. 2113 (1976). Similarly,
consent is not required prior to formal agreement, as the clause suggests, but may be
evidenced either before or after agreement is reached. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 521 (1893). The critical question is whether "Congress, by some positive act in
relation to such agreement, [has] signified the consent of that body to its validity."
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 86 (1823).
2. U.S. CONST., art. 3, §2.
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ployed over the years, primarily in connection with interstate
water resources matters. Some 35 compacts have been approved by Congress relating to water resources management,
and a large number of Supreme Court decisions have been
rendered on disputes over the consumptive use or pollution of
the waters of 14 interstate river basins.'
It was not until its 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,
an interstate dispute over the allocation of the waters of the
Lower Colorado River Basin, that the Supreme Court discovered that a third possibility for the solution of interstate water
disputes existed, namely through Congressional exercise of
some of its powers, particularly the power to regulate interstate
commerce, the scope of which had gradually been expanded by
the Supreme Court since the 1930s. I refer to the Court's
"discovery" of such Congressional power advisedly, since in a
1907 interstate water decision, Kansas v. Colorado, the Court
had explained that "[a]s Congress cannot make compacts
between the States, as it cannot, in respect to certain matters,
by legislation compel their separate action, disputes between
them must be settled either by force or else by appeal to tribun5'
als empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof."
However, half a century later in Arizona v. California, the
Court concluded that Congress had in fact imposed a compact
on several of the states of the Lower Colorado River Basin
through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.1 It held that
Congress had effected a "statutary apportionment" of the waters of the mainstream of the Colorado River at Hoover Dam
and below among the states of California, Arizona, and Nevada
by conferring upon the Secretary of the Interior, as part of his
3. Compacts currently in effect are set out in Appendix A to this paper. For a
scholarly compilation of most of the compacts as of 1968 dealing with consumptive use,
pollution control, and flood control with respect to interstate waters as well as related
legislation and the principal Supreme Court decisions in interstate water disputes, see
Witmer, Documents on the Use and Control of the Waters of Interstate and International Streams, H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
The Court's interstate water decisions as of April 1959 are also collected in a useful
indexed compilation prepared by Professor Charles E. Corker and filed by the California defendants with the Special Master in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963),
as a supplement to their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
4. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
5. 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
6. 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see also Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 617-617t (1970).
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authority to manage Hoover Dam and the other water conservation works authorized under that Act, the power to make a
"contractual allocation" of those waters in the event that
the
three states were unable to agree to the terms of a tristate
compact to which consent was given in the Act.'
Of these three means for allocating interstate waters, I
have been asked to focus on interstate compacts. But before
dealing with that subject, I want to review briefly Supreme
Court litigation and Congressional allocation as a means of
resolving interstate water disputes.
The guiding principle which the Supreme Court has applied in interstate water disputes is the doctrine of "equitable
apportionment." In Nebraska v. Wyoming, I the Court enunciated the basic factors involved in determining the "equitable
shares" of an interstate stream to which competing states are
entitled:
[I]n determining whether one State is "using, or threatening to
use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a stream, all
the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other
must be weighed as of the date when the controversy is mooted."
320 US p. 394. That case did not involve a controversy between
two appropriation States. But if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just and equitable, strict adherence to the
priority rule may not be possible. For example, the economy of a
region may have been established on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible those established uses should be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed
judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the
river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect
of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas, if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors.
They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue.
They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and
the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.'
7. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
8.325 U.S. 589 (1945).
9. Id. at 618.
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With respect to "statutory apportionment" of interstate
waters, there is no real guidance beyond the Supreme Court's
analysis of the legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act in Arizona v. California. One can only speculate whether
some of the multitude of Congressional authorizations for multiple purpose projects under the federal reclamation and flood
control programs may someday receive a similar interpretation. For example, did the Secretary of the Interior's recent
execution of a contract with Montana for delivery of 300,000
acre-feet of water from the Fort Peck Reservoir to users in that
state, referred to by Assistant Secretary Horton this morning, 0
accomplish a pro tanto "contractual allocation" of the waters
of the Missouri Basin? Whether Congress will be inclined to
legislatively direct the allocation of interstate waters among
competing states in particular controversies in the future is also
highly speculative. It would seem preferable for the affected
states to determine their own water destiny by agreement,
rather than to have it decided by a Congressional majority
which may have little interest in the problems peculiar to a
region, or whose votes may be influenced by political considerations wholly unrelated to the merits of a particular basin's
water problems.
It is apparent that the determination of a state's equitable
share in the waters of an interstate river basin is fraught with
complex factual, legal, policy, and political considerations, and
the Supreme Court has pointedly commented on several occasions that the difficulty of the task makes it one peculiarly
appropriate for resolution by interstate agreement if at all possible. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court characterized the
problem as follows:
There is some suggestion that if we undertake an apportionment
of the waters of this interstate river, we embark upon an enterprise involving administrative functions beyond our province.
...[Tihese controversies between States over the waters of
interstate streams "involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns,
present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert admin-

istration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule.
Such controversies may appropriately be composed by negotia10. See Horton, Water Issues in Perspective, infra, at 405.
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tion and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause or the Federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has said of
interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accomodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power." But the
efforts at settlement in this case have failed. A genuine controversy exists. The gravity and importance of the case are apparent. The difficulties of drafting and enforcing a decree are no
justification for us to refuse to perform the important function
entrusted to us by the Constitution."

Similarly, in the New York Harbor pollution litigation, the
Court admonished the party states as follows:
We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration
of this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented
by the large and growing populations living on the shores of New
York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative
study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of the
representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by
proceedings in any court, however constituted. 2

The Court has always exercised its discretionary original
jurisdiction cautiously, and there are some signals that it may
3
apply even more rigorous standards in the future.'
II. COMPACTS
With respect to the use of interstate compacts for the resolution of interstate water disputes, I have dealt with that subject at length in a study for the National Water Commission
in 19711' and in a briefer article in 1973 '5 and do not intend to
duplicate that detailed analysis here. Rather, I propose to survey briefly the use of interstate compacts in the water resources
field, review the conclusions and recommendations contained
in my study for the National Water Commission, and then
amplify on my view that the federal-interstate compact offers
the optimal permanent institutional arrangement for regional
water resources management, particularly in the Western
United States.
Water compacts (other than those relating to navigation
11. 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945).
12. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
13. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
14. J. MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS (1971) (NTIS PB202 998).
15. Muys, Interstate Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planning and
Management, 6 NAT. RES. LAW. 153 (1973).
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and fishing) may be grouped into four categories relating generally to (1) water allocation, (2) pollution control, (3) flood control and planning, and (4) comprehensive water regulation and
project development programs, i.e., principally the federalinterstate compact.
The basic purpose of all 18 existing water allocation compacts is to accomplish an equitable apportionment of the waters of the affected interstate streams. They reflect a number
of different approaches to allocating water rights to the signatory states, but whatever the allocation formula, existing uses
and rights are usually protected. About half of them provide
that the allocations are to include all federal uses, which can
be significant in the western states because of the predominance of federally-owned land and federal water projects constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation under the Reclamation
Act or by the Corps of Engineers under various Congressional
authorizations.
The earliest compacts generally charged the chief water
officials of the compacting states with obtaining and correlating necessary hydrologic data on supply and uses, and authorizing them to agree to such regulations as were necessary to
implement the compact apportionment. More recent compacts, however, provide for the establishment of a permanent
administrative entity to carry out the functions essential for
achieving the compact's objectives.
Some 10 compacts deal with interstate water pollution
control in a variety of ways. The older compacts are single
purpose agreements concerned only with pollution, but the
more recent compacts encompass a more comprehensive approach to water quality problems. All provide for an administrative agency to implement the compact purposes. The powers
conferred on these commissions range from the Potomac River
Basin Commission's rather limited authority to study and recommend remedial actions on pollution problems to the broader
water quality standard-setting and enforcement powers of the
Delaware and Susquehanna commissions.
A handful of flood control and planning compacts, created
generally in response to the federal flood control program of the
1930s in order to promote cooperative state action in that effort, now largely appear to be dead letters.
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The federal-interstate compacts on the Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers are what I have characterized as comprehensive regulatory and project development compacts. Under a
general directive in the Delaware River Basin Compact to
"adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water
conservation, control, use, and management in the basin [and
to] encourage the planning, development, and financing of
water resources projects according to such plans and policies."
The Delaware River Basin Commission is charged with formulating a "comprehensive plan" for the development and use of
the basin's waters, and is endowed with very broad planning,
licensing, regulatory, and project construction powers to aid in
implementing the basin plan. The Susquehanna River Basin
Compact follows a similar format.
In my study for the National Water Commission I evaluated the effectiveness of existing water compacts and compared
the compact mechanism to other institutional approaches to
river basin management. With respect to compact commissions established to monitor or administer water allocations or
to carry out limited functions associated with joint planning or
certain aspects of the states' role in federal flood control programs, I concluded that the performance of most of them was
generally adequate given their relatively modest objectives.
In the water quality area, efforts through interstate compact mechanisms to deal with water pollution problems generally appeared to have been no better or worse than the overall
national effort, and I could draw no general conclusions as to
the impact of the compact approach on particular rivers, although I was impressed with the efforts of ORSANCO on the
Ohio River.'"
As to the federal-interstate compact approach, it was, and
is, my enthusiastic conclusion that the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC) has compiled an impressive record of accomplishment, much of which I am convinced would not have
resulted but for the existence and efforts of DRBC.
16. For an analysis of operative and proposed compacts dealing primarily with
water pollution control see Chambers, Water Pollution Control Through Interstate
Agreement, 1 U. CAL. DAvis L. REv. 43 (1969) and Curlin, The Interstate Water Pollution Compact-PaperTiger or Effective Regulatory Device, 2 EcOL. L.Q. 333 (1972).
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In addition to the evaluation of the record of various compacts, I also examined the potential of the compact as an institutional mechanism for future water resources management
against six legal and political criteria:
1. The availability and adequacy of legal and administrative authority that may be exercised by compact to deal with
problems deemed important by the compacting parties;
2. The degree of difficulty in creating, implementing, and
altering a compact program, including the ability to match function and area and to respond expeditiously to changing needs and
conditions;
3. The degree to which the compact affords meaningful
public participation in planning and the formulation of decisions;
4. The ability to facilitate and achieve productive cooperation and coordination among federal, state, local, and private
interests;
5. Political accountability and responsiveness; and
6. The ability to establish regional visibility and to attract
adequate executive leadership and staff.

In addition I considered a number of traditional arguments
sometimes advanced against interstate compacts and found
them either to be unpersuasive or generally inapplicable to
water compacts. In light of my study, I concluded that the
compact mechanism, specifically the federal-interstate variety, affords the optimum permanent institutional approach to
regional water problems.
Perhaps the chief advantage of the compact approach to
river basin management is its adaptability to the particular
needs of a basin. It is axiomatic that each river basin has its
distinctive physical and political characteristics; such peculiarities demand specific legal approaches. Since a compact
must be the product of agreement among the states, it can be
shaped as the states desire, in accordance with their particular
regional philosophy of appropriate intergovernmental relations. It can be targeted on a single problem, such as water
quality management, or may seek comprehensive, multipurpose goals. Similarly, it may create a permanent administrative entity and endow that entity with such powers as the states
consider appropriate to accomplish their regional objectives,
provided they are consistent with broad national water resource goals.
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Although the states generally possess ample authority to
confer adequate powers on compact commissions, it is difficult
to disagree with one characterization of most traditional water
compacts as creatures of "states jealous of their prerogatives
and niggardly in their grants of authority."' 7 With the exception of the Delaware and Susquehanna compacts, and a few
others, the authority granted to compact commissions has been
extremely limited and their funding, accordingly, as anemic.
What this historic pattern unfortunately seems to reflect
is a lack of commitment on the part of the states to any cooperative regional effort that would require a significant delegation
of power to an interstate entity they may not be able to wholly
control. The irony of this approach is that the more successful
the states have been in hobbling compact agencies in order to
protect their sovereign prerogatives, the more likely it has become that regional water problems will be dealt with by federal
programs wholly superseding state or local authority. If the
states, and particularly the western states, are truly determined to have a stronger role in regional water development,
it seems clear to me that they must recognize and utilize the
potential of the compact as a mechanism for positive action on
regional water problems and confer adequate powers on compact agencies to deal with such problems effectively.
I find little substance to the argument sometimes advanced that the endowment of compact commissions with
broad powers will simply add an unnecessary or undesirable
layer of government between existing state and federal water
agencies. Both state and federal water officials often appear
apprehensive that some of their responsibilities might be
usurped by a regional agency, a reaction which might be
termed the bureaucratic version of the "territorial imperative."
Federal agencies also contend that such regional entities
should not be allowed to preempt federal agency responsibilities for national water programs allegedly requiring uniform,
functional implementation throughout the Nation. This latter
argument assumes that because the Congress has previously
filled the gap left by the states, a point of no return has been
reached. But the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engi17. H. ODUM & H. MOORE, AMERICAN REGIONALSM 206 (1938).
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neers, and the other federal executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions involved in water matters were
established by Congress to meet specific national needs at particular times. There is nothing to preclude Congress from now
deciding that changed conditions or national sentiment-and
I think that there is ample current evidence of both-dictate
that other institutional arrangements, such as regional compact commissions, may be a more appropriate way to implement national water policies than is continued wholesale reliance on federal agencies.
To the extent that there may be a need for overall national
policies on certain water resource matters, there arises a distinctly different issue from the question of the institutional
means by which such policies should be carried out. It is clear
that Congress may utilize any agent it chooses to implement
national programs. Hence, if Congress should elect to have the
national flood control program, or the reclamation program, or
the licensing of nonfederal dams carried out by joint federalstate regional entities of some kind, there is no constitutional
reason why that could not be done. The national policies would
still be articulated in federal legislation binding on the regional
entities, so there would be no subversion of the paramount
national interest. However, if compacts are to be used in attacking regional water quality and other water resource management problems, it will be essential that Congress scrutinize
each compact to determine whether it implements the national
programs provided for in federal law or may serve only to
impede them. For example, with regard to regional water
quality control efforts, the Environmental Protection Agency
has aptly recognized that although "compacts have already
demonstrated their usefulness, and . . .have the potential for
playing a more important role," nevertheless, "a compact
which established dilatory procedures, or which provided an
inadequate commitment of resources from the signatory states,
could have the effect of delaying the establishment of enforceable standards or plans."' 8
18. Hearings on S.907 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 87, 91 (1971), in which the Senate Public Works Committee expressed similar
concern in connection with the proposed Interstate Environment Compact Act. See
also S. REP. No. 92-643, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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A major criticism of compacts is that they require an inordinately long time to negotiate and effectuate by state ratification and Congressional consent. Although the track record of
the various kinds of water compacts is uneven on this score,
there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the
compact is not inherently more cumbersome and timeconsuming in its creation and change than other institutional
approaches to comparable water resource problems. Most delays appear to have been caused by specific policy controversies
which are not unique to the use of the compact mechanism, but
also plague efforts at problem solving through interagency
committees, river basin planning commissions, and Congressional legislation. The fact that it took the Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation 16 months to consummate a
one-page power marketing agreement on the Missouri River is
illustrative. I should also note that 12 years elapsed between
the filing of Arizona's complaint in the Supreme Court in 1951
in Arizona v. California until the Court's decision in 1963, 11and
the post-decree proceedings to resolve the question of "present
perfected rights" are still pending.
The recent experiences with the Delaware and Susquehanna compacts demonstrate that even relatively complex interstate agreements can be negotiated and approved with impressive swiftness, given proper incentive on the part of the
states. An obvious problem, however, is that a compact must
find acceptance in the legislatures of all the compacting states
and Congress, thus affording multiple opportunities for delay
or frustration of the compact plan. Similarly, the rigid constraints which have been placed on compact agencies by their
creators in some cases have necessitated a return to the legislatures for additional authority with the concomitant delays associated with that process. Nevertheless, given the implementation of recommendations made to the National Water Commission for (1) a more explicit statement of Congressional policy on water compacts, (2) more constructive federal participation in compact negotiations, and (3) some liberalization of the
state ratification and Congressional consent process, the potential for significantly expediting the compact negotiation and
approval process appears excellent.
19. 373 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1963).
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Finally, I want to emphasize why I recommended to the
National Water Commission that the federal-interstate compact should be endorsed as the preferred permanent institutional arrangement for regional water resources planning and
management.
The great goal of river basin planning and management
over the last half-century has been to achieve meaningful coordination of federal and nonfederal water resources plans and
actions. With respect to interstate waters, the search has also
been for a mechanism to provide a regional perspective to the
development and implementation of a comprehensive plan.
The interstate compact always has provided a theoretical
means for achieving those two objectives and, starting about 30
years ago, began to be used to provide the permanent administrative mechanism lacking in more informal approaches, such
as interagency committees. However, the compact approach
has traditionally evidenced important shortcomings. A major
one relates to the role of the federal government. The broad
constitutional powers of the federal government over the development, use, and management of the nation's water resources
inevitably make it the controlling force in the success or failure
of cooperative state efforts to deal with regional water problems. It is ever present, either as the provider of essential hydrologic data, as a de facto river master through its construction and control of reclamation and flood control projects or
the Federal Power Commission's licensing of nonfederal hydroelectic projects, or as the ultimate regulator of activities
affecting a river's quality through the Environmental Protection Agency's administration of the federal water pollution control program. Where its land ownership is significant, as in the
West, its claims to water for consumptive use on its lands or
for minimum streamflows to maintain important in-stream
environmental values is a significant aspect of the regional
water picture. Similarly, the activities carried out on federal
lands by the land management agencies or their private licensees, lessees, and permittees have an important impact on
water quality. Yet the federal government has neither been a
party to the traditional compacts nor been formally committed
in any way to support the compact programs.
Most of the water allocation compacts and several of the
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older pollution control compacts merely invite the President to
appoint a federal representative to sit as a neutral, nonvoting
chairman of these commissions, occasionally granting him the
right to cast decisive votes when the states cannot agree. But
the federal government in those situations appears to be little
more than an honored observer, without obligation to see that
federal plans or programs in the region are coordinated to the
maximum extent feasible with those of the states. Obviously,
a compact plan for an interstate river basin cannot be
"comprehensive" if it does not encompass federal water planning as an integral part of the effort, nor can it serve any
meaningful function unless all interests in a basin, and particularly the federal government, are committed to carry out their
respective programs in accordance with it.
A second major shortcoming is that the member states of
the traditional interstate compacts do not appear to have been
really committed to a regional approach to river basin problems. Their participation has been cautious and hesitant, concerned primarily with preservation or promotion of their individual interests. Thus, one commentator has concluded that
"the interstate compact approach to river basin development
therefore tends to accentuate state and local parochialism at
the expense of regional and national goals in water use
policy."20 In short, the traditional interstate compact approach
has been "regional" in name only.
It was against this generally discouraging backdrop of interstate compact performance that the federal-interstate compact on the Delaware emerged in 1961 to provide both (1) the
long-sought linkage between federal and state planning and
program implementation, 2 and (2) the regional emphasis lacking in earlier compact approaches. The Delaware River Basin
Compact embodied two significant innovations in the compact
approach to interstate river basin problems. First, it estab20.

W. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PRocEss 177 (1965).
21. The Compact preamble states that its foundation rationale was that unified
regional development and control were essential because of "the duplicating, overlapping, and uncoordinated administration of some forty-three State agencies, fourteen
interstate agencies, and nineteen Federal agencies which exercise a multiplicity of
powers and duties resulting in a splintering of authorities and responsibilities." Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961) [hereinafter cited

as DRBC].
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lished a structure for meaningful comprehensive planning by
including the United States as a signatory party and imposing
significant coordinating constraints on both the states and the
federal government. Second, it assured a more regionallyoriented approach through a generous grant of powers to the
Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) and by providing
for the injection of a broader perspective of basin problems
through the federal government's active participation in the
compact program.
To assure that development projects in the basin are in
general conformity with the comprehensive plan developed by
the DRBC, section 3.8 of the Compact confers a "licensing"
power on the DRBC by providing that "no project having a
substantial effect on the water resources of the basin shall
hereafter be undertaken by any person, corporation or governmental authority unless it shall have been first submitted to
and approved by the Commission." 22 The Commission must
approve any project which it finds "would not substantially
impair or conflict with the comprehensive plan," and a project not meeting that standard may be either disapproved or
approved subject to modification to make it consistent with
the plan.
In addition to its comprehensive licensing authority, the
DRBC is granted broad regulatory and financing powers (other
than the power to tax) and is even authorized to construct,
develop, operate, and maintain "all projects, facilities, properties, activities and services, determined by the commission to
be necessary, convenient or useful for the purposes of [the]
compact." 3
The DRBC's powers have been exercised in consonance
with "the purpose of the signatory parties to preserve and utilize the functions, powers and duties of existing offices and
agencies of government to the extent not inconsistent with the
compact," and the Commission is "authorized and directed to
utilize and employ such offices and agencies for the purpose of
this compact to the fullest extent it finds feasible and
advantageous. ' 24 Thus each state's authority is preserved to
22. Id.
23. DRBC at §3.6(a).
24. DRBC at §1.5.

1976

THE FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT

the maximum extent compatible with the Compact's objectives.
One of the unique features of the Compact is the DRBC's
power to allocate the waters of the basin among the signatory
states in accordance with the doctrine of equitable apportionment,25 a provision designed as an alternative to (1) what was
considered to be the relatively inflexible apportionments
made by the traditional water allocation compacts and (2)
litigation in the United States Supreme Court. This allocation power, as well as all other DRBC authority, may not be
used to adversely affect the rights and obligations of the states
under a 1954 Supreme Court decree," other than by unanimous
agreement.2 7 The DRBC's power to make interstate allocations
of water is supplemented by its authority to regulate withdrawals and diversions of surface and groundwaters in certain
situations.
The Compact mandates interstate and federal-state cooperation through the constraints which DRBC approval of the
comprehensive plan places on the water resource programs of
the signatory parties. All water projects in the basin are required to conform to the DRBC's comprehensive plan. Specifically, with respect to federal projects, a reservation of the consent legislation provides that "whenever a comprehensive plan,
or any part or revision thereof, has been adopted with the concurrence of the member appointed by the President, the exercise of any powers conferred by law on any officer, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States with regard to water and
related land resources in the Delaware River Basin shall not
substantially conflict with any such portion of such
comprehensive plan."" Since the content of the comprehensive
plan is determined by majority vote of the DRBC, on which the
federal government has a single vote with each of the state
representatives, Congress has provided an escape valve in its
consent legislation which provides that the federal government
25. DRBC at §3.3.
26. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
27. DRBC at § §3.3(a), 3.4, 3.5.
28. DRBC at §15.1(S)(2). "Concurrence" of the federal member is presumed unless he files a notice of nonconcurrence with the Commission within 60 days after notice
of action with respect to the comprehensive plan.

322

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICYV

VOL. 6:307

need not shape its projects to a plan with which it is not in
agreement, authorizing the President to "suspend, modify or
delete" any provision of the comprehensive plan affecting federal interests when he "shall find. . . that the national interest
so requires."
The Compact's procedural requirements are designed to
afford maximum opportunity for the expression of public opinion on significant matters prior to DRBC decisions. Thus public hearings are required as a precondition to almost all important DRBC actions, and all meetings are required to be open
to the public. 9 In addition, the Commission is authorized, but
not directed, to establish advisory committees representing a
broad spectrum of water resource interest groups.3
The DRBC has compiled an impressive record of accomplishments over the past 15 years 3' which are particularly noteworthy when viewed against the obstacles it has faced, particularly its role in breaking much new ground as the first federalinterstate compact, the broad responsibilities it has been delegated under the Compact in areas which all merit serious attention, its relatively modest financing, and the distraction of
the 1965-1966 Northeast drought emergency which commanded much of its time and resources in those formative
years. Nevertheless, it has moved forward in many areas. It
played an important role in alleviating the 1965-1966 Northeast
drought crisis. It has developed a comprehensive plan for the
basin and has reviewed some 2500 proposed projects for their
compatibility with that plan. A basin-wide water quality control program has been established, including regional sewage
collection and treatment works. The DRBC has assumed responsibility for the cost of nonfederal water supply features in
federal reservoirs in the basin, thus serving as a middleman
between the Corps of Engineers and state and local ultimate
users. As a corollary to that program it has instituted charges
for basin-wide water withdrawals for consumptive use in excess
29. DRBC at § § 13.1, 14.2, 14.4(b).
30. DRBC at §3.10.
31. For a general review of DRBC operations, see MuYs, supra note 14, at 157-92;
see also U.S. ADVISORY COMM.

ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MULTI-STATE

REGIONALISM 95-96, 99-108, 111-20 (1972). The DRBC publishes an excellent annual
report detailing the highlights of its operations.
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of 1971 levels. It has made studies of water supply and demand
in the basin, a major component of which is a Commissionmandated master power plant siting study prepared by electric
utilities in the basin. The DRBC has laid the groundwork for
comprehensive flood plain regulation. In recent years, it has
placed increasing emphasis on environmental values, and in
1975 it took the almost unprecedented step of recommending
Congressional deauthorization of the major proposed reservoir
project in the basin, the controversial Tocks Island Dam. It has
been a useful mechanism for facilitating public participation
in the planning of projects in the basin and is providing a
basin-wide point of view for balancing diverse values and exploring various alternatives to proposed projects.
Both in theory and practice the Delaware River Basin
Compact has shown that disparate federal, state, and local
elements in water resources development can be forged into a
comprehensive, cooperative, and consciously directed regional
program. While it is too early to tell whether the similar compact on the Susquehanna will be as successful, at this point the
framework for regional coordination under the federalinterstate compact mechanism appears unrivalled by any existing or proposed institutional arrangement.
Although some jurisdictional problems in the federalinterstate compact approach are still in the process of being
resolved, this compact approach justifies serious and thoughtful consideration by other regions. It merits particular consideration in the western public land states where the federal
government's dominant role as landowner and water master
makes the goals of the federal-interstate compact particularly
relevant. It is meaningless to talk of comprehensive planning
and management of water and land resources in the West if the
federal government is not to be an integral part of the effort.
Effective water and land use planning requires a fully cooperative, coordinated effort among the federal government, the
states and, perhaps most important, the Indian tribes who are
probably holding the biggest and most secure water rights in
the West. Almost all of the water allocation compacts were
agreed to before the full impact of the so-called "reservation
doctrine" of federal and Indian water rights was announced by
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the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California in 1963.32 Consequently, I think it safe to assume that the estimated water
requirements which undoubtedly formed the basis of the allocations to the compacting states were grossly understated for
those states with substantial areas of reserved federal and Indian land. I know from my National Water Commission study
that this was the case with respect to the Upper Colorado River
Compact. Whether the conflicting equities in those situations
can be fairly balanced remains to be seen. What is clear is that
federal and Indian claims should be fully reflected in, and
bound by, any future efforts at compact allocations or renegotiation of present allocations.
Similarly, future compact allocations or reallocations
must reflect not only federal rights and obligations as landowner and trustee of Indian rights, but should be made with
careful consideration, to the extent possible, of the impact of
the national water pollution control program on consumptive
use water rights. It would be idle to allocate quantities of water
to a particular state or states if physical and geographic factors
or use patterns, coupled with the limitation of water quality
control standards under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, would never permit those waters to be put to maximum
beneficial use.
If the federal government were a signatory party to a compact and therefore bound by it the same as each of the states,
to the extent constitutionally permissible, the federal representative would serve as the focal point for all federal interests,
whether consumptive use rights, in-stream and other environmental values, water quality control, flood control, project construction and licensing, and the like. That kind of arrangement
would compel coordination and sanity in comprehensive river
basin development, and I would hope it would be embraced by
both the states and the federal government.
However, in conversations with state water officials about
the prospects of such an approach in the West I have sensed
an attitude of mixed despair and hostility toward the concept,
apparently a residual legacy of antipathy toward the federal
dominance of land and water use policy in the West.
32. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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While I can understand this attitude, I believe that it is
shortsighted. The fact is that old "States' Rights" arguments
are futile, since the federal government, both as a legal and
practical matter, wields paramount power in the West in land
and water (and now air) 33 resources. Although periodic gestures
of comity and cooperation are made by various federal officials,
they are only as substantial as the tenure of those officials.
What is needed is a Congressionally approved regional institutional arrangement which will mandate cooperative, coordinated action by federal agencies in conformity with the views
of the affected basin states, while necessarily reserving the federal government's right to assert the paramount national prerogative in appropriate situations. That vehicle, in my view, is
the federal-interstate compact now operating so successfully on
the Delaware.
III. CONCLUSION
Over 50 years ago Harvard law professor (later Supreme
Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter collaborated with Harvard
Dean James M. Landis in a classic article advocating the
"imaginative adaptation of the compact idea" to regional problems. Their conclusion is appropriate to our times:
The overwhelming difficulties confronting modern society
must not be at the mercy of the false antithesis embodied in the
shibboleths "States-Rights" and "National Supremacy." We
must not deny ourselves new or unfamiliar modes in realizing
national ideals. Our regions are realities. Political thinkers must
respond to these realities. Instead of leading to parochialism, it
will bring a fresh ferment of political thought whereby national
aims may be achieved through various forms of political
4
adjustments.1
33. Under the EPA's nondeterioration regulations promulgated under the Clean
Air Act, as well as even more stringent statutory amendments which have been proposed, constraints on future development in the public land states are dependent in
many cases on the impact of various activities on certain classes of federal lands. See
40 C.F.R. §52.21 (1976); H.R. 10498, §108 & S.3219, §6, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976)
(House and Senate versions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1976). Although each
body passed its version of the bill, the Conference Committee Report was not acted
on before adjournment. H. REP. No. 94-1242, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
34. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925).
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Appendix:
Compacts Relating to the Planning and Management of
Interstate Water Resources

I.

WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS

Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-82, 63 Stat. 145
(1949) (signed by the States 14 Dec. 1948).
Arkansas River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 89-789,
§107(a), 80 Stat. 1409 (1966) (signed by the States 31 Mar.
1965).
Arkansas River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 93-152, 87
Stat. 569 (1973) (signed by the States 16 Mar. 1970).
Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-348, 72 Stat. 38
(1958) (signed by the States 4 Feb. 1955).
Belle Fourche River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78-236, 58 Stat.
94 (1944) (signed by the States 18 Feb. 1943).
Canadian River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-345, 66 Stat. 74
(1952) (signed by the States 6 Dec. 1950).
Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § §37-61101 et seq. (1973), approved by Congress, Pub. L. No. 70-642,
§13, 45 Stat. 1057, 1059 (1928) (signed by the States 24 Nov.
1922). Text may be found at 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
Costilla Creek Compact, as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-198,
77 Stat. 350 (1963) (signed by the States 30 Sept. 1944).
Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, Pub. L. No.
92-308, 86 Stat. 193 (1972) (signed by the States 25 Jan. 1971).
Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-222, 71
Stat. 497 (1957).
La Plata River Compact, Pub. L. No. 68-346, 43 Stat. 796
(1925) (signed by the States 27 Nov. 1922).
Pecos River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-91, 63 Stat. 159
(1949) (signed by the States 3 Dec. 1948).
Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86
(1943) (signed by the States 31 Dec. 1942).
Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, 53 Stat 785
(1939) (signed by the States 18 Mar. 1938).
Sabine River Compact, Pub. L. No. 83-578, 68 Stat. 690
(1954) (signed by the States 26 Jan. 1953), as amended, Pub.
L. No. 87-418, 76 Stat. 34 (1962).
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Snake River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-464, 64 Stat. 29
(1950) (signed by the States 10 Oct. 1949).
South Platte River Compact, Pub. L. No. 69-37, 44 Stat.
195 (1926) (signed by the States 3 May 1923).
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-37,
63 Stat. 31 (1949).
Upper Niobara Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83
Stat. 86 (1969).
Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat.
663 (1951) (signed by the States 8 Dec. 1950).
II. SINGLE PURPOSE POLLUTION CONTROL COMPACTS
New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, Pub. L. No. 80-292, 61 Stat. 682 (1947).
New York Harbor (Tri-State) Interstate Sanitation Compact, Pub. L. No. 74-62, 49 Stat. 932 (1935).
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Pub. L. No.
76-739, 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
Potomac River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-93, 54 Stat.
748 (194.0) (signed by the States 16 Apr. 1940), as amended,
Pub. L. No. 91-407, 84 Stat. 856 (1970).
Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact,
Pub. L. No. 85-734, 72 Stat. 823 (1958).
Ill. PLANNING AND FLOOD CONTROL COMPACTS
Connecticut River Flood Control Compact, Pub. L. No.
83-52, 67 Stat. 45 (1953).
Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat.
414 (1968).
Merrimack River Flood Control Compact, Pub. L. No. 8523, 71 Stat. 18 (1957).
Red River of the North Compact, Pub. L. No. 75-456, 52
Stat. 151 (1938) (signed by the States 23 June 1937).
Thames River Flood Control Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-526,
72 Stat. 364 (1958).
Wabash Valley Compact, Pub. L. No. 86-375, 73 Stat. 695
(1959) (approved by Indiana on 26 Feb. 1959 and by Illinois on
20 Mar. 1959).
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Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention District Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-181, 81 Stat. 553 (1967)
(approved by Pennsylvania on 2 Aug. 1967 and by West Virginia on 1 Mar. 1967).
IV.

MULTIPURPOSE REGULATORY COMPACTS

Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75
Stat. 689 (1961).
Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-743, 64
Stat. 569 (1950), as amended, Pub. L. No. 86-303, 73 Stat. 583
(1959).
Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575,
84 Stat. 1509 (1970).

Transmountain Diversions of Water in
Colorado
RAPHAEL J. MOSES*

Most of Colorado's internal water problems arise from the
fact that Colorado is a rectangular state, established by Congress, in its infinite wisdom, without regard to river basin
drainages.' Thus we find ourselves, on our Centennial anniversary, with most of the people living east of the Continental
Divide, and most of the water running in streams on the western side of that same divide.
The exterior boundaries of Colorado may be great for cartographers, but they are a constant source of friction for water
users. Not only does the western half of Colorado lie in the
drainage of the Colorado River and its tributaries, but North
Park should, geographically, be part of Wyoming; and the San
* A.B. (1935), LL.B. (1937), J.D. (1972), University of Colorado; Visiting Lecturer
and Regent Emeritus at the University of Colorado; Consultant to Colorado Water
Conservation Board. The author was the Special Assistant Attorney General for the
Rio Grande Compact, 1957-58. Member of the firm, Moses, Wittemeyer, Harrison &
Woodruff, Boulder, Colorado.
1. The writer became so fascinated with the background of Colorado's "rectilinearism," if a word may be coined, that a long detour in preparation occurred. Unfortunately, there appears to be little to indicate how Colorado's shape evolved. L.R.
Hafen, in a 1926 article, mentions it only briefly. He said:
The bill for creation of "Colorado Territory" introduced in the previous
session (April 3, 1860) was brought up in the Senate January 30, 1861,
and the name changed to "Idaho Territory." The original bill had designated the Green and the Colorado rivers as the western boundary of the
Territory, while the other boundaries were identical with those of the
present state. This western boundary was first changed (in the bill) to
the 33d meridian and finally to the 32d (from Washington). The bill was
again considered February 4th and Senator Wilson "at the request of the
delegate from that Territory" proposed to substitute the name "Colorado" for "Idaho." The bill was so amended and immediately passed.
The bill now went to the House and was considered on the 18th. The
Delegate from New Mexico objected to having Colorado include that
portion of New Mexico north of the 37th parallel, but his objections were
disregarded. The bill with minor changes was passed by the House and
now returned to the Senate. The Senate concurred in the amendment on
the 26th and the President approved the measure two days later. ...
Hafen, Steps to Statehood in Colorado, 3 THE COLORADO MAGAZINE 97,106 (1926). It
should be noted that even if the western boundary of Colorado had been the Green
and Colorado Rivers, the transmountain diversion problems would not have been
eliminated. Only by making the Continental Divide the western boundary would the
problem go away.
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Luis Valley, ethnically, historically, and geographically should
have been part of New Mexico.
Originally, no legal inhibitions barred transmountain diversions of water designed to overcome quirks of geography.
The Colorado Constitution provides:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the
water for the same purpose . .. .

In Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company,3 the landmark
decision which resulted in what is now commonly known as the
"Colorado Doctrine," our Supreme Court said:
[W]e hold that, in the absence of express statutes to the contrary, the first appropriator of water from a natural stream for a
beneficial purpose has , . . . a prior right thereto, to the extent
of such appropriation.
[Tihe right to water acquired by priority of appropriation
thereof is not in any way dependent upon the locus of its application to the beneficial use designed.

Coffin itself involved a transmountain diversion, albeit a
very low mountain. The Left Hand Ditch Company had taken
water out of the St. Vrain Creek across a divide into the watershed of Left Hand Creek, and Coffin, a downstream riparian
owner on the St. Vrain, complained. The analogy applies to the
Continental Divide as well. A prior appropriator from the
Western Slope to the Eastern Slope retains his priority, and the
place of use is not material.
Colorado has had many private transmountain diversions.
Some of the most significant are the diversion from the Laramie River to the Poudre watershed, the substantial Twin Lakes
Diversion from the headwaters of the Roaring Fork to Lake
Creek-a tributary of the Arkansas, the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel
in the same vicinity, and smaller ones from the Pine and
Piedra, tributaries of the San Juan, into the headwaters of the
Rio Grande.
By far the largest transmountain diversions have been
made by cities and by water conservancy districts. The largest
transmountain diversion in the state is that of the Northern
2. CoLo. CONST. art 14, §6.
3. 6 Colo. 443, 19 P. 466 (1882).
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Colorado Water Conservancy District, some 340,000 acre-feet
diverted from the headwaters of the Colorado River into northeastern Colorado by way of the Adams Tunnel. This Bureau of
Reclamation Project, commonly known as the Colorado-Big
Thompson, is controlled by operating principles set out in
United States Senate documents.' Plans are underway by the
Municipal Subdistrict of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District to increase this amount by 30,000 acre-feet by
means of the Six Cities Project.
Going south along the Continental Divide, we next encounter the transmountain diversions by the City and County
of Denver, consisting of existing divisions through the Moffat
and Roberts Tunnels diverting respectively from the Fraser
River and the Blue River and their tributaries, and proposed
diversions from the Piney and the Gore. The proposed diversions would utilize the existing Dillon Reservoir and Roberts
Tunnel.
Colorado Springs and Aurora have joined together to construct the first phase of the Homestake Project, which takes
water from Homestake Creek, a tributary of the Eagle, through
a tunnel into the Upper Arkansas. The second phase of this
project has been deferred because of the additional costs associated with additional restrictive environmental constraints.
The Frying Pan-Arkansas diversion will take 67,000 acrefeet of water from the upper tributaries of the Frying Pan River
and Hunter Creek through the Boustead Tunnel into enlarged
Turquoise Reservoir on the Upper Arkansas, there to enlarged
Twin Lakes Reservoir on Lake Creek, a tributary of the Arkan4. In his excellent article entitled Compensatory Storage, 22 RoCKY MTN. L. REV.
452, 455 (1950), Charles J. Beise expresses it this way:
At the time the foregoing developments occurred, one individual
representing the West Slope assumed an outstanding role as protector of
that area. Congressman Edward T. Taylor, as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House, was, by virtue of his position, able to
enforce his edicts and to preclude the development of any publicly financed project which would divert water from his congressional district
to the East Slope, unless the proponents of such project were willing to
make such concessions as he deemed necessary. This is no criticism of
Congressman Taylor, who was sincere in his belief that an area developing more slowly needed protection from one developing more rapidly.
Thus, because of Congressman Taylor's political prominence, the West
Slope was placed in an unusually strong bargaining position.
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sas River, for irrigation and municipal use in the valley of the
Arkansas and Fountain Creek.
In the 1930s, the sponsors of the Colorado-Big Thompson
were pushing strongly for authorization. Concerned citizens of
the Western Slope, visualizing the loss of their water to the
Eastern Slope and buttressed by the fact that their representative, Congressman Ed Taylor, was chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, were able to accomplish two things:
the establishment of the Colorado Water Conservation Board
as the State's policymaking entity in water matters, and the
formation of water conservancy districts.5
The act authorizing formation of conservancy districts
contains the first area-of-origin protective legislation ever
adopted in Colorado. The act provides:
[A]ny works or facilities planned and designed for the exportation of water from the natural basin of the Colorado river and its
tributaries in Colorado, by any district created under this article,
shall be subject to the provisions of the Colorado river compact
and the "Boulder Canyon Project Act." Any such works or facilities shall be designed, constructed, and operated in such manner
that the present appropriations of water, and in addition thereto
prospective uses of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive use purposes, including consumptive uses for domestic,
mining, and industrial purposes, within the natural basin of the
Colorado River in the State of Colorado, from which water is
exported, will not be impaired nor increased in cost at the expense of the water users within the natural basin. The facilities
and other means for the accomplishment of said purpose shall be
incorporated in and made a part of any project plans for the
exportation of water from said natural basin in Colorado.

Sec. 1(c) of that same act provides:
To have and to exercise the power of eminent domain and dominant eminent domain and in the manner provided by law for the
condemnation of private property for public use to take any property necessary to the exercise of the powers granted in this article;
except that such district shall not have or exercise the power of
eminent domain over or by means thereof to acquire the title to
or beneficial use of vested water rights for transmountain diversion, and in connection therewith such district shall not have the
power to carry or transport water in transmountain diversion, the
5. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-45-118(1)(b)(iv) (1973).
6. Id.

1976

TRANSMOUNTAIN

DIVERSIONS

title to which has been acquired by any municipality by virtue
of eminent domain proceedings against any such vested rights.

As a result of these provisions, and the operating principles
of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project,' Green Mountain Reservoir was constructed at Eastern Slope water users' expense,
as a compensating reservoir for the Big Thompson Project.
Similarly, Ruedi Reservoir was constructed, under the provisions of the same statute and of the operating principles of
the Frying Pan-Arkansas Project,' as a compensating reservoir
for the Frying Pan-Arkansas Project.
Subsequently, the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
responsive to continued Western Slope concerns, adopted a
resolution that it would approve no further federally financed
transmountain diversions until the total water requirements of
the Watern Slope had been determined.9 To date, such a
determination has not been made.
The increased concern on the part of Western Slope residents about the inadequacy of water supplies for Western Slope
development will be a major obstacle to future major transmountain diversions. However, increased environmental constraints pose an even greater threat to such diversions.

For example, the inclusion by the Congress of a substantial
part of Denver's proposed Eagle-Piney watershed in the Gore
Creek Wilderness Area 0 will, in the opinion of the Denver
Water Board, increase the cost of that project by several
hundred million dollars. Such environmental expenditures
may render the project economically impracticable.
The necessity for the sponsor of a transmountain diverter
to obtain federal rights of way across the federal forest lands
that blanket the Continental Divide may further impede the
construction of such projects. Colorado Springs and Aurora
7. S. Doc. No. 80, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).

8. H.R. Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
9. See MINUTES, Colorado Water Conservation Board (April 1969).
10. Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-352, 90 Stat. 870 (1976) (to be codified in
16 U.S.C. §§1131n., 1132n.).
11. Colorado Springs and Aurora have each acquired other water rights in lieu of
presently developing the second stage of Homestake. See, e.g., Preliminary Official
Statement and Notice of Sale, $27,000,000 City of Colorado Springs Utilities Improvement Revenue Bonds, Series 1976A (released July 31, 1976).
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have already been advised that materials, supplies, and equipment for the second phase of their Homestake Project will have
to be helicoptered to the site. The additional costs, over the
estimated cost, together with inflation, have combined to cause
these cities to defer construction of the second phase. Instead,
these cities are purchasing additional water rights formerly
used for agriculture." The problems which arise from this kind
of a policy decision could be the subject of an entire additional
paper.
In 1973, the Colorado legislature approved the instream
appropriation of water by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board, on behalf of the people:
For the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations,
"beneficial use" shall also include the appropriation by the State
of Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum
flows between specific points or levels for and on natural streams
and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment to
a reasonable degree.' 2

Although the constitutionality of this legislation is, as of the
moment, untested, the Water Conservation Board has blanketed the Western Slope with applications for instream decrees
which will effectively bar future filings for transmountain diversions.
What are the ethics of transmountain diversions? I suspect
that most people, regardless of which side of the mountain they
live on, sympathize with the Western Slope's desire to keep the
water over there. This feeling undoubtedly permitted the passage of the area-of-origin legislation earlier referred to. 3
It should be noted that such legislation refers only to transmountain diversions by water conservation districts, so that
major cities are not restricted save by the environmental constraints which translate into costs which make the economics
questionable.
We have always maintained that water seeks its own economic level, or as it is sometimes expressed, "water flows uphill
to money." However, there is a limit to the money available,
particularly where alternate choices exist, and they do exist.
12. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-103(4) (1973).
13. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §37-45-118(1)(b)(iv) (1973).
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If one desired to be fanciful, he could resort to what I call
the "reverse domino" scenario. That goes something like this:
Western Colorado will agree to transmountain diversions the
day that California agrees to forego its Colorado River entitlement. That will happen only when all of Southern California's
needs are supplied from Northern California. Northern California will let its water go when Oregon agrees to replace it. Oregon will replace the water when Washington agrees to furnish
the water Oregon gives up, and Washington will do this only if
Canada foregoes its Columbia River rights. Canada will act
only if the flow of the MacKenzie is reversed to supply the
Columbia needs, and that will only happen when the United
States supplies Canada with water from the Yukon.
Everyone who thinks any of these events will soon occur,
please stand up.
In short, the day of major transmountain diversions of
water in Colorado has passed, and we are unlikely to see built
even those that have been on the drawing board for years.
Politics, ethics, economics, and environmental concerns all
raise obstacles. Any one is probably enough. The combination
is overwhelming.

COMMENTS
Water Law and the Public Interest:
A Commentary
ROBERT EMMET CLARK*

I was going to address you as "fellow students of water
problems and fellow slaves of the mythical marketplace," but
the two need not be equated. My place on this program is one
that I enjoy, that of a gadfly and a critic.
Some of you know that I have been a member of the bar
of Arizona and New Mexico for 30 years. Many of you know
that I have been in Arizona for the last 12 years; I went there
for one year to be a visiting professor, and we are still there! I
found something I could really criticize-namely, the Arizona
water law, which is terrible.
When I was in New Mexico, we always used to have something to say about Texas; now, in this gathering, I think I
should say something about Arizona. And what I have to say
is pretty bad. You may have read the last Arizona Supreme
Court decision that emphasizes exactly what Mr. Ogilvie of the
Denver Water Board has discussed-the plight of municipal
water users. I am especially pleased that he discussed municipal suppliers, because I feel like a prophet on that subject.
While the farmers are going to grow pecans-which take about
seven acre-feet per year-the mines are theoretically going to
be shut down for lack of sufficient water, and the city of Tucson
is going to be left somewhere in the middle.' Obviously, some
reevaluation of our water priorities will soon be necessary.
I should also like to make a disclaimer here. Some of the
people on this panel represent particular interest groups. I do
not represent any interest other than the critical ideas of a
teacher and an opportunity to disagree with my long-time
friend, Frank Trelease, about the role of public management-a concept that has been found in all systems that
evolved from the primitive prior appropriation doctrine.
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
1. Farmers Inv. Co. v. Pima Mining Co., 111 Ariz. 56, 523 P.2d 482 (1974).
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The comparative system outlined by Professor Trelease
emphasizes what makes this subject both serious and interesting. Water law demonstrates that jurisprudential studies are
not high-level, metaphysical, or theoretical. The law of necessity, or of utility, is evident in most water law systems around
the world. Thus, ever since the time of Mesopotamia and
Egypt, the visible sources of the rivers have been the sources
used, and the parties using them acquired the right to continue
their uses.
Three questions may be asked in this jurisprudential context:
(1) What are the sources of the law? Can a man with a
shovel and some enterprise using the stream to grow some frijoles be one? Should he be one?
(2) How does the law change? How does it grow? How
does it develop? The permit system and its many variations
might be one instructive example in this regard.
(3) What is the purpose of the law? Is it the purpose of
the law of Arizona to ensure that the farmers will have water
when others do not? Clearly, that is not the purpose, and
clearly the legislation in Arizona will have to be changed.
A review of these juridprudential concerns further demonstrates my point: we must have a better system of public management of all resources, not just water resources. Professor
Trelease knows that the prior appropriation system is no longer
in its pure form, that it has been modified by statute, and that
the modifications are directed toward greater public management. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court, early in this century, made one of the strongest statements about public management in a case involving the permit system.
But, greater representation of the public's interest in water
allocation is still necessary. We can no longer allow the pressures of special-interest groups to determine, one against the
other, which interest shall prevail. This must be changed and
is being changed. When I speak of the public management
system I realize that Professor Trelease thinks that is a system
of the God-damn bureaucrat and the wise administrator, which
in his mind are the same thing.
But the marketplace is a wonderful thing to talk about; it
a
is wonderful myth. The economists have an objective stan-
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dard that we in the law do not, since we deal in "weasel words"
like "justice," "fairness," "equality," and "equity." The economists use "money" and they use it to measure love, and debt,
and water rights. The economists cannot adequately measure
the law's concerns, and the marketplace cannot be allowed to
dictate the law's functions. Public participation and management is sorely needed in the water decisionmaking system.

Legal Restraints and Responses to the
Allocation and Distribution of Water
MICHAEL

D.

WHITE*

The legal aspects of water allocation and distribution are
governed by three variable factors:
1. The law being applied-which could be state,
interstate, federal, or international;
2. The legal classification of the water involved-an
artificial distinction between surface and underground stream waters on one hand and underground
percolating water on the other; and
3. Whether one is dealing with the initial allocation
or a second generation allocation of water.
I. THE LAW BEING APPLIED AND THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF
WATER

The first two factors, the law which is being applied and
the legal classification of the water involved, are inextricably
entangled. As will be explained below, the legal classifications
of water depend on the jurisdiction involved. Similarly, how
allocation and distribution of waters are made depends in turn
on their legal classification. The best way to approach this
briar patch is to address in turn each level of law involved:
state, interstate, federal, and international.
A. State Law
There are at least 50 different systems of water law in the
United States. Although certain jurisdictional types can be
fairly easy to identify, no two states are exactly the same. As a
starting point, however, most states classify water into two
broad categories: stream water and groundwater. Many jurisdictions further divide groundwater into two types: underground streams and percolating water.
1. Stream Water
There are three general types of jurisdictions when it
comes to the allocation and distribution of stream water: prior
* Member of the firm White & Burke, Denver, Colorado; lecturer at the University of Denver College of Law.
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appropriation, riparian, and those that mix appropriation and
riparian.
(a.) The Appropriation Doctrine
The appropriation doctrine has as its basic tenet the familiar maxim of "first-in-time, first-in-right." This simply means
that the person who first uses water will always have the overriding or senior right to continue the use of that water. Similarly, the second person to use water from a stream has the
second most senior right. Subsequent users (or "appropriators") are accorded increasingly junior water rights until there
is no water available for anyone to use. The phenomenon of a
large number of water rights having various degrees of relative
seniority is called the priority system.
The prior appropriation doctrine is followed in those portions of the country where water is scarce and, like tax law, it
is established primarily by statutes which are frequently interpreted by case law. Nine states recognize a pure prior appropriation doctrine: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. These nine states
are further divided into two jurisdictional types: the mandate
version of the prior appropriation doctrine (which now includes
only Colorado, but formerly included Montana) and the permit
version of the prior appropriation doctrine, which has been
adopted by all the other western states.
Under the mandate version as it exists in Colorado, the
Constitution establishes an individual right to appropriate
water. While water rights may be created by individual acts,
the priorities for those rights can be established only by court
decree. The process of obtaining a decree or priority for a water
right in Colorado is commonly referred to as "adjudication."
Adjudications formerly took place in the district courts
throughout the State of Colorado. Now, however, they are conducted only in seven "water courts," one for each of the major
river basins in the state.
Under the permit version of the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights are not created by individual act but are,
instead, awarded in the form of permits and/or certificates by
various state administrative officials.
(b.) The Riparian Doctrine
Riparian water right systems exist in approximately thirty
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states, most of which are the more humid states in the Midwest
and East. In theory, at least, these states are divided into two
jurisdictional versions of the riparian doctrine: the natural flow
and the reasonable use versions.
The natural flow version, which is rapidly going out of
style and may well be extinct in all states by now, embodies
the older concept that an owner of land alongside the stream
is entitled to the maintenance of that stream in its natural
condition with respect to both the quantity and quality of the
stream flow.
Since about the turn of the century, courts have acted to
modify the harsh rule of the natural flow version which, by its
very nature, discouraged or prohibited consumptive uses of
water. This judicial tinkering resulted in what is now generally
referred to as the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine. Under the reasonable use version, which is probably applied in all of the riparian jurisdictions by now, each owner of
land along a stream is entitled to the reasonable use of the
water in the stream. While it does not actively discourage or
prohibit consumptive uses of stream water, the reasonable use
version does create a great deal of uncertainty, since what is a
"reasonable use" is determined on an ad hoc basis and may
vary from year to year, depending on the amount of water in
the stream as well as the social value of the uses by other
riparian owners.
Regardless of the jurisdictional type involved, there are
several issues which affect water allocation and distribution in
the riparian states. Most of these issues revolve around the
question of what is "riparian land." Riparian water rights, of
course, are owned only by those persons who own "riparian
land," that land which touches a stream. Whether a severed
portion of a riparian parcel continues to be considered riparian
land regardless of the fact that it no longer touches the stream
is a question that is resolved differently in different jurisdictions. In addition, whether water may be used on land which
is not riparian is also treated differently among the jurisdictions.
(c.) Mixed Jurisdictions
A number of states mix the prior appropriation doctrine
and the riparian doctrine. In the West, riparian rights are still
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recognized in Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. In those
states, however, all new water rights are established under the
permit version of the prior appropriation doctrine. It appears
that in only two western states, California and Nebraska, are
new rights perfected under the riparian doctrine.
Finally, many of the states normally thought of as riparian
states have recently begun to establish new water rights under
some permit system which may incorporate principles from the
prio'r appropriation doctrine. These states include, to some
degree, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
2. Underground Water
In very general terms, underground water is divided into
two classifications: underground stream water and percolating
water. Underground stream water is generally thought of as
that underground water which has discernible flow within ascertainable boundaries. Percolating water is that underground
water which oozes through the ground, without perceptible velocity. The presumption in most states, but not in Colorado, is
that underground water is presumed to be percolating.
In Colorado, however, all water, including underground
water, is presumed to be tributary to a natural stream. The
burden of showing the water as nontributary falls on the person
who makes that assertion.
In very general terms, underground stream water is treated
in most jurisdictions under the same rules that apply to those
streams that are on the surface of the earth.
With respect to underground water that is classified as
percolating water, however, there are five distinct jurisdictional types which should be considered: the absolute privilege
doctrine, the American reasonable use doctrine, the Restatement of Torts reasonable use doctrine, the correlative rights
doctrine, and the appropriation doctrine.
The absolute privilege doctrine is the oldest groundwater
doctrine in the United States, and appears to provide that the
owner of land has an absolute right to pump all the water he
can find underneath his land for any purpose whatsoever,
whether on or off his overlying land.
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The American reasonable use version is similar, but provides that uses off the overlying land may be unreasonable and
unlawful if the pumping for those off-site uses injures a neighbor of the overlying landowner.
The Restatement of Torts version of the reasonable use
doctrine incorporates a process of balancing between competing uses-regardless of whether or not those uses are on or off
overlying land.
The correlative rights doctrine, found primarily in California, involves the concept of sharing in times of shortage, based
on the amount of land owned by the competing overlying owners.
The appropriation doctrine as applied to underground
water is found in most of the western states which have
adopted the appropriation doctrine for surface streams. In
most of the appropriation doctrine states, however, there are
differences between the way the appropriation doctrine is applied to surface streams and underground waters. For example,
in Colorado there are three distinct and different applications
of the appropriation doctrine to groundwater. First, most Colorado underground water is presumed to be tributary and is
treated exactly the same way as the waters of a natural surface
stream. Second, in what are called designated groundwater
basins located on the eastern plains of the state, Colorado uses
the permit rather than the mandate version of the prior appropriation doctrine, requiring that permits for rights to use underground water be obtained from the Colorado Groundwater
Commission. Third, there is also a requirement that permits to
construct all wells be obtained from the State Engineer. He will
issue such permits to construct wells (the permits not giving
any right to use water) only when there is unappropriated
groundwater available and when the proposed well would not
injure the rights of other water right owners. There are numerous exceptions to the standards for the issuance of well construction permits, including those for smaller wells, those for
aquifers which are wholly confined, and those for groundwater
which will take more than one hundred years to reach a natural
stream.
B. InterstateAllocation and Distribution
Because so many of our country's major streams or rivers
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cross state boundaries, it is necessary to allocate the water of
those streams among the various states which they cross. Without such allocation, the old rule of "highority is priority" would
apply, with the upper states taking the lion's share, if not all,
of the water in the interstate streams. By and large, there are
two ways in which water is allocated among those states which
happen to be on an interstate stream: interstate compact or a
decree of the United States Supreme Court exercising its original jurisdiction in suits among states.
Compacts are essentially treaties or contracts among the
states on interstate streams, which take a variety of approaches
to the allocation of water among those states. Although those
approaches have been skillfully described by Jerome Muys, it
may be of interest to know that Colorado is a party to compacts
which affect the allocation of water of the Colorado River, the
LaPlata River, the Animas-LaPlata Project, the South Platte
River, the Rio Grande, the Republican River, Costilla Creek,
and the Arkansas River.
When it is impossible for states to agree among themselves, disputes over interstate streams inevitably find their
way to the United States Supreme Court. When that happens,
the United States Supreme Court acts as a trial court when the
litigation is among states and eventually issues a decree allocating the waters of the interstate stream involved. In Colorado, there are two such decrees which affect two of our rivers:
the Laramie River and the North Platte River.
There are two significant problems with the interstate allocation of water, whether it be by an interstate compact or a
court decree. The terms of those documents often are ambiguous, yet very difficult to change. In addition, interstate allocation generally ignores groundwater, which is a very important
component of the hydrologic cycle. Perhaps the most prominent example of this omission today is the Madison formation,
which underlies both Wyoming and South Dakota. And yet
there is no interstate mechanism at present to resolve the problem.
C. Federal
Although federal law affects water allocation and distribution in a number of ways, there are four principal areas in
which the impact of federal law is most strongly felt: the navi-
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gation servitude, reserved rights, water pollution control, and
reclamation and flood control projects.
1. Navigation Servitude
The navigation servitude applies to streams which are
classically navigable, those which could support commerce, as
well as the tributaries which support them. The servitude is a
paramount right in the United States government to the use for
purposes of commerce of the waters of navigable streams. This
means that water rights under state law which interfere with
the use of water for navigation are potentially and alarmingly
unstable. Parenthetically, it should be noted that it has been
suggested that states have a navigation easement or a navigation servitude that is remarkably similar to that of the federal
government.
2. U.S. Reserved Rights
Reserved water rights of the United States are associated
with all withdrawals and reservations of land from the public
domain. The general theory is that at one time the United
States owned all the land in the western United States, particularly in those states, such as Colorado, that have come to be
known as public domain states. As settlement and development of those public lands increased, the United States began
to withdraw or reserve large portions of the public domain for
such uses as national forests, national parks, Indian reservations, etc. At the time that these large tracts of land were
withdrawn or reserved, little thought was given to where the
water would come from to be used to promote the purposes of
the reservations. As a result, around the turn of the century the
federal courts began to remedy this oversight through the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
Beginning with Indian reservations, the courts began to
enunciate a doctrine which has come to be known as the Federal Reserved Right Doctrine. Under that doctrine, the courts
have found an implied reservation of water which necessarily
accompanies the reservation or withdrawal of land by the
United States. The water so reserved is in that amount which
is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the land reservation
or withdrawal. In addition, the reserved water right bears a
priority as of the date that the land was reserved or withdrawn.
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Needless to say, the concept of reserved rights has been in
almost continual litigation since the federal courts began to
establish the doctrine. Not only is there continued opposition
to the general concept of reserved rights, but there also is a
growing realization that those reserved rights associated with
very old reservations will be senior to those private rights which
have been perfected under state law. Presently, there is litigation in progress throughout the Western Slope of Colorado as
well as on the North Platte and the South Platte Rivers on the
Eastern Slope. That litigation is in fairly early stages in all the
trial courts involved.
3. Water Pollution Control
In the area of water pollution control, the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments established two programs which affect water resorces. First, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) was established
to control the discharge of pollutants from point sources
through a permit program which can be run either by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency or those particular states
which have obtained federal approval of their own permit program (as is the case in Colorado). Second, with respect to nonpoint sources of pollution, water quality planning efforts under
Section 208 of the 1972 Amendments will eventually result in
significant controls on nonpoint sources of pollution. Not only
is §208 planning taking place on the state level in all states, it
is also taking place at the designated regional planning agency
level, of which there are six in Colorado:
1. The greater Denver metropolitan area, comprised of the City and County of Denver, and Adams,
Arapahoe, Jefferson, and Boulder Counties, for
which the Denver Regional Council of Governments
is a designated planning agency.
2. Teller and El Paso Counties (Colorado Springs),
for which the Pikes Peak Area COG is a designated
planning agency.
3. Pueblo County, for which the Pueblo Area COG
is a designated planning agency.
4. Larimer and Weld Counties, for which the
Larimer-Weld COG is a designated planning agency.
5. Routt, Jackson, Grand, Summit, Eagle, and Pit-
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kin Counties, for which the Northwest Colorado
COG is a designated planning agency.
6. Moffat, Rio Blanco, Garfield, and Mesa Counties, for which the Colorado West Area COG is a
designated planning agency.
Both the NPDES and the §208 programs raise severe water
allocation questions. For example, with respect to those effluent guidelines, standards, and limitations which apply to
point sources under the NPDES program, as effluent limitations grow more severe there is an inherent requirement that
consumption or evaporation of wastewater increases. As that
consumption increases, the amount of available water decreases. For example, for each 500-megawatt coal-fired power
plant, we can expect that eight to ten thousand acres of irrigated land will either be dried up or forced to go without water.
In addition, under most prior appropriation doctrines, downstream junior owners are entitled to the maintenance of stream
conditions as they were at the time of their appropriations. If
consumption is increased in order to meet the requirements of
the NPDES program, those downstream owners will have
legally-recognizable tort claims against the holders of NPDES
permits. This situation causes a significant and as yet unresolved conflict between the effluent limitations under federal
law and the water rights of downstream owners under state law.
With respect to nonpoint sources regulated under §208,
there are also difficulties. The primary problem is that §208
requires land use controls to deal with the nonpoint sources of
pollution, such as irrigation return flow. The new irrigation
management practices which will be necessary to control the
irrigation return flow under §208 may drastically alter the
course of western agricultural economics. If, however, irrigators
should be required to use more efficient means of irrigation
(such as a switch from flood to sprinkler irrigation), less water
may be consumed by evapotranspiration, increasing the availability of water.
4. Federal Projects
Finally, we are all aware of the pervasive and oftentimes
beneficial effects of federal projects throughout the West. The
problem with those projects is that their operation usually
blithely ignores water right allocations under state law. As a

350

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:341

result, these projects may throw any state allocation plans into
a tailspin.
D. InternationalAllocation
Waters of international rivers are allocated by international treaties which enjoy the benefit of the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, taking precedence over state
and interstate allocations of water. In Colorado, we are primarily concerned with the treaty between the United States and
Mexico, which has an effect on both the Colorado River and the
Rio Grande.
II. PROBLEMS OF INITIAL ALLOCATION
Although other levels of government play an important
role in water allocation, the primary focus today is still on state
levels of government and how they distribute water. The various state agencies raise a number of problems, the most important of which are discussed below.
A. RiparianJurisdictions
In riparian jurisdictions, problems are found on either end
of the spectrum. Under the natural flow version of the riparian
doctrine, water allocation is very inflexible because of the need
to maintain the natural flow and quality of the water. As a
result, industrial development is not encouraged except
through rather extraordinary means.
Under the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine,
where riparian owners share in the use of water based on the
relative social value of their particular use, allocations are
made on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis which ignores the need
for certainty, an essential prerequisite for major capital investment.
B. AppropriationJurisdictions
Under the appropriation doctrines, water users enjoy a certain amount of certainty because of the rather absolute nature
of initial allocations of water. As will be pointed out later,
however, the rational readjustment or secondary allocation following the initial allocation is somewhat difficult.
More specifically, in the jurisdictions which follow the permit version of the prior appropriation doctrine, the initial allocation is generally based on three factors: the availability of
unappropriated water, the possibility of injury to other water
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rights, and the "public interest." The "public interest" is a
fertile field for the wise allocation of water resources. Unfortunately, however, the meaning of "public interest" is usually restricted to economic or utilitarian concerns. Although recent
legislation has begun to emphasize environmental concerns in
the public interest, the "public interest" still does not generally
include other broad concerns, such as the preservation of agricultural lands.
In Colorado, which adheres to the mandate version of the
prior appropriation doctrine, the initial allocation of water, at
least for a conditional water right, requires only a showing that
the water right owner intends to appropriate water and that he
actually conduct some first step on the land which is indicative
of that intent. There is absolutely no concern with the public
interest when priorities are awarded by the water courts. In
addition, the water right is essentially a hunting license because the water courts also are not at all concerned with the
availability of unappropriated water.
III. PROBLEMS OF SECOND GENERATION ALLOCATION
In riparian jurisdictions, even those which have adopted
the reasonable use version of the doctrine, it is very difficult to
make rational allocations of water to new uses. What again is
involved is an ad hoc determination of the relative social value
of the new competing use. This, of course, has the same infirmity of uncertainty suffered by the first generation allocation.
In those prior appropriation states which have adopted the
permit version of the doctrine, it is still usually possible to take
advantage of the "public interest" in the administrative approval of change of water rights. The "public interest" concept
still must be refined and developed as was true in the first
generation allocation of water. In addition to the "public interest" test, the permit states generally do have yet another limitation on reallocation of water: that the change of the water
right cannot injure other water rights.
In Colorado, the sole remaining mandate jurisdiction of all
the prior appropriation states, the traditional test is that no
reallocation or change of water right may be allowed if it will
injure other water rights. There is, at least on the face of the
statute, no provision for consideration of the "public interest"
by the water court when it approves a reallocation or change.
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In 1969, however, the Colorado General Assembly recodified
the State's water law. With respect to change proceedings and
plans of augmentation, the General Assembly did a curious
thing. A literal reading of the new statute indicates that the
injury prohibited in a change proceeding is injury to the owners
or users of water rights rather than the water rights themselves.
This, of course, suggests a back-door approach to insertion of
the "public interest" in the Colorado water court proceedings
involving change of water rights and approval of plans of augmentation. If the proscribed injury is to "owners or users," then
that injury might be considered to include such things as environmental, economic, social, aesthetic, and similar considerations. At the present, we have no case law on this new interpretation, and its impact on the course of future Colorado water
law remains to be seen.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS OF WATER RESOURCE ALLOCATION
AND DISTRIBUTION

Although there are innumerable other factors which influence water resource allocation and distribution, there are seven
of them which are of particular importance today, especially in
Colorado: minimum stream flows, use of developed water, antiexport statutes, basin of origin protection statutes, constitutional preferences for the use of water, condemnation of water
rights, and the relationship between water allocation and land
use control.
A. Minimum Stream Flows
The federal government as well as various state governments throughout the West have begun to assert minimum
stream flows which are applicable to water heretofore unallocated by the prior appropriation system. The minimum stream
flows, in addition to designation of wilderness areas by the
federal government, as well as wild and scenic rivers by both
state and federal governments, essentially foreclose any future
allocation or reallocation of water.
B. Developed Water
In many of the state courts in the West, concepts of maximization or efficient utilization of water have been growing
alongside a strict interpretation of the prior appropriation or
priority doctrine. Courts have been under significant pressure
to recognize a benefit for those persons who do make more
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efficient use of water. When push comes to shove, however, the
old prohibition against "extended use" often precludes the enjoyment of such benefit. For example, a recent Colorado case
provided that water salvaged by phreatophyte removal could
not be used by the person who removed the phreatophytes but
instead must be relinquished to the stream for the use of senior
water right owners. While the opinion in this case is undoubtedly a victory for environmental values, the decision can probably not be justified from the standpoint of agriculture. With a
yearly loss of irrigated agricultural land in Colorado, it might
be prudent to encourage the replacement of trees with crops.
C. Anti-Export Statutes
Roughly one-third of our states have what are called "antiexport statutes," which prohibit or severely restrict the diversion of water from its state of origin to another state. The antiexport statutes are hot topics at this time if for no other reason
than their application to coal slurry pipelines. Not only are the
statutes of doubtful constitutionality (on the theory that they
place an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce), they
also do not seem to promote the rational allocation of water
resources, without consideration to state lines.
D. Basin of Origin Protection
Even within states, there is competition between different
regions for available water supplies. Several states try to control inter-basin transfers of water by what are called "basin of
origin protection statutes," which may prohibit or severely regulate the transfer of water from one river basin to another. In
Colorado, we have only one such provision, which is applicable
only to water conservancy districts.
E. Constitutional Preferences
Many state constitutions create preferences among different types of uses. For example, in Colorado, preference is given
to domestic use of water over agricultural and to agricultural
uses over manufacturing uses. The effect of such preferences
varies among different jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions,
those preferences mean what they say-essentially establishing
a parallel allocation system which, in times of shortage, may
override the priority system. In other jurisdictions, the preferences simply provide guidance to the state administrative official who is forced to choose between otherwise identical but
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competing applications for the same water. Other states, such
as Colorado, simply give to the preferred right the power of
private condemnation over water rights for less preferred uses.
Even in Colorado, the preference is somewhat of a joke, since
it is difficult to imagine that any agricultural user, for example,
could come up with enough money to condemn a manufacturing water right.
F. Condemnation of Water Rights
When money is available for that purpose, condemnation of
water rights is a powerful tool. In recognition of the almost
unlimited power which has been vested in municipalities in
Colorado to condemn water rights, Colorado's General Assembly recently adopted House Bill 1555 (1974), which limits municipal condemnation to the satisfaction of only those needs
anticipated within the next fifteen years and which requires
that condemnation be preceded by an environmental impact
statement as well as substantial community planning. As of
yet, unfortunately, House Bill 1555 has not been the subject of
recorded litigation. Its effect remains uncertain, and it has become a thorn in the side of those persons who are attempting
to plan for municipal water supplies.
G. Relationship Between Water Allocation and Land Use
Controls
We are gradually learning that the manipulation of water
resources may be a valuable aspect of any land use control
program. By and large, local governments, political subdivisions of their states, are tending to take a lead in this regard.
For example, the following solutions have been proposed by
local governments to deal with the interrelationship between
land and water:
1. Prohibiting the construction of water facilities in
certain areas by traditional zoning regulations.
2. Refusing to issue a building permit for construction of any water facilities until the water court
makes certain findings, e.g., that water quality and
minimum stream flows will not be impaired.
3. Zoning of water rights as an interest in real property similar to land.
4. By adoption of a comprehensive plan, restricting
the location of all pipeline facilities to federal lands.
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While local governments seem to be the most active in this
area, states are also starting to get on the water/land use relationship. For example, in Colorado, House Bill 1041 (1974),
which is administered by the state Land Use Commission, included the following two matters of state interest:
1. "Site selection and construction of major new
domestic water and sewage treatment systems and
major extension of existing domestic water and sewage treatment systems."
2. "Efficient utilization of municipal and industrial
water projects."
V.

CONCLUSION

Today's water law is like an incredibly complicated machine that is held together and added to by odd assortments of
baling wire. This means that, to lay persons, water law is an
inscrutable system. If it takes a specialist to understand and
use the law, have not members of the general public been denied the opportunity to become meaningfully involved in water
allocation and distribution decisions?
Part of the confusion, of course, may defy clarification
because of the numerous levels of government involved. On the
other hand, it should be possible for each level of government
(including the State of Colorado) to make the law more understandable and more responsive. In Colorado, it probably would
not be advisable to conduct a massive overhaul of our water
law-after all, we have built an entire economy on it. On the
other hand, there are a number of small ways in which the
water law can be greatly simplified from a procedural standpoint. In addition, as a matter of substance, we clearly do need
some mechanism by which the water courts, as well as the
State Engineer, are required to take into consideration the
"public interest," whatever that may be. Until that is done, we
will continue to make water allocation decisions in this state
without any rational basis except for the energy and foresight
of individual appropriators.

II. POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC
Emerging Values in Water Resource
Management
GARY HART*

I want to comment on an important phenomenon for consideration by people who are experts in resource management:
that is, a national awareness just beginning to develop which
recognizes that our natural resources are limited and must be
intelligently allocated if they are going to serve the general
welfare of this country. This is particularly true of those resources which are owned and managed by the federal government. It is also true of water.
The traditional exploitation of public resources for private
gain is being replaced by a new emphasis on a stewardship of
these resources for the public benefit. That water resources fall
within the focus of this new awareness has put tremendous
pressure on the traditional process under which water policies
and priorities are determined. At the outset it must be remembered that water is a unique resource. It is self-renewing, like
timber, but it is also a fixed and limited resource like a mineral
in that once it is allocated for a specific use, it is almost always
available only for that use.
In the western states the ordeal of questioning traditional
assumptions, which is going on and must continue to go on, will
be enhanced because the exploited character of water resources
development will have to change dramatically. Development of
water resources in the West has always been regarded as a
critical component in economic development, and this has
been magnified by the relative, and often extreme, scarcity of
water throughout the western region. Western water resource
development has grown through first simple then complex rules
based on a doctrine of appropriative water rights and beneficial
use, which have in turn justified some of civilization's most
awesome technical undertakings designed to put water to use.
Water has been the tool of economic development and often the
* United States Senator, Colorado.
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key to that development. Economic growth under the old rules
paid little attention to social and environmental values. As
long as the principle objective of fostering economic growth was
justified, water projects were deemed to be in the general welfare. And, with this justification came enormous amounts of
federal financial and technical assistance.
Water projects, and of course other public works projects,
were funded to satisfy what amounted to a circular demand to
exploit available resources and promote economic growth. The
basic equation for justifying water resource projects, both in
general and with regard to specific projects, was the costbenefit ratio. Balance sheets for developing this analysis were
based on the old prerequisites for growth, quantifiable financial
and economic factors, such as the initial capital outlays and
the return on investments. Reliance on these quantifiable factors neglected assessment of non-quantifiable environmental
and social considerations. These values have always been present, but our economic priorities, until recently, discounted
them to the point where they were never really taken seriously.
The emergence of new social and environmental values is forcing reevaluation of this whole equation, using concepts which
are entirely different from those of water policy decisions in the
past. But, because no formula incorporating these present values has emerged, in some cases the only avenue open to those
questioning a specific water project is to totally oppose its construction.
Apart from the emerging resource management ethic,
there are other variables which have come into the equation.
There are increasing fiscal limitations on the economic efficiency and effectiveness of water projects. Competition for the
federal dollar has, of course, intensified and will continue to do
so, even more than we have seen in recent years. Water available for irrigation, the vast bulk of consumptive use, is beginning to reach its practical limits. New demands for water for
urban growth, for recreational use, for water quality restoration, and for energy development are beginning to be strong
competitors with traditional agricultural uses. One expert in
resource management observed that "culmination of new environmental constraints and the relentless mathematics of exponential growth have brought us to the grim reality of physical
shortage. In several regions, we are dividing up the last can-
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teen." He continues to say that the essential character of water
resource management in the future will not be the development
of new supplies, but rather the more intensive management of
relatively fixed supplies and reallocation of supplies among
competitive uses.
And that is the point I am trying to make. Water resource
management has shifted from the development of new supplies
to this kind of prudent management of existing supplies and
the allocation of these supplies among competing uses. Technological innovation must achieve the balance between the traditional demand that we are all familiar with and these new
uses. The planning process that has served until recently will
have to be overhauled; the planners and policy makers will
have to reorder water priorities in their states and local regions
to accommodate the new facts of resource life. As a part of this
new focus, engineers and technicians must devise means to
manage water resources more efficiently and effectively. They
will be the ones who will present the alternatives to the politicians who have the ultimate responsibility to determine what
needs must be met.
Competing pressures are manifest in this decisionmaking
process. As a member of the Senate Public Works Committee,
the pressures-as well as responsibilities to integrate the new
resource management awareness into the development of a traditional resource-are evident to me. However, this responsibility has not been fully accepted. I think that those of us in
the public arena have to acknowledge that. The old equations
that I have mentioned still hold firm, and at the base of our
application of those equations is the advice that those of us in
the public arena get from those in the sciences and engineering.
It is the responsibility of the engineer or of the scientist who is
involved in the process of policymaking to provide the technical analysis of alternatives, not merely to say why or why not
a particular project can or cannot be developed.
Alternatives are still available to us. We just have not
focused on what those alternatives may be. Rather we have
taken projects on an "up" or "down" basis as I have indicated.
This is particularly the fault of the politicians who have not
pressed for inclusion of other factors. The reason for this is
simple: traditional water projects result in jobs and economic
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stimulus for the home constituency. I believe this situation is
changing.
Gradually, awareness by those in policymaking positions
is moving us away from the traditional premises upon which
projects were evaluated. The cost-benefit ratio is being dissected, not always by the politicians, but by interested individuals or organizations who are tuned into new and emerging
values. As is too often the case, the people become aware of the
changes that have to be made, but political judgment is slow
to adapt to those changes.
Looking forward to the future of water resource management, development of new rules can only be accomplished by
evaluating the multiple demands that are placed on this critical and increasingly limited resource. Demands obviously include traditional needs, but policymakers must also look to
new needs such as recreation, fish and wildlife conservation,
energy development, assertion of Indian water rights, and enhanced water quality. The technological skills of engineers and
scientists will have to focus on meeting, these demands. Water
resource management will have to move away from a public
works orientation to a more literal reclamation such as recycling, desalination, reducing losses from conveyance systems,
and increasing the efficiency of water use in all regards.
But, maximizing water values cannot be achieved by new
technology alone. It will find its ultimate solution in more sophisticated management at every level. And, as a result, the
rule that we use to guide our decisions will also have to change.
Ways must be found to adapt appropriate rights and beneficial use doctrines to multiple-use priorities; cost-benefit
analyses will have to incorporate the unquantifiable variables
I have already mentioned. The goals of water management
will have to correspond to what is newly perceived as the public welfare. Procedures recently incorporated into the policymaking area require and demand broader public participation,
a forum for the discussion of alternatives which will force politicians to take a more active role in changing the rules themselves. The pressure on political figures to come up with alternatives hand-in-hand with the scientists and technicians will
lead to broader options to recognize new demands.
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The old process for determining priorities for the use of
water has become obsolete, and emerging public values support
change. No longer will the decisions be made by a specialized
few who base their decisions on outmoded concepts; the process has been opened up to integrate new concepts. To some
the costs will be high. Sacred cows will undoubtedly be sacrificed. But this reassessment must come about if water resource
management is to be brought in line with modern national
goals.

The Market for Property Rights in Water
TIMOTHY

D.

TREGARTHEN*

The market for any good or service will operate more or less
efficiently depending on the structural characteristics of the
market, the adequacy of the definition of the property rights
being exchanged, the availability of information, and the cost
of bargaining and reaching agreements among interested parties. Water, despite frequent allegations that it is somehow
wholly unlike all other goods, is no exception. The oft-cited
complaint that water flows uphill toward money not only fails
to reflect the gravity of the situation, but raises what is in many
cases a non-problem. Under certain conditions, the flow of
water toward money is a perfectly desirable result. This paper
examines those conditions and suggests changes in existing
legal approaches to the problem of water allocation.
I. THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE MARKETPLACE
The function of defined rights in property is perhaps best
understood by considering the consequences of their absence.
All the goods would, in effect, be "owned" in common. As a
result, there would be no incentive to economize on the use of
any good, to maintain the condition of the good, or to engage
in investment to improve it or increase its quantity. The benefits of productive activity could not be appropriated by any
agent in the economy; little productive activity would result.
The absence of clearly defined property rights would assure a
large scale and continuing tragedy of the commons.
The economic problem is fundamentally one of choice;
alternative uses exist for virtually all goods and services, requiring that decisions be made to select from among these
alternatives. Well defined rights give decision makers in the
economy a guide as to what they can reasonably expect of
others. If rights to the use of a particular asset clearly rest with
an individual, then the results of that individual's use of the
asset are internalized, forcing him or her to bear the costs and
benefits of decisions made concerning that use. Property rights
* B.A., 1967, California State University; M.A., 1970, Ph.D., 1972, University of
California at Davis. Associate Professor of Economics, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. I am grateful to participants of the Water Needs for the Future Conference for helpful suggestions.
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thus seek to internalize what would otherwise be externalities.,
To be complete, this internalization must involve the exclusion
of all other parties from the use of the right, and these parties
must be unaffected by that individual's use. Where the use is
collective in nature, as in the enjoyment of a beautiful stream,
it may be appropriate to define exclusive ownership to some
collection of individuals, represented perhaps by a government
agency. Thus exclusive ownership may rest with a single individual or with an agent representing several individuals. The
important thing is that rights to the use of a good or service rest
exclusively with agents affected by that use.'
Once defined, property rights to the use of a good or service
must be enforceable; owners must have the ability to seek relief
for any violation of the rights owned. 3 Finally, ownership of the
rights to the use of any good or service should include the rights
to appropriate returns from this and to transfer ownership
rights for a price.'
The marketplace in which rights are to be exchanged
should ideally be characterized by large numbers of buyers and
sellers for rights to each good and service. Potential sellers
should have ready access to each market, and information
should be readily available concerning the terms at which
rights are being sought and offered for sale. Bargaining costs
should be low enough to assure that all parties with an interest
in an exchange can participate in it. The satisfaction of these
conditions should assure an efficient allocation of resources.
Unhappily, one or more of these conditions is typically not met;
the marketplace of the real world is an imperfect mechanism
for allocating society's goods and services.
The market, whatever its imperfections, should serve in a
rough way to face decision makers with the full costs and benefits of their decisions. Bids by buyers of a good generate price
information about the benefits of using resources for the pro1. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
2. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive
Resource, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 27 (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds.
1974).
3. C. STONE, SHOuLD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL
OBJECTS 11 (1974).

4. Cheung, supra note 2.
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duction of that good; bids by producers of other goods for those
same resources generate price information about its cost.
Where exclusion is not complete, the information provided by
prices will be incorrect. If, for example, all beneficiaries of a
beautiful stream are not excluded from enjoying it if they do
not pay for it, prices will not reflect the value of the stream as
an aesthetic or recreational resource. If potential bidders are
left out of the exchange process because of inadequate information, prices will again provide incorrect signals. Markets dominated by a single seller (monopoly) or by a single buyer (monopsony) will generate prices which give, respectively, artificially high and low signals via the price mechanism. But if the
market is working well, it will continuously generate valuable
information in the form of prices, information which should
guide resources toward their fabled "best use."
This notion of the ideal solution of a market model requires some cautions. First, the notion of "best" rests on each
individual's perception of his or her own welfare. It is an axiom
of economic analysis that individuals can and do make choices
that they assume will make them better off. The added assertion that these individuals are the best judges of what is best
for each of them is itself a value judgment for which there is
no scientific foundation.' It is, however, a value judgment to
which most economists, including this one, subscribe. If one
assumes that individuals are incapable of making choices in
their own interest, then one is left with the perplexing problem
of deciding who is able to make such choices for them.
The second problem of this model is the role of uncertainty. All choices must be made on the basis of expectations
about the future; the benefits of an activity can only be guessed
at before it is undertaken. The benefits of activities foregone
for the activity chosen will never be known. It is not surprising
that individuals often make choices that seem, in retrospect,
to have been wrong. This problem is solved in much of economic analysis by assuming perfect certainty and, thus, the
absence of error. It is a useful assumption; uncertainty is a
mathematically messy addition to most economic analyses.
The fact that uncertainty cannot be assumed away in the real
5. See, e.g., J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 59-60 (1976).
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world does not by itself prove that individual choice must be
abandoned; one would have to demonstrate that other mechanisms deal better with uncertainty. An important feature of a
reasonably well-working marketplace is that it at least provides
the incentive to make correct decisions. Mistakes will be made,
but decision makers will presumably learn from such errors and
attempt to avoid them in the future.
The notion of a "best," or "optimal" allocation of goods
and services is thus more the stuff of mathematical models
than of the real world. A more useful consideration by which
one might test the market's usefulness is to inquire whether it,
relative to other mechanisms for resource allocation that might
be considered, tends more consistently to provide incentives
that nudge decision makers along in the direction of improved
resource allocation. Competitive markets with well-defined
property rights, reasonably complete exclusion, and ready access to the exchange process should serve this more modest
cause well.
II. THE INITIAL ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS IN WATER
A theory of the process by which rights are created has not
been developed.' In general, one would expect that those individuals who first needed a resource would simply start using it;
other users could be expected to do the same. As the demand
for the use of a resource increased to the point at which the use
of any one individual conflicted with that of another, i.e., the
resource was no longer a free good, exclusive property rights
would be defined. Riparian doctrine, which defines a sort of
collective ownership to rivers by owners of adjacent lands, represents a half step in this process. On the one hand, it imposes
exclusion of those who do not own adjacent land, but does not
define individual ownership of the water itself. It is an odd sort
of compromise, one that implies that water has become a
scarce good, but that treats it essentially as a free one.'
A clearer definition of rights has been achieved under the
doctrine of prior appropriation. This was simply the granting
6. One preliminary effort to assess the creation of rights in land is given in Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.
LAW & ECON. 163 (1975).
7. G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE, D. ALLARDICE & C. KIRiWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976 at 16 (1976).
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of specific titles to rights in water on a first-come, first-served
basis. From the point of view of economic efficiency, this is an
adequate way to initiate a market in rights for water. A lottery
would also suffice. In either case, the initial allocation defines
a starting point from which exchange can take place. Rights
will, over time, be allocated to those users who place the highest value on them, providing that exchange is possible
Equity is also a relevant concern in the selection of a
method by which the initial allocation of water rights is to be
determined. The initial assignment of property rights, together
with initial endowments of abilities and interests, determines
the distribution of wealth in the economy. Rights to water use
represent valuable assets; it would not be unreasonable to base
their initial allocation on social goals with respect to the distribution of wealth. On this criterion, it is not obvious that the
first-come, first-served approach of prior appropriation is of
particular merit.
But another form of definition of rights preceded most
grants to appropriators. States using prior appropriation doctrine typically asserted that the waters of the state were the
property of the state, or of the people of the state.' These rights
were then given to appropriators as they claimed them. This
public largesse was impressive as well as surprising; it is not
at all clear that gifts to first takers represent the most equitable
means of transferring property from the public to the private
sector.' 0 The question is of more than historical interest. The
public sector, by transferring wealth from itself on behalf of all
individuals to a few individuals, has weakened its ability to
reenter the market for water rights to buy back rights needed
8. Costly transactions may suggest an advantage for prior appropriations because
this approach may reduce the number of future transactions needed to allocate the
water rights. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
9. COLO. CONST., art. 16, §5 states:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within
the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided.
10. N. Wollman argues that states should make use of the price mechanism by
selling rights to the highest bidder. See Wollman, Economic Factors in the Study of
Water Use, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION INTHE EASTERN UNITED STATES 565 (D.
Haber & S. Bergen eds. 1958); for a differing view see Trelease, Policiesfor Water Lau:
Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. Ras. J. 1, 10 (1965).
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for public use, as discussed below. To the extent that unappropriated rights remain, states should consider selling them
rather than giving them away. The question is one of equity
rather than efficiency, but equity is not an unimportant consideration in the allocation of goods and services.

III.

BENEFICIAL USE AND THE SECURITY OF RIGHTS IN WATER

Status as the first claimant of a right under prior appropriation is (usually) a necessary but not sufficient condition to
assure title to a right to use water." The water claimed must
be put to a beneficial use, a curious qualification that suggests
all manner of limitations on rights in water. Some of these are
indicated in the following excerpt from a Nevada case, Union
Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg:'2
Under the principles of prior appropriation, the law is well settled
that the right to water flowing in the public streams may be
acquired by an actual appropriation of the water for a beneficial
use; that, if it is used for irrigation, the appropriator is only
entitled to the amount of water that is necessary to irrigate his
land, by making a reasonable use of the water; that the object
had in view at the time of the appropriation and diversion of the
water is to be considered in connection with the extent and right
of appropriation; that if the capacity of the flume, ditch, canal,
or other aqueduct, by means of which the water is conducted, is
of greater capacity than is necessary to irrigate the lands of the
appropriator, he will be restricted to the quantity of water needed
for the purposes of irrigation, for watering his stock, and for domestic use; that the same rule applies to an appropriation made
for any other beneficial use or purpose; that no person can, by
virtue of his appropriation, acquire a right to any more water
than is necessary for the purpose of his appropriation; that, if the
water is used for the purpose of irrigating lands owned by the
appropriator, the right is not confined to the amount of water
used at the time the appropriation is made; the appropriator is
entitled, not only to his needs and necessities at that time, but
to such other and further amount of water, within the capacity
of his ditch, as would be required for the future improvement and
extended cultivation of his lands, if the right is otherwise kept up

A water right must thus be used for purposes that are beneficial
in nature and suitable for the purpose in amount. The right can
11. See G. RADOSEVICH, supra note 7, at 20.
12. 81 F. 73, 94 (C.C. Nev. 1897); quoted in G.

RADOSEVICH,

supra note 7, at 22-
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exceed present use if justified by the prospect of expanded
operations, at least in agriculture. While the general nature of
non-beneficial uses is unclear, rights can be forfeited in the
event of non-use.' 3 Existing legislation provides for the discontinuance of any diversion within a designated groundwater
basin if the rights are no longer necessary for a beneficial use.'4
In a world of freely exchanging rights in water, the doctrine
of beneficial use would, of course, be unnecessary. Water use
would be allocated to uses judged beneficial by the market.
Non-use would not be a problem; owners of rights would have
nothing to gain by holding them idle when they could be sold.'"
To be sure, the market's estimate of beneficial use might differ
from that of the public, or its legislature. Some might, for
example, object to the use of water in the washroom of a pornographic theatre. But the solution to such a problem is surely
to regulate the theatre rather than shutting off its water.
If the beneficial use doctrine were merely unnecessary,
there would be no particular cause for concern. It would serve
as an amusing example of an eccentricity in the law, and nothing more. But the doctrine of beneficial use may be harmful,
and thus warrants further examination. As noted above, rights
in property must be enforceable if the market is to work properly; the absence of enforcement would destroy the market for
rights. One usually thinks of this requirement in terms of protection from thieves and frauds. But, as Ciriacy-Wantrup has
pointed out, security of rights requires more than the protection against unlawful use by others. It also requires tenure
certainty, i.e., protection from encroachment by the legal acts
of others.'" The doctrine of beneficial use, with its implications
of judicial determination of need and non-use, in effect increases the uncertainty of title to rights in water, and therefore
reduces their marketability. As Trelease has noted, the flexibil13. See Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887).
14. See, e.g., Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, CoLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 et seq. (1973); especially §37-92-502(2).
15. An appropriator might find it desirable to hold rights idle temporarily; an
efficient market would provide such an owner the opportunity to rent out rights not
currently needed, as suggested below.
16. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts used as Economic Criteriafor a System of Water
Rights, 32 LAND ECON. 295, 297 (1956).
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ity of use in water rights is best assured by making those rights
as rigid and clear as possible, thus making exchange easier.' 7
A classic example of the judicial mischief to which the
doctrine of beneficial use can lead is the ruling in Young v.
Hinderlider.'9 Hinderlider had made first application for certain water rights in New Mexico, intending to market the water
to a number of farms. Young and Norton filed an application
for the same water two months later, proposing to use the water
to irrigate their own farm at a substantially lower cost per acre
than that anticipated by Hinderlider. The District Court
awarded the rights to Hindelider on grounds that he had applied first. The Supreme Court, however, developed an interest
in the economics of the problem, ruling that "[t]he mere fact
that the irrigation under the [Hinderlider] project would cost
more per acre than under the [Young and Norton] project is
not conclusive that the former project should be rejected. But
the attempt to cover too much land may have gone so far that
the cost of irrigation under that project would be so excessive
that the owners of land under the project could not pay the
water rights and farm the lands at a profit."' 9 It ordered the
District Court to reconsider which proposal suggested the more
beneficial use on this basis. It is an intriguing exercise to consider the effects of such reasoning were it applied to the acquisition of property rights for all other forms of investment.
The doctrine of preferential use is similar in spirit to the
beneficial use doctrine in that it imposes a non-market test of
priorities in rights. In its most common form, the doctrine
holds that domestic uses of water have priority over agricultural uses, which in turn have priority over manufacturing
uses. The notion is quite silly. All economic activity is ultimately for domestic use, that is, consumption. The eating of
food off of a manufactured plate does not seem greatly less
domestic than washing the plate afterwards. The purpose of
the priority structure imposed by this doctrine is to permit
preferred uses to exercise powers of eminent domain in the
17. Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 301, 314 (1957); see also J. HIRSCHLEIWER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN,
WATER SUPPLY (1969).
18. 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
19. 110 P. 1045, 1050 (1910).

1976

THE MARKET FOR WATER

acquisition of water rights.2 " The justification for such a provision is not apparent. As noted below, monopoly power is more
likely to rest with municipal buyers than with sellers in the
market for water; granting buyers additional power does not
seem necessary.
IV.

LIMITS ON THE TRANSFERABILITY OF WATER RIGHTS

Rights to water are typically expressed in terms of a rate
of diversion at a specific point. Holders of rights do not own
water that they return to the stream after they have used the
rights. This definition results in two major sets of difficulties.
First, it reduces the ability of the market to generate incentives
2
to economize on the consumptive use of watery.
Second, it
reduces the marketability of the rights.
If rights to divert water implied full ownership of the
water, then holders of these rights could sell "leftover" water
to other users. This would force these owners to face the opportunity cost of wasting water. Users of irrigation water would,
for example, have a greater incentive to line and cover ditches
if water not consumed could be resold. The concern of the
National Water Commission, that "[u]sers of water, public or
private, are now typically awarded the right to divert and use
water free of charge and need to give no heed to values that
some other use of the water might yield," would be
eliminated. 22 Some incentive to economize exists now, given
that conservation measures can reduce the amount of water a
user needs to divert, and thus allows that owner to sell some
of his rights. Increasing the marketability of these rights by
providing for a resale market for water recharged to the stream
would increase the force of this incentive.
Because water rights are really rights to divert water for
some use, the courts have imposed limitations on their sale
when that sale involves a change in use. Agricultural rights in
water, for example, involve a decreed right to divert a specific
volume of water per unit of time. The citation from the Union
Mill & Mining case quoted above suggests that the decreed
right can exceed present use to the extent that expanded agri20. G. RADOSEVICH, supra note 7, at 64-65.
21. Trelease, supra note 10, at 27.
22. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 251 (1973).
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cultural operations are planned for the future. The greater the
volume of water decreed, the greater the value of the right.
When such rights are sold for domestic use, however, the nature of the right is changed. Because domestic use typically
involves a continuous diversion of water and a greater degree
of consumptive use, the full amount of water decreed to agricultural users cannot generally be sold. Instead, sales are limited to the amount of historical use, which must in addition be
reasonable .3 These rulings suggest that the volume of water
implied by the right changes if the use changes, thus limiting
the incentive for rights to transfer to what may be a more
efficient use. Recognizing rights as decreed, and permitting the
resale of water not used, would take care of the problem of
incentives to conserve water as well as providing for the easy
exchange of water among users.
Another legal limitation on the transferability of rights is
the ban on the sale of rights to waters in one state to agents in
other states.2 4 This ban reduces the market's ability to communicate, through the price system, alternative needs for water.
It also exacerbates a structural difficulty noted above. Interbasin transfers of water are characterized by the enormity of the
scale with which they are carried out.2 It is unlikely that within
a state like Colorado there would be very many buyers able to
build a large interbasin diversion project. This limits the number of domestic bidders for water in remote areas, thus resulting in possible monopoly power on the buyer's side, or monopsony. Monopsony power permits buyers to pay a price below
the price that would exist in a competitive market. Eliminating
competing purchasers from other states strengthens the bargaining power of local domestic buyers. As noted above, granting them powers of eminent domain makes things even worse.
23. In Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575,
272 P.2d 629 (1954), the court held that the amount of water claimed as historical
agricultural use was excessive, and noted that the testimony of "any capable
experienced farmer" could be used to determine a reasonable amount, which, in turn,
would define the amount that could be sold for domestic use. See also Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 183 P.2d 552 (1947);
City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
24. J. HIRCHLEIFER, supra note 17, at 242.
25. C. HOWE & K. EASTER, INTERBASIN TRANSFERS OF WATER 4-5 (1971).
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V.

MARKET FAILURE AND WATER RIGHTS

The discussion to this point has dealt with market problems in the exchange of water rights that result from public
policy. But there are other difficulties inherent in the market
process itself, difficulties that emerge when it is not possible to
define property rights in a way that forces the market to incorporate all of the costs and benefits of decisions into the choice
perspectives of the individuals making those decisions.
Some uses of water are not susceptible to easy exclusion
of individuals that do not pay for them; a beautiful stream may
be a difficult thing to price in the market. The benefits derived
from the stream are no less economic as a result; the prices
generated in the market will simply fail to reflect them'adequately. The result will be too few unspoiled streams. In such
cases, public purchase of water rights to preserve the streams
may be justified. If the rights are already held by the public,
the decision would involve a comparison of the public benefits
of leaving the stream in its natural state with the bids offered
for private purchase of the rights. The problem is the classic
one of the public good.
A related objection to the market's allocation of water is
the prospect that domestic users would be able to buy up all
of the rights in water for irrigated agriculture. The fear is rather
fanciful; water for irrigation accounts for such a high percentage of all water used that a relatively small percentage reduction in agricultural use would provide for a tremendous increase in residential or industrial use. In any event, if some
diversion of water from agricultural use is expected, the problem is to determine whether such a market-induced diversion
is undesirable. Food is not a public good; there is no problem
there. But agricultural operations provide another service that
has value; fields devoted to crops provide open space, which
yields aesthetic benefits as well as flood control and reduced air
pollution. The field that produces food thus produces other
benefits at the same time. These other benefits are not characterized by exclusion; the price system therefore fails to reflect
them. Farmers are thus forced to bid for factors of production,
like water, with the deck stacked somewhat against them. If
these public benefits are to be recognized, however, they suggest a payment to farmers for the open space benefits of their
agricultural operations, not the provision of cheap water. The
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latter approach makes no more sense than decreeing that farm
workers should receive a low wage to encourage agricultural
operations. Keeping the price of any factor artificially low results in the waste and inefficient allocation of that factor."
VI. TOWARD GREATER EFFICIENCY IN WATER MARKETS
A smoothly functioning market for rights in water would
result in the easy exchange of water among agents and among
uses, resulting in greater efficiency. Owners of water rights
would continually be faced with bids reflecting the cost of their
use of the rights; they would be induced in their own interest
to economize on their use of water, and to sell their rights if
some other agent placed a higher value on them. But observers
of the water market commonly note that it does not work that
way. The fact that water rights for agricultural uses sell for
prices much lower than equivalent rights for other uses is evidence that the market does not work as smoothly as suggested
here. This essay has explored some of the reasons for those
rigidities; many of them can be eliminated by changing public
policy.
But an added difficulty arises from the rather complex
nature of water as a fluid resource. Rights in water are harder
to define and to observe than, say, rights in basketballs. Purchasers and sellers of water rights face high information costs
in determining which rights are available for sale and who may
be buying them. Tracing the title to a water right is a complicated business. The authority of state water engineers and
water allocation boards can be of great significance in dealing
with these problems. If these agencies were to focus all their
efforts on the problem of providing information about the
rights owned in water, they would be providing a great service.
Investment in information and the smooth functioning of the
marketplace in water may yield benefits far greater than those
of new water projects. 7
As information systems in water allocation improve, there
is reason to believe that a variety of new methods of exchanging
26. Nancy L. Sidener has suggested that provision of cheap agricultural water
could even be construed as a violation of the prohibition of subsidies to export industries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
27. See Null, Water Use as a Property Right, 22 THE COLORADO QUARTERLY 317,
326 (1974).
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rights might emerge. Rights could be leased from owners for
short periods. Problems of temporary shortage, such as
drought, could be dealt with through such lease arrangements.
Associated problems of uncertainty might generate the same
response in the water market that they have in other markets,
the creation of futures markets. It may become commonplace
in the future to hear December quotes on July South Platte
water. Water brokers might increase in number.
The market is no panacea. As has been noted above, public intervention will be required to deal with public goods-and
public bads, such as pollution. But the market for any good has
the enormous virtue of generating large amounts of information, transmitting this information in the form of prices, and
through these prices prodding decision makers in the direction
of more efficient use of scarce resources. It has been insufficiently used in the allocation of water; investment in its increased use should be a high priority of water policy.

A Social Well-Being Framework for Assessing
Resource Management Alternatives
DAVID
I.

M.

FREEMAN*

INTRODUCTION'

Alternative water projects and policies are central social
and political phenomena because any one will impact unevenly
on society. Some social groups are advantaged at costs to others. While economic techniques for determining the general
magnitudes of dollar "costs" and "benefits" of alternative
water programs are relatively well developed, the assumption
has been generally accepted that the entire population will be
affected in a roughly equal manner. This assumption is rarely
tenable. The well-being of some groups is almost always damaged more than others-esthetically, politically, and socially.
Many significant social costs are not reflected in marketplace
exchange-dollar values simply fail to reflect true costs-and
most such non-market costs have not been amenable to systematic analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to:
A. Briefly state some of the most significant problems
which must be confronted when attempting to address nonmarket social well-being considerations;
B. Present an analytical approach to the definition of
social well-being that copes with the problems;
C. Illustrate the approach by presenting an analysis of
four resource management alternatives conducted on a U.S. For2
est Service planning unit identified here as "Big Vista Divide."

II. THE PROBLEMS OF ANALYZING SOCIAL WELL-BEING
The problems of defining and measuring social well-being
have been complex, intractable, and, for the most part, skirted
by the social scientist who leaves the value judgments up to the
* Associate Professor, Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Colorado State
University; B.A., M.P.I.A., Ph.D.
1. The procedures described in this report are the product of work accomplished
over the preceding two and one-half year period in conjunction with, and with support
of, the River Basin Programs Staff, Area Planning and Development Branch, Division
of State and Private Forestry, and the Office of Multiple Use/Environmental Quality
Coordination, Region 2, U.S. Forest Service. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge the
assistance of Coryell A. Ohlander and Peter Ashton, without whose help this exercise
could not have been completed.
2. The actual planning unit upon which the analysis was conducted will not be

revealed.
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public or other responsible authorities. Yet, it is impossible to
sort out alternative natural resource program impacts except
in the context of some value criterion defining what is meant
by social well-being. Analysis of social well-being presents
problems because:
A. Solutions for some groups are problems for others.
To enhance social well-being of wilderness buffs undercuts the
social well-being of snowmobilers, loggers, and other specialinterest groups.
B. There is the problem of intensity of gains and
losses among groups. One alternative may spread small benefits
to many people while imparting a large cost to a very few people.
How much pleasure of the many gainers should it take to balance
off the pain of the fewer losers? Although marginal economic
analysis can suggest something with regard to this problem, there
is no known methodology which can net-out pleasure over pain
when all important values are not adequately reflected in the
marketplaces-as is the case with much natural resource planning.
C. People change their minds. Values and associated
preferences are not permanent but can be fluid and unstable
under changing circumstances. One's pattern of recreational
preferences can be altered significantly by changing gasoline
availability, real income levels, etc. Trying to predict what patterns of preference will hold in future decades for social groups
in a rapidly changing society is a loose and hazardous exercise
subject to great error.
D. Social well-being is, in any case, not defined by
what the majority of affected publics claims to prefer.

As Kenneth Arrow has demonstrated, where there are at
least two choosing parties and three or more alternatives from
which to choose, it is not possible to construct a decision rule
which will yield stable results that can be identified with the
peoples' maximal or optimal welfare.' For example, assume
that the decision maker is faced with choosing among three
alternative ways of using the land base and that each of the
alternatives distributed some value differentially to affected
parties as shown below:
3. K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); see also Arrow,

A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. OF POL.

ECON.

328 (1950).
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Alternative

A

Payoff To
B

C

1
2
3

3
2
1

1
3
2

2
1
3

If no side payments are allowed by which the parties might
agree on an alternative and compensate the losers, thereby
making everything come out equally, there is nothing in the
structure of the situation that makes the social well-being mix
represented by any one alternative more preferable than any
other.
Furthermore, if we let parties A, B, and C choose the preferred alternatives by a majority vote, taking two at a time, we
see that they end up selecting different alternatives as the best,
simply as a function of the order in which pairs are compared.
If alternatives 2 and 3 are first compared, 2 will obtain the
majority vote; 2 when compared to 1 will be defeated leaving
alternative 1 as the best choice. Yet, if the first pair compared
is that of alternatives 1 and 3, then 3 will defeat alternative 1,
and 2 will then be chosen over 3, resulting in a different definition of what the same group ends up choosing as best.
Thus, there can be nothing but despair for someone seeking to serve social well-being by learning what people prefer
and then investing in those management alternatives which
secure majority support. Serving majority preferences might be
politically wise, but it has no necessary connection to social
well-being. What is politically acceptable at any given time
may undercut social well-being.
III. APPROACH TO THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING
Productive and useful analysis of social well-being must be
approached by distinguishing between two levels of choice:
A. Prescriptive Choice: At which level does one encounter all the problems mentioned above? Prescriptive choice
has to do with people prescribing choices for themselves and/or
others. It is simply impossible to do a useful and defensible analysis by tapping into individual preference patterns of particular
persons, groups, or organizations. There are no methodologies for
determining that dollars spent to produce X acre-feet of water for
agricultural use will generate more net social well-being than the
same dollars spent to make Y acre-feet of water available for
municipal use.
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B. Context of Choice: At which level is it possible and
useful to determine whether a given management alternative will
shrink, sustain, or expand the context of choice opportunities
from which the publics may pursue and prescribe for themselves
their particular and noncommensurable preferences? Decision
makers are asked to view their land and water resources as setting
contexts from which particular preferences can be met. The problem is to sustain and even increase the choice opportunities
yielded by the land/water base. To broaden the context of choice
is to serve social well-being-to undercut the context of choice is
to damage social well-being. The decision maker is viewed as
custodian and manager of choice opportunities. To get at the
problem of analyzing what is happening to choice contexts as a
consequence of implementing management alternatives, several
analytical dimensions can be employed. One of these dimensions,
the analysis of Futures Foregone, will be presented here.'
A.

Social Well-Being and The Analysis of Futures Foregone

In sum, promoting social well-being is equivalent to promoting the context of choice which the planning area can afford
to the diverse interested publics. One dimension of choice context is presented to measure whether the choice contexts will
shrink more or less as a consequence of implementing different
management alternatives. Who will be hurt and who will be
advantaged if natural resource decision makers would choose
to implement different management alternatives in designated
planning areas? One key way to help and hurt people is to
support or undercut futures for their activities on the land
base. The part of social well-being which I wish to address here
is that which has to do with who loses out on opportunities to
act out their choices. A foregone future is an implementation
of a management alternative that cancels out futures for incompatible choices or activities.
The idea of Futures Foregone is broken down into three
measurable dimensions:
A. The scope of loss: What proportion of people or
things will lose a future for their activities on the land base if the
designated management alternative is implemented?

4. Analyses of other dimensions of the choice context are also under development
and testing. They are presented in Freeman, Procedures to Display Effects of Land
Management Alternatives on Social Well-Being, Dec. 1976 (prepared for the Division
of State & Private Forestry, Area Planning & Development Branch, U.S. Forest Service).
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B. The intensity of loss: How much will the lost future be missed in the planning area?
C. The duration of loss: What will be the length of
time in years before the land base can sustain the foregone activities in their present condition after the proposed management
alternative has been terminated?

A management alternative which foregoes futures for choice
opportunities to a greater scope, with a greater intensity, and
for a longer duration is a management alternative which is
estimated to undercut social well-being, more than another
management alternative which has lower futures foregone values associated with it.
B. The Meaning of Scope of Futures Foregone
Scope values indicate how much a choice opportunity for
a future inside a given planning unit will be foregone if the
designated management alternative is implemented. Scope
values indicate the proportion of people or things affected by
removing a future for a choice opportunity. (See Figure 1 for
illustration of the scope concept.)
A. Scope values of (-)1.00 indicate that a future for
some group or activity will be totally eliminated or foregone in
the particular Planning Unit. For all practical purposes no group
member can pursue a future for his activity on the Unit.
B. Scope values of (-).50 indicate that the future for
some group or activity will be one-half foregone in the particular
Planning Unit. This means that one-half of the hunters, elk,
timber cut, etc., present can be sustained on that Unit if the
designated management strategy is implemented.
C. Scope values of 0 indicate that the future for some
group or activity will be totally unaffected on a given Unit if the
designated management strategy is implemented.

The Meaning of Intensity of Futures Foregone
Intensity values indicate the degree to which a foregone or
lost future will be missed. Intensity values indicate the significance of loss. The key question for intensity is: Out of all the
possible Resource Capability Units (RCU's) for sustaining a
given future in the overall forest, how much will the lost future
on the affected RCU's be missed if the designated management
strategy is implemented? (See Figure 2 for illustration of the
intensity concept.)
C.
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FIGURE 1
MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVESCOPE OF IMPACT
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A. If the designed management alternative will
dercut the possibility of a future for some group or activity,
that future is being sustained on many other RCU's, then
intensity of losing a future for that activity or group on the
pacted Unit is low.

unbut
the
im-

B. If the designated management alternative will
eliminate the possibility of a future for some group or activity on
a given RCU or set of units, but that future is being, or has been,
foregone on many other units, the intensity of losing a future for
that activity or group on the impacted unit is high.
C. People will miss a lost future choice opportunity
more when that choice cannot be exercised elsewhere in accessible places.
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FIGURE 2
MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVE
INTENSITY OF FUTURES FOREGONE LOSS

Number of Resource
Capability Units on
Which a Future For
an Activity Can Be
Sustained In Accessible Locations In
The Forest.

m

x

Activities
To lose a future for group/activity "Al" on one
of many units would be a loss of low intensity.
m
To lose a future for activity "A " on the only
unit left capable of sustaining it would be a
loss of highest intensity.

To lose a future for activity "A3 " on one unit
when only a few other units can sustain it
would be a loss of moderate intensity.
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D.

The Meaning of Duration of Futures Foregone
Duration values indicate the length of time, in years, before the lost choice opportunity can be restored to its present
condition after the proposed management alternative has been
terminated. In other words, if decision makers should decide to
terminate a given program, project, or policy, duration values
indicate the number of years it is estimated to take to restore
the land/water base to a point at which the previously foregone
future for a choice opportunity can be exercised at present
levels.

IV.

THE METHOD AND PROCEDURE

A.

The Source of the Data
Judgment is necessary as a source of data. However, since
any given judge may start with a base of hidden biases, distorted information, fear of ridicule from peers, or reluctance to
press views against strong personalities, it is important that the
process of obtaining estimates minimize distortion factors and
maximize the flow of information to the individual participant.
To do this the Delphi technique is used.5 The following steps
are involved in the technique's operation:
A. The list of items is presented to each participant
who remains separate and anonymous from the rest of the group.
B. Each participant writes down a judgment anonymously and passes it back to the coordinator.
C. The coordinator, in turn, sets aside those areas on
which substantial agreement occurs and passes back the items on
which disagreement has been revealed.
D.

Keeping anonymity protected, each contributor

gets to see any comments given as reasons for judgments made

by the others and then proceeds to render once again a judgment,
possibly revised, based on the anonymous inputs of the others.
E. Within the course of three or four rounds, there
typically is a convergence of judgment, and where judgments fail
to converge, reasons for the differences emerge.
5. For a detailed background in and discussion of the Delphi technique and its
applications, the reader should refer to the following publications: N. DALKEY, D.
ROURKE, R. LEWIS & D. SNYDER, STUDIES IN THE QuALrrY OF LIFE: DELPHI AND DECISIONMAKING (1972); Pyke, A PracticalApproach to Delphi, 2 FLruES 143 (1970); Dalkey
& Helmer, An ExperimentalApplication of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,
9 MANAGEMENT So1. 458 (1963); Pill, The Delphi Method-Substance, Context, a Critique and Annotated Bibliography, 5 SOcio-EcONOMIC PLANNING SCI. (1969); Hill &
Fowles, The Methodological Worth of the Delphi Forecasting Techniques, 7
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 179 (1975).
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The Delphi exercise is, therefore, a series of sequential
interrogations based on opinion feedback at each step and focusing on areas of contention. It is an attempt to keep communication of informed judgments free from the biases of personality factors and social status, keeping the environment of
judgment and communication as objective as possible.
A set of specific procedures has been developed for the
purpose of obtaining data for the Futures Foregone portion of
the analysis. These procedures have evolved out of extensive
discussion and trials by the River Basin staff and limited field
testing.
B. Interpreting the Data
The quantifications for Futures Foregone consist of ordinal
values. Such values express the idea of "greater than" or
"lesser than;" there is no standard unit underlying such scores.
This means that when summing up all scope scores, for example, a value of -10 is not exactly two units greater than a value
of -8; a score of -10 is merely somewhat greater than the value
of -8. Ordinal measures only indicate the direction of social
well-being impacts on each dimension, and alternative scores
must be viewed as providing "greater than . . " or "lesser
than .. ." statements.
C. Panel Members and Their Characteristics
The group of judges participating in the exercise is small,
not randomly selected, and is unrepresentative of the diverse
affected publics in important ways. Participants were selected
because:
A. Each has a background of experience with the Big
Vista Divide Planning Area and a familiarity with the kinds of
activities which take place on the unit.
B. Three Forest Service participants were selected
not only because of their familiarity with the planning area but
also because they possess technical backgrounds appropriate to
the kinds of management issues being confronted.
C. Six citizen participants were selected from volunteers who had served as a Big Vista Divide land use study group
-a group of private citizens who participated in a series of public
involvement meetings conducted by the National Forest Service
over the ten months preceding the Futures Foregone analysis.
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It is important to note the hypothesis that participants
need not be fully representative of all possible values or interests.6 It is essential that participants be sufficiently knowledgeable about the planning area and the kinds of management
strategies under consideration so that they can identify an impact on an activity or group even if they do not represent those
interests. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that knowledgeable judges can identify an impact on an activity or group even
if they do not personally engage in that activity and are not
members of that group. In fact, most judges quickly agreed on
the nature of management alternative impacts on most items
under consideration. In those cases where disagreement occurred, it was frequently reduced in succeeding rounds of the
exercise and, when differences persisted after three rounds, discussion was carried out to uncover the nature of the outstanding differences of judgment.
The demographic characteristics of the judges are
summarized in Table 1. Three foresters serving on the panel
were joined by a real estate broker, a land-use planner, a city
director of development, a resort owner-operator, and two
county planners.
V.

ILLUSTRATING THE FUTURES FOREGONE ANALYSIS ON BIG

VISTA DIVIDE

A.

The Nature of the Management Alternatives Under
Investigation
The Management Alternatives evaluated for their impacts
on social well-being are as follows:
Alternative A - Continue Present Management
Management emphasis is directed toward long term con-

tinuation of present uses and activities. Primary emphasis will be
placed on maintaining endangered and threatened fish and
wildlife habitats along with maintenance of historic and cultural sites. Dispersed recreational activities in a natural environment, protection and use of unique natural areas, and primitive
types of recreation will also receive emphasis along with improve6. It is recognized that this is a major point and one on which specific empirical
support has not been adequately developed. Discussions of this problem can be found
in: G. WILLS, TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING (1972); Pyke, A PracticalApproach to
Delphi, 2 FuTruisi 143 (1970); Hill & Fowles, The Methodological Worth of the Delpi
ForecastingTechniques, 7 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING TECHNIQUES 179 (1975); Helmer
& Rescher, On the Epistemology of Inexact Sciences, 6 MANAGEMENT Sci. 25 (1959).
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the
Panel Members
Panel
I.

Age:

Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

0
3
4
2
0
0

II.

Sex:

Male
Female

8
1

I. Ethnic Group Status:
Anglo
Chicano
Black
Indian
IV.

V.

Education:
Professional (M.A., M.S., M.E., M.D., Ph.D.,
LL.B., etc.)
Four Year College Graduate (A.B., B.S.,
B.M., etc.)
1 -3 Years College
Gross Family Annual Income:
10,000-12,499
12,500-14,999
15,000-17,499
17,500-19,999
20,000-24,999
25,000-29,999
30,000+
ment of fish and wildlife habitats. Other resource uses and activities would be directed toward the protection of recreation and
wildlife values.
On the west side of the Continental Divide emphasis is directed toward providing more intensive recreation and silvicultural opportunities which will contribute toward local economic
and community stability. Thus, Alternative A would provide for
a primitive, though non-wilderness area accomodating some
forms of non-motorized recreation.

9
0
0
0

2
6
1
0
2
1
2
1
2
1
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Alternative B - Maximum Wilderness
Protection and enhancement of amenity value will receive
the primary emphasis. These amenities or intangible products
and uses include: maximizing wilderness acreage within the definition of the Wilderness Act and Forest Service policy, fish and
wildlife habitats, and protection of scenic and cultural features. Other resource uses and activities would be subordinated
to the goals of environmental protection and maximizing wilderness. The maximum amount of wilderness within the definition
of the Wilderness Act would be provided.
Alternative C - RecreationalDiversity
Outdoor recreation would be optimized with primary emphasis on providing diversity of opportunities. Protection and
enhancement of amenities and intangible values will receive
emphasis. Fish and wildlife habitats will be protected and enhanced in support of optimizing recreation diversity. Alternative C would lie between alternatives B and D in the amount of
wilderness provided.
Alternative D - Economic Development
Production of tangible forest products and resources would
be optimized. Major emphasis will be placed on assisting local
and regional economic growth and stability through development
of high intensity recreation sites and utilization of renewable
surface resources which include timber, forage, wildlife, and
water. Resource utilization activities will emphasize maintaining
compatibility of other resources, such as silvicultural practices,
to improve water yields. Management emphasis will provide for
maximizing economic values at minimal environmental costs.
This alternative would provide the least amount of wilderness.

B.

The Overall Approach to Social Well-Being
In sum, the approach to the analysis of social well-being is
as follows:
A. to employ panels of judges selected for their knowledge
and experience with the planning area under consideration;
B. to make estimates about the impacts of four different
management alternatives on one dimension of social well-being
-future choice opportunities foregone under each management
alternative: Management alternatives which eliminate the fewest futures-for-choice opportunities and are judged to be superior
from a social well-being standpoint.

What follows is the presentation of the data for each dimension
of Futures Foregone.
C. The Futures Foregone Data
The Futures Foregone data is displayed in Table 2. Look-
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ing down the page the reader will see the estimates of the panel
for scope. Where the scope of a loss is a non-zero value, one will
see accompanying estimates for intensity and duration values.
The overall Futures Foregone summary score is computed as

follows:
TABLE 2
FUTURES FOREGONE
ALTERNATIVE A ALTERNATIVE B
Cont. Pres, Mgt, Max. Wilderness
Scope Int. Our. Scope Int. Dur.
Social Group Category
-1 6
4
-.3 2 5
Sawmills/Planing Mills
-1 6
2
-.3 2 3
Logging Contractors
0
0
Cattle/Sheep Grazing
0
0
Other Livestock
-1 2 3
0
Food Processing
0
-.3 7 100
Wilderness Recreation
0
0
Dispersed Recreation
0
0
Wildlife Recreation
-.8
6
5
-.3
4
2
Developed Recreation
1
-.9
7 3
-.2 3
Minerals/Mining
3
-.2 6
5
-.4
6
Watershed
-.2 2 1
-.6
2
1
Gas Stations/Auto DIrs.
-.4
4
1
Eating/Drinking Estab.
-.2 2 1
-.5 4
2
0
Transport/Warehousing
2
0
-.5 4
Personal Services/Repair
0
-.4
4 2
Other/Retail
0
0
Hunting-Game Birds
-.5
4
1
0
Hunting-Small Animals
-.3 4
1
0
Hunting-Large Animals
0
0
Camping- Remote
2
-.2 4
4
-.5 6
Camping - Developed
0
0
Hiking
5
-.3 4
5
-.5 4
Auto Sightseeing
-.5
0
Skiing/Snow-Downhill
0
0
Skiing/Snow, Cross Ctry.
0
0
Skiing/Water
0
0
Swimming
0
0
Fishing
1
-1.0 1 0
-.5 2
Boating- Power
0
0
Boating - Non-Power
-.3 2 2
-1.0 4
2
Housing
2
5
-.8
2
3
Business - Industrial
-.3
0
0
Business - Agricultural
1 = -3.6 42 135 -12.6 76 42
FF = (S) (1)+(-D) =

-286.2

-999.6

Futures Foregone Ranking:

ALTERNATIVE C ALTERNATIVE D
Econ. Dev.
Rec. Diversity
Scope Int. Dur. Scope Int. Our.
4
5
0
-.5
5
0
-.5 4
0
-.2 4
3
-.3
4
1
0
0
-.3
2
3
-.3
6
50 -.7 8 100
3
0
-.5 8
1
0
-.3
6
5
0
-.3
2
-.5 4
5
0
-.3
4
5
-.3 6
5
-.3 2
1
0
1
0
-.3 2
0
-.3 2 3
0
0
-.3 2 1
0
-.4 3
2
0
-.4
3
2
0
4
5
0
-.3
-.7
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
-.4
2 1
0
0
0
-.4
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
-.3
4
1
-.3
1 1
0
-.2
2
0
0
-.5 3 1
0
2 5
0
-.8
5
0
-.5 3
57 123
-6.9 55 101 -5.0
-480.5

-408.0

A-Cont. Pres. Mgt.
D-Econ. Dev.
C-Rec. Diversity
B-Maximum Wilderness

-286.2
-408.0
-480.5
-999.6

Note: Scores are outcome of Delphi Estimation Procedure. In those cases where there was not
total consensus, the median score is employed.
FF = (XS) (%I) + (I-D)
Where:
FF = Futures Foregone for any single Management Alternative
S = Estimated Scope of Loss
I = Estimated Intensity of Loss
D = Estimated Duration of Loss (and where both scope and duration are entered as minus numbers).
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In effect, this formula for computation of the FF score
weights intensity as the single most important variable in the
equation because scope can vary only between 0 and -1 while
intensity can vary from 0 to 16. Duration, by adding it to the
product of scope and intensity, has an important impact but
not nearly as much as if the number of impact years were also
used as a multiplier.
The logic is that higher scope and duration of losses can
be tolerated where intensity of the loss is low, but when intensity of losses rises-because few or no alternative Resource
Capability Units exist to support the activity in the surrounding area-then the foregone choice opportunity will be severely
missed on the land base and that fact should be highlighted by
an equation that makes intensity of loss a most significant
determinant of the FF score.
The results of the Futures Foregone analysis are as follows:

Management Alternative

Futures
Foregone
Score

Rank
Order

A.

Continue Present Management

-286.2

1

B.

Maximum Wilderness

-999.6

4

C.

Recreational Diversity

-480.5

3

D.

Economic Development

-408.0

2

Why do we find this pattern of outcomes? There are several points to be made:
A. Economic Development shows a second place finish in
the Futures Foregone analysis because economic development in
the Planning Unit is heavily recreation oriented as opposed to
industrial, agricultural, or forest product oriented. In other
words, economic development in this Planning Unit does not
carry with it as much in the way of negative side effects, which
would sound the deathknell of futures for many other activities,
as one might think if one has the image of economic development
as associated with intense industrial, agricultural, or forest product (timber) development.
B. Economic Development looks good as compared to
Maximum Wilderness, not because of any inherent bias in the
procedure against environmental quality and a wilderness man-
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agement strategy, but because of the provisions of the separate
alternatives. The Economic Development alternative provided
for some wilderness area in the northern portion of the Planning
Unit. The Maximum Wilderness alternative, on the other hand,
provided for a much enlarged wilderness area to extend southward across the Planning Unit. Therefore, the management
alternatives were constructed in such a manner that the Economic Development alternative provided for some wilderness
while the Maximum Wilderness alternative failed to provide for
many of the diverse activities which necessarily results in the loss
of futures for many non-wilderness opportunities.
In other words, the Maximum Wilderness alternative emphasizing wilderness did not leave room for the diversity of activities which each of the other management strategies allowed for,
and this fact is clearly reflected in the high Futures Foregone
scores. Each of the other three alternatives provided for varying
portions of wilderness in primitive recreation areas-thereby
holding the wilderness losses down-whereas the Maximum Wilderness alternative did not provide as many opportunities for the
other activities which the affected publics act out on the Planning Unit.
In sum, there is no inherent bias in the procedure against
wilderness uses of the land base. The results obtained are an
outcome of the manner in which the management alternatives
were constructed. Had the Economic Development alternative
not been so recreation oriented and had it not provided. for a
wilderness area in the northern portion of the Planning Unit, it
would have drawn much higher Futures Foregone scores.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Since demand for water and land resources is outstripping
available supplies, it is critical that careful analysis of resource
management alternatives be pursued before making irreversi-

ble commitments. Tool kits have been developed for constructing analyses of technical and economic aspects of such alternatives, but the toolbox labelled "Social Well-Being" has remained notably empty. This is no mere happenstance-the
emptiness reflects the existence of tough conceptual problems
which are outlined in Part II of this paper. No one knows how
to solve these problems in any ultimate sense, but it is possible
to construct a definition of social well-being which is subject
to systematic analysis and measurement. The problems are
sidestepped by moving away from the analysis of choices at
the prescriptive level and by focusing on attributes of the context of choice offered by a given land/water planning unit.
Whereas it is impossible to prescribe that there is any more net
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human well-being in a municipal use of X units of water than
in a recreational or agricultural use, it is possible to examine
the effects of the alternative uses on the choice context which
would be available to present and future generations of affected
groups. Thosb mixes of water/land use which expand the choice
context, or which reduce the choice context the least, contribute more to social well-being than those which foreclose more
futures for choice opportunities. The Futures Foregone analysis
has potential because:
A. It makes possible the quantitative comparison of natural resource alternatives before highly irreversible commitments
are made. Too often social well-being implications have been
discovered only in retrospect. By the time the negative impacts
are felt, and groups are mobilized, the investments in an alternative have been so high as to make remedial action costly,
difficult, time-consuming, and peripheral to the damages sustained by negatively affected groups.
B. The Futures Foregone analysis can be performed at low
cost. Given the current state of the art, it is possible to conduct
a Futures Foregone analysis at a small fraction of the costs of
technical and economic analysis, and it has been established that
the procedures can be phased into natural resource planning processes without creating disruption of existing technical and economic procedures of analysis.
C. The analysis can provide a framework for the coherent
structuring of public involvement. Much current public involvement is diffuse, unfocused, and difficult to analyze. Before systematic analysis of public involvement information can be accomplished, it is important to have a set of well-formulated questions. It is insufficient to have found that some groups support
and oppose given projects or policies. The questions to be answered always have to do with trade-offs among different mixes
of advantages and disadvantages. The analysis of Futures Foregone has the potential of providing a framework within which
each set of proponents and opponents can begin to systematically
comprehend the social effects of a given land/water use alternative and begin to visualize the overall pattern of those effects on
other affected parties. The systematic display of such information might operate to increase the meaningfulness of participation in public involvement sessions, and it should result in more
constructive consideration of trade-offs among opposing groups
who otherwise tend to make public involvement sessions a forum
for non-negotiable conflict.
D. The Futures Foregone analysis of social well-being can
supplement more traditional technical and economic analysis in
a complementary fashion. The social well-being analysis of Fu-
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tures Foregone does not replace other technical and economic
analysis, but it does open up new aspects of the resource allocation problem which have great significance to the quality of life.
Alternative futures are a precious resource. Decision makers
must husband, conserve, and expand them with as much consideration as any material resource.

It is impossible to prescribe particular choices in the name
of social well-being today and for coming generations, but it is
possible to think of serving others, including future generations, by retaining and expanding the context of choice as
much as possible. To leave a legacy of expanded choice opportunities for others is to leave the greatest gift of all-it is what
progress in social life is all about.

Let's Dismantle (Largely but not Fully) the
Federal Water Resource Development
Establishment, or The Apostasy of a
Longstanding Water Development Federalist*
HENRY

P.

CAULFIELD, JR.**

I now live in Fort Collins, Colorado, a rapidly expanding
city of some 50,000 people, and I serve as a member of the Fort
Collins Water Board, in addition to teaching and doing research with respect to water and related land resource uses at
Colorado State University. Thus, in recent years, I have been
observing federal-state-local relations with regard to water
from a diametrically opposite perspective than that provided
by my many, previous years of federal service in Washington,
D.C. The views which follow endeavor to reconcile my research
findings, observations, and experiences from both perspectives.
I.

SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT DYING

To begin, I will make this general observation, with which
others may want to strongly differ: The federal water development program is politically dying, if not already dead. In recent
years, federal development programs have doubled (not even
keeping pace with inflation in construction costs) while
federally-assisted state and local programs, largely for wastewater management, have increased 16-fold. Clearly, national
value priorities have changed.
The recent emergence of major federal responsibility for
water quality was accomplished by the Water Pollution Control Acts of the last decade. With hardly a dissenting Congressional vote, the primary force in water pollution control was
removed during the 1960s from the state to the federal level.
This new federal responsibility was strongly supported by public opinion, as indicated by many opinion polls. No such public
opinion, or even solid interest group enthusiasm, calls loudly
enough to be heard these days for federal water and related
land development.
* Paper originally delivered as a Panel Member, Panel on the Role of Federal,
State and Local Governments, National Conference on Water, sponsored by the U.S.
Water Resources Council, Washington, D.C., April 22-24, 1975.
** Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University; former Director, U.S.
Water Resources Council.
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The last really big authorizations to the Bureau of Reclamation for federal water development in the West were those
for the Central Arizona Project in 1968 and, earlier in the 1960s,
for the Garrison Diversion and Oahe projects in North Dakota
and South Dakota, respectively. These three big projects
stemmed from implicit political understandings of decades before. They appear now as being pursued with something less
than ecstatic political enthusiasm, even within the areas which
they are presumed to benefit directly.
Similar observations could be made, generally, with respect to the water development programs of the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service.
How might one explain this decline in national political
support for federal water development projects? Let us discuss
a number of possible interrelated explanations.
A. Opposition of Office of Management and Budget
There is no question that the institutional position of the
Office of Management and Budget and its predecessor, the
Bureau of the Budget, has been to oppose somehow all federal
water development projects. Regardless of the political party of
the President, this has been the institutional position for over
20 years. Many arguments and devices have been used over the
years to implement this position. These include diversionary
tactics such as encouragement of the establishment of national
water commissions, suggesting unfeasible cost-sharing or reimbursement schemes, and insisting upon politically untenable
benefit-cost standards. I can recall no federal water development project (including federally-assisted watershed projects
of the Soil Conservation Service) that these budget agencies
have strongly supported. This institutional position of this
well-entrenched professional staff-arm of the President has
undoubtedly helped to bring about political malaise, but cannot really explain it.
B. Environmental Movement
The rise in political legitimacy during the 1960s of wild
and scenic rivers as an alternative use of rivers, along with
other environmental concerns with rivers and lakes, has
openly, forcefully, and successfully challenged the traditional
federal water development programs. But the environmentalists would have been forced to compromise with federal
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water development much more than they have, if national political vitality in support of development were still abroad in the
land. The environmentalists have contributed to this loss in
vitality, but their strength does not fully explain it.
C. Decline of Federal Role in the Development of the West
The United States was developed from East to West. The
origins of the water development functions of both the Corps
of Engineers in the early 19th century and the Bureau of Reclamation at the end of the 19th century stem from national concern for development of the West, first to the Mississippi River
and then through the arid West to the Pacific. Both programs
stemmed politically from the desire to support agriculture: the
interests of what were seen as pioneering, reliable, individualist
farmers and ranchers. This support was given by the federalist
Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln to the navigation program of the Corps of Engineers and by the federalist Republican Party of Theodore Roosevelt to irrigation development by
the Bureau of Reclamation. The federalist Democratic Party of
Franklin Roosevelt put a largely bipartisan federalist stamp
upon water resources development, except with respect to federal public power development.
Quite apart from political response to the interests of our
former national agricultural and rural majority, these federal
programs could be justified more generally by the substantial
failure (except for the early Erie Canal) of state navigational
promotion efforts with federal land-grant support during the
Canal Era, 1817-1838, and by the great difficulties encountered
in nonfederal public and private irrigation development in the
arid West in the latter part of the 19th century. Federal responsibility for planning, financing, constructing, operating, and
maintaining navigation and irrigation projects was justified at
the times of their origins by: (a) the superior financial capability of the federal government to finance projects whose benefits
would accrue over a long period of time; and (b) the ability of
the federal government to utilize most effectively the very
scarce engineering and other scientific talent available to the
Nation until more recent times.
Both of these justifications for federal direct responsibility
are no longer valid. To the extent federal financial help is
needed for nonfederal water development agencies, grants and
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loans can be made as is now the common practice in other areas
of governmental concern. With the plethora of expert consulting engineering firms now available to states and local governments, to say nothing of their own increased professional personnel aided by financial grants under Title III of the Water
Resources Planning Act since 1966 and expanded expertise in
state land-grant universities by use of funds provided under the
Water Resources Planning Research Act since 1965, federal
professional expertise is no longer as essential as it once was.
All of this adds up to the fact that Western development
no longer lights fires of political imagination, even in the West.
The West is now as developed in large part as the East. And
the Western states no longer provide a bloc within the Congress
unequivocably dedicated to federally-promoted Western development.
D. Needed Federal Development Largely Accomplished
Among the interrelated factors that help to explain the
decline in political support for federal water development projects is also the fact that the federal job has largely been accomplished. Probably this fact is generally perceived by many public leaders as well as by people generally.
The main stems of the Columbia, Colorado, Missouri,
Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, Rio Grande rivers,
and probably some others, have already been developed, more
or less fully. Moreover, except for engineering dreams of largescale continental water transfer, the potential large-scale irrigation schemes of the West have been, or are now being, accomplished.
E. Emergence of the National Urban Majority
Finally, among the interrelated factors that help to explain
the decline in political support of water resource development
projects is the political emergence of a national urban majority.
Agriculture and other resource development concerns are not
a major interest of this relatively new national majority; they
are foreign to it.
In the area of domestic policy, the urban majority is primarily concerned with urban problems: housing, transportation, health, welfare, air and water pollution, urban open space
and recreation areas, energy, etc. Its concern with the rural and
natural hinterland, expressed effectively now for some 10 or
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more years, is that of the environmental movement. Urban
people, not rural people, strongly support establishment of wilderness areas, national parks, wild and scenic rivers, and fish
and wildlife enhancement.
The federal response to urban problems has not been a
federalist response of direct public service such as that of the
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. The federal
response has been categorical financial grants-in-aid to state
and local governments and, more recently, block grants and
general revenue sharing. Grantsmanship is now the dominant
mode of federal-state-local relations.
Comprehensive major river basin plans for federal development of water and related land resources are foreign to
"urban and regional plans" of urban professionals (both in and
out of universities) and most of the urban public. They are two
worlds apart. The emergence of the urban majority, nationally,
and increasingly in each state (e.g., recently in Colorado), indicates that this anachronism needs to be faced frontally and
overcome at the level of national policy. But, in so facing this
problem, it needs to be remembered that water resource development is still needed in this nation, particularly that which
is intrastate.
1I.

WATER DEVELOPMENT STILL NEEDED

Urban water management is clearly a need for the longterm future. Such management includes for many urban areas
development of new domestic and industrial water supplies.
For all areas it includes wastewater management and reuse of
water to the greatest practicable extent. Urban flood plain
management, including development of flood protection works
in appropriate circumstances, is also a clear need for the future.
Both urban water management and urban flood plain management are major urban public concerns.
The extent to which these needs and public concerns will
require assumption by states of direct state responsibilities, as
a service to two or more urban communities or for river basin
management, will vary from state to state.
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Idaho are,
possibly, the only states in the West with the economic need
for new irrigation projects and with the agricultural-rural majorities which would support state planning, financing, con-
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struction, and operation and maintenance of state or special
public-district irrigation works.
The longrun viability of rural watershed protection
schemes of the Soil Conservation Service is not clear. No doubt
it varies substantially from state to state. If this financialassistance program were converted by the Congress to the more
usual grant-in-aid form, with the technical personnel being
state, rather than federal, employees, then the response of each
state would correlate, presumably, with the degree of
agricultural-rural political power in each state.
Not only are intrastate water developments needed in the
future, some interstate water developments will also be needed.
Continued federal responsibility for such new interstate navigation developments as are needed and politically viable is
clear. Major elements of flood management on interstate rivers
is also clearly federal.
What is not clear is the need and political viability of
major federal urban water management schemes for interstate
areas. The Corps of Engineers has tried valiantly to explore
whether it has a viable role in urban water management in its
Northeast Water Supply Study and other such studies. A hard
question, for example, is this: Would a federally planned, financed, constructed, and operated wholesale water supply and
pollution treatment scheme for multistate Metropolitan New
York be politically viable? If not there, then where? Certainly
not Denver or San Francisco.
Other relevant questions regarding interstate situations
are these:
1. Is the responsibility that the federal government has
recently assumed for water quality enhancement on the Colorado River unique? It could be.
2. Are the federal-interstate compact commissions on the
Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers really viable as agencies to
plan, finance, construct, and operate needed management
works? They are not as yet.
3. Are the future domestic and foreign demands for
American agricultural products such as to require development
by the federal government of large water-transfer schemes for
new irrigation development or for rescue of agricultural areas
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that are mining their groundwaters, for example, West Texas?
I doubt it.

III.

NEW FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL SYSTEM

If the foregoing analysis is basically accepted, then obviously fundamental changes are needed in the authorization
of federal, state, and local responsibilities with respect to
water.
The most important strategic action that the Congress
needs to take is to repeal the authorizations of the Corps of
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation to plan, finance, construct, operate, and maintain further intrastate projects. This
action should include deauthorization of the intrastate projects
within the $30 billion and $8 billion of authorized, but unfunded projects that the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation, respectively, are said to have at the present time.
The Congress should also repeal the authorization of the Soil
Conservation Service to plan and supervise construction, etc.,
of small watershed protection projects. Finally, the Congress
should repeal the Small Reclamation Projects Act.
These Congressional actions would clearly place basic decisional responsibility for intrastate water development upon
state governments. State governments would then have to
reappraise the division of responsibility for action between
state governments and local governments. To make this change
practicable, the Congress should authorize a program of block
grants and loans to aid states in undertaking the types of projects formerly undertaken by the federal agencies.
Though the operational clarity of the distinction between
intrastate and interstate is obviously critical to the working out
of this proposal, working out this distinction in careful detail
cannot be attempted here. Suffice it to say that in my judgment it is capable of being operationally made.
Under this proposal the federal government would have
responsibility for planning, financing, constructing, operating,
and maintaining interstate projects, except for those undertaken by federal-interstate compact commissions. Because federal, interstate, and intrastate concerns with water and related
land use will continue, mechanisms for federal-state coordination and comprehensive planning will be needed in the future.
The Congress, therefore, should study the present roles of
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federal-state river basin commissions created under Title II of
the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, the federalinterstate compact commissions on the Delaware and Susquehanna, the several federal regional commissions modelled on
the Appalachian Regional Commission, and the federal executive councils created by the Executive Branch. In addition, it
should study the basic procedures involved in federal-statelocal relations embodied in Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-95 as well as those directly in the water field. The
upshot of such study should be Congressional reconciliation of
these mechanisms and procedures in law.
These proposals could overcome the very substantial frustration that exists today in meeting water development needs.
State people who have made a career of promoting federal projects at federal expense, and opposing (implicitly if not explicitly) state assumption of responsibility including financing,
will need to shift their activities. The need for carrying out
these proposals is sufficiently great to justify Congressional
consideration as soon as this may be practicable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

These proposals are radical. They involve radical changes
in major institutions of government, and for people in them
with whom I have long been associated. However, the importance to society of academic freedom (including tenure) is not
just that an incumbent professor possess it but that he use it
as he sees the need. I have now used it as I see the need.
I expect that from many quarters my apostasy in this
paper will not be well-received-to say the least. Longstanding friendships that I value may be broken up. Nevertheless, I believe these proposals are worthy of real debate. If my
present views can be successfully refuted and buried, so much
the better. My own original faith in water development federalism will be vindicated. But if my views are not successfully
refuted, or better proposals are not forthcoming, then let us get
on with the task of further designing a new system of federalstate-local water and related land jurisdictions that makes professional sense and has political vitality for the future.

CASE STUDIES
Water Issues in Perspective
JACK

0.

HORTON*

Instead of the legal framework addressed by many of the
speakers I will discuss the actions of the government-particularly of the Department of the Interior-which address the
problems of allocation, supply, and distribution of water. I
will take a common man's approach to this framework (how
to make government work) while looking at the complex
legal array of problems, such as the problem of federal-state
relations. I hope to provide at least a status report of the Department's progress with the law and with the operating units
in the field.
Let me address four different areas very quickly: (1) the
study and analysis of the supply of the upper Colorado River;
(2) an analysis of the Missouri-Yellowstone; (3) state water
rights and the relationship between state and federal government; and (4) the very difficult subject of Indian water rights.
In 1973, when I joined the Department of the Interior, it
appeared that we had no overall study of projected water demands on the upper Colorado River; indeed, the areas of agreement and the areas of dispute as far as the supply was concerned were unclear. We have what now is regarded as a professional group of federal employees, assisted by state and private
individuals, preparing a report entitled Water for Energy in the
Upper Colorado.The report does not argue for diversion or use
of more water for energy, but simply recognizes that within this
country and this region there are increasing demands for the
use of water from the upper Colorado. The figures were used
in alternative scenarios; the Bureau of Reclamation uses a
conservative estimate of supply of 5.8 million acre-feet, while
many of the state authorities would argue that there is 6.5
million acre-feet available. In our presentation and in our analysis we subtracted from the 5.8 million acre-foot estimate the
present uses, totalling 3.7 million acre-feet-leaving, of course,
* Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Land and Water Resources.
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2.1 million acre-feet. We then tried to determine a reasonable
estimate of future uses for irrigation, agriculture, recreation,
and fish and wildlife flows. We came up with the following
results, estimating the predicted demands on the Colorado
basin by the year 2000. We found that, despite many opinions
to the contrary, there was less than 1 million acre-feet needed
for energy uses; in fact, the amount was only 870,000 acre-feet.
We projected another 800,000 acre-feet for new agricultural
uses, and 150,000 for required fish and wildlife flows. Thus, we
predicted a possible "pinch-point," supply no longer exceeding
demand, occurring between 1995 and the year 2000. Of course
this will vary depending upon what assumptions are placed in
the equation.
The same calculations were performed for the upper Missouri; in fact, there were two studies-one done by the Bureau
of Reclamation, and one being an outstanding federal-state
study called the Northern Great Plains Resource Program. As
in the upper Colorado, we found that a considerably lesser
volume of water would be required for energy than had previously been thought. The Missouri-Yellowstone system is far
larger than the Colorado, containing 28 million acre-feet. Of
that average historic flow, 6.5 million acre-feet are now being
used and depleted. Taking into account future demands placed
by energy, agriculture, mining and industry, Indian water, and
fish and wildlife flows, there will still remain 15 million unused
acre-feet of water by the year 2000.
The above figures and studies were intended to provide a
framework for planning and discussion of water management
needs. Within this general mathematical framework the Department has tried to come up with a coordinating mechanism
involving the state governors that will make possible more sophisticated planning systems between the federal and state
levels of government than we have had before.
Starting in 1973, we realized that one of the paramount
difficulties in water planning and use in the Missouri was the
lack of coordination between the Corps of Engineers, who had
built the reservoirs for flood control and for navigation, and the
Bureau of Reclamation, who had diverted and used the water
for irrigation and who had the authority to market water for
industrial purposes. The Department spent almost 16 months
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negotiating a memorandum of understanding between these
two parties. This was a major first step in effective water management, being the first time there had ever been an agreement
between the two proud and professional federal water agencies.
The next step in 1973, was to inform the western governors
of the procedural results of this agreement, and to emphasize
that a greater decisionmaking role should be assumed by the
states. The professional state water agencies and officials
should have that responsibility. Accordingly we have given
them in every instance the first right to contract or process any
application that comes to the federal government for use of
Missouri water for industrial purposes. Additionally, we offered
them the opportunity to contract for significant single blocks
of water behind the federal reservoirs in the Missouri system.
And, on Oct. 1, 1976, in what is truly an historic step forward,
the Department signed a contract with the Governor of Montana which gives to the State the right to handle all applications to the first 300,000 acre-feet from Fort Peck at no cost to
the State, until they should subcontract that water for industrial or industrial-related uses.
The reason this arrangement was successful is because we
have found new ways to solve old problems, and we are not now
looking at the historic dispute that has aggravated the water
situation for so long on these two river systems. Another reason
this agreement was successful was because there were very
important agricultural spin-offs for the use of Fort Peck water.
The first known state water application will be for what conceptually is called a gasification plant. Once operational, the
plant will produce ammonia fertilizer, which means that nitrogen ammonium fertilizer will be much cheaper in Montana
than it has been before.
The toughest problem we face, however, is not the supply
question or water for energy, nor is it the difficulties between
the federal agencies and the state agencies. In my opinion,
without question, the most pressing and demanding problem
that we have yet to address, let alone resolve, is the problem
of Indian water rights. As the state looks towards future irrigation and energy demands, and as we look at our responsibilities
on the Colorado and on the Missouri, we realize that we have
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not yet come up with a well-defined understanding of what
Indian water rights are and what they involve.
In the first instance, those waters which fall on or flow
across an Indian reservation are available to them for agricultural purposes. But can they also use that water for nonagricultural purposes? Do they have to use it only on the
reservation? Can they sell water to energy companies? Indeed,
can they sell it for future irrigation development or to cities?
These questions remained unanswered, but we have not progressed even that far. We have not defined what these water
rights are. Moreover, there is a standing dispute between the
federal agencies and the Bureau concerning what formulates an
economic understanding of what it means to produce practicably irrigable developments on an Indian reservation.
I am pleased to say that modest progress has been made
within the Department of the Interior. Specifically, we have
had a task force working on the problem for about a year, and
it is my hope that there will soon be an announcement that will
initiate progress toward an administrative solution of Indian
water rights problems. We believe that practical solutions can
be found and negotiated with the Indians and the states that
will recognize that, by law, certain amounts of water are due
to the Indians; and it is time that we started to recognize those
rights, to quantify those rights, and to assist the various Indian
reservations in making these waters useful to their reservations
and to their people. This, I hope, will be a new way to solve a
long-standing problem.
These issues evidence that we cannot rely on old formulae
to answer new questions. We are, I believe, going to build reclamation projects, not to settle family farmers on their quartersections but: (1) because this country is going to need food for
both domestic and international consumption; (2) because irrigation remains the most economic and sound use of a great deal
of water in the American West; (3) because we will have mastered the technique of economic analysis of water problems;
and (4) because we will have mastered the techniques of more
efficient irrigation and be willing to end wasteful practices.

The Role of Water in the History and
Development of Colorado
DAVID LAVENDER*

Any account of the role filled by water in the growth of
Colorado must begin with yet another description of the implacable circumstances of geography. From the standpoint of
persons whose culture is rooted in more humid climes, both
rainfall and, as a consequence, streamflow are deficient west
of the 100th meridian. Moreover, and this is also important to
our tale, such streams as do exist are perverse, deceptive, and
difficult to control. Arroyos either have no water in them at all
or else roar with destructive flash floods laden with sand. Sand
is also an eternal part of the freight even of rivers that do not
dry up every summer.
The consequences are different on the different sides of the
Rockies. To the east the rivers lack volume enough to cut firm
channels through the gently sloping plains. Thus, the settling
sand aggrades the streambed. The water wanders, and the
braided flow that results is, in the folk cliche of the early settlers, a mile wide and an inch deep, too thick to drink but too
thin to plow, the biggest rivers with the least water in the land.
A significant portion of the flow, moreover, is completely underground. Obviously such a river presents grave problems to
men endeavoring to build permanent headgates or seeking to
determine ownership of the buried portions of the flow.
West of the Rockies, by contrast, the land lacks the flat
sameness of the Plains. There the loads of sand have helped the
water scour out canyons that are things of beauty but hardly
joys forever to the frustrated settlers who want to use them for
either transportation or diversion.
The point is that in the midst of a dry land of enormous
extent-almost two-fifths of the area of the coterminous United
States-a few cantankerous streams do exist. They exist because of the echelons of the mountains, most of them running
north and south, that wrinkle the sun-smitten spaces between
* Thacher School, Ojai, California; Guggenheim Fellowship Recipient, 1961,
1969.
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the Sierra Nevada and the Rockies. Although these uplifts occupy only 15 percent of the West's total area, they drain from
passing clouds 90 percent of the moisture that reaches the
ground between the 100th meridian and the western slopes of
the Sierra Nevada-Cascade chain.
Because Colorado possesses the highest average elevation
of any state in the Union, it captures a disproportionate share
of this moisture. Of all the major streams that flow to the ocean
from the interior of the American West, the Columbia River is
the only one that does not receive appreciable augmentation
from the Colorado Rockies.
Because water promotes prosperity, particularly when
used in connection with booming new industrial and cybernetic
pursuits, Coloradans are inclined to be possessive about
"their" streams and to become embroiled with neighboring
states that cast covetous eyes upon the same rivers. These
many controversies, particularly those involving the Colorado
River, are an integral part of the story of the state-a story not
yet ended.
The beginnings of the state's water story are likewise
shrouded in obscurity. We do know, however, that long before
the documentation of ordinary events seemed necessary, the
Indians of the American Southwest had learned to grow crops.
Some of their maize and squash they dry-farmed, some they
planted on terraces where run-off water from storms could be
collected, and some they irrigated with diversion canals that
tapped the streams at a few easily approachable spots.
Canal irrigation was the system adopted by the first whites
to encounter America's aridity. In fact, some early settlers in
Arizona actually resurrected many miles of the prehistoric
ditches of the Gila River area, just as the Bureau of Land
Management today occasionally utilizes ancient Pueblo Indian
check dams to distribute the run-off of storm waters sluicing
across the exposed slickrock of southwestern Colorado. More
generally, however, the ditches were dug by those who used
them-by the Spanish colonists of New Mexico, the fur traders
at their posts on the high plains, and the Mormons of Utah. By
1856, well before Colorado Territory had been created, Mexican
settlers in the San Luis Valley had built at least a dozen short
ditches for bringing water to their croplands.
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There is a paradox here. Agriculture accounted for the first
water development in the intermountain West, and agriculture
today remains the single greatest consumer of mountain water.
The basic law of water diversion, however, did not come from
agriculture but from mining.
Western water law is a California invention. When the
argonauts of 1848 and 1849 descended on the foothills of the
Sierra Nevada, they were trespassers on the public domain.
The United States, which had just acquired the land from
Mexico, had codified no laws concerning the acquisition of placer mining claims. In order to fill the vacuum, the California
miners drew up, at local meetings, some 500 sets of district laws
designed to legalize their extralegal position.
The men-there were very few women miners-did not
want title to the ground. Titles would have resulted in taxes,
and besides, the great majority intended to abandon their
small plots as soon as the gold had been extracted. All they
wanted was a usufructuary right. The point to recall is this: as
soon as use ceased, so did the right to mine, at least until 1866
when Congress finally got around to promulgating laws
whereby title to mining ground could be perfected.'
Methods for acquiring the water needed in the mining process followed an analogous course. A claimant-either an individual, a partnership, or a corporation-posted a notice of intent and began a survey for a ditch. That was enough to establish a right, and the right continued for as long as the water was
used.
Inevitably the volume of water in the foothill streams diminished as the dry summer advanced. No attempt was made,
however, to equitably apportion the shrinking supplies among
different claimants. Instead it was decreed that whoever first
put water to use was entitled to his full quota before later
diverters could take a drop. This procedure was the basis of
what later became known as the doctrine of prior appropriation
for beneficial use, or, to resort to the catch phrase used in all
water discussions, "first in time is first in right."
Significantly, the three gold strikes that launched the Col1. 30 U.S.C. § 32 (1970).
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orado mining stampede were made by men experienced in California customs-William Green Russell, George Jackson, and
John Gregory. Russell, it is worth noting, soon turned from
mining to promoting a ditch company that supplied water to
placer claims. Nor was his example unique. When water decrees were adjudicated in Colorado the number one right on
Clear Creek went to David K. Wall, also a California veteran,
who had used his diverted water during the summer of 1859 to
grow potatoes on two acres of soil now embraced within the city
limits of Golden. California practice thus became Colorado
custom.
The first ditches, like the first placer claims and truck
gardens, were simple. Complexity and conflict did not develop
until the advent of the Kansas Pacific and Denver Pacific railroads in 1870. At that point a mania for cooperative colonies
seized the area. One of the earliest and most successful of those
ventures was Union Colony, precursor of Greeley. An early rival
was the Fort Collins Agricultural Colony, founded on the site
of an abandoned military reservation beside the Cache La
Poudre River. The word "colony" contained such magic connotations, indeed, that General William Palmer of the Denver &
Rio Grande Railroad used the term to lend glamor to his speculative townsites of Colorado Springs and South Pueblo.
Because the colonies depended for life on ditch water, interest in irrigation swelled high. In October 1873, territorial
Governor Samuel Elbert convened here in Denver the Nation's
first symposium on the subject. Delegates attended from Utah,
Wyoming, New Mexico, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. In
1873 Colorado was not yet a state, but already the delegates
knew that the rivers of the West were too difficult to be handled
by individual effort. Fervently they recommended federal aid
for the construction of reservoirs and distribution systems.
Congress, however, paid no heed.
Meanwhile accelerating demands for irrigation water led
to conflict, notably an acrimonious dispute between Greeley
and Fort Collins over the drought-shrunken waters of the
Cache La Poudre. Their troubles forced the 1876 convention
charged with preparing a state constitution to devote part of
its attention to water problems. As a result, the legality of prior
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appropriation of water was written into the State's organic
law;' a trail-blazing step of such importance that prior appropriation, the basic law of all Rocky Mountain States, is often
called the Colorado Doctrine.
The codification of firm laws regarding water, a growing
population, and favorable climatic conditions during the 1880s
touched off a burst of competitive ditch and reservoir building
throughout the South Platte watershed, and somewhat later,
the Arkansas Valley. Several of the projects were carried to
completion by the cooperative effort of the farmers who would
benefit; others were the fruit of private corporations financed
by capital from the East and from Great Britain. About 1900,
mutual companies legally capable of selling bonds to finance
their work became as great a rage as colonies had been a
quarter of a century earlier.
Geography played its inescapable part in these new developments. Water-seekers from the northern tributaries of the
South Platte Valley discovered that by running canals across
relatively low passes in the Continental Divide they could move
Pacific water to overappropriated streams on the Eastern
Slope. During the slack farm season between planting and harvest, whole families would sometimes camp in the high country
while working on community ditches. Although these were the
Nation's first transmountain diversion projects, it is unlikely
that the participants realized even faintly the consequences
that would follow from their activity.
The ditch building enthusiasm of the 1880s was temporarily chilled by the economic depression of the 1890s. Seeking
relief, fervent Populists filled the Western air with demands
that the federal government extend aid to suffering communities. Free silver was one such burning issue. Another revolved
around federally sponsored conservation and reclamation
measures. The latter drive came to fruition with the National
Reclamation Act of 1902,1 which put the United States Government into the business of building dams and distribution systems on rivers too cantankerous for local agencies to handle.
Those who like to use hindsight for finding omens can discover
2. COLO. CONST., art. 16, § 6.
3. Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902).

412

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:407

one in the fact that Colorado's first two federal projects, the
Uncompahgre and the Grand Valley systems, both involved the
waters of the Colorado River.
First, however, we need to glance at Colorado's disputes
with Wyoming over the Laramie River, 4 a tributary of the
North Platte. In that situation, Colorado wanted to "have its
cake and eat it too." Because the Laramie River originates in
Colorado, the state maintained that diversions within Colorado
were legitimate even when they interfered with prior appropriations in Wyoming. The United States Supreme Court struck
down the contention on the grounds that both states subscribed
to the doctrine of prior appropriation and that both must follow
it regardless of political boundaries.'
The decision came at a time when Californians were pressing Congress to authorize a project on the lower Colorado River
that, among other things, would facilitate the diversion of large
amounts of water into the fabulously rich Imperial Valley. If
approved, the Imperial project would almost certainly lead to
other diversions and hence enable Southern California to establish priorities capable of retarding industrial and agricultural developments in the states higher up the River.
The upper states, still smarting from the Laramie River
decision, took alarm. Denver, for instance, was already dreaming of a water tunnel through the Continental Divide-the pioneer bore of the Moffat Railroad eventually opened the
way-and Utah was studying means for augmenting its Strawberry Project, which even then was moving water out of the
Uintah foothills to the Wasatch Front. If such dreams were to
be realized, California would have to be forestalled.
The vigorous opposition of the mountain states led California to subscribe to the famed Colorado River Compact of 1922,1
which divided the waters of the River not among the states
involved-jealousies were too intense for that-but between
the upper and lower basins. This allocation, whose impact on
the State of Colorado can hardly be exaggerated, vitiated the
right of appropriation insofar as interstate streams are con4. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1921).
5. Id. at 466.
6. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-61-102 et seq. (1973).
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cerned, and the precedent was reaffirmed in 1948 when Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming at last agreed to divide
the upper basin's allotment of water among themselves.7
Nearly 52 percent of the River's water was assigned to Colorado.
All of that 52 percent originates on the Western Slope,
which is the wettest part of Colorado's mountain oasis. Historically, however, not much of that western water has been beneficially used. Except in favored spots near the Utah border, the
growing season is too short for large-scale agriculture, and isolation discouraged most industry. As a result, only one-fifth of
Colorado's residents live in the western two-fifths of the state,
and so Eastern Slope dwellers thought it quite permissible to
reach across the mountains to satisfy their water needs. After
all, does not the state constitution declare that water anywhere
within the boundaries belongs to all the people, subject only to
the limits of prior appropriation?
Even the barest mention of three of the Eastern Slope's
increasingly mammoth transversions will indicate the shifting
direction of Colorado affairs. First is the traditional ColoradoBig Thompson Project; traditional in that it was designed to
supply agricultural water to the overextended South Platte.
But as a marked sign of the times the Colorado-Big Thompson
also generated hydroelectric power for industrial use. A second
project is the great mixing bowl of the Arkansas Valley-Turquoise Lake. In that expanding reservoir near Leadville, the waters of the Homestake Project, designed for the
urban centers of Colorado Springs and Aurora, intrude into
water intended ultimately for the melon and sugar beet farmers
of the lower Arkansas-agricultural and urban uses mingling
more or less on equal terms. Then, finally, there are Denver's
Roberts Tunnel and lovely Dillon Lake, in which agricultural
considerations play scant part. The thought is sobering. Industrial growth has made Denver, like Los Angeles, so powerful
politically and financially that the city can complete, unaided,
projects of a magnitude that agricultural districts can handle
only with federal help.
The implications are not lost on the residents of the Western Slope. They feel, as the people of Colorado's northwestern
7. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-62-101 et seq. (1973).
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counties felt during the Laramie River disputes with Wyoming,
that they ought to have some control over water originating in
their area. They echo suspicions similar to those that all Colorado turned on California before the signing of the Colorado
River Compact, namely, a dread that prior appropriation by
strongly muscled adversaries can strangle their own hopes of
prosperity.
The possibility of profitable development on the Western
Slope looms larger now than ever before. The area contains
enormous reserves of energy currently locked out of reach in the
form of coal and oil shale. Releasing that energy will take large
quantities of water, both for the processes themselves and for
the new towns that may be built. In addition, the potentials for
water-based recreation are high on the Western Slope, and the
savants tell us that recreation will become increasingly important as the nation grows increasingly urbanized. But will the
necessary water be available beyond the Divide if the momentum of history keeps it flowing east?
My murky crystal ball does not show clear answers. But
the examples of the past will inevitably play their part during
the discussions and compromises that must precede final decisions about the future welfare of both halves of this mountaindivided state.

Interstate River Compacts: Impact on

Colorado
IVAL V. GOSLIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The first interstate water compacts' predated the Constitution itself, originating under the Articles of Confederation.'
The earliest compacts were interstate agreements dealing with
boundary problems, navigation, and fishing rights in interstate
waters. Increasing population in the American colonies and
competition for agricultural lands, navigation, and fishing
privileges led to the negotiation of agreements that permitted
these activities to continue under equitable limitations. Recognizing the value of such agreements, the colonists specifically
created a "compact clause" in article I, section 10, clause 3,
of the Constitution of the United States. The pioneers followed
the same pattern.
As large numbers of peoples moved westward in search of
economic and social opportunities, problems moved with them.
When the number of people in a given area increased to the
point that water resources became short in relation to the demands placed upon them, agreements were negotiated under
which the resources could be equitably used by members of
society. These agreements between and among sovereign states
developed into interstate river compacts.
Today there are 20 major interstate river compacts in the
United States that allocate water between and among states.
The State of Colorado is a party to nine of them and to three
interstate agreements that can be designated as subcompacts
inasmuch as they are important segments of one of the nine
major compacts. 3 A quick review of the geography of the area
and history of water development in Colorado illustrates the
importance of these compacts to the state.
* B.S., Utah State University; B.A., M.A., University of Utah. Mr. Goslin has
been the Executive Director of the Upper Colorado River Commission since 1955.
1. WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged 1961) defines a
compact as "an interstate agreement entered into to handle a particular problem or
task."

2. J. Muys,

INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS

5 (1971) (NTIS 202 998).

3. A chronological list of water allocation compacts and subcompacts involving
the State of Colorado is found in the appendix to this article.
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SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHY

Geographic and orographic conditions play major roles in
the distribution and amounts of precipitation that fall upon
Colorado. The location and arrangement of the mountains and
valleys through their influence upon air movements determine
to a great extent the nature of the runoff of the various stream
systems. Precipitation varies annually from 40-50 inches on the
high mountain ranges to about 8-10 inches in the more arid
regions of the state.
Water has acted as an important catalyst for both agriculture and industry in the economic development of Colorado

from the time the first white settlers arrived. As in most western states, the distribution of population shows no direct correlation to the availability of surface water. As an example, about
two-thirds of the Colorado people live within the South Platte
River basin that produces less than 10 percent of the state's
average annual surface water. The Colorado River Basin contains about 10 percent of the population, but its average annual
surface runoff comprises about 70 percent of the total.

Colorado, in relation to its neighboring states, is a highaltitude region having in excess of 50 mountain peaks reaching

over 14,000 feet. Reference is often made to Colorado as the
"roof of the nation." Five major stream systems, the Arkansas,
Colorado, Platte, and Republican Rivers, and the Rio Grande,
deliver water to nine other states under compact terms.' Thus,
despite its arid regions, Colorado is a water-producing state
from the standpoint that precipitation falls upon it, and much
of the runoff flows beyond its borders.'
III.

A CAPSULE OF EARLY COLORADO WATER HISTORY

Construction of the earliest recorded continuous water
development by white settlers was started as early as 1852 on
4. Arizona, California, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah,
and Wyoming.
5. An interesting statement in UNrrED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & COLORADO DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WATER FOR ToMORRow, COLORADO STATE WATER
PLAN 2-14 (1974), says:

With few exceptions, waters originating in other states are not available
for use in Colorado. On the other hand, all the surface flows of the State,
except natural losses, are available by gravity to 18 other states.
This statement appears to be a slight exaggeration of the actual facts, but it does
indicate the nature of the problem.
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the People's Ditch, a diversion from the Rio Grande in the San
Luis Valley in southeastern Colorado. This ditch has been used
since its completion and has the earliest decreed priority (1852)
in Colorado. About this same time other water developments
were initiated, the largest of which was on the Purgatory River
near Trinidad.
In the 1860s and 1870s many new immigrants constructed
more extensive irrigation facilities in the valleys of the Rio
Grande, Purgatory, and South Platte Rivers. Irrigation development was very rapid, especially in the warmer climate of
southern Colorado where by 1864 in the Purgatory River basin
the summer base flows were completely appropriated.
Later in the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th
century larger irrigation systems were constructed in the Rio
Grande Valley and in the South Platte, Arkansas, and Colorado River basins. Where it has been physically and economically possible these irrigation enterprises have been expanded.
Irrigation systems in these basins still constitute the foundation for a substantial portion of the economy of the state.
It should not be overlooked that some of the earliest water
usage in Colorado was for mining and mineral processing. Exportation of water from the West Slope to eastern Colorado
commenced in 1880 when the small Ewing Ditch for placer
mining was constructed from the headwaters of the Eagle River
to the Arkansas River watershed. Today 25 transmountain diversions transport approximately one-half million acre-feet of
Colorado River system water per year to eastern Colorado for
domestic, municipal, agricultural, electric energy generation,
and industrial purposes.
Since 1900 settlement of the West has been very rapid.
Passage by the Congress of the Reclamation Act in 1902, together with the increasing demands for more lands for agricultural and industrial expansion, accelerated the development of
water resources and hydroelectric energy generation.
IV.

NEED FOR INTERSTATE RIVER AGREEMENTS

Colorado and her sister states became deeply involved in
the western migrations of people. Conditions were right for
settlement, for acquisition of mineral and agricultural lands,
and for the development of the related water resources with the
blessing and encouragement of federal and state govern-
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ments. Water supplies of western streams at first appeared to
be limitless. By the beginning of the 20th century it was realized that the water supplies of these same streams were far
from ample in proportion to the other natural resources-such
as land, minerals, oil, and gas-that required water for their
exploitation and processing.
With the State of Colorado as a nucleus at the headwaters
of important water sources, formal legal processes evolved from
pressures of increasing populations claiming the use of more
and more waters from streams that flowed by gravity to other
states.
Aside from the unique position of Colorado at the "roof of
the nation," Colorado also found herself in a vulnerable political situation with respect to other states using water from the
same river systems. Colorado officials soon became aware of
the fact that water users in these other states were staking
claims to the consumptive use of large quantities of water from
what they believed should be Colorado rivers. There was real
apprehension that these claims might develop into permanent
legal rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation. There
was some irony in the situation, too, because this doctrine, also
known as the "Colorado doctrine," had been perfected in Colorado in earlier days to establish valid water rights for mining
enterprises.
It was inevitable that the requirements for more and more
water would collide with the limited supply. This collision led
to disagreements among users of waters of interstate streams
and, consequently, to actual or potential disputes between and
among states. The result had to be either interstate litigation,
an adversary approach, or use of the interstate compact, a
cooperative, constitutionally approved approach through mutual understandings of the disputants.' Colorado has been a
leader with respect to both approaches in the field of water
resources.
V.

STATE OF COLORADO-INTERSTATE RIVER COMPACTS

Compacts were not generally used for the apportionment
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, clause 3 provides:
No State shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power.
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of water between and among states until 1922. With Colorado
as one of the paramount leaders, the Colorado River Compact
of 1922 was negotiated by commissioners representing the
seven states of the Colorado River Basin-Arizona, California,
Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming - and a
federal representative, Mr. Herbert Hoover. Among the various
factors that precipitated action on the part of Colorado and her
neighboring upstream states, the following appear to have had
a major influence:
(a) In 1907 the Supreme Court had encouraged the use
of interstate agreement or litigation in the settlement of a dispute between Colorado and Kansas involving the Arkansas
River.7
(b) The other states of the basin had for years viewed
with trepidation the apparent efforts of California to dominate
water usage from the Colorado River. In August 1920 the
League of the Southwest, an organization for the promotion of
western development, adopted a resolution stating that the
rights of the Colorado River Basin states and of the United
States should be settled and determined by compact. By January 1922 each of the seven states and the United States had
appointed commissioners to negotiate an agreement. Simultaneously, California was pressing Congress vigorously for
authorization of construction of a federally-financed regulating
reservoir on the lower reaches of the river to provide flood control, electric power, and irrigation benefits.
(c) In June 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Wyoming v. Colorado s which upheld the doctrine of prior appropriation of water without regard to state
lines. The final negotiation of the compact took place in the
atmosphere created by the Court's decision.
7. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) the Supreme Court said:
As Congress cannot make compacts between the States, as it cannot, in
respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their separate action,
disputes between them must be settled either by force or else by appeal
to tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof.
8. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 496 (1922), the Supreme Court, in its
opinion, said:
As the available supply is 288,000 acre-feet and the amount covered by
senior appropriations in Wyoming is 272,500 acre-feet, there remain
15,500 acre-feet which are subject to this junior appropriation in Colorado.
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The decision in Wyoming v. Colorado confirmed the fears
of Colorado and the other states of the Colorado River Basin
that the already rapidly growing State of California was in an
opportune position to appropriate the lion's share of Colorado
River waters. The upriver states openly opposed the construction of storage or diversion works on the lower reach of the river
that would place that area in a position to monopolize the use
of the waters through prior appropriation. Delph E. Carpenter,
Commissioner for the State of Colorado, effectively summarized the situation:
The upper state has but one alternative, that of using every
means to retard development in the lower state until the uses
within the upper state have reached their maximum. The states
may avoid this unfortunate situation by determining their
respective rights by interstate compact before further development in either state, thus permitting freedom of development in
the lower state without injury to future growth in the upper.,

The decision in Wyoming v. Coloradobecame the stimulus
which consummated the Colorado River Compact, signed on
November 24, 1922.
A. Colorado River Compact0
In the 1920s, laws with respect to rights to use water from
interstate streams were not firmly established. Each state
claimed the exclusive authority to regulate the appropriation
of all water within its borders. The federal government claimed
jurisdiction of interstate streams. The lower reach of the Colorado River was considered navigable and subject to federal
laws. At the same time people of the Southwest were promoting
the idea that there should be federal financing of the construction of a large multiple-purpose water development in the lower
basin, principally for the benefit of California.
If a stalemate of long duration were to be avoided, some
type of agreement allocating the use of the river's waters among
the seven basin states was necessary. The lower basin states
wanted an interstate agreement because they needed the political support of the upper basin states for passage of authorizing
9. R. Wnaui & N. ELY, THE HoovER DAM DOCUMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 717, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. A84 (1948).

10. Colorado River Compact, Pub. L. No. 70-642, §§12-19, 43 Stat. 1057 (1928)
(signed by the States 24 Nov. 1922) [hereinafter Colorado River Compact].
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legislation by the Congress. The upper basin states, like Colorado, favored a compact in order to protect their deferred water
use against prior appropriations in the lower basin.
The State of Colorado's main concern was to effectuate an
equitable apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River
system in perpetuity in order to assure that, in the future when
it was needed, her water resource development would not be
impaired or precluded. The purpose of the Colorado River
Compact, as stated in Article I, adequately expresses the objectives being sought and has become representative of similar
statements of purpose in other compacts that followed.
ARTICLE I
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the
Colorado River System; to establish the relative importance of
different beneficial uses of water; to promote interstate comity;
to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial development of
the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters, and the protection of life and property from floods. To these ends the Colorado River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an apportionment of the use of part of the water of the Colorado River System
is made to each of them with the provision that further equitable
apportionments may be made.

The Colorado River Compact is regarded as the grandfather of water allocation compacts in the United States.
Among some of its more important provisions are the following:
1. The Colorado River Basin was divided into two
subbasins-the upper basin and the lower basinwith the line of demarcation located at Lee Ferry,
Arizona, which was defined as a point one mile
below the mouth of the Paria River which is located
a few miles south of the Utah-Arizona boundary.
Here the waters of the entire upper basin system,
including the Paria River and return flows from the
upper basin projects, converge into one stream.
2. The annual beneficial consumptive use of
7,500,000 acre-feet of water was apportioned to each
subbasin-to the upper basin and to the lower
basin-with the lower basin granted the right to consumptively use another million acre-feet annually if
it is available.
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3. States of the basin were aligned into two
divisions. The states of the upper division include
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; the
states of the lower division are Arizona, California,
and Nevada.
4. Rights of Mexico to use water under a future
treaty were recognized.
5. The states of the upper division are not to cause
the flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry to be less
than 75,000,000 acre-feet in any period of ten consecutive years.
6. The Colorado River Basin is defined to include
"all of the drainage area of the Colorado River system and all other territory within the United States
of America to which the waters of the Colorado River
System shall be beneficially applied."
7. A term which is very important to the State of
Colorado is, "Colorado River System," which means
"that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the United States of America."
8. The Compact negotiators, believing they were
dividing the use of only a part of the river's flow,
provided that at any time after October 1, 1963, if
and when either basin had reached its total consumptive use as apportioned, the use of the remaining waters could be further apportioned between the
two basins.
9. The Colorado was recognized as a navigable
river, but "the use of its waters for purposes of navigation shall be subservient to the uses of such waters
for domestic, agricultural, and power purposes."
10. Consumption of water for agricultural and domestic purposes was made dominant over impoundment and use of water for generation of electric energy.
11. Each state was permited to regulate and control
the appropriation, use, and distribution of water
within its boundaries, subject to other provisions of
the Compact.
12. The Compact may be terminated at any time
by the unanimous agreement of the signatory states,
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but all rights established under it shall be perpetuated.
13. The compact is not to be construed as affecting
the obligations of the federal government to the
Indian tribes.
It should be noted that water quality is not mentioned in
the Colorado River Compact. Also, the apportionments of
water are to two defined subbasins and not to individual states.
B. La Plata River Compact"
Colorado and New Mexico executed this Compact in 1922
to provide for the division of waters of the La Plata River. An
allocation formula limits the use of water by each state on the
basis of magnitudes of the streamflow during specified periods
of time. Rotation of the use of the waters between the two
states during low flow periods is permitted if the respective
state engineers concur that the most beneficial use of the waters can be accomplished in this manner.
C.

South Platte River Compact"
This Compact between Colorado and Nebraska divides the
waters of the South Platte River. During certain periods, such
as from October 15 to April 1, Colorado has full use of the
waters of the South Platte River within Colorado with Nebraska entitled to divert surplus waters under certain conditions. Between April 1 and October 15, if the flow at the state
line is less than 120 cubic feet per second, Colorado cannot
permit diversions from the lower reaches of the river to water
users whose dates of priority are later than June 14, 1897.
3
D. Rio Grande Compact'
The Rio Grande Compact involves apportionments of the
waters of the Rio Grande among three states: Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas. Colorado's obligation to deliver water at
the New Mexico state line is based on runoff measurements at
four "index" stream-gauging stations on the headwater
11. La Plata River Compact, Pub. L. No. 68-346, 43 Stat. 796 (1925) (signed by
the States 27 Nov. 1922).
12. South Platte River Compact, Pub. L. No. 69-37, 44 Stat. 195 (1926) (signed
by the States 27 Apr. 1923).
13. Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, 53 Stat. 785 (1939) (signed by the
States 18 Mar. 1938).
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streams. This Compact includes schedules of required deliveries of water, for an accrual system of debits and credits in
annual deliveries, and control of reservoir storage waters.
This Compact has a water quality element in it. If water
is delivered from the closed basin portion of the San Luis Valley after 1937, Colorado shall not be credited with the amount
of such water delivered, unless the proportion of sodium ions
is less than 45 percent of the total positive ions when the salinity concentration exceeds 350 parts per million.
E. Republican River Compact'4
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska negotiated this Compact
apportioning the waters of the Republican River and its tributaries.
The State of Colorado's share of the water amounts to
43,100 acre-feet per year based upon the average virgin flow'5
from six specified tributaries of the Republican River. Provision is also made for adjusting the allocations if the computed
virgin flow for a given year varies more than ten percent from
the average annual virgin flow.
F. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact"'
The federal government informed the states of the Colorado River Basin that no water development projects could be
constructed in those states until the states had agreed upon
their respective rights to deplete the water supply of the Colorado River, or the courts had apportioned available water
among them.' 7 The five states (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) having interests in the upper basin
negotiated and executed the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in 1948. After each state's legislature had ratified this
Compact, Congress gave its consent to it in 1949. The consumptive use of water apportioned to the upper basin by the
Colorado River Compact of 1922's was allocated on an annual
14. Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (signed by
the States 31 Dec. 1942).
15. "Virgin flow" is the flow of a stream undepleted by the activities of man.
16. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-37, 63 Stat. 31 (1949)
(signed by the States 11 Oct. 1948) [hereinafter Upper Colorado River Basin Compact].
17. Letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget to the Secretary of the Interior,
H.R. Doc. No. 419, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
18. Colorado River Compact, art. III.
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basis by the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact to the upper
basin states as follows:' 9
Arizona
50,000 acre-feet
and of the remainder:
Colorado
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming

51.75
11.25
23.00
14.00

percent
percent
percent
percent

The Compact created the Upper Colorado River Commission as an administrative agency for the four upper division
states: Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Arizona
with its fixed amount of consumptive use of water and minor
interests in the upper basin is not a member of the Commission. The President appoints a federal representative who
has the same vote as each state's commissioner and who
serves as chairman. Rules and regulations are described under
which the Commission can order curtailment of water uses
within a state or states when deemed necessary to meet delivery requirements by the upper division states to the lower basin
under the terms of the Colorado River Compact. Three agreements or subcompacts between Colorado and other signatory
states 10 pertaining to the use of water of interstate tributaries
are included within the Compact. Recognition is given and
more definitive terms are applied to the La Plata River Compact of 1922.21 Consumptive use of water in the upper basin and
in each state thereof is to be measured in terms of manmade
22
depletions of the virgin flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry
instead of by the method of diversions of water minus return
flows as used in other portions of the basin.
19. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. IH.
20. Subcompacts within the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact are:
Little Snake River (art. XI) between Colorado and Wyoming; Yampa River (art. XIII)
between Colorado and Utah; and San Juan River (art. XIV) between Colorado and
New Mexico.
21. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. X.
22. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. II(e) states that Lee Ferry means
a point in the Colorado River one mile below the mouth of the Paria River. This point
is about 13 miles downstream from the Utah-Arizona state line and is the division
point between the Upper and Lower Basins.
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Arkansas River Compact2 3
The Arkansas River Compact provides operating criteria
for John Martin Reservoir constructed by the Corps of Engineers in 1943. The Compact provides that during the winter
storage season (November 1 - March 31) Colorado may demand
releases of water from the reservoir equivalent to the river flow
but not to exceed 100 cubic feet per second.
During the summer (April 1 - October 31) Colorado may
demand releases of storage water equivalent to the river flow
up to 500 cubic feet per second. Kansas may demand releases
of water equal to the portion of the river flow between 500 and
750 cubic feet per second. Storage water may be released upon
demand of both states concurrently or separately in amounts
depending upon the amount of stored water available. Under
concurrent demands Colorado is entitled to 60 percent of the
water released, and Kansas 40 percent.
H. Costilla Creek Compact24
This Compact negotiated by Colorado and New Mexico
apportions the waters of Costilla Creek, a tributary of the Rio
Grande which traverses the state line three times before entering the Rio Grande in New Mexico. Allocations are also made
of storage water from Costilla and Eastdale Reservoirs.
5
I. Animas - La Plata Project Compact"
This document establishes the priority of New Mexico
users of water from the Animas - La Plata Project (if and when
it is constructed) as equal to the priority of Colorado water
users who will receive water from the project. The Compact was
deemed necessary by Colorado and New Mexico to clarify the
relationship between potential Colorado and New Mexico
water users.
G.

VI.

EFFECTS OF INTERSTATE RIVER COMPACTS ON THE STATE

A.

Impacts on Water Supply
In analyzing the effects of interstate river compacts upon
the State of Colorado, the first question that presents itself is,
23. Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-82, 63 Stat. 145 (1949) (signed by
the States 14 Dec. 1948).
24. Amended Costilla Creek Compact, Pub. L. No. 88-198, 77 Stat. 350 (1963)
(original signed by the States 30 Sept. 1944).
25. Animas - La Plata Project Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-537, §501(c), 82 Stat. 885,
898 (1968).
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"How has the ultimate water supply of the state been
affected?" Table 1 illustrates the effects on the state in quantities of water committed to other states in relation to the total
water supply available in Colorado from five major river systems.
Table 1 shows that Colorado is using an average of about
5.6 million acre-feet per year of a total of 15.6 million acre-feet
of water produced. Colorado will be able to increase its use
about 1 million acre-feet to a total of about 6.6 million acrefeet per year for the state as a whole, or about 42 percent of the
produced water supply. Colorado is furnishing nearly 8.8 million acre-feet of water to sources outside the state to meet
compact commitments.
TABLE 1
Colorado- Surface Water Supply
2
and Use Within Colorado -

River
System

Surface
Water
Supply

.34

2.04

Remainder
Available
*

.05

.15

2.15

7.75

.84

1.66

.52

.20

.84

0

10.74

Platte

Use
(1975)

.16

.88

Arkansas
Colorado

Import

Compact
Commitments

Republican

.35

0

.23

.12

0

Rio Grande

1.58

0

1.26

.32

0

6.14

8.76

Total

.50*

15.59

1.19

*This item also counted as a depletion in Colorado River Basin. Actual
use by State of Colarado =

**State + Import
able.

-

Use -

6.14 -

.50

-

5.64.

Compact Commitments = Remainder Avail-

Table 1 also shows that the drainage basins in Colorado,
excluding the Colorado River Basin, produce a total of 4.85
million acre-feet of water per year of which Colorado uses 3.99
million. Compact commitments to the other states amount to
1.01 million acre-feet per year of which 860,000 acre-feet per
year are being used. The remaining 350,000 acre-feet are still
26. Adapted from Table VI-1I of U.S. DEP'T OF
ELEvEN WESTERN STATES 261 (1975).
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THE INTERIOR, CRITICAL WATER
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available at the state boundary. The compacts pertaining to
these drainage areas, insofar as protection of Colorado's right
to use water therefrom, have been a distinct advantage to the
State of Colorado which is using 82 percent of the water originating in the state.
In the Colorado River Basin over 70 percent of the virgin
flow of the river, as measured at Lee Ferry, originates within
the State of Colorado.2 7 According to Table 1 about 72 percent
of this supply is allocated by compacts to be used in other
states.
B. Administrative Impacts
Administration of compacts by Colorado officials to implement the expressed purposes of the compacts, including the
delivery of waters allocated, have at times presented problems
of varying complexity to the state. These problems are usually
unique to a given river basin and compact. Therefore, a brief
mention of a few problems facing the state will be made.
1. La Plata River Compact
On some occasions the flow of the La Plata River is so low
that under the 50-50 compact split of the waters between Colorado and New Mexico neither state can receive a usable supply.
In order to alleviate this situation the states agreed to adopt a
system of rotation of the streamflow between the water users
of the two states. In recent years a problem of maintaining an
agreeable rotation system has developed. The ultimate impact
of this problem on the state is unknown, and a solution is yet
to be attained.
2. South Platte River Compact
Presently Colorado is planning to construct the Narrows
Reservoir near Fort Morgan. Although Nebraska has not yet
formally complained about this potential reservoir, officials of
that state are reported to be investigating the possible effects
upon Nebraska water users. Under present conditions during
the non-irrigation season, a large quantity of water flows in the
South Platte River from Colorado into Nebraska. Also a large
27. Final Report, Engineering Advisory Comm. to Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact Comm 'n, in 3 OFFICIAL RECORD OF NEGOTIATIONS OF UPPER COLORADO RIVER
BASIN COMPACT (1948). Lee Ferry is the point of delivery of water to the Lower Basin
under the Colorado River Compact.
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number of irrigation pumping wells have been drilled in Colorado in the river basin since execution of the Compact in 1923.
There is reason to speculate that the storage of water in the
Narrows Reservoir may not only affect the amount of water
delivered to Nebraska but may also affect pumping from wells
and diversions of water made in Colorado after the date of the
Compact. Officials of the State of Colorado will need to watch
this situation carefully in order to assure compliance with the
South Platte River Compact.
3. Rio Grande Compact
The Rio Grande Compact has been a bone of contention
among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas for about 20 years,
principally because Colorado failed on many occasions to deliver sufficient quantities of water at the New Mexico state
line. The deficits in deliveries finally became of sufficient magnitude that Texas entered a lawsuit in the U.S. Supreme Court
against Colorado in an endeavor to force Colorado to meet its
obligations under the Rio Grande Compact." The Supreme
Court in 1967 granted leave to Texas to file a complaint. New
Mexico intervened in the case on the side of Texas." In 1968
the Court issued a continuance order. As long as Colorado
meets its annual Compact water delivery commitment at the
state line each year, the case will remain in abeyance. Meanwhile, an administrative solution is being developed.
Colorado has had to enforce the curtailment of the use of
water by irrigators in the San Luis Valley in recent years in
order to meet the Compact commitment. The state has also
sponsored the construction of the Closed Basin Project in the
San Luis Valley as a federal reclamation project to make possible the continuance of irrigation in Colorado and at the same
time deliver the required amounts of water to New Mexico and
Texas.
The restrictions of the Rio Grande Compact have caused
serious impacts on the development and economy of the local
area and the state.
28. Texas v. Colorado, 389 U.S. 1000 (1967), continuance granted, 391 U.S. 901
(1968).
29. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); and Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
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4. Republican River Compact
Colorado law treats underground water in the same manner as surface water, i.e., as being a part of the total supply of
a river basin. If the pumping of water from this basin in Colorado increases to such an extent that deliveries of water to
Kansas are affected, Kansas will undoubtedly object.
5. Arkansas River Compact
Prior to the Arkansas River Compact of 1948 the use of the
waters of the Arkansas River was a subject of litigation between
Colorado and Kansas in at least three different legal proceedings.2 There have been continuing problems with the administration of the interstate Compact. Although Kansas was given
the right to 40 percent of the water stored in John Martin
Reservoir, there are times when Kansas' share of the water does
not arrive at the state line. There is also a problem related to
a large number of irrigation wells in Colorado that are depleting the groundwater and thus contributing to the overall problem of compact administration.
6. Costilla Creek Compact
Problems with administration of this compact have been
minor.
7. Animas - La Plata Project Compact
The Animas - La Plata Project, which was authorized by
the Congress in 1968,30 has not been constructed. Therefore,
this Compact has not been put into effect.
8. Colorado River Compact
The Colorado River Compact does not provide for a permanent administrative agency. There are two articles in the
document that indicate that a certain amount of administration was anticipated. For instance, the Compact specifies that
the chief official of each state charged with the administration
of water rights, together with the Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service and the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey
shall cooperate, ex officio, to determine and coordinate facts
relating to water supply and consumption, publish a record of
annual flows of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry, and perform
30. Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (1968).
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such other duties as3 may be assigned by mutual consent of the
seven basin states. '
The Compact also provides that if any claim or controversy arises between any of the signatory states, the governors
of the states affected, upon the request of one of them, shall
appoint commissioners with power to consider and adjust such
claim or controversy, subject to ratification by the legislatures
of the affected states. 3 This provision of the Compact has never
been invoked. The 1964 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the fourth Arizona v. California33 lawsuit requires the Secretary
of the Interior to act as water master or administrator for operation of the lower main stem of the Colorado River for deliveries
of water to Arizona, California, and Nevada.
9. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
Unlike any of the other river agreements to which the
State of Colorado is a party, this Compact created an interstate
agency known as the Upper Colorado River Commission to
administer the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.3 4 The
Commission is composed of one commissioner appointed by
each state and one commissioner appointed by the President
to represent the United States of America. The Commission is
charged with certain well-defined powers and duties, among
them that of making findings as to the necessity for and the
extent of curtailment of use of water by each of its member
states in the event such curtailment becomes necessary, in
order to maintain the river flow to the lower basin in compliance with Article III of the Colorado River Compact.3 5 Due to
the fact that none of the member states of the Commission
have used their full apportionments of water it has not been
31. Colorado River Compact, art. V. The present Commissioner of the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation is the successor to the Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service.
32. Colorado River Compact, art. VI.
33. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
34. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VIII.
35. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, arts. IV & VII(8). Under art. 111(c),
(d) of the Colorado River Compact the Upper Division States, which are the same as
the member states of the Upper Colorado River Commission, are required to: (a)
deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply their obligation under the Mexican Treaty, whatever that may be determined to be by some future Supreme Court decision; and (b)
to not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75
million acre-feet for any period of 10 consecutive years.
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necessary to invoke this power of the Commission.
VII. PROTECTION OF COLORADO'S RIGHTS TO USE WATERS OF
INTERSTATE STREAMS

Although there have been administrative problems, compacts have been beneficial to Colorado in protecting the use of
interstate waters against prior appropriation and use in other
states. This beneficial impact far outweighs any administrative
problems that have been encountered, some of which have been
caused by Colorado water users themselves combined with poor
administration of water rights within the state. The Rio
Grande situation is an example of this point. The pending
Texas v. Colorado lawsuit can be regarded as an outgrowth of
the Rio Grande Compact. It certainly was not caused by the
Compact itself, but by the failure of Colorado to meet its commitments thereunder.
Certainly, there are other related benefits from water-use
compacts to the State of Colorado. Some of the compacts, notably the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, made possible
the construction of a number of water development projects
that otherwise would have had to be foregone. This Compact
also led to close interstate cooperation in promoting Congressional legislation to authorize the Colorado River Storage Project and participating projects of which Colorado is a major
beneficiary. 6 The allocation of water resources by means of
amicable mutual agreements has saved much time and energy
through the avoidance of litigation. Compacts have defined the
respective rights of all parties to the use of water, have resolved
mutual interstate difficulties, and bound Colorado and her
neighbors together with regional development ties.
The federal government with its vast resources on public
lands and its deep interest in water resource development has
been effectively kept within reasonable bounds in its pursuit of
dominance by Colorado's interstate compacts. Most federal
-agencies seem to feel a moral obligation to stay within the
limits of interstate river compacts to which the Congress has
given its approval. In fact, federal-state cooperation has led to
the development of a large portion of Colorado's compactallocated water supplies.
36. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1970).
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SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR COLORADO UNDER THE COLORADO

RIVER COMPACT

A.

Litigation
The existence of interstate river compacts has not always
been used to the benefit of Colorado, especially in the political
arena. In spite of the fine language utilized by capable negotiators in the past in writing compacts, they are susceptible to
different interpretations by different parties under different
political situations at a later time. This is especially true if all
of the facts are not at the disposal of the compact negotiators.
An excellent example of a compact in this category is the
Colorado River Compact.
In 1922 when the Compact was being negotiated, it appeared that the annual average virgin flow of the Colorado
River at Lee Ferry was about 17 million acre-feet. Data collected during the last 54 years indicate that this average annual
virgin flow may be less than 14 million acre-feet. Based upon
the 1922 assumption as to water supply, the negotiators wrote
into the Compact the provision that the upper states should
not deplete the flow at Lee Ferry below 75 million acre-feet for
each period of ten consecutive years. 7 Obviously with annual
allocations totaling 17.5 million acre-feet (1.5 million to Mexico," 8.5 million to the lower basin, and 7.5 million to the upper
basin"9 ) some allocations cannot be met.
In the 1950s California knew about this shortage. California bitterly opposed the Congressional authorization of water
development projects in the Upper Colorado River Basin for
the benefit of Colorado and her sister states on the grounds
that there was insufficient water in the river, and that the
upper basin should bear all of the shortage in water supply
under the compact allocation. 0
Arizona interprets the Compact in such a way that Colorado and the other upstream states would be charged with all
37. Colorado River Compact, art. III(d).
38. Mexican Water Treaty, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (1944).
39. Colorado River Compact, art. III(a), (b).
40. See Hearings on S. 1555, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hearings on H.R. 270,
2836, 3383, 3384, 4488, & S.500, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (Bills to authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Colorado River Storage Project and participating projects).
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of the shortage in water supply plus the delivery of one-half of
the United States annual water obligation to Mexico (not onehalf of any deficiency) plus losses in the river to deliver onehalf of the Mexican water delivery." The Secretary of the Interior, although he denies he is interpreting the compacts, in his
calculations of available water supply assumes that Colorado
and her sister upper division states should bear the shortage
and deliver to the lower basin an amount equal to one-half the
entire United States annual water delivery to Mexico in addition to 7.5 million acre-feet per year (1/10 of 75,000,000 under
Article III (d) of the Compact). The effect of these interpretations, according to the Secretary of the Interior, is to leave 5.8
million acre-feet of water for annual consumption by Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming." This arbitrary method of
calculation reduces the water available to Colorado under the
Compact from 3.8 to 2.98 million acre-feet per year-a reduction of 23 percent of the amount intended for Colorado when
the Compact was executed in 1922.
Arizona also contends that the waters of the Gila River
which flow through parts of New Mexico and Arizona are not
included under the Colorado River Compact water apportionments, although those apportionments are made from the Colorado River system which is defined by the Compact to include
the Colorado River and all of its tributaries within the United
States.
The State of Colorado is strongly opposed to the above
interpretations of the Compact and the actions of the Secretary
of the Interior in his decisions affecting the river which result
in an inequitable distribution of the benefits. These issues will
41. W. Steiner, Water for Energy as Related to Water Rights in the Colorado River
Basin, May 1975 (presented at the Conference on Water Requirements for Lower
Colorado River Basin Energy Needs, University of Arizona). See also Weatherford &
Jacoby, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the Colorado River, 15 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 171 (1975).
42. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS OF THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES (1975). The Governor of Arizona apparently believes that the Secretary of
the Interior does interpret the compacts in arriving at 5.8 million acre-feet per year
for the Upper Basin. Thus, the Governor has written:
The 5.8 m.a.f. is supportable by interpretation of Compacts and was
derived on the basis of an interpretation. It may not be the final or right
interpretation, but it is an interpretation.
Letter from Governor of Arizona to Secretary of the Interior, 7 Aug. 1974.
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have to be settled by the U.S. Supreme Court. At the present
time there is no other alternative that can be reasonably anticipated. Because of the basic differences in philosophy among
involved parties there is no chance of seeking a more equitable
apportionment of water through renegotiation of the Colorado
River Compact.
The issues involving inclusion of the Gila River under the
compact, the determination of the upper and lower basins'
shares of the Mexican Treaty burden, equitable distribution of
the water storage, consumptive use, and energy generation
benefits are all interrelated. They are also of great importance
in the determination of the course of Colorado's future water
development and related resources conservation program, especially as related to social and economic values.
B. Water Quality
The Environmental Protection Agency under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197241 has declared that salinity in the Colorado River system is a form of
pollution, and therefore falls under its jurisdiction.
On other river systems where the administration of the use
of the waters is not under the terms of interstate river compacts, the attitude of the Environmental Protection Agency
has been that a part of the water resource, including water from
reservoirs constructed for other purposes could be released
under edict of the federal government for dilution purposes to
enhance water quality. When the EPA and its predecessor
agencies first became active on the Colorado River this concept
was also expressed. To anyone who has been closely associated
with the salinity problem, it is apparent that the presence of
the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, combined with the close political unity of the
seven basin states concerning this problem, caused the EPA to
look at it in a more reasonable light. In fact, the EPA cooperated fully to the extent possible under the law with the seven
basin states in seeking a completely different kind of solution
to the salinity problem, a solution that was acceptable to both
the states' and federal interests. The result was a cooperative
43. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §§1251 et seq.
(Supp. I1, 1973).
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effort by the states to sponsor the passage of legislation4 4 by the
Congress that should cause the salt concentration in lower
reaches of the river to become no worse that it was in 1972, if
the authorized salinity control measures are effective. The
states, also with the cooperation of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Interior, established
salinity criteria at several points on the main stem of the river,
as required under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, and adopted a plan of implementation to meet
those criteria.45
The two Colorado River compacts aided in reaching a solution to the salinity problem that will have far less adverse social
and economic impacts on the State of Colorado than would a
solution involving the use of large quantities of high quality
water for dilution purposes to improve water quality in downstream states. Representatives of the EPA in the beginning
complained that the compacts impaired their ability to accomplish the purposes of the water pollution laws to control and
enhance water quality. The important point is that the compacts inhibited the EPA in any designs it may have entertained
to revolutionize the entire scheme of river management.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The State of Colorado has heavily influenced the history
and development of the compact concept; compacts are a mutually agreeable means of settling existing water disputes and
preventing future controversies over the waters of interstate
streams. Colorado, a party to the first interstate water allocation compact in the United States and to a total of nine similar
agreements, together with her sister states, has had a great
impact on the process of interstate water allocation. Conversely, water compacts to which the state is a party have had
and will continue to have their influences on the nature and
44. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266
(1974) (codified in various portions of 43 U.S.C.). It is acknowledged that the negotiation of Minute No. 242 to the International Boundary and Water Commission, United
States and Mexico, to settle an impending salinity problem between the two countries,
stimulated action and gave impetus to the passage of the Salinity Control Act by the
Congress. Title I of the Act also implements Minute No. 242 exclusively for the benefit
of Mexico. See also 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. 7708 (1973).
45. 41 Fed. Reg. 13656 (1976) (water quality standards for salinity of the Colorado
River System, promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency).
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direction of actions of state officials in the future development,
conservation, and utilization of the water resources of Colorado. Compact terms have served as parameters for resource
development processes.
Officials of the state have done an effective job in preserving the rights of Colorado citizens to use waters of interstate
streams. It can be said with respect to river systems with headwaters in Colorado that, without compacts, other states probably would have obtained the permanent rights to use the bulk
of interstate waters by prior appropriation due to their more
rapid settlement and development. The benefits of this compact protection greatly outweigh the adverse effects of administrative problems that have been created, or the trials and tribulations that will be associated with seeking judicial corrections
of inequities through Supreme Court interpretations of the Colorado River Compact. This is not to say that such judicial
determinations should not be sought, because they certainly
should be whenever inequities are believed to exist and the
remedy will be beneficial to the state.
Changes in the overall economy have made possible the
great expansion of groundwater pumping in several of Colorado's river basins in recent years. The interweaving of Colorado laws related to groundwater and surface water may lead
to future disputes with neighboring states, if extraction of
water from wells materially affects the streamflow across state
lines. In that event, litigation under the compacts can be expected, and the legal position of Colorado will be tested under
compact interpretation.
Although compacts have attained a great stature in the
allocation of the use of water resources of interstate streams in
the West, they should not be regarded as the means of permanent resolution of all water problems. Many years ago the
writer attended a water conference in Colorado at which the
century-old East Slope-West Slope controversy over the transmountain diversion of Western Slope Colorado River water to
the Eastern Slope was being aired in no uncertain terms. One
of the participants facetiously suggested that a permanent settlement of the fight could be attained by dividing Colorado at
the Continental Divide, giving the western portion to Utah and
the eastern portion to Kansas, and negotiate an interstate
streams compact between Utah and Kansas!
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In Colorado as well as in other parts of the West, exploitation is gradually being superseded by a sense of conservation.
As the ultimate limit of the use of available water resources is
approaching it is hoped that interstate water compacts may
prove to be effective devices in aiding members of society to
live together and make the most of what remains. As the goals
and desires of Colorado society change, time may prove that
too much rigidity in one or more of the interstate compacts
could impair or preclude arriving at the best possible combination of social and economic benefits. Such changes ordinarily
do not happen in one state alone. They usually occur on a
regional basis. An atmosphere may be created in which tradeoffs can be possible. At that point it is hoped that reasonable
men will be able to sit around the table and reach interstate
agreements that will be as successful as those of the past.
Interstate river compacts notwithstanding, one conclusion
seems certain. To paraphrase a noted water authority of the
State of Colorado, the final chapter in the continuing struggle
over the waters of Colorado's rivers has not yet been written,
and may never be."6
46. F. Sparks, Synopsis of Major Documents and Events Relating to the Colorado
River, 20 July 1976 (presented at a symposium sponsored by the Colorado Water
Congress and Western State University).
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Appendix
INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS TO WHICH THE STATE
OF COLORADO IS A PARTY

Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-61101 et seq. (1973), approved by Congress, Pub. L. No. 70-642,
§13, 45 Stat. 1057, 1059 (1928) (signed by the States 24 Nov.
1922). Text may be found at 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
La Plata River Compact, Pub. L. No. 68-346, 43 Stat. 796
(1925) (signed by the States 27 Nov. 1922).
South Platte River Compact, Pub. L. No. 69-37, 44 Stat.
195 (1926) (signed by the States 27 Apr. 1923).
Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, 53 Stat. 785
(1939) (signed by the States 18 Mar. 1938).
Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86
(1943) (signed by the States 31 Dec. 1942).
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-37,
63 Stat. 31 (1949) (signed by the States 11 Oct. 1948).
Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-82, 63 Stat. 145
(1949) (signed by the States 14 Dec. 1948).
Amended Costilla Creek Compact, Pub. L. No. 88-198, 77
Stat. 350 (1963) (original signed by the States 30 Sept. 1944).
Animas-La Plata Project Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-537,
§501(c), 82 Stat. 898 (1968).
SUBCOMPACTS

Little Snake River, in Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-37, art. XI, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (signed by
the States 11 Oct. 1948).
Yampa River, in Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
Pub. L. No. 81-37, art. XIII, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (signed by the
States 11 Oct. 1948).
San Juan River, in Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
Pub. L. No. 81-37, art. XIV, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (signed by the
States 11 Oct. 1948).

Colorado, Water, and Planning for the Future
RICHARD

D.

LAMM*

One of the things that intrigued me when I was at the
University of Denver law school and now as Governor is the
whole question of natural resources and the way in which we
commit those resources. In 1968 my wife and I had the opportunity to view the remains of the ancient civilization of Angkor
Vat in Cambodia, and we heard the story of its discovery by a
French priest in the 1860s. Angkor Vat was built in incredible
proportions; it extended over 50 square miles with various
buildings and settlements. As one settlement after another
dried up, due to misuse of water resources, they would simply
build another city, much as the Mayan and other civilizations
of the time did. One of the least understood questions in our
civilization is the relationship of natural resources to our standard of living and to our well-being in every way. Let me illustrate.
There is a book, titled Topsoil and Civilization, written
about twenty years ago, which says that "one man has given a
brief outline of history by saying that civilized man has
marched about the face of the earth and left a desert in his
footprints." This may be an exaggeration, but it is not without
foundation. Civilized man has spoiled most of the land upon
which he has lived, and this is the main reason why civilizations have moved from place to place. Despoilation of land was
the chief cause for the decline of civilizations in older settled
regions and is a dominant factor in historical trends. Historians
seldom note the importance of the wise use of resources; they
seem not to recognize that land and resource use may determine the destinies of empires and civilizations. Most historians
point out that many wars and colonial movements began because someone wanted more land, but they fail to note that
conquerors often ruined their own land prior to seizing that of
their neighbors. Current historians know that the strong and
wealthy nations of today are those with abundant natural resources, but they often forget that many poor and weak nations
* Governor, State of Colorado; former Professor of Law, University of Denver
College of Law.
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were once similarly blessed. Some of the poor people on this
earth are poor because their ancestors wasted the natural resources upon which present generations must live.
It is apparent that one of the major issues facing the
United States, the West, and Colorado is the question of how
we use our land, our water, and our natural resources and how
we are inextricably tied to the natural resource base of the
world. One of the pressures on the West comes from the energy
crisis and the increasing number of resource cartels in many
valuable minerals or materials upon which the United States
depends. The cartel list is a long one. There are 12 OPEC
nations. Seven countries have formed a bauxite cartel with
great success and have increased the price of bauxite by a
factor of seven. Six nations have formed a semi-successful
phosphate cartel. Four countries have banded together on copper. Tin or other natural resource cartels may be formed. The
same thing is happening with coffee and bananas, and we may
be seeing a whole new chapter in world history, where, in the
wink of an historical eye, the power to set prices and control
availability of resources has been transferred from the consuming nations to the producing nations. I suspect that one of the
current trends of history is movement from the politics of
plenty to the politics of scarcity. This of course brings us to the
topic of water.
An exorbitant amount of my time in the last two years has
been spent on dealing with water problems-either too much
water, or too little. Walter Orr Roberts, of the National Center
for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, speaks articulately about
the next drought, which in his opinion is likely to hit Colorado
and the West in the near future. At the same time we have
disasters such as the Big Thompson flood where we got much
more water than we wanted in one place. In addition to the
problems created by nature we face problems in planning for
the use and distribution of normally available water. As you
know, competition for water in this state is tremendous. I recently looked up the figures for the number of adjudications
under the 1969 Water Rights Act. The number of adjudications
has increased from 85,000 in 1969 to 121,000 by the end of 1974.
Over 7,000 cases have been filed in Division One of the Water
Court alone. We are being swamped with a backlog of adjudication claims, petitions for change of use or point of diversion,
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and other adversary actions arising out of water administration. Both Texas and New Mexico have recently sued Colorado
over the water of the Rio Grande. A few years ago Kansas
initiated action against Colorado over the water of the Arkansas River. Recent federal and state legislation concerning water
pollution controls have imposed standards which a number of
people in this state find intolerable.
Geographically, Colorado is unique. There is an old
Chinese proverb that states: "He who rules the mountain rules
the river." That may be true in China, but it certainly is not
true in the West. Almost 50 percent of Colorado's mountain
water is obligated to other states. As far back as 1900 the dependable flows of the Rio Grande, the Arkansas, and the Platte
Rivers had already been appropriated. Since that time we have
spent hundreds of millions of dollars in diverting water and
capturing flood flows. At this point the Colorado River is also
fully appropriated, but not yet fully utilized. The whole question of how we manage Colorado's remaining water is now of
vital importance, perhaps of greater importance than the traditional question of how we can develop additional water. In
short, the only water available in Colorado is the water we now
have. Faced with this, with the rapid growth of energy development, and with growth in the Front Range and elsewhere, the
challenge will be to manage the use of our remaining water
without destroying the quality of life in the state.
One lesson from history is that when a commodity becomes scarce, the government comes to play at least a mediating role. One can like it, decry it, or bemoan it, but whether
the scarce commodity is game animals, petroleum products, or
natural gas, the government invariably intrudes into the system of allocation in some way to try to assure equity and fairness in the method of distribution. Thus it seems clear to me
that we are in a transition period moving from the development
and storage of water to a period which will be characterized by
management and distribution. This new era will be characterized by increasing conflicts between the agricultural use. of
water and the transfer or attempted transfer of agricultural
water to municipal, industrial, recreational, and other environmental uses. We will not be as preoccupied with the development of new water supplies as we have been in the past.
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Any government intrusion in water matters has historically been only on the supply side of the demand and supply
equation. In the last hundred years we have never really looked
at different methods of allocation of water, other than the appropriation doctrine. In the future I suspect that we are going
to have to look at how government may have some control, or
at least some influence, on the demand side of that equation.
We must, therefore, focus our attention on the changes in use
of available water. The whole question of continued exploitation of water and land is before us, and I think that to preserve
Colorado as a livable, attractive place, we must reconcile ourselves to some increase in governmental control over natural
resources. Some controls will be at a federal level, some at a
state level, and perhaps some at an international level. Human
society, through government, must exercise controls to insure
that we do not destroy those resources upon which we depend.
Unlike water and air, land masses have a fixed location, and
are thus more susceptible to degradation. Land use and water
use are, however, inseparable. Unlike land, water is an easily
transportable commodity, and the method and place of using
water is nearly always dictated by the use of the land. It is
difficult if not impossible to control the use of water unless we
also control the use of land.
The present Colorado water laws were designed as the result of virtually unrestricted use of land. Water can be appropriated for almost any use incidental to the use of land. Such
appropriations can be modified to change the place and purpose of use with no restriction other than protection of other
appropriators. It, therefore, seems both proper and logical to
attach the same type of control over the use of water as we do
over the use of land. For example, if certain land is owned for
agricultural use, then perhaps water decreed for those lands
might not be changed to serve another use unless that change
would be in the best interest of the people of Colorado. The
current test, however, is not the overall public welfare, but only
whether the proposed change would injure other appropriators.
This problem poses one of the more difficult aspects of managing our water-how do we establish and measure our values?
Historically the yardstick has been the measure of economic
values. We all know that water runs uphill toward money.
Other values are largely ignored. A clear mountain stream is
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nice; irrigation water might be helpful in the future to produce
food; but there is a greater dollar value when we divert that
same water for municipal or industrial use. I hope that we are
beginning to realize that other values have at least some importance in water matters and that today's economic values
might, in the long run, be counterproductive to the economy
of tomorrow.
Some of you may have seen an equation dealing with social
change. The first stage is "no talk, no do." There is no conversation about a subject, and there is nothing done about it. The
second stage is "talk, no do." People are starting to talk about
a problem, but still nothing is done. The third stage is "talk,
do." People are both discussing the problem, and acting on it.
The end result of the discussion results in some sort of plan.
The final, fourth stage is "no talk, but do." The social change
has become an accepted reality. I suspect that as to water in
Colorado, we have arrived at the "talk, no do" stage. The past
few years have brought an increasing crescendo about the way
in which Colorado appropriates and allocates its water. A recent executive order on growth and development policy identifies water as an important component. In addition, we are
working toward a more comprehensive and coordinated planning of our resources through a Policy Coordinating Council.
More than 4.2 million dollars in federal funds are now being
spent for local planning in regions along the Front Range and
in other areas of rapid energy development. A water policy
study is now underway in the Department of Natural Resources
which will provide guidelines for me and the Executive Branch
on water and water related decisions.
During the past 15 years we have seen a phenomenal
growth of agencies dealing with development, use, and control
of water resources at both the local and national level. The
Congressional Select Committee on National Water Resources
has produced voluminous reports on the state of the nation's
water. Congress created the National Water Commission to
follow up on the work of the Select Committee, and they have
produced more reports. The Water Resources Council was created by Congress to coordinate the national water policy, and
the Environmental Protection Agency has the responsibility for
water quality standards. The question of implementation of
§208 of the Water Pollution Control Act is one of the more
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intriguing and complex problems the state will face in the next
year. We certainly do not lack for agencies to deal with problems relating to water. The agencies, however, will not produce
automatic answers, because there will never be a simple or even
a best answer. Water will continue to be a contentious area of
endeavor.
If there is any future to water planning, however, some
assumptions must be made. Let me share with you those now
being made on a state level. First, population and industrial
growth in Colorado will continue, but at a less accelerated rate.
Secondly, continued agricultural production at present or
greater levels is absolutely essential to the welfare of the state
and the nation. We are genuinely concerned about agriculture
in Colorado, its relationship to municipal water supply problems, and the fact that twenty dollar per acre-foot agricultural
water cannot compete with energy water at two hundred dollars per acre-foot. Assumption number three is that the use of
water for the production of energy will continue to grow. Number four is that the pressures for more water-oriented recreation
and for protection of the natural environment will continue to
increase also. Finally, we assume that the amount of water
available for use within Colorado will remain relatively unchanged for the foreseeable future. It is an illusion to think we
can develop as much water in the future as we have in the past.
With these assumptions in mind, the objectives of the
state as they relate to water resource planning are as follows:
1. To examine closely the feasibility of encouraging industrial growth in Colorado on a selective basis, considering those
industries which are heavy water consumers and which would
have a significant adverse effect on the natural environment as
less welcome than others.
2. To maintain Colorado's agricultural industry and the
amount of land dedicated to agriculture at or near the present
level and to strengthen the agricultural industry whenever possible.
3. To insure that the allocation of water for the energy industry is consistent with other state goals and will not undermine
the agricultural goals of the state.
4. To prevent further depletion of our mountain streams at
the higher elevations so we can preserve our mountain environment and our recreation opportunities to the greatest extent possible.
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5. To explore the possibilities of amendments to our laws
relating to changes in points of diversion, or changes in use of
existing water rights, so that such changes can be made to conform with state and local land use laws and policies.
6. To dedicate the energies of state government to research
in water use efficiency and water conservation.

I am aware that it will be difficult to reach many of these
objectives, but difficult or not, these goals are essential to the
maintenance of the quality of life in Colorado. I am of course
not the only person in the state concerned with the proper
management of water. Others are giving serious thought to
waste and inefficiency and are proposing innovative solutions
to some water problems. I know that the Pikes Peak area is
considering the use of effluent from secondary sewage treatment to irrigate golf courses and parks, and Denver is looking
at a project to pump its wastes out to a drying process for use
as fertilizer. In the Grand Valley there are demonstration projects to reduce salinity in the Colorado River. Sterling has a
water project under way, and the city of Northglenn is working
out a relationship for use and return of nearby agricultural
water. This last item is an innovative idea that has generated
great interest. With greater efficiency and better management
the available water resorces can be made to serve us better.
Since we have no feasible way to manufacture water, we have
no choice.
In summary then, it is difficult, if not impossible, to control the use of water unless the use of land is also controlled.
In Colorado we are beyond the stage of only developing our
water resources; they are already largely developed. We must
instead look to better management and careful allocation of
this important resource. This is truly an historical shift, but it
must come. Thank you very much.

The Role of the State in Water Planning,
Research, and Administration
HARRIS D. SHERMAN*

Other papers in this series have touched upon the role of
the state in water planning and development. We at the Colorado Department of Natural Resources have a unique perspective on what that role should be. In the first place, we are
confronted daily with the whole spectrum of opinion as to the
degree to which state government should be involved in water
projects. The opinions range from almost no government control or influence to heavy government involvement, regulation,
and control. Secondly, we are now coming to recognize that
historically the absence of controls over water was a function
of the abundance of water and of the consequent limited number of conflicts over water. It goes without saying that over the
years things have changed dramatically, and the following discussion highlights five or six areas where this change has taken
place.
One area of great change is the degree to which Colorado's
water has been consumed. You have heard many statistics, but
a few more may be in order here. In the Arkansas Valley, my
understanding is that about 86 percent of the water is now
being consumed. The remainder is held by conditional decrees;
the total of which most likely goes far beyond 100 percent. In
the South Platte/Missouri River System, 91 percent of the
water is being consumed. In the Rio Grande, there is little, if
any, water left unconsumed. In the Colorado, approximately
one-half the water is consumed (possibly a very conservative
estimate) and the remaining 50 percent is undoubtedly committed under conditional decrees. In addition, there is little
question that salinity problems will cut into Colorado's share
of the water. In any event, "free water" is simply no longer
there for the taking. As the Governor reiterated in his paper,
we are facing times of water scarcity. Transfer of water rights,
change in point of diversion, and change of use will be the name
of the game in the future.
*

Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources.
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A second change is that an era of large-scale water resource
development in this state is rapidly coming to an end. Since
1960 Colorado has witnessed a phenomenal boom in water projects, particularly federal projects. The federal government has
spent approximately seven hundred million dollars on water
projects in Colorado since 1960. We have eight authorized
projects on the Western Slope, some of which are under construction and some of which are awaiting construction. On the
Eastern Slope we have two Bureau projects that are either
under construction or awaiting construction. The Corps of Engineers has several projects in Colorado. I have not even listed
the numerous and significant private development and storage
projects now planned or under construction. When the current
series of public and private projects is completed, the water
that was available for development will no longer be available;
most of the prime sites will have been taken; and the most
economical projects already built. When that day arrives, the
thinking will have to change from how do we increase supply
to how do we best use the water. Generally speaking, the state
has not seriously considered this question in the past; it is time
to begin such consideration.
The third area of change is that of state government
growth policy. Each recent Colorado Governor, back through
Governors Love and Vanderhoof, has articulated the kind of
growth and development policy he would like to see for the
State. Last month Governor Lamm released his own growth
and development policy as an executive order. The interesting
thing is that none of the growth policies-Love's and Vanderhoof's included-are synchronous with the actual use, allocation, and transfer of water. It is a rather remarkable thing that
there is so little similarity between the policy and the actuality.
Each Governor and Legislature knows generally where they
want to go, but the way in which Colorado's water is used does
not necessarily match the way they would have the State grow.
The fourth observation is that up to now the State has
played a ministerial role as opposed to a managerial role in
water. We have been the bookkeeper and the referee. The
major function of both the State Engineer and the courts has
been to keep the books and to be the referee of water use by
private parties. The main emphasis of state involvement has
been to facilitate the use and to provide enforcement for water
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users. I do not mean to detract from the efforts of various state
agencies who work with the federal government on water development projects, but those are basically federal, not state, pro-

jects.
Fifth, I would like to note that as of now the State has little
if any role in the allocation, transfer, or appropriation of water.
The 1972 Holland and Hart Report to Governor Love said it
succinctly:
The existing water law in Colorado does not recognize that appropriators may seek to develop water rights which although of beneficial use under the existing law are nonetheless socially undesirable for the public at large.

If the use is "beneficial" in terms of the applicant's economic
needs, that suffices. Colorado water law now assumes that all
growth and all development give rise to beneficial use of water,
and water is allocated to the first claimant. Thereafter the free
market may cause a shift in uses, but the law is not concerned
with the merit or demerit of the choice made by the market.
Only a few so-called public interests are taken into account by
our water law today. We have a minimum stream flow law
which is one example of the public right being put forward.
However, that particular law has been under constant constitutional attack in the courts, and it may well be unconstitutional
because there is no actual diversion of water as the constitution
seems to require. The minimum stream flow bill is a rare example of public interests and public rights being given some recognition in water matters.
In view of all five factors or observations above the question must be asked: What should the state role be with reference to future management of our water resources? This is, of
course, an immensely controversial, difficult subject, and, as
one can see from watching the legislature, no one agrees on the
answer. However, let me offer a few thoughts for discussion.
The Governor and others have discussed what happens
when there is a scarcity of natural resources. Usually the government gets involved. There are parallels between what is
happening in water and what has happened elsewhere with
other natural resources. I think we need to reevaluate the wisdom of the pure appropriation system. Our neighboring Western States do in fact have different ways of dealing with water
appropriation, and when critical levels of scarcity are reached,
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maybe their system will work better than ours. For example,
the Wyoming Constitution states that "[a]ppropriations for
beneficial use shall not be denied, except in the public interest." The last five words, ". . . except in the public interest,"
which have a profound meaning, are not found in Colorado
water law. In Utah the state engineer is allowed to reject an
otherwise valid application for water if it will interfere with
more beneficial potential uses, or if it will prove detrimental to
the public welfare or the natural stream environment. I also
believe that Utah sets a statutory time period in which an
applicant must perfect a conditional decree. Perfection of conditional rights is, of course, a very controversial subject in Colorado, and I know that some applicants for conditional decrees
have a difficult and costly time perfecting their decrees because
the projects involved are large, expensive, and long term. New
Mexico's constitution, another example, speaks to the public
interest in terms indicating more than just consideration of
public health and safety.
The State of Idaho has recently completed a basin-bybasin water study, and Colorado now has a similar project
underway. There are a number of suggestions and ideas in the
Idaho report which are quite interesting and worth noting here.
One idea is that the state should encourage, in whatever way
possible, the efficient use of water and the reduction of water
waste. Idaho also suggests transferring water from areas of
abundance to areas of need as a matter of state policy. The
Idaho study is replete with other examples which might have
application in Colorado. The point is that I think we can make
some slight modifications of the appropriation system which
will permit consideration of the public interest and be of benefit to us all. I think that administratively, legislatively, and
judicially the state can play a much more important role in
water matters. We should begin to think about changes in the
definition of beneficial use and how an amended definition
could be enforced.
Any discussion about increasing the role of state government in water matters leads inevitably to the question: Who
should make the decisions? The legislature ought to make decisions about any change in the meaning of "beneficial use," and
it is clear that we have never really attempted a definition. I
think a legislative definition is certainly possible without
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changes in the state constitution. I also think that the legislature and the executive ought to develop guidelines for state
water policies. Our efforts now underway in the Department of
Natural Resources are just a beginning, but an important step,
nevertheless. We should give the State Engineer and the Attorney General a more active role in judicial proceedings regarding
changes in water rights. The state should take a more active
role in helping to shape federal water programs. The state
should develop water rights on its own land and purchase water
when necessary for public benefit. I think the legislature ought
to begin to set standards for waste of water and give the State
Engineer or other state agencies tools to enforce the prevention
of waste. These and many other ideas should be weighed carefully by the citizens of Colorado and by the various branches
of government. If we realize that times of water scarcity will
soon be upon us, and if we take the reappraisal of our water
rights system seriously, then we may emerge with a state water
plan which will have some relationship to growth policy. It
makes no sense at all to have divergent policies that cancel out
each other. In the end, I hope that the public interest will be
served, for, after all, there is no reason why private interest
cannot be compatible with public interest.

Colorado: The Problem of Underground Water
C. J. KUIPER*
Probably one of the most difficult areas to resolve in water
law is the right to appropriate and put to beneficial use underground water. Because of the short and seasonal supply of surface water in many parts of the world, including the state of
Colorado, we have no alternative but to cope with the problem.
If existing economies are to be enhanced, or even preserved,
underground water is probably the last frontier for water resource conservation and development in the vast arid and
semiarid areas of the world. The ever-increasing population
growth, need for food, fiber, and essential exploitation of natural resources, and the preservation of the environment for a
decent quality of life are dependent on adequate water supplies. The impetus for maximization of the beneficial use of
available supplies demands treatment of underground water by
imaginative and innovative legislation designed to provide the
framework for sound development.
Promulgating and implementing laws on the use of underground water is a relatively new and extremely challenging
field. Without a thorough knowledge of the physical characteristics and ramifications of effect, an ill-advised groundwater
law can be a total disaster.
The first step in devising a groundwater law must be to
categorize this water into one or more of the several types and
deal with each category as a separate entity when and if applicable. Underground water can be considered under two broad
general categories: tributary to a surface stream and nontributary.
Even this broad categorization must be approached with
caution. Judgment based on policy and on local situations
must be made, because from a purist's viewpoint there is no
such animal as non-tributary groundwater. The purist maintains, and rightly so, that there is no magic source of groundwater. It all derives from surface sources, whether it be precipitation, stream percolation, or recharge from surface application.
In Colorado, considerable work is still necessary on the
* Colorado State Engineer.
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groundwater law. In the area of non-tributary groundwater,
further dissection is necessary for proper definition and treatment, as follows: (1) transient water-groundwater with little
or no hydraulic connection to surface streams and/or little or
no utilization of surface water; (2) water in bedrock aquifers-not hydraulically connected to surface streams; (3)
perched aquifers; (4) closed basins-isolated by geological formation from either surface or other groundwater; and (5) water
trapped in solid rock zones. Generally speaking, these nontributary waters are being or soon will be mined, causing the
withdrawal of water in excess of the natural recharge rate. The
policy of the State is to exploit these waters, realizing that at
some future date we will reach a point of no return. The solution to this seemingly short-sighted policy would be a rather
nebulous hope that technology might provide economicallyjustifiable recharge programs before the axe falls.
Transient water with little or no hydraulic connections to
surface streams was given special consideration in the statute,
under the title, "Designated Groundwater." Seven basins now
exist which have been designated in eastern Colorado by the
Colorado Groundwater Commission and are under the jurisdiction of the Commission rather than the courts. Although appellate recourse from any decision of the Commission is provided
for in the district courts, I would call your attention to the
policy of the Commission on mining groundwater. Each application for a well permit is analyzed on the basis of permitting
40 percent depletion of the saturated thickness of the aquifer
within a circle three miles in radius and a time period of 25
years.
Groundwater, as defined in (2), (3), (4), and (5) above,
might be recategorized as static rather than transient water,
although each has its own peculiarities and its own unique
problems. Some bedrock aquifers are considered as nontributary because historic depletion has caused declines in the
static water tables which would take centuries of natural recharge to restore to their past hydraulic connection with surface water. These bedrock aquifers were treated separately in
the statutes, with the proviso that the State Engineer may
grant a well permit to an applicant if the annual withdrawal
of water did not exceed 1/100 of the recoverable water underlying his property: a 100 year aquifer. This was designed to an-
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swer the question of adequacy of the water supply for subdivision development dependent on these aquifers. Although this
may not be in strict compliance with the constitutional doctrine of prior appropriation, expedience often dictates policy,
and this may be a good example.
Numbers (3), (4), and (5) above would probably be best
defined as static aquifers which are "a little bit" tributary,
since natural recharge does occur, but at a rate less than the
rate of withdrawal. I suppose if there is a condition being "a
little bit pregnant," then we can have aquifers which are "a
little bit tributary." But again, expediency dictates the terms.
The hazards involved in applying the doctrine of prior appropriation and the right to divert unappropriated water to these
conditions are obvious, especially for subdivision development.
The ramifications of circulation of water in a closed system by
well withdrawal and recharge with sewage effluent boggles the
mind. Our legislature has not addressed this rather nauseous
problem as yet.
The general category of tributary water superficially presents fewer problems than non-tributary groundwater if one
were to adopt a simplistic approach under the priority system
and order all tributary wells to cease and desist diverting, because of injury to senior vested rights. Unfortunately, the realization that diversions of tributary groundwater eventually
diminish surface flows, to the injury of prior vested rights, was
recognized only after the fact. In the interim, a substantial
economy has developed around the use of this groundwater.
The legislative body is thus faced with closing the barn door
after the horses have been stolen.
In Colorado, this sin of omission was thought to have been
atoned for by declaring a policy to integrate surface and
tributary groundwater, i.e., conjunctive use. The more knowledgeable legislators recognized the fallacy of this atonement
because there simply was not enough water available without
some innovative management plan. The policy statement further proclaimed that the doctrine of prior appropriation would
be honored and the economy dependent on groundwater would
be preserved. This was to be accomplished, despite the overappropriated water supply, through the provisions requiring
plans of augmentation to be reviewed by the State Engineer for
approval or help in devising a viable plan, and through another
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statute granting the State Engineer authority to adopt rules
and regulations.
By consulting Mr. Webster's published works, I renewed
my understanding of augmentation as meaning increasing, especially in size or amount. I knew I should have been more
attentive in advanced mathematics because with an overappropriated river I kept adding zero to not enough and coming
up with not enough.
The best answer had to be better management of the resource. That included converting the root of the problemtributary aquifers-from a culprit to an asset. Starting with
the general concept that underground storage is far superior
to surface storage, the solution seemed to be to divert water
from this underground reservoir during times of deficient surface supplies and to recharge that reservoir during times of
surplus surface supplies.
The next question was who would pay the bill for recharge
projects and pumping back to the river? Quite obviously the
beneficiaries of the project are the underground water appropriators who are junior to injured vested rights. Probably the
most Herculean task of the entire exercise was to convince well
owners, especially those most remote from the river, that (1)
their pumping affected the surface flow, (2) they did not own
the water underlying their property, (3) they were injuring senior vested surface rights, and (4) they had to finance remedial
measures for that injury.
The difficulty of this public relations task was aggravated
by procrastination of previous legislatures and polarization of
diametrically opposed positions by well owners and surface
appropriators, almost to the point of anarchy. We then organized a task force of experts in the fields of geology, hydrology,
and administration to conduct a series of well-advertised informational meetings along the entire reach of the South Platte
River Basin. Hostility was the name of the game at the earlier
meetings. However, our bullet-proof vests received nary a dent
after the well owners understood: (1) the interaction between
surface and groundwater, (2) the constitutional doctrine of
prior appropriation, (3) the new law, (4) our mutual problems,
and (5) our willingness to help them devise ways to remedy
injury at a reasonable cost. Their cooperation since that time
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has been remarkable. It certainly brought home to me the
adage that a person's greatest fear is that of the unknown.
The culmination of our meetings in the South Platte River
Basin was a general meeting to discuss ways and means of
organizing some kind of legal entity to implement the plans for
remedying the injury to prior rights. The result was a nonprofit corporation under the name, "Groundwater Appropriatiors of the South Platte, Inc.," G.A.S.P. for short. Membership in the corporation is voluntary with a board of directors
elected by members from the several districts. The board has
done an outstanding job of furnishing replacement water to the
river at a price to the members of about 25-35 cents per acrefoot of diversion. How can the corporation provide water at
such a low rate, when the price of water in the South Platte in
particular is inflated beyond all comprehension? A careful
analysis of the law will answer that question. Groundwater
appropriators are required by law to remedy any injury only
during times that an injured senior right is demanding water
and only in the amount of the injury occurring at that time.
The first function in determining injury is consumptive use
derived from, in the case of irrigated agriculture, irrigation
efficiency. That water which is not consumed percolates back
to the aquifer and does not constitute injury. The next function
is timing of effect, which varies with the distance from the
extreme channel, among other parameters. Given the physical
characteristics of the aquifer, distance from the stream, and
rate of pumping the lifetime and amount of effect can be determined by computer programming for any number of wells. This
injury, at that given point in time, must be remedied when and
if a downstream senior is demanding water. With the time
frame of demand narrowed down to a small percentage of the
year, the total injury is again reduced by that percentage factor. The end result is that an acre-foot of replacement water
goes a long way toward remedying the net injury of considerable groundwater diversions.
Two projects have been completed that demonstrate the
capability of utilizing groundwater storage for replacement
water, one in the South Platte River and one in the Arkansas
River, both of which have been very successful. The lower
reaches of the South Platte ditch had been abandoned for
some time because of excessive seepage losses, and a small
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holding pond was also abandoned for the same reason. That
was the very thing we were looking for, the means to recharge
the aquifer during times water not demanded by a senior was
available in the river. In cooperation with other agencies the
lower reach of the ditch was rehabilitated and water was diverted into the pitch and pond during periods when there was
no call on the river. Instrumentation of the recharge area recorded the effect on the water table to ascertain the amount
of recharge attributable to the project. The cost accounting
indicated that this water in storage, and available for diversion
during the following irrigation season, cost about $1.00 per
acre-foot when the minor capital cost for culverts, and so forth,
was disregarded.
In the lower Arkansas, wells were constructed along the
Buffalo Canal to pump replacement water into the canal during times when the canal would have demanded curtailment of
upstream junior rights, namely, wells. The first year of operation happened to be one of the driest on record. These wells
provided water to the Buffalo Canal during the most critical
part of the season, saving crops along the canal estimated to
be worth about $225,000.00. This benefit was accrued in one
year. With a construction cost of some $70,000.00, it more than
paid for the project in the first year of operation. Further, the
member wells of the Lower Arkansas Water Management Association, which was the sponsoring entity, were permitted to
pump without restriction and grew crops also valued at many
times the cost of the project. I had to contract as State Engineer with the Four Corners region in order to get this project
built as a demonstration project, and the State of Colorado
owns it for five years, at which time it will revert to the ownership of the association.
Other proven means of remedying injury include the purchase of reliable surface water rights and storage water, transmountain diversions for release to the streams, changes in
points or alternate points of diversion with the replaced surface
right released to the stream, and use of non-tributary developed water augmenting the stream.
In summary, good management planning solves many of
the problems of the State of Colorado and other arid and semi-
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arid areas of the world. Good management must include maximum utilization of groundwater in conjunction with surface
water.

CONFLICTING DEMANDS FOR
ALLOCATION OF WATER: A
ROUNDTABLE
Municipal
JAMES L. OGILVIE*

As suggested by the conference chairman, Professor Ved
Nanda, I prepared a suggested reading list for inclusion in the
preconference materials. The list includes studies that are several volumes in length and obviously could not be read in advance of the meeting by conference participants, nor could they
be included in total in the preconference materials. But, in line
with this conference theme, I highly recommend them to you
for your water libraries as research documents and background
material. My brief remarks will center around a few quotations
from each of the recommended reading materials.
Water Policies for the Future,' the study by the National
Water Commission, deals with municipal and industrial water
supply programs. The section on municipal water supply programs starts out saying:
From the earliest days of the Nation, cities and industries have
provided their own water supplies. In general, there is no reason
why they should not continue to do so. For many years this was
recognized by the Congress, and several laws contain statements
to the effect that the Federal Government will confine itself to
an ancillary role in this field. The Water Supply Act of 1958 made
it possible to increase the capacity of major Federal reservoirs,
constructed primarily for purposes other than the provision of
water supply, in order to store water for municipal and industrial
(M & I) purposes. This did not add to the Federal responsibility
for M & I water as non-Federal interests
were required to assume
2
the full cost of the added capacity.

I do not wish to denigrate the efforts of the federal government in financing flood control projects and wastewater control
efforts throughout the United States, but it sometimes seems
incongruous that the federal government and, for that matter,
* Manager, Denver Water Department, Denver, Colorado; former Director,
Frying Pan-Arkansas Project, Bureau of Reclamation.
1. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLIciES

FOR

THE FUTURE (1973)

report to the President and to the Congress of the United States).
2. Id. at 161-62.

(final
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the state government have very little interest in financing potable water projects that are so vital to the health and welfare of
our municipalities. In the case of municipal supplies, the federal and state governments seem to be saying:
We will tell you how pure the water must be, we will tell you the
standards you must adhere to, and we will tell you how to build
the plants and meet the environmental safeguards you must
guarantee, but you will finance both the cost of the projects and
the ancillary expense caused by the regulations we establish.

This study also points out that 75 percent of the nation's
population now lives in metropolitan communities comprising
less than two percent of the country's area. The chapter concludes by stating in part:
It seems certain that population growth, increasing per capita
use, migration of people to urban areas, and expanding economic
activity will strain many existing municipal and industrial water
supply systems in the years to come. Effective planning followed
by effective implementation measures will be required if serious
shortages of water services for the nation's cities are to be
avoided. In the more water-scarce and rapidly growing areas,
competition for water supplies will mount and improved water
3
husbandry will become increasingly necessary.

Rivkin/Carson, Inc., a Washington consulting firm, did
the study for the National Water Commission called
Population Growth in Communities in Relation to Water Resources Policy.' On population in metropolitan areas, this consulting firm found that: "New communities and large developments have followed and are at present being planned to follow
the general trend of growth in the outer areas of metropolitan

concentrations.'"
The study also reached the following basic conclusions:
Fundamental economic and location factors determine
whether a community will grow or decline, and the availability
of water related facilities and services plays a minor role. Since
population growth will continue to be predominantly metropolitan, relationship to a metropolitan area is the principle factor
influencing growth of small communities.'

3. Id. at 169.
4.

RIVKIN/CARSON, INC., POPULATION GROWTH IN COMMUNITIES RELATIVE TO WATER

RESOURCES (1971) (prepared for the National Water Commission).
5. Id. at 121.
6. Id. at i.
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When carefully applied to funding and regulatory matters
within metropolitan areas, it [water resource policy] can have
considerable influence in directing the form of metropolitan settlement. Water policy can help to achieve a more efficient, environmentally sound pattern of development than currently exists.
Indeed, water policy can have more impact on directing the form
of community growth than its location.'

This firm also asked whether investment in water resource
development and water allied facilities stimulates population
growth. The question was answered thusly:
The hypothesis that water investment affects the growth of population was tested in four representative states across the country.
Expenditures made by Federal agencies were arrayed against
population trends in each of the counties in the four states and
regression analyses performed. Neither the metropolitan population nor the least populous counties appear to be influenced in
their rates of growth by water resource investment. Indeed, across
the board for all counties there was no correlation. The test confirmed earlier more limited studies that water resource projects
in and of themselves seem ineffective tools for promoting
economic development.'

The so-called "West Side Study," Critical Water Problems Facing the Eleven Western States, conducted by the Bureau of Reclamation,9 found that the population of the West
will increase at a rate more than twice that of the rest of the
nation. Every year between now and the year 2000 the West
will add a population increase equal to the 1970 population of
Idaho or Montana. Stated another way, this means the addition of the equivalent of a city of 65,000 people every month
throughout the eleven states between now and the year 2000.
Colorado and the Denver metropolitan area will receive more
than an average share of this growth.
The West Side report found what we all know: that while
the Colorado River is a facile source of water for these states,
the river is not going to be able to supply enough water to
support the new influx of population, particularly to the desert
metropolitan areas and southern California.
7. Id. at ii.
8. Id. at viii.

9.

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS

FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES (1975) (often referred to as

Report).

the West Side Study
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Critical water problems facing the eleven Western states
have been catalogued in the report. It recommends over 70
additional detailed investigations to be conducted by the federal government in cooperation with state governments. A total
of 20 federal agencies were involved in the West Side Study,
10 from the Department of Interior. Future investigations are
considered necessary to find solutions for water resource development to meet expected demands on the West's limited supplies through the year 2000.
It is interesting to note that projects requiring national
planning, such as Columbia/Colorado Interbasin Transfers or
the procurement of Canadian water, have not been considered
in this particular study.
At the state level one of the most interesting recent reports
was made to Governor John Love on Colorado water law problems in December of 1972.10 Holland & Hart, a prominent Denver legal firm, reviewed the doctrine of prior appropriation and
other existing water law in Colorado. While the authors of the
report did not come to any firm conclusions or recommendations, they did offer a series of "observations," including the
observation that our water law should be flexible enough to
accommodate noneconomic values which the public may hold,
such as social and environmental water values. In fact, the
report notes, the failure of various western states to accommodate social and environmental values in water is one of the
justifications offered by federal officials for the United States
claims to reserved water rights.
The Colorado State Legislature studied metropolitan Denver water requirements and resources for a two-year period."
The study was under the direction of the Denver Regional
Council of Governments and consists of three volumes: a text,
a primary area appendix covering the urbanized areas around
Denver, and a secondary area appendix covering the remainder
of the nine-county study area. The report represents an update
and an expansion of the earlier study, Metropolitan Water Re10. Carlson, Report to Governor John Love on Certain Colorado Water Law
Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
11. DENVER WATER DEPARTMENT, METROPOLITAN WATER REQUIREMENTS AND
RESOURCES, 1975-2010 (1975) (prepared for the Metropolitan Denver Water Study
Committee of the Colorado State Legislature).
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quirements and Resources, 1968-2010, commissioned by the
Denver Regional Council of Governments and conducted by
the Denver Water Department. 2 The 1975 report indicates that
the metropolitan area will be short of both raw and potable
water in the near future, that the importation of transmountain
water appears to offer the best potential for the largest amount
of additional supply, that development of water will continue
to be controversial and more expensive than ever before, and
that:
a new horizon is coming into focus for those who make water
supply decisions. By 1980, most present water projects will be
completed, and after that time the projects appear to be evermore controversial, costly, and complex. Because of these frustrating factors, an attempt is being made by most agencies to find
some other agency to assume water supply responsibilities. While
the desire for a metropolitan-wide water agency to solve the problems appears to be very clear to everyone, there is no consensus
regarding details of the structure and responsibility of such an
3
agency .

The Denver Water Department does operate as a metropolitan water agency. It serves some 900,000 people in a relatively small geographical area. By City Charter" it must serve
all the people in the City and County of Denver and by contract
it serves another 400,000 people in a 200 square mile area surrounding the core city.
The Department's studies indicate a sufficient raw water
supply to meet present needs. However, treatment capacity is
strained to the limit, and we foresee a restricted use of water
in the summer months ahead. These restrictions will continue
until a new treatment plant, under planning for several years,
is completed in Douglas County. The Foothills Treatment
Plant, already delayed more than three years, is the subject of
an environmental assessment study under review by the Bureau of Land Management.
The Board and the staff of the Water Department
recognize the controversial aspect of many of its planned projects. It also recognizes the need for environmental concern,
12. DENVER WATER DEPARTMENT, METROPOLITAN WATER REQUIREMENTS
RESOURCES, 1968-2010 (1969).
13. II DENVER WATER DEPARTMENT, supra note 11, at xxvii.
14. CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, ch. c, § 4.14 (1904).
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stream flows, minimum flows, fish life, and aesthetic and recreational aspects of water. But our critics should recognize that
all municipalities in Colorado, including the metro Denver
area, use less than three percent of the water diverted annually from our streams to meet the needs of millions of people.
The Water Department recognizes its primary responsibility to the people of the metropolitan area. That responsibility
is to provide an adequate and safe supply of water for present
customers, as well as those that all population projections tell
us will be here in the years to come. These people also are
entitled to a quality of living that a green environment assures,
one that is possible only when there is sufficient water.
We shall continue to meet that responsibility until and
unless some other agency created by the people and their
elected representatives are willing and able to meet the needs
of the people of this great and growing metropolitan Denver
area.

Agriculture
JOHN STENCEL*

Since the early days of Colorado's history, agriculture has
played a dominant role in its development. However, its population has grown and cities have expanded along the Front
Range. The general consensus is that the importance of agriculture has declined. That is not true. In recent national ratings, development of new water supplies for irrigation was
ranked well down on the list in terms of priority. This low
priority may be due largely to the high productivity of American agriculture and our surpluses.
But recent world food shortages indicate a need for reconsideration of our priorities. Even today, agricultural production
and related activity such as food, fiber, and livestock processing still constitutes a substantial share of our state's total economy. In 1970, for example, cash receipts from farm marketing
totaled almost 1.2 billion dollars. And more recently until the
* President, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.
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recent farm price decline, it was approaching the 2 billion dollar level.
Much of the productivity of agriculture in Colorado stems
from its supply of irrigation water. In fact, of the estimated
water depletion of 5.3 million acre-feet per year in Colorado,
about 4.2 million goes to irrigated agriculture. For the entire
state the irrigation depletions represent 79 percent of the total,
and are even higher-90 percent-if the Rio Grande basin is
excluded. In comparison, only .25 million acre-feet, or 4.8 percent, is depleted by municipal and industrial use.
In the marketplace, irrigated agriculture is able to pay
substantially less for water than can be paid by some of the
other productive uses, such as municipal and industrial development. In the past, this situation has resulted in many irrigation water rights being converted or transferred to other uses.
In the future, the ultimate result is likely to be a significant
decline in overall irrigated acreage and in livestock production
from irrigated hay and pastureland. This decline will occur
more rapidly if cities have prescriptive rights to the water they
need for expanding population.
A definite need exists to determine, adopt, and implement
a water-use policy that will direct Colorado's future development on the basis of criteria other than just the ability to pay.
A state water plan is needed.
Some water is used for problems that relate to specific
areas that deserve special mention. For instance, in some cities
along the South Platte River the municipal and industrial
water supply is becoming critical, and, in the absence of other
alternatives, agricultural water rights have been purchased.
There is a danger here that the basic agricultural economy will
be destroyed. In the Arkansas basin shortages and rationing of
municipal and industrial (M & I) water supply have already
occurred, even though irrigation water rights have been converted to M & I use. In the Colorado River basin, potential
mineral development, especially in connection with oil shale
development, offers substantial threats to agricultural water
use. Through programs to rehabilitate existing private irrigation systems there is much opportunity to increase the efficiency of use of limited water supplies.
However, the careful redesigning of systems that is neces-
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sary is often beyond the financial capability of private individuals or companies. Similarly, farm irrigation efficiency can also
be greatly improved, but the essential equipment and structural changes can be costly, and widespread adoption of new
practices cannot be accomplished on short notice. Existing programs need to be funded and new ones developed.
In the southeastern portion of the state there are numerous
localized groundwater aquifers which have been mined in the
past, and yet may offer opportunities to recharge. This is not
a program that an individual can undertake for private benefit,
but one which requires public investment in order to be practicable. The same principle holds true for managing the snow
melt and heavy summer rainfall which runs off the land without full utilization. Storage reservoirs could control the majority of this water and provide opportunity for the release of
downstream appropriations to increase the useable supply of
Colorado water.
However, the realization of these opportunities nearly always requires public investment rather than private. In 1969,
lands totalling nearly 36.7 million acres were included in Colorado farms and were used for agricultural purposes. These
lands constitute approximately 55 percent of the total land
area and are widely distributed over the state. In western Colorado, more than one-half of the agricultural land is used for
grazing. The plains area, which includes the major part of both
the Arkansas and Missouri River basins in Colorado, has most
of the cropland. The intensively cultivated lands are those that
have been developed for irrigation. The irrigated lands constitute 27 percent of the cropland and account for a large percentage of crop production.
This state needs to retain a diversified economy. The loss
of water for irrigation purposes would be detrimental to our
entire agricultural economy-the agricultural segment of Colorado and Wyoming economies would be greatly hindered-and
it would drop from its present ranking and become minimal in
its contribution to the overall condition of the economics of
our state. Conservation of our water resources by farmers and
ranchers is necessary, and we need to utilize our resources to a
greater degree.
There are no trade-offs when it comes to maintaining irrigated agriculture in our region, but two important questions
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need to be answered: (1) Should there be additional federal and
state aid for developing water for irrigation? And, (2) are we
going to maintain or expand our present acreage of irrigated
agriculture in this region through the protection of prime
agricultural land, together with incentives to promote agriculture and open space utilization? Other questions that need to
be answered are: What really is beneficial use? What is considered domestic use of our water? What do we do about condemnation rights as they concern irrigation water? What do we do
about the outright purchase of water by municipalities? What
do we do about mineral development and energy production:
the coming of coal plants, coal gasification, and nuclear development? These questions all affect our water.
In closing, we in agriculture would like to remain an important part of the economy of this state. Irrigation does play
a significant role in the economy of our entire region. However,
if we do not consider the alternatives to water-use justly, we
will return to a dry-land type of agriculture in this state.

Energy
T. W. TEN EYCK*
One of the most important facts of life this Nation must
face is that it takes water to produce energy under the technology available to us now and for the rest of this century.
The United States, with 6 percent of the world's population, consumes about 30 percent of all of the energy used in the
world. That same 6 percent of the world's population produces
31 percent of the gross national product of the world. There is
a direct correlation between energy consumption and the GNP.
The only way we can hope to guarantee our high level of
productivity in America is to produce as much energy as we can
from sources within our own borders. I think we should be
realistic. We are going to continue to need and want energy,
and we know that dependence on foreign oil for 40 percent of
our national needs is dangerous. Another embargo would be far
* Vice President for Governmental, Community, and Public Affairs, Rio Blanco
Oil Shale Project.
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more serious than the one three years ago. Further, whether we
like it or not, oil and gas, oil shale, coal, and nuclear power are
the sources we will have to use in the next several years. Increased conservation and use of renewable forms of energy such
as solar power should be part of a national energy policy, if we
ever get one. But, they will not contribute significant amounts
of energy for many years to come.
The production of the kind of energy which is available to
us now and will be in the next 20 to 25 years requires the use
of water. Necessary water quality ranges from very low for such
duties as water flooding of oil fields and moisturizing processed
oil shale, to a very high quality water required for such jobs as
high pressure boiler feed and production of hydrogen by reforming hydrocarbons with steam.
To give you some perspective on the use of water in the
energy-producing industries, a few comparisons are in order.
Here are some typical water requirements for various materials
on a "per ton of material produced" basis: gasoline from the
refining of petroleum requires 350 gallons of water per ton;
shale oil by surface retorting, 1,000 gallons per ton; water flooding for secondary recovery of petroleum reserves, 7,000 gallons
per ton; synthetic liquid fuel from coal may require from 1,000
to 7,000 gallons per ton; production of a ton of corn requires
10,000 gallons per ton; and wheat, 35,000 gallons of water per
ton.
When push comes to shove, I believe it likely that powerful
economic forces will exert a tremendous influence on the decision of who gets how much water for energy development and
agriculture. The first test will likely take place here in the semiarid West before it does in the rest of the country.
A recent study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and
the Environmental Policy Institute shows that the dollar value
of produced wheat is only about 4 percent of the dollar value
of synthetic fuel produced from coal. This is based on each
using the same amount of water. That is, if it takes 100 gallons
of water to produce about one-half million B.t.u.'s of synthetic
coal liquid worth one dollar, the same amount of water would
produce about one-hundredth of a bushel of wheat worth four
cents. These numbers could indicate that irrigated crops in the

1976

ENERGY

West may be unable to compete economically with synthetic
fuels for the use of water. There might be political constraints
which would overcome some of the economic considerations in
favor of increased agricultural use of water. Nevertheless, economic pressures are very likely to have an effect on future
water-use decisions.
Now, I would like to be more specific about the use of
water. The United States petroleum industry has pioneered the
use of a zero discharge concept for use in petroleum refineries.
In this concept, the total amount of water taken into the refinery, whether it be in the form of raw water required for cooling
purposes or rainwater falling on the plant premises, is recycled
and evaporated until it is totally consumed. There is no discharge of waste waters into surrounding streams with the concomitant problems of water quality and treatment required
before discharge.
In the case of shale oil production, we find that the zero
discharge concept fits in very nicely with the requirements of
moisturizing the processed shale prior to discharge. The moisturizing serves the triple purpose of reducing the dust from the
processed shale, providing a proper consistency for compaction, and avoiding the need for final evaporation. As I noted
above, about 1,000 gallons of water are required per ton of shale
oil produced. This is a total consumption of water. About onehalf is used for moisturizing the processed shale and the other
half is evaporated to the atmosphere, largely to take care of
cooling certain process streams. There is not much potential for
reduction of water consumed unless a way can be found to
dispose of the processed shale without moisturizing. If water
becomes too costly to be economical, the water cooling requirements could be partially reduced by substituting air cooling.
However, there is only a limited potential because air cooling
cannot completely replace water cooling.
The Rio Blanco Oil Shale Project proposes to kill two
water birds with one stone. The saline groundwater, which
must be pumped out in order to de-water the mine, is estimated to be capable of supplying all the water required for
more than 50,000 barrels per day of production. Production at
this level for us is probably more than 10 years into the future.
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This means there will be no discharge of pumped saline water
into the White River. As a matter of fact, our studies project a
reduced natural flow of saline water into the White River as a
result of our pumping. Another advantage is that we will not
need to import more expensive water to our tract until our
production increases. If and when our production does expand
above 50,000 barrels per day to a potential ultimate of 300,000
barrels per day, we would import water from the White River
through use of an existing industrial water right on which we
have an option.
Our plans for use of water are more completely spelled out
in our detailed development plan submitted to the U.S. Department of the Interior in March 1976. We stand ready to
modify these plans if new information becomes available which
would indicate a better solution.
In summary, the kinds of energy available to this country
require the use of water. While there will probably be some
competition for this valuable resource, it is probable that energy development will take much of it simply because we will
not have that much of a choice in the next several years. In the
case of the Rio Blanco Oil Shale Project, we can get by with
underground water for production of some 50,000 barrels per
day.

Industry
LYLE E. BUSH*

We as members of the water resource department of a large
Eastern Slope industry in Colorado feel like a rare breed. It is
unusual for manufacturers here to be self-sufficient to the extent that they provide their own water resource and water
treatment systems. We appreciate the opportunity to present
several ideas from that point of view.
Coors is the largest single brewing complex in the world.
Our water diversions last year were a little over 40,000 acrefeet. Most of that water is used for cooling mechanical equip* Manager, Water Resources, Adolph Coors Co., Golden, Colorado.
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ment and is returned directly to the stream, so our depletions-the true measure of our impact on the state's water
supply-totaled less than 2,000 acre-feet. That makes us a relatively minor user of water in the South Platte basin. In fact,
municipal and industrial users together consume only about 10
percent of the total flow of the South Platte. Therein lies one
of the major problems facing us today. We, like many of the
outlying municipalities in the metropolitan Denver area, are
simply not a large enough water user to justify sophisticated
water resource projects similar to those developed by the Denver Water Board. This forces us to rely almost entirely on Eastern Slope water, and, because almost all of that water was
originally used for agricultural purposes, results in the potential for conflict with the farming community in addition to
spirited competition with the municipalities in the area.
We hope that those conflicts can be minimized. We have
a good many friends in the agricultural industry, and we have
to live every day with members of the communities near us
with whom we share the area's water resources, so it is important to us that the situation not get out of hand. In order to
reduce the potential for this conflict we feel that there are two
conditions which should be encouraged.
The first of these factors is the continued use of the marketplace as the means of allocating water to the various users.
As a large industry, we would be hesitant to spend millions of
dollars to construct manufacturing facilities if the availability
of the water supply required to operate those facilities was in
the hands of an administrator whose goals and objectives could
change each time the state's winds of political fortune change
direction. But even beyond that, the marketplace recognizes
the value of the water right which is owned by the individual
irrigator. We at Coors directly support about 7,000 families
with our 2,000 acre-feet of depletions, but a farmer with whom
we negotiate for water is able to determine whether the economic value offered by us exceeds the value of the water to him
on his farm.
The marketplace system has another advantage in that it
easily allows acquisition on an equitable basis of water required
or desired for scenic or recreational uses. The people, acting
through their government, need merely determine that a flow
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for aesthetic purposes is worth more than the next highest and
best use and then go to the marketplace to acquire that flow
through a system that protects the rights of the former owner.
The second condition which we feel will help to reduce
conflicts between Eastern Slope users is the cooperation of
those users in as many ways as possible in both the joint use
or successive use of water, and in the development of additional
usable supplies of the water resource. As an example, municipalities and industries are forced to plan their water resource
programs around the possibility of an extremely dry year.
Much of the water they acquire might be available for other
purposes, perhaps the irrigation of agricultural lands, for seven
or eight years out of a 10-year period. Perhaps the agricultural
lands from which that water is removed could produce foodstuffs for those seven or eight years to be stockpiled for use
during the two or three years when the water is needed for
domestic or industrial consumption.
A second area of potential cooperation involves the "first
use" of an agricultural right by a municipality or industry, with
the return flow resulting from that use then being delivered to
the irrigation ditch for successive use by the farmers who presently own the right.
In the area of resource development, significant improvement is possible by having several moderately-sized water
users band together to build reservoirs to capture some of the
200,000 to 300,000 acre-feet of water which leaves the South
Platte basin in an average year. The statutes, as they presently
exist, may not encourage an industrial user to participate in
this type of activity, but it is certainly a direction toward which
we must work if we are to make the fullest and best use of water
supplies available to us.
A second possibility in resource development is a joint
venture to import out-of-basin flows from water-rich areas-a
concept which is normally far beyond the scope of small cities
or industries acting individually.
In summary, because nearly all Eastern Slope water was
originally diverted for agricultural purposes, some conflict is
inevitable as a portion of that finite supply is converted to
support municipal and industrial activities. We feel that con-
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flict can be minimized if significant efforts are made to cooperatively develop additional supplies of usable water and to encourage the joint and successive use of the supplies available
as efficiently as possible. We also feel that reallocations of
water are equitable only under a marketplace situation which
recognizes that a fair price will be set when a willing buyer and
a willing seller agree to a transaction, and that water is automatically directed toward its highest and best use when such
a situation exists.

III. TECHNOLOGICAL
Alternative Strategies for Closing the
Supply/Demand Gap*
J. GORDON

MILLIKEN**

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a conceptual framework for policy
analysis to assist decisionmakers in future water supply planning for semiarid metropolitan areas where water resources are
limited. These policy analysis principles can be applied by
urban decisionmakers in areas of the United States where projected water demands seem likely to outstrip assured supplies.
Until fairly recently it has been possible to develop new
water supplies to keep pace with the requirements of continuous urban growth. In many areas in the United States today,
however, the continued concentration of population in urban
industrial clusters is outstripping municipal efforts to develop
additional water supplies. Water supply agencies face diminishing returns of water and increasing development costs. The
problem of providing urban water resources grows increasingly
complex, especially because it is interrelated with the issues of
economic growth and environmental quality. Just when traditional sources of water are becoming exhausted resistance is
growing to damming scenic rivers, to transferring water supplies from agricultural to municipal use in an era of world food
shortage, and to constructing ever more remote water collection
and transmission facilities as cities grow and compete for
water.
The purpose of this paper is: (1) to present and discuss
briefly several alternative water strategies, including some that
are nontraditional such as wastewater reuse, which can be used
by urban policymakers working to resolve the technological,
economic, environmental, and social issues of municipal water
* This paper derives from a forthcoming Denver Research Institute report, Policy
Analysis for Metropolitan Water Supply Planning by Milliken, Taylor, Cristiano,
Schooler, Creighton & Martz, prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
** B.S., B.E., Yale University; M.S., D.B.A., University of Colorado; Senior Research Economist at the Denver Research Institute, University of Denver.
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supply; (2) to present a framework for analysis of these alternative strategies; and (3) to indicate a method for arriving at a
rational least-cost decision based on this analysis.
The methodology proposed here is intended to lead to a
thorough systems analysis (involving economic, social, and
environmental considerations) of known alternative means to
increase water supplies or to reduce water demands and to help
select a least-cost mix of actions that will achieve a supply/demand balance throughout the chosen planning period.
Techniques of cost-effectiveness analysis are recommended to
help determine the least-cost actions that will achieve the desired goal of matching water supply and demand.
It should be emphasized that this methodology must be
considered within the framework of overall community goals,
i.e., the desires of the citizens, as expressed through the ballot
or other forms of political action, concerning the future of their
community, which will differ from one community to another.
It should also be recognized that a least-cost supply of water
implies a weighing not only of economic costs but also of social
costs which will differ from one area to another. Thus, a best
solution for one metropolitan area will not necessarily be best
for another.

II.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR CLOSING THE SUPPLY/DEMAND

GAP

The next section of the paper briefly discusses 10 alternative strategies for closing the water supply/demand gap in a
metropolitan area. Two are strategies for reducing or alleviating demand: (1) conservation measures (voluntary or involuntary) and (2) changes in water pricing. The remainder are alternative ways of adding to the supply of water, increasing its
effective yield, or reallocating it among users. Some of the supply alternatives may be effective in certain geographic areas
but infeasible or inappropriate in others. They are described
briefly in the following paragraphs.
Alternative 1- Water Conservation Measures
Conservation of water encompasses many activities: from
encouraging people to fix leaky faucets through low key public
relations campaigns, to requiring the installation of water saving devices in new households, imposing mandatory lawn watering restrictions, and limiting the service area of a water sup-
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ply agency. Each measure is relatively inexpensive in economic
terms, but as a measure shifts from "conservation" to
"restriction" to "prohibition," in terms of the user, the political and social costs increase, as does the potential for a decline
in the perceived quality of life. The impact of these costs falls
directly upon an administrator's constituents whereas traditional means of increasing supply have their primary negative
impacts on persons outside the service area. Therefore, conservation measures, other than encouraging wise use of water, are
considered politically undesirable by most urban administrators, and their exact potential for effecting a reduction in demand is largely unknown.
Alternative 2-Water Pricing to Reduce Demand
If a water supply agency is seeking to motivate more efficient use of existing and future supplies of water, nothing is as
simple, comprehensive, and effective as the pricing mechanism. The demand for domestic water exhibits some price elasticity; therefore, a change in pricing structure can be an effective option for reducing the supply/demand gap. In many respects it is an especially attractive option in that the market
forces will encourage residents to reduce demand for unnecessary water voluntarily. The effects of implementing a new
water rate structure are almost immediate, the environmental
impact is relatively minimal, and the benefits to be derived in
terms of optimal use of existing water resources and reduced
demand for future resources could be quite substantial.
There are other potential advantages as well. Pricing
structures can be used to distribute more equally the costs of
providing water to those persons receiving the greatest benefits
and can promote a greater degree of efficiency in the allocation
of productive resources by relating water prices to the costs of
developing new water supplies.
In general, other than increased administration, pricing
techniques have few monetary costs attached to them. There
are, however, substantial social and political impacts, as well
as some legal impediments, which should be considered prior
to implementing any new pricing structure.
Alternative 3-Water System Management
Some water-short metropolitan areas must store water
provided in periods of peak supply to satisfy the water de-
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mands during the rest of the year. They may also face periods
of shortage and the need for short term water allocation procedures during these periods. For these water-short areas it is
very important to provide an adequate amount of available
storage and to establish techniques to best manage that storage
so that evaporation and distribution (conveyance) losses are
minimized and so surface runoff is captured and stored for
later use, rather than flowing by unused. Techniques of water
system management that may increase yield include proper
design and operation of storage facilities and reduction of conveyance losses. A third technique, reduction of evaporation
losses, has not yet been proved effective.
Alternative 4-Diverting Additional Water Supplies Into the
Study Area
Many U.S. cities obtain their municipal water supplies
from rivers which run through the city, from lakes which border
them, or from wells which tap groundwater. When these
sources are inadequate, cities will "divert," or take water from
rivers at some distance from the city and bring it through aqueducts to reservoirs serving the city. Even if an ample quantity
of water is nearby the municipality, if the local water quality
is poor because of pollution or mineral content, diversion of
distant river sources may be used to obtain a cleaner, purer
supply of water.
A municipality which contemplates a river diversion must
first obtain rights to the water through appropriation, or purchase. This can be a complex process involving negotiations
with numerous landowners over the value of water and the
damage caused by its diversion.
Once a water right is purchased or appropriated, the city
must construct a physical system to collect the water through
dams or diversion works; must transport it through canals,
aqueducts, or natural river channels; and must construct storage reservoirs to accumulate and store the water for later use.
Depending on circumstances, the water may be brought directly from the reservoir by aqueduct for treatment, stored in
the reservoir until needed, or exchanged (e.g., traded to another water user for an equivalent amount of water located
more conveniently for the using city).
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In the case of transbasin diversion the water must be
transported from points of collection or storage in one basin
through or over the basin divide to the other basin. This may
require pumping to a higher elevation, tunneling under the
divide, construction of siphons or pipelines to carry the water,
or construction of additional storage reservoirs. Such facilities
are costly, and so may be the acquisition of land to hold them.
Direct costs attributable to the diversion project, besides
construction costs, are the continuing operating and maintenance costs of the water system. The secondary costs of diverting water include environmental effects and social costs. There
may also be political costs in the source area, i.e., the area of
export.
Alternative 5-Reallocation of Agricultural Water Supplies
In many water-short regions the agricultural land adjacent
to the metropolitan area is irrigated. It is possible, therefore,
to reallocate or divert water from agricultural to municipal
uses, and this change in water use sometimes accompanies a
change in land use from agricultural to urban. The cost of
reallocating agricultural water has usually been established
through the market system. The direct monetary costs of reallocation are competitive with those of other techniques for increasing water supply, as there is a very high percentage of
water currently used for irrigated agricultural purposes, and its
value in use is lower than the current value of water used for
municipal purposes. However, indirect costs which include the
effect on agriculture and agriculture-related businesses of the
diversion of irrigation water to domestic use are apt to be very
high and to fall on a relatively small part of the population.
Because of its high indirect costs, agricultural water reallocation should be carefully evaluated before being considered as
an alternative.
Alternative 6-Using Groundwater
Nearly one-fifth of the water withdrawn for use in the
United States come from groundwater. The water is found in
two types of aquifers: shallow or unconfined, which are closely
related to the surface flow of rivers, and confined or deep aquifers, which are recharged only through faults or fissures in the
overlying layers of impervious rock. The principal advantages

of using groundwater, as opposed to surface water, are that: the

484

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:479

total volume in storage is enormous, the storage is available at
"no cost" with no environmental damage, and groundwater
does not suffer the high evaporative losses associated with surface transmission and storage. Other advantages of groundwater include the generally low temperature (e.g., for industrial
cooling) and comparative immunity from pollution and natural
disasters such as earthquakes.
On the other hand, the disadvantages of using groundwater include the slow response and relative uncontrollability of
the source, low water quality in some locations (due, for example, to dissolved solids), and the difficulty of treating or eliminating pollution once it has occurred. In some areas aquifer
yields may not be great enough to provide sufficient water feasibly, or the cost may be exorbitant due to the depth of the
wells which would be required.
Groundwater withdrawals which are balanced by recharge
often constitute an attractive source of supply. Such withdrawals may exceed recharge during dry periods with the deficit
being made up during wet periods. However, if long term natural recharge of the aquifers is insufficient to balance withdrawals, groundwater mining occurs. When this occurs, a natural
resource is being used up, and the supply cannot be relied upon
forever.
Alternative 7-Using Watershed Land Management
Techniques
Wildlands (forests and associated brush and rangeland)
are particularly important sources of water. Much of the U.S.
streamflow originates from forested land as forests almost always occupy the higher elevations which receive the greatest
amount of precipitation and yield substantially greater than
average runoff. In the comparatively water-short Western
United States it has been estimated that 90 percent of the
usable water yield originates on the largely forested mountain
watersheds.
In view of the significance of wildlands as water sources
consideration should be given to managing these watersheds to
enhance the water yield in areas which are short of water. In
the United States it has been estimated that over 71 percent
of the precipitation which falls on the watersheds is consumed
locally and that only 29 percent reaches the streams; hence, it
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would appear that there could be significant potential for increasing streamflows. Such techniques are administratively
feasible, as a major portion of the wildlands is publicly owned.
There are three groups of land management techniques
which can be used to increase the runoff from watersheds.
These are:
1. Localized snowpack enhancement by means of snowfences;
2. Modification of the vegetation within the watersheds;
3. Elimination of riparian vegetation.

The first technique is aimed at increasing the stream runoff from alpine areas and from brush and grassland. The second
is effective in forest and brush areas. The third technique is
oriented more towards conserving water in streams and rivers
during its transmission to beneficial usage but is also applicable within forest and brush areas.
Alternative 8-PrecipitationAugmentation
Man has been modifying the weather for centuries. For
example, the presence of a city changes the average temperature, cloud cover, and wind speeds with respect to those which
would pertain if the city were not there. It is only relatively
recently that man has considered deliberate modification of the
weather with the emphasis on changing the patterns of precipitation of rain or snow in a given location-a subject area more
precisely termed "precipitation inducement" or "precipitation
augmentation."
The first step in the process of estimating the potential
increase in watershed yields resulting from a precipitation augmentation program involves identification of the cloud characteristics pertaining to the watersheds from which the municipal
surface water supplies are or can be obtained. If these watersheds are extensive, they will probably need to be divided for
planning purposes into a number of separate tracts with relatively homogeneous characteristics. However, it must be appreciated that in a practical program the dividing lines between tracts will be somewhat variable, as the effects of seeding
one tract may spill over onto adjacent tracts. Expert opinion
should be sought on the potential for increasing precipitation,
the direct cost of such an operation, and the increased runoff
which can be expected. These data should include information
about the seasonality of the increased supply and predictions
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of the magnitude of the increases for dry and wet years as well
as years with average rainfall. Allowance should be made for
suspending seeding during inappropriate or potentially dangerous periods. For example, in the Colorado Rocky Mountains
seeding has been suspended during holidays and the big game
hunting season.
Alternative 9-Desalinizationof Brackish or Salt Water
Desalting seawater is costly and to date has been justified
only where there are virtually no feasible conventional alternatives. In the Florida Keys, for example, several small plants
have been installed. However, desalting saline groundwater or
surface water could be an almost indispensable part of plans
for locations where all sources are of low quality. To raise
slightly saline water to an acceptable quality with regard to
dissolved solids need not involve desalting the entire flow. A
portion of the water could be desalted and used to dilute the
remainder.
There are four types of processes currently available for
desalting:
1. Distillation;
2. Crystallization (freezing);
3. Membrane processes (reverse osmosis and electrodialysis);
and
4. Ion exchange.

Use of ion exchange is normally restricted to removing limited
quantities of salts to enhance water quality, e.g., to reduce
hardness.
In planning for desalting as a basic water supply source
data should be obtained on the quantities of water available
and the total dissolved solids content of the various possible
sources; the data should include detailed chemical analyses to
aid process selection. For inland areas land costs for evaporation ponds, feasibility of deep-well injection, and likely well
depth should be determined. Availability and costs of alternative energy sources should also be investigated.
Alternative 10-Reuse of Municipal Wastewater
The case for directly recycling wastewater from municipal
and industrial sewage is increasingly gaining support in the
United States today. Although some people may view the prospect of having treated wastewater come through their house-
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hold water taps with aversion, technology has made it possible
to return wastewater to a quality level which, with few (though
nevertheless important) exceptions, equals that of pure natural
sources. While the cost of treatment is still relatively high,
there is every expectation that it will decrease over the years
as the technical processes are further refined. However, the
most significant sources of support for the use of recycled water
owe less to a technical ability to purify wastewater than to a
number of other considerations having to do with problems of
developing new "fresh" water supplies and of disposing of municipal and industrial wastewater.
The task of dealing with domestic and industrial wastewater becomes more onerous as population continues to concentrate in urban areas. The volume of such waste is increasing;
it includes ever greater levels of pollutants; and it is difficult
to dispose of. This waste is not only an aesthetic problem; it
has led to the pollution of conventional sources of drinking
water: both surface water and, in some cases, groundwater.
Moreover, providing both for new water supplies and for safe
effluent disposal has been made more difficult by recent
changes in the public's attitude toward the environment. These
changes, largely reflected in Environmental Protection Agency
rules and regulations, have imposed restrictions on the development of new water supplies and on the unregulated disposal
of untreated municipal and industrial wastes. It is not surprising, then, that recycling which takes wastewater and processes
it into usable water supplies is being proposed as a solution to
the problem of both fresh water supplies and used water disposal.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
A conceptual framework for the rational analysis of alternatives is essential to the decisionmaking process. There are
three prerequisites to establishing the analytical framework.
One is to determine the water supply/demand gap for the metropolitan area over a multiyear period which extends as far as
the chosen planning horizon. Another is to array all possible
alternative techniques for closing the gap and to separate these
techniques into their natural subdivisions (i.e., their stages, or
progressive degrees of application). The third prerequisite is to
determine for each subdivision of each technique the direct and
indirect effects of its adoption. This task involves identification
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of the parties-at-interest, that is, the organizations or identifiable groups of persons who share a common interest and who are
significantly affected, for better or worse, by the application of
a specific technique. The third task also involves an identification and assessment of the economic, social, and environmental impacts which result from application of a particular technique. Each of these prerequisite tasks is briefly outlined in the
following sections of this paper.
A. Determining the Supply/Demand Gap for Municipal
Water
The determination of the supply/demand gap for water in
a municipality requires judgment, historical data, and a knowledge of the principles of risk analysis. In simplest terms, the
relationship of water quantity to time is projected for both
supply and demand over a chosen period of years.
Because water demand fluctuates as a function of annual
climate, it is necessary to establish a series of confidence limits,
showing the extent to which demand can be expected to differ
(plus or minus) from the mean no more often than one year in
10 (i.e., 90 percent confidence level), no more often than one
year in 20 (i.e., 95 percent confidence level), and no more often
than one year in 100 (i.e., 99 percent confidence level). The
confidence levels can be established by statistical analysis of
past years' per capita water demand. Since the supply/demand
gap is most significant when demand is greater than average,
it is necessary to show only the confidence levels above the
mean.
Water supply also varies as a function of annual climate.
Furthermore, water supply will increase over the baseline supply as assured future developments of new supplies are completed. (For planning purposes those potential developments
that are not absolutely certain should not be shown.) The average year water supply (i.e., the amount of water which the
supply system will generate in a year of average climate) is
determined first. Superimposed on the average (mean) supply
are a series of confidence levels, showing the extent to which
supply can be expected to differ (plus or minus) from the mean
no more often than one year in 10 (i.e., 90 percent confidence
level), no more often than one year in 20 (i.e., 95 percent confidence level), and no more often than one year in 100 (i.e., 99
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percent confidence level). These confidence levels can be established, at least for the baseline supply, by statistical analysis
of hydrologic (i.e., water flow) records of the supply system.
Confidence levels for future developments increasing the supply system can usually be estimated by hydrologic records of
flow in the new additions or by engineering judgment. Since
the supply/demand gap is most significant when supply is
below average, it is necessary to show only the confidence levels
below the mean.
When the water supply and demand curves are superimposed, as in Figure 1, it is possible to detect gaps during certain
time periods. In Figure 1, for example, it appears that a supply/demand gap appears during years of average demand and
average supply soon after year 2005. That is, the curve D-D lies
above curve S-S after that year. The height of the gap (i. e., the
cross-hatched area of the figure) represents the severity of the
water supply gap.
Even though no gap may occur between the average supply
and demand curves, there still can be a strong likelihood of a
shortage during certain years. If climate variation causes a relatively hot, dry year every 10 years and during this year water
supply is at a 10-year low while demand is at a 10-year high,'
the water supply gap will be significantly increased. Figure 2
illustrates this.
Some gaps may occur only in extreme cases, e.g., when the
95 percent confidence level in demand overlaps with the 95
percent confidence level in supply or when the 99 percent confidence levels overlap. The overlapping of the 95 percent curves
can, by definition, occur no more often than one year in 20, and
the likelihood is still lower that the low supply and high demand curves will occur simultaneously. However, this possibility may still occur frequently enough that the policymaker will
wish to plan for it. For extremely unlikely cases, i.e., the overlapping of the 99 percent curves, it is probable that the policymaker would accept the risk rather than spend money to avert
1. The probability of the 10-year low supply coinciding with the 10-year high
demand is less than 1.0 percent, due to variability of climate. Yet it is not an unlikely
case since the same hot, dry conditions which produce one tend to produce the other.
It may be appropriate to plan for this worst case and to use the possibility that the
years do not coincide as a form of safety factor.
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this unlikely shortage. Certain undesirable alternatives (e.g.,
severe water use restrictions that limit use to drinking and
cooking) could be reserved for such unlikely contingencies.
Perhaps the single most important decision made by the
water resources policymaker is that of deciding how much risk
to avert in developing alternative ways to reduce the potential
supply/demand gap. In this decision the policymaker must be
guided by a knowledge or probability and particularly by a
familiarity with risk analysis. Risk analysis permits a manager
to understand the range of possible gains and losses from a
proposed action and to avoid actions which may lead to disastrous outcomes, even where the predicted (probable) outcome
is favorable.
B. Arraying Alternative Techniques for Closing the Gap
A suggested method of approach is first to eliminate techniques which are completely impractical in the study area of
interest (e.g., desalting sea water in Denver, orographic
weather modification in California's Imperial Valley). Second,
each technique should be analyzed to subdivide it into its various subtechniques or its various degrees of application. For
example, watershed land management can be divided into subtechniques of snowfencing, forest cutting, modifying watershed
vegetation, and controlling phreatophytes. Each subtechnique
has different effectiveness in augmenting water supply and has
different direct costs and impacts. Thus, each should be analyzed separately.
Similarly, some techniques have natural stages or degrees
of application which should be analyzed separately. For example, conservation should probably begin with a first stage of
voluntary public information conservation programs, which
have a low cost in relation to the quantity of water which can
be saved and few, if any, undesirable secondary effects. The
next stage might be the voluntary installation of cost-effective
water saving devices, followed by a stage of mandatory installation in newly-constructed houses and buildings. Water use restrictions represent more advanced degrees of application of
the conservation technique and should be subdivided into
stages according to the severity of the restrictions: (1) limited
restriction of lawn watering hours; (2) a severe restriction on
watering to the minimum quantity necessary for lawn and tree
health; and (3) prohibition of all but inside house uses.
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C. Determining Effects of Each Technique on Parties-atInterest
For each technological or policy action which may be taken
there are several identifiable groups of persons whose common
interests are affected. These have been termed parties-atinterest and have been categorized roughly as follows:
1. Parties internal to the affected industry (or activity);
2. Suppliers and customers of an affected industry (or activity);
3. Government, at different levels and in certain roles, e.g.,
taxer, regulator, or keeper of social welfare;
4. Affected bystander, e.g., those concerned with resources,
wildlife, recreation potential, or aesthetic effects.

The basic question used to identify parties-at-interest is:
What are the goals of identifiable social or cultural or locational
groups which lead them to perceive problems differently, to set
different priorities for solving problems, or to respond differently
to a particular policy/program?

For municipal water supply planning involving 10 alternative
techniques to close the supply/demand gap, the authors of the
University of Denver Research Institute (DRI) report have analyzed and identified 20 distinct parties-at-interest. These include an affected industry (water supply agencies), customers
of the affected industry (residential, industrial, and commercial water users), government (metropolitan area political officials, Forest Service, and public health officials), and affected
bystanders (environmentalists and several others). The vertical axis of Figure 3 lists the 20 parties-at-interest, subdivided
into five parties-at-interest in most policy decisions, and 15
parties-at-interest in some decisions. The horizontal axis of
Figure 3 lists the various alternative techniques and distinct
subtechniques to close the supply/demand gap. The first column distinguishes between effects of increases in water supply
and effects of specific techniques.
The DRI report next analyzed the impacts' which application of each of the various techniques would have on the various
parties-at-interest. By consensus judgment these impacts have
2. in earlier DRI research on environmental policy analysis, impact was defined
as a change from the present state of things or from the way things are clearly evolving.
Any impact may be either positive or negative depending on the interests, values, or
goals of different parties-at-interest. It may fall on individuals, economic entities,
social or political institutions, or cultural characteristics.
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been identified and weighted in gross terms according to significance.

IV.

EVALUATING AND DECIDING AMONG ALTERNATIVES

The first step in the evaluation/decision process is to determine the effectiveness of each technique in terms of quantity
of water produced (in added supply or reduced demand) annually. Where effectiveness is uncertain, a technique such as
expected value or sensitivity analysis should be used to convert
all effectiveness measures to an equal degree of certainty.
Next, all techniques should be arrayed on the effectiveness
scale in terms of number of acre-feet of water which the technique could produce annually in the study area.
For each technique all associated costs and effects should
be recorded:
1. Direct cost in dollars per acre-foot annually;
2. Indirect economic effects in dollars per acre-foot annually
where possible to estimate;
3. Social effects, i.e., quality-of-life effects;
4. Environmental effects;
5. Energy effects;
6. Political aspects;
7. Legal uncertainties;
8. Technical uncertainties.

A First Trial Solution
The next step in the process is to propose a tentative solution to the supply/demand gap by adopting a combination of
techniques whose combined effectiveness in acre-feet of water
provided annually equals the magnitude of the supply/demand
gap in a given year. Theoretically, since any proposed solution
will be compared with all other possible solutions before one is
selected, it should not matter what combination is used to
begin. However, to simplify comparisons and perhaps also to
begin closer to the ultimate solution, it is suggested that the
first tentative solution be made on the basis of least-direct cost.
Once the least-direct cost combination of selected techniques with their associated costs and effects is arrayed, the
policymaker can identify certain costs which seem excessive.
For example, the trial solution may include groundwater withdrawal involving a moderately high use of energy, a risk of land
subsidence, and a possible loss of amenities caused by well
drilling throughout the metropolitan area.
A.
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B.

Improving the Trial Solution
The next step in the process is to look for an alternate
technique to substitute for one in the trial solution. For example, if groundwater mining were rated at 60,000 acre-feet a year
on the effectiveness scale, the policymaker might substitute a
brackish water desalting plant also rated at 60,000 acre-feet a
3
year.
Should this substitution be made? First, the changes in
costs and effects due to the substitution must be analyzed.
Using hypothetical figures, the direct cost for groundwater
mining may be $70 per acre-foot while brackish water desalting
costs $170 per acre-foot. The indirect economic effects involving short term and long term construction and operating employment vary for the two techniques. The effects on quality
of life, the environment, energy use, and political aspects also
differ. Table I displays these differences as a policymaker
might view them.
Table I shows that the substitution of brackish water desalinization would cost $100 times 60,000, or $6 million annually in direct cost. This would be partially offset during the
first 18-month construction period by stimulated construction
employment of $10 million which would produce, directly and
through a multiplier effect on the local economy, jobs and tax
revenues. The operation of the desalting plant would also provide more, permanent jobs. However, the heavy capital and
operating costs of the desalting plant make it clearly inferior
to groundwater mining on the basis of quantifiable direct and
indirect economic effects.
In cities concerned about "urban sprawl," groundwater
mining, which encourages further horizontal urban development, is particularly undesirable. In other cities, where residents desire the amenities of lawns and gardens and decentralized, low-density housing, use of groundwater is more acceptable, particularly as it reduces the cost of water collection and
distribution systems.
3. It is not, of course, necessary that an alternative have exactly equal effectiveness to be substituted. An alternative with limited effectiveness could be substituted
for a portion of the trial solution. For a desalting plant rated at 30,000 acre-feet a year
might be substituted for half of the planned 60,000 acre-foot groundwater mining
program.
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TABLE I.
TYPICAL COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

(Note: All quantitive data are hypothetical; they will differ from one metropolitan
area to another)
Groundwater Mining

1990 Effectiveness:
1990 C-st/acre-font
Indirect Econnmic
Effects:

60.000 acre-feet/year

$70
Stimulated basic employment in well-drilllng:
$3,500,000 income over
3 years

Continued employment in
maintenance of pumping
plants, $100,000/year

QUality .)fLife
effect
Environmental
effect

Energy effect

Political aspects

Legal uncertainties

Tecla:n;cl
uncertainties

Desalinizing Brackish
Water
60,000 acre-feet/year
$170
Stimulated basic employment in constructing
plant:
$12,000,000 income over 18
months
Capital cost = $35,000,000
Continued employment in
operation of desalting
plant: $300,000

Encourages horizontal
urban development

Small, if any

Risk of land subsidence
Depletion of nonrenewable
resource

Depletion of brackish water
resource
Problem of brine disposal
through deep well InjeciLon
Energy intensive in operation
3,500 kwh/acre-font
Energy used in plant construction

Moderately energy intensive in operation
1,500 kwh/acre-foot
Energy used in well
drilling
Considerable concern by
present groundwater
users over lowering of
water table
Risk of not obtaining
state approval of approriation of groundwater
Risk that groundwater may
be ruled to be directly
connected to surface
source.
Yield of formations
varies widely, hence
cost is uncertain
Quantity stored is most
uncertain and hence
duration of supply is
not known
As drawdown continues,
pumping cost increases.

Groundwater Mining
Zffect on Partiesat-interest:
Water supply agencies
Metro political officials
Environmentalists
Power supply agency
Public health officials
Downstream water users
Present groundwater users
Metro area developers
Water project construction
sector

+
+
+
--

+
+

Some concern over cost risk

Question over right to appropriate brackish water.
Risk of disapproval of method
used to dispose of residual
brine (e.g., deep well
disposal)

Little is known is to plant
cost and reliability due to
limited experience with
plants.
Substantial future cost reductiorns are anticipated

Desalinizing Brackish
Water
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Each alternative method has environmental drawbacks:
desalinization depletes a visible but little-valued resource of
brackish water; groundwater mining depletes an invisible but
valuable resource. The problems of brine disposal and possible
land subsidence, additional environmental problems, are
somewhat difficult to compare in severity.
The effects on parties-at-interest vary, and it requires a
subjective analysis to determine which is superior for society as
a whole.
Faced with the differences shown in Table I, the policymaker would weigh the possible effects according to criteria
chosen for applicability to the specific metropolitan area. By
identifying and isolating the effects of the proposed substitution, the policymaker can judge it according to any of several
values: reduced risk of horizontal urban development, greater
direct cost of $6 million per year, increased energy expenditure
of 120 million kilowatt-hours (KWH) per year, etc. Correctly,
it would be judged according to all of the factors listed in Table
I interpreted through the subjective criteria of the policymaker.
The policymaker should consider all the various possible substitutions until it is clear that, according to the criteria selected, the optimum solution has been found.
The analysis technique described herein has an important
advantage: it permits the policymaker to measure the direct
dollar cost of any proposed substitution of one technique for
another. By doing so, the policymaker can place an approximate minimum dollar value on a normally nonquantifiable effect, such as preservation of an environmental feature, if these
are the key factors in the substitution decision. It is this aspect
of the analysis process which is critical; only by weighing all
costs can an optimal decision be made.

Augmentation and Conservation of Water
Resources
LEWIS
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INTRODUCTION

The management and use of existing and potential water
supplies is a topic of critical importance. As the demands for
the available supplies increase, the problems of water allocation and distribution will increase, and hard decisions on optimal societal utilization will be needed. An increasingly high
premium must be placed on the management of the total water
resource: surface water, underground water, and atmospheric
water. If additions are to be made to the total volume of water
supplies to land areas over the globe, the additional water
must, as does natural precipitation, come from the atmosphere. Diversion and transfers can redistribute surface water
but do not increase the initial supply. The atmosphere, in addition to being the initial source for surface water, also constitutes the primary "sink" to which this water is lost.
How Much Water is There in the Atmosphere?
Huge quantities of water vapor pass over the watersheds
of the semiarid Western United States. However, not more
than about one percent of the water vapor present in the air
that passes over Colorado annually, for example, is condensed
into clouds that can form precipitation. Most of the atmospheric water remains in vapor form and is not potentially available for precipitation. There are extensive periods, however,
when the local atmosphere is saturated and some of the water
vapor condenses into liquid drops or ice particles forming
clouds. Some of this water is in a suitable state for precipitation and is the water from which all natural precipitation
comes. Only a portion of this condensed cloud water actually
reaches the ground as precipitation.
The type of cloud in which condensed water is contained
is important in considering how much of the cloud water
reaches the ground as precipitation. Orographic clouds are
Professor, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University.
Ph.D. candidate, Atmospheric Sciences, Colorado State University; Research
Associate/Scientist, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University.
*
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500

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

POLICY

VOL. 6:499

formed when air is forced over a mountain. Orographic clouds
are relatively simple and therefore their physical descriptions
are relatively complete and accurate. Cumulus clouds are
usually associated with summertime weather phenomena.
Cumulus clouds can be small, white, puffy clouds typical of
many warm summer days, or they can be large storms, sometimes resulting in lightning, hail, and heavy rains. A small
fraction of the summertime cumulus clouds in Colorado are
highly efficient in converting condensed cloud water into drops
or ice particles large enough to fall out and reach the ground.
Many others, however, are not. Most summertime thunderstorms of the High Plains region of the United States probably
precipitate 5 to 20 percent of the cloud water, while the remaining portion reevaporates as the clouds move out of their source
area and into a drier region. A few summertime cumulus clouds
are highly efficient precipitators and convert 70 to 80 percent
of the cloud water into precipitation. Still other cumulus
clouds have zero efficiency, and none of the cloud water is
precipitated.
Some orographic clouds are also highly efficient in converting cloud water to rain or snow while others are highly
inefficient. Overall, the natural precipitation efficiency of orographic clouds in wintertime may be higher than for summertime cumulus clouds. It is the water that condenses to form
clouds but does not reach the ground as precipitation that constitutes the potential for weather modification to augment precipitation. Under some conditions, this potential is large since
in these cases conditions are suitable for the formation of additional precipitation by enhancing cloud efficiency through
cloud seeding. Under many other conditions, the natural inefficiencies are inherent in the system and cloud seeding cannot
be an aid.
The amount of atmospheric water vapor and the existing
weather conditions are also important in the rate of depletion
of existing surface and underground water supplies. Some 90
to 95 percent of the average annual precipitation over Colorado
is returned to the atmosphere by evaporation and evapotranspiration while the other 5 to 10 percent is transported out
of the state in the form of runoff. A major portion of the water
transfered back to the atmosphere is in the form of useful tran-
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spiration or unavoidable evaporation losses. An important portion of it, however, might be conserved or utilized more effectively by employing good management practices.
This paper briefly considers the potential of weather modification as a technology for increasing usable water resources.
It considers both the augmentation of water supplies by enhancing the efficiency of cloud water conversion to precipitation and the conservation of water by modifying evaporation
and evapotranspiration losses.
II. CLOUD AND PRECIPITATION MODIFICATION
Clouds and weather can clearly be modified under some
circumstances. However, given differing weather conditions,
one could either cause more efficient use of cloud water and
produce more precipitation, produce no change in cloud efficiency or precipitation, or even decrease the natural precipitation efficiency of the cloud and thereby possibly reduce the
precipitation on the ground. Clearly one must be able to define
and recognize just which effect will occur before practical operational weather modification efforts can be undertaken. The
important point is that there are many situations when the
natural precipitating efficiency is low and can be increased by
treatment. Since summertime cumulus cloud systems are very
complex and the technology for their modification is very primitive, we will only briefly summarize their potential for modification. Precipitation augmentation prospects for the simpler
and better defined wintertime orographic clouds will be discussed in greater detail.
A. Summertime Cumulus Cloud Systems
While changes in both the clouds and precipitation have
been shown from seeding certain individual convective summertime clouds, the augmentation of precipitation over an area
has not been demonstrated with a satisfactory degree of certainty for most geographical regions. The results from at least
four carefully conducted experiments suggest (but not at a statistically significant level) a decrease in precipitation following
seeding. At least two or more recent experiments using more
advanced concepts provide results indicating precipitation increases, but still without a substantially high degree of certainty.
These cloud types are complex, very short-lived, and diffi-
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cult to study. A probable reason for present conflicting evidence is that differing effects resulting in both precipitation
increase and decrease are incorporated in existing experimental samples. Clearly, cloud conditions and seeding methods
leading to precipitation increases or precipitation decreases
must be defined before extensive operational field programs are
feasible. The Bureau of Reclamation in its large High Plains
precipitation augmentation research experiment, and other
groups, such as the South Park Area Cumulus Experiment
(SPACE) at Colorado State University, are addressing these
problems with the parallel and complimentary efforts of laboratory simulations, field cloud studies, and field seeding experiments. The benefits can be large, particularly in the semiarid, Western United States.
B. Wintertime Snowpack Augmentation
The basis for considering augmentation of snowfall from
wintertime orographic clouds is considerably more advanced
than summertime cumulus precipitation augmentation, and
the basic technology for augmenting precipitation in many geographical areas on a determinate basis now exists. Careful research over a 15-year period has provided the basis for defining
which clouds are efficient and which ones require treatment to
improve their efficiency. These concepts have been confirmed
in carefully designed, long term field experiments.
During two randomized seeding experiments carried out
by Colorado State University, an average of less than half of
the cloud water was converted to precipitation reaching the
ground on unseeded days defined as having naturally inefficient cloud water utilization. On similarly defined days that
were seeded, actual precipitation averaged nearly twice as
much as on the unseeded days. These results, of course, apply
only to certain weather situations, and in the Northern Colorado Rockies these days constitute only about 15 to 30 percent
of the cloudy days. On the other 70 to 85 percent of the days,
the natural precipitation process was efficient so that no seeding effects should have been expected, and none were observed. The large increases on certain days, however, can be
shown to have the potential for augmenting overall snowfall in
most Colorado mountain areas by 10 to 20 percent over a winter
season. Results of another six-year field test by Colorado State
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University in the Wolf Creek Pass area of southern Colorado
indicated even larger percentage increases since there was a
higher frequency of warmer, more seedable weather episodes.
A subsequent randomized experiment in this same area by the
Bureau of Reclamation provided confirmation and refinement
of the physical concepts but demonstrated the difficulties involved in trying to predict the seedability of the respective
cloud systems for 24 to 30 hours in advance. In fully operational
programs with automated data observation systems, seeding
operations can and should be based primarily on current observations rather than forecasts.
Streamflow from snowpack increases should be at least
comparable to corresponding natural increases in snowfall in
various watersheds. The Colorado State University Wolf Creek
Pass experiment provided strong, statistically significant evidence of a streamflow increase of about 23 percent during the
continuously seeded winter seasons.' This amounted to a total
of 276,000 acre-feet of water, of which half was produced in the
head waters of the San Juan River Basin and the other half in
the Rio Grande. Based on the changes in precipitation determined to be feasible and the results of this Wolf Creek Pass
streamflow analysis, the potential for water augmentation from
Colorado watersheds should be of the order of 1.5 to 2.0 million
acre-feet per year.
C. Societal and Environmental Impacts of Augmented
Precipitation
Augmenting water resources in the Western United States
can make a substantial contribution to the solution of current
regional and national water resources problems. The direct cost
of the augmentation would be low in relation to present water
values and particularly those to be expected in the future.
Weather modification affects entire communities or regions,
not just individuals or individual groups. Thus, the entire spectrum of societal and environmental impacts must be considered.
First, studies to date have not identified any short term
1. Mielke, Williams & Wu, Covariance Analysis Technique Based on Bivariate
Log-Normal Distribution with Weather Modification Applications (1977) (to be pub-

lished in 16 J.

APPLIED MErEoRoLoGY).
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environmental impacts that are of a magnitude that would
preclude the use of weather modification for augmenting
mountain snowpack. 2 Most of the undesirable effects that
might occur can be managed. For example, treatment can be
terminated during particularly bad storms or heavy snow
years. It also appears that most adverse environmental impacts
that might arise are reversible by subsequently terminating the
augmentation treatment.
Second, as in naturally occurring heavier snow years, augmented precipitation will cause added expenses at the locale
where precipitation is being augmented. It seems likely that
expenses incurred could be borne as part of the cost of the
added water without seriously affecting the cost-effectiveness
of the technology. A method for distribution of the direct costs,
benefits, and reimbursements does present a difficult problem
that will have to be addressed.
Third, water ownership and cost sharing for its production
will have to be established.
Fourth, special societal problems are introduced by increasing water in western watersheds3 since the relatively small
community affected by the additional snowfall has little or no
use for the additional water while the relatively large user community, frequently hundreds of miles downstream, is the beneficiary. At least some, and likely many, of the affected communities may object to this arrangement even though they, by
choice, live in the water source area of many downstream agricultural, urban, and industrial water users. Land use issues are
raised. Perhaps the greatest present and potential land use
value for these mountain watersheds is for the production and
storage of usable water supplies. This may or may not be compatible with present recreation, mining, and agricultural uses.
Expanded working relationships will have to be developed to
facilitate multipurpose land use planning and implementation.

2. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE IMPACTS OF SNOW ENHANCEMENT: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF WINTER OROGRAPHIC SNOWPACK AUGMENTATION IN THE UPPER

(1974).
3. B. Farhar, Weather Modification in the United States: A Socio-Political Analysis, 1975 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado).
COLORADO RIVER BASIN
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MANAGEMENT TO REDUCE UNPRODUCTIVE
EVAPOTRANSPIRATION

The reduction of water returned to the atmosphere
through evaporation, sublimation, and transpiration at the
surface-atmosphere interface has a high potential for enhancing water supplies in the Western United States.
A. Low PrecipitationAgriculturalAreas
In agriculture on semiarid lands, water conservation techniques are aimed at maintaining limited subsoil moisture supplies by reducing evapotranspiration. One conservation technique involves keeping soil free of vegetation for a growing
season to reduce evapotranspiration and to allow the precipitation which occurs that year to replenish subsoil moisture. This
moisture is then used to enhance the water supply for the crops
which are planted the following season. A second widely-used
agricultural technique, mulching, involves only partially removing crop stubble after the crop has been harvested. The
plant stems are left standing to intercept blowing snow during
the winter. If the snow had not been trapped it probably would
have sublimed and returned to the atmosphere. Thus, in the
first example, evapotranspiration is reduced, and, in the second, sublimation losses from blowing snow are reduced. A
number of additional techniques are routinely used in agriculture aimed primarily at reducing evapotranspiration losses.
B. Low PrecipitationRange Area
Ranchers in semiarid areas conserve moisture for productive vegatative growth by reducing nonproductive evapotranspiration losses.' This is accomplished by controlling vegetation types on rangeland. One example of this type of control is
reduction of big sagebrush. The moisture which would normally be used by the sagebrush can then be used by plants
which are better food producers for grazing animals. In addition, Sturges has estimated that reducing big sagebrush
foliage' on rangeland can result in up to a 15 percent increase
in water yield under the most favorable conditions.
4. D. Sturges, Hydraulic Relations on Undisturbed and Converted Big Sagebrush
Lands: The Status of our Knowledge, Mar. 1975 (U.S.D.A. Forest Service Research
Paper RM-140).
5. Id.
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Alpine Areas
In addition to water savings resulting from management of
agricultural and rangelands, the management of watersheds in
the West has a high potential for enhancing streamflow. Mountain watersheds often have a region above timberline which is
typically referred to as the alpine region. Estimates of the alpine area coverage in Colorado range from 1.9 to 4.5 million
acres, which corresponds to approximately 3.5 percent of the
surface area of the state. The runoff resulting from this relatively small area produces about 20 percent of Colorado's total
water yield. The amount of water returned to the atmosphere
from this region by evaporative losses as a whole has not been
well-defined. A major portion of these losses are probably due
to sublimation of windblown snow. Santeford defined water
losses due to sublimation on a mountain ridge line at 62 percent
of the total wintertime precipitation for the area.' Twenty percent of this amount was due to direct sublimation from the
snow surface, and 60 percent was due to losses related to blowing snow. This study and a subsequent study7 investigated
snow entrapment by inducing avalanches on the lee slopes of
the ridge. The Santeford study indicated that approximately
half of the windblown snow losses in his study plot could be
saved using this technique. Such savings would produce an
increased water yield of 270 acre-feet of water per mile of treatable ridge line. Other studies in the alpine region have investigated the possibility of enhancing runoff and changing the timing of runoff through the interception of blowing snow by
snowfences. Terrain modification is another technique which
is aimed at reducing sublimation losses resulting from blowing
snow. Estimates of water savings from these techniques are not
well-defined. It should be recognized that treatment of the
relatively small alpine area may result in significant streamflow increases.
D. Subalpine Areas
In the high elevation, forested regions (often referred to as
C.

6. H. Santeford, Management of Windblown Alpine Snows, 1972 (unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Colorado State University).
7. M. Pope, Snow Surface Modification in the Alpine to Augment Water Yield,
1977 (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Colorado State University).
8. M. Martinelli, Water Yield Improvement from Alpine Areas: The Status of our
Knowledge, Mar. 1975 (U.S.D.A. Forest Service Research Paper RM-138).
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subalpine) watershed management techniques can enhance
streamflow significantly. The Colorado River Basin has a total
alpine and subalpine areal coverage above about 9000 ft.msl
(2900 m) which is 17 percent of the basin area, yet this portion
of the basin is responsible for 80 percent of the streamflow.
Thirty years of study have shown that the subalpine region is
capable of producing 25 percent more streamflow if 40 percent
of the watershed area is occupied by small, protected openings.
This study by the National Forest Service in the Fraser National Experimental Forest indicates that the openings should
be 5 to 8 tree-heights in diameter and 5 to 8 tree-heights apart.'
The pattern results in a redistribution of snow with more snow
in the openings and less snow in the trees. The net effect is that
the snow melts earlier in the spring and, due to reduced evapotranspiration, streamflow is increased. The increased streamflow remains stable at approximately a 25 percent increase for
30 years with lesser increases evident for up to 60 years. The
increased runoff is a by-product of timber harvest. It should be
emphasized, however, that only when the harvest is appropriately planned and managed will increases in streamflow result.
This technique is silviculturally sound, does not degrade water
quality, and, if planned to fit the terrain, is not aesthetically
displeasing. Watersheds with commercial forests to which this
type of treatment might be applied comprise about ten million
acres in Colorado alone.'" Leaf and Alexander have numerically
simulated a forest management technique which considered
optimal forest growth and watershed runoff enhancement for
the South Tongue River of the Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming." The simulation was run for a 120-year time period with
a stepwise harvesting and rejuvenation of the watershed. The
simulated treatment resulted in increased streamflow ranging
from 10 to 20 percent for the entire period. This method pro9. C. Leaf, Watershed Management in the Central and Southern Rocky Mountains: A Summary of the Status of our Knowledge by Vegetation Types, Mar. 1975
(U.S.D.A. Forest Service Research Paper RM-142).
10. R. Alexander, Silviculture of Central and Southern Rocky Mountain Forests:
A Summary of the Status of our Knowledge by Timber Types, Apr. 1974 (U.S.D.A.
Forest Service Research Paper RM-120).
11. C. Leaf & R. Alexander, Simulating Timber Yields and Hydraulic Impacts
Resulting from Timber Harvest on Subalpine Watersheds, Feb. 1975 (U.S.D.A. Forest
Service Research Paper RM-133).
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vides a very lucrative potential for enhancing streamflows in
the West.
E. Streambeds and Standing Water Areas
Rivers of the West are bounded by phreatophytes (Greek
word meaning "well plants"). These plants use the water that
flows in the streams and, through evapotranspiration, release
the water to the air. It is estimated that phreatophytes occupy
16 million acres along streams in the 17 Western States.' 2 Horton and Campbell have estimated that one to two acre-feet of
water per acre of phreatophyte can be saved each year by removing the phreaophytes.' 3 If only 25 percent of the phreatophyte area were treated, this translates into 4 to 8 million acrefeet of additional streamflow per year in the 17 Western States.
F. Environmental and Social Impacts of Water Conservation
Treatment
Establishment of optimum multiple-use management
techniques for mountain watersheds and phreatophyte areas
often requires a compromise between the environmental factors
and the needs of society. Seldom are areas best managed by
devoting the land to a single use. Most of the environmental
difficulties associated with these techniques are or can be defined. Intelligent decisions cannot be made on the use of watershed management techniques unless the environmental ramifications are carefully considered.
Social and legal difficulties associated with water ownership, treatment cost, and compensation for those receiving disbenefits must also be resolved for optimal technique utilization
to occur.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The atmosphere under some meteorological conditions is
a source for additional surface and subsurface waters. The atmosphere is also a sink for evaporative losses under other conditions. By utilizing well-defined techniques for augmenting
wintertime orographic precipitation, it is possible to increase
12. SELECT

COMMITTEE

ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES,

86TH CONG.,

2D SESS.,

WATER RESOURCES ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: EVAPO-TRANSPIRATION REDUCTION

(Comm. Print 1960).
13. J. Horton & C. Campbell, Management of Phreatophyte and Riparian Vegatation for Maximum Multiple Use Values, Apr. 1974 (U.S.D.A. Forest Service Research
Paper RM-117).
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the atmospheric source. Management of watersheds provides a
means for reducing evaporation and evapotranspiration losses,
thus reducing the atmospheric sink for moisture. Combined,
these treatments constitute potential major water supplies to
assist in meeting the water needs of the future for Colorado, the
United States, and the world.
Specifically, weather modification for augmenting orographic precipitation over many western watersheds, using existing or near-ready techniques has the potential of adding 10
to 20 percent to natural supplies. In Colorado, this can involve
the addition of up to 1.5 to 2.0 million acre-feet of water annually. The increase in available water supplies from management practices to reduce unproductive evaporative losses are
comparable and likely greater. In addition, a synergistic relationship has been suggested for these two techniques.'
Each of these resource utilization techniques involves societal and environmental impacts that must be addressed. The
total water resources, including the atmospheric component
and the impacts of its utilization, must be included in water
planning for the future.
14. A. Rango, Possible Effects of Precipitation Modification on Selected Watershed Parameters, 1969 (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Colorado State University).

Legal System Requirements to Control and
Facilitate Water Augmentation in the
Western United States
KELVIN SCOTT DANIELSON*
GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, JR.**

LEWIS
I.

0.

GRANT***

INTRODUCTION

Water is a basic necessity for both plant and animal life.
The availability of water has had a pronounced effect on the
physical and social organizations which develop in any particular region. This inherent value has been recognized for centuries. Historically, water has been used for human consumption,
irrigation, industry, transportation, recreation, and power generation.
In many regions of the world, water supply is not adequate
to meet societal water requirements. The Western United
States, in general, and Colorado, in particular, have only limited surface and underground water supplies. Water diversion
projects have been instituted to remedy this situation. However, expanding population, increasing industrial and agricultural demands, and inefficient water use have displaced the
interim solution of water diversion.
One possible solution to the problem is to limit population,
industrial, and agricultural growth in the semiarid western region of the United States. An alternative solution could be to
increase the total surface and subsurface water supply through
the use of watershed management techniques and wintertime
orographic weather modification.' When used in combination,
* Ph.D. candidate, Atmospheric Sciences, Colorado State University; Research
Associate/Scientist, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University.
** J.D. candidate, University of Denver College of Law; Graduate Research Assistant, University of Denver Research Institute.
*** Professor, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University.
1. Orographic clouds are formed when air is forced over a mountain. Unlike cumulus clouds, they are relatively simple and their physical descriptions are relatively
complete and accurate. The potential for water augmentation from orographic clouds
relates to the amount of water that condenses to form the clouds but does not reach
the ground as precipitation. Seeding operations can improve the efficiency of such
clouds resulting in increased precipitation. It must be noted, however, that this is not
a long-term solution. Both watershed conservation and wintertime orographic weather
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these techniques are estimated to be capable of increasing
streamflow in the Western United States by 15 million, acrefeet annually.' Even though this water might enter the water
use priority system at the lowest end of the value structure
(irrigated agriculture), the value of this additional water would
be approximately three hundred million dollars per year.3
When reuse and higher valued uses are considered, the direct
gains in production in 1976 prices could amount to several
billion dollars per year.' The direct costs of weather modification and appropriate watershed management techniques are
not high. In fact, a considerable margin in the cost/benefit
structure would exist.5
The ability to enhance streamflow in the Western United
States through wintertime orographic weather modification is
a technique which has been studied extensively for well over a
decade. The physical principles are understood, and the capability of the technique to enhance streamflow is well documented in the literature.' Similarly, the physical principles
modification will serve to meet the water needs of the Western United States only until
such time as augmented water supplies are utilized by ever-expanding water demands.
2. This would result from 10 million acre-feet being produced by wintertime orographic weather modification and an estimated 5 million acre-feet resulting from watershed management. The region-wide potential of watershed management to increase
water supplies has not yet been fully evaluated. Experimental results to date indicate
that the potential of watershed management to augment water supplies may be equal
to or greater than that of weather modification. For the purposes of this analysis a
conservative projection of 5 million acre-feet was utilized. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMM'N ON NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
CLIMATE AND WEATHER FLUCTUATIONS AND AGRICULTURE AND RENEwAL RESOURCES, CLIMATE AND FOOD
HANNAFORD &

131-62 (1976) [hereinafter cited
R.

SHAFFER, TWELVE BASIN

as CLIMATE AND FOOD];

INVESTIGATION: ANALYSIS

R.

ELLIOT, J.

OF POTENTIAL IN-

CREASES IN PRECIPITATION AND STREAM FLOW FROM MODIFICATION OF COLD OROGRAPHIC
CLOUDS IN SELECTED RIVER BASINS OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 1-200

(1973); C.

LEAF,

WATERSHED MANAGEMENT IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN SUBALPINE ZONE: THE STATUS OF OUR

KNOWLEDGE 1-28 (1975) (U.S.D.A. Forest Service Research Paper RM-137)[hereinafter

cited as LEAF].
3. This projection is based on an assumed cost of $20.00 per acre-foot for agricultural water.
4. The costs of water for industrial and domestic water users has been estimated
to range up to ten times the cost of water for irrigated agriculture. The specific values
vary substantially with location.
5. CLIMATE AND FOOD, supra note 2.
6. See generally L. GRANT, C. CHAPPELL, L. CROW, J., FRITSCH, & P. MIELKE,
WEATHER MODIFICATION-A PILOT PROJECT (1974) (Final Report, Bureau of Reclamation Contract No. 14-06-D-6467). See also note 2 supra and note 8 infra.
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and application techniques utilized in watershed management
are defined, tested, and documented. 7
The major problems encountered in applying these techniques to increase water supplies do not lie with scientific understanding or technological limitations. The fundamental
problems are environmental, social, and legal.
The direct environmental problems introduced by employing these techniques (not including increased population
growth) have been addressed on a limited basis.' Numerous
studies have defined many of the environmental problems. The
problems thus far identified, while important, do not present
any major obstacles to the development of operational water
augmentation programs. As such, they are not considered in
this analysis.
Problems relating to sociological considerations are quite
complex. For watershed management, these are relatively
minor. For weather modification, they present significant difficulties.9 The primary issue is that those people who benefit
from water augmentation activities (senior water right holders)
are generally not the same individuals who incur disbenefits
from the activities (increased snowfall plus associated inconveniences and costs). It is unlikely that those individuals receiving disbenefits will voluntarily accept a degradation in
their quality of life for the benefit of others. It may be that
monetary compensation will not remedy this situation.
The responses of local, state, and federal governments to
legal problems related to water augmentation have been varied. The bulk of legal system actions have been at the state
level, though a number of proposals have recently been considered by the federal government.
The problems of water augmentation are twofold. First,
the complexity of the weather modification portion of water
augmentation must be considered. Weather modification can
7. LEAF, supra note 2.
8. See generally STANFORD

RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE IMPACTS OF SNOW ENHANCE-

MENT: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF WINTER OROGRAPHIC SNOWPACK AUGMENTATION IN

THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1974); see also note 2 supra.

9. B. Farhar, Weather Modification in The United States: A Socio-Political
Analysis, 150-367, April, 1975 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Dep't of Sociology,
University of Colorado).
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be used on wintertime orographic clouds to enhance precipitation and on summertime cumulus clouds to reduce or enhance
precipitation or to decrease hail; additionally, to dissipate cold
and warm fogs, to control cirrus clouds in order to control surface temperatures, and for many other purposes.'" Some of
these treatments are well defined. Others, however, are not.
The legal system response to the problems of water augmentation should facilitate the application of those techniques which
are well defined while controlling, and in certain cases limiting,
the application of other weather modification techniques. Only
wintertime orographic cloud seeding, for which modification
techniques are well defined, will be considered as weather modification in the following discussion.
"Water augmentation via watershed management, which
has both well defined and developing techniques, must also be
analyzed. Many watershed management techniques will require legal system responses to protect both water rights holders and the general populace.
The second aspect of legal uncertainties concerning water
augmentation involves the issue of water rights. Questions of
subsidizing and controlling augmentation activities, taxing for
compensation, liability, record-keeping, and the administration of streamflow enhancement programs all depend on the
ownership of "new" water. The following analysis examines
different approaches to the ownership of water. Because of the
application of the Shelton Farms decision of the Supreme
Court of Colorado" to the question of the ownership of water
produced by water augmentation activities, specific attention
will be focused on it.
II.

GENERAL STATE CLAIMS TO WATER

State claims to the ownership of water which may have a
critical impact on the ownership of water produced by water
augmentation must be evaluated. All eight appropriation doctrine states of the Western United States, without exception,
claim the waters within the state. Their claims are based on the
presumption that state waters are the "property of the public,"
10. W. HEss, WEATHER AND CLIMATE MODIFICATION 227-765 (1974).
11. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 187 Colo.
181, 529 P.2d 1321 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shelton Farms].
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"belong to the public," or are the "property of the state."' 2
Traditionally, the appropriation states have acted as a public
trustee, administering the waters of the state in the public
interest. The appropriation system, the usufructory nature of
a water right, and the requirement of beneficial use as the
basis, measure, and limit of a right, exist in all eight states.
The questions of those waters subject to state jurisdiction
and appropriation for beneficial use come into critical focus
when the ownership of waters developed by water augmentation activities is considered. It is possible that a theory of ownership might be developed based on a definition of the waters
produced by water augmentation as "unnatural" waters. This
may free such waters from state ownership claims. Four of the
eight western states consider the "natural" characteristics of
the water to which they assert a claim.' 3 Three of the appropriation doctrine states do not make mention of the "natural"
characteristics of the waters within their jurisdiction."
The claims of the State of Colorado appear to be a combination of the "natural" claims of Wyoming, Arizona, Idaho,
and New Mexico and the more inclusive claims of Utah, Montana, and Nevada. The Constitution of the State of Colorado
includes a provision asserting claim to "the water of every
12. Colorado (COLO. CONST., art. 16, §5; COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-82-101 (1973),
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §73-1-1 (1953)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §533.025 (1975)), and
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §75-1-1 (1953)) all declare the waters of the state to be
either the "property of the public" or to "belong to the public." Wyoming (Wyo.
CONST., art. 8, §1; WYO. STAT. §41-2 (1957)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE §42-101 (1947)), and
Montana (MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §89-866(1) (Supp. 1975)) all assert title to waters
as the "property of the state."
13. Wyoming states a claim to "the water of all naturalstreams, springs, lakes or
other collections of still waters" (Wyo. CONST., art. 8, §1). Idaho claims "all the waters
of the state, when flowing in their natural channels" (IDAHO CODE §42-101 (1947)).
Arizona asserts title to the "waters of all sources flowing in streams, canyons, ravines
or other natural channels" (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §45-101(A) (1956), §45-180 (Supp. 1976)).
New Mexico claims "all natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses" (N.M.
STAT. ANN. §75-1-1 (1953)) and "the unappropriated water of every natural stream"
(N.M. CONST., art. XVI, §2) (emphases added).
14. Utah asserts title to "all waters in [the] state, whether above or under the
ground" (UTAH CODE ANN. §73-1-1 (1953)). Nevada claims "the water of all sources of
water supply . . . whether above or beneath the surface of the ground"(NEv. REV.
STAT. §533.025 (1975)). Montana appears to make the most expansive state water
claims by asserting title to "all surface, underground, flood and atmospheric waters"
(MONT. CONST., art. IX, §3(3)) and to "all water of the state, surface and subsurface,
regardless of its character or manner of occurrence" (MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §89867(1) (Supp. 1976)).
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natural stream."' 5 This claim, however, has been expanded by
statute to include "all water originating in or flowing into this
state.""
III. WATER FOR WEATHER MODIFICATION
Four of the eight appropriation doctrine states make specific claims to the waters produced by weather modification
activities. New Mexico claims "the right to all moisture in the
atmosphere which would fall so as to become a part of the
natural or percolated water" of the state. 7 Wyoming asserts a
"sovereign right to . . . the moisture contained in the clouds
and atmosphere."' 8 The statutory provisions of Colorado regarding the ownership of water produced by weather modification, asserting claim to all water "suspended in the atmosphere"" or "artificially induced to fall," ' " reflect the approaches taken by both Wyoming and New Mexico. Utah,
which bases its water claims on very expansive definitions of
cloud seeding, has provided that "all statutory provisions that
apply to water from natural precipitation shall also apply to
water derived from cloud seeding."'2
Arizona seems to have taken a quite different approach. Its
weather modification statute does not contain a statement of
the ownership of the water produced. It does provide, however,
that nothing in the statute is to be construed to prohibit the
owner of land used for agricultural purposes from doing
weather modification on the individual's property for exclusive
benefit. 22 This statute seems to have been intended to deal with
some forms of summertime cumulus cloud seeding. The application of a statute so designed for both wintertime orographic
cloud seeding and watershed management would be doubtful
as the benefits of these two activities frequently occur in areas
other than the area where the activity was conducted.
Both Montana and Nevada assert claims to those waters
which may have been produced by weather modification.
art. 16, §5 (emphasis added).
16. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-82-101 (1973).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §75-37-3 (1953).
18. Wyo. STAT. §9-266 (1957).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-20-103 (1973).
20. Id.
21. UTAH CODE ANN. §73-15-4 (Supp. 1975).
22. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §45-2406 (1956).
15. COLO. CONST.,

1976

LEGAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

These claims, however, are not contained in the weather modification statutes of either state. Montana, in its state constitution, asserts a claim to "atmospheric" waters.23 Nevada appears to be asserting a claim to atmospheric water when, by
statute, the state claims water "above . . . the surface of the
ground." 24 Finally it should be noted that only Idaho does not,
in some way, address the problem of the ownership of atmospheric waters. Statutory claims to waters produced by water
augmentation activities must be understood if the issue of ownership is to be resolved. It would appear, in some states, that
private claims to such waters are impossible. In other states,
private claims to water so developed would appear to be possible. Such ownership questions must be resolved by legislation
if private water augmentation activities are to be encouraged.
IV. WATER FROM WATER AUGMENTATION
As with weather modification, the question of the ownership of water produced by water augmentation activities is
critically important to those individuals and organizations contemplating water augmentation activities. It can be argued
that the waters produced by these activities fall under the
"water from all sources" types of water ownership policies previously considered. Such general policies, however, are not conducive to water augmentation activities in that they do not
guarantee a water right to those individuals and organizations
augmenting water supplies.
Colorado appears to be the only state in the region to have
developed specific statutory provisions concerning water augmentation.2 5 Under the statute, augmentation is defined, in
part, as an increase in the supply of water "by the development
of a new or alternate means or point of diversion, by a pooling
of water resources, by water exchange projects, by providing
substitute supplies of water, by the development of new sources
of water, or by any other appropriate means." 2 The statute
23. MONT. CONST., art. IX, §3(3).
24. NEV. REV. STAT. §533.025 (1975).
25. This statute, however, is not aimed at the ownership question regarding new
sources of water supply. It is primarily intended to encourage the development of
alternate sources of supply to protect the rights of senior appropriators.
26. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-103(9) (Supp. 1976). While not specifically
mentioned in the Statute, it would be difficult to argue that water produced by weather
modification and watershed mangement falls outside the scope and intent of the legislation.
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specifically excludes from the definition of water augmentation
programs phreatophyte eradication and the use of water runoff
collected from land surfaces which have been made impermeable.27
Under the Colorado procedure, an application and a plan
for water augmentation are filed with both the water clerk of
the specific division and the State Engineer. The State Engineer can then approve, on a temporary basis, the augmentation
plan. The water judge of the specific division is then to hold a
hearing on the augmentation plan to consider either a final
approval or denial. At this hearing, the conclusion of the State
Engineer is prima facie evidence unless challenged by
"competent countervailing evidence." 8 It is apparent, under
the Colorado water augmentation statutes, that one augmenting water supplies pursuant to an approved plan has first claim
to the waters produced in accordance with the plan.
. V. ARTIFICIAL WATER: DEVELOPED WATER
New Mexico has defined artificial water as water "whose
appearance or accumulation is due to escape, seepage, loss,
waste, drainage, or percolation from constructed works." 9 In
both New Mexico and Arizona, artificial waters are not subject
to appropriation.3 In New Mexico, however, the exemption for
such waters from appropriation exists only as long as the water
is on the property of the individual who created the artificial
waters.
The aforementioned definition of "artificial waters" is very
similar to the definition of "salvaged waters" developed by the
Supreme Court of Colorado. 3 ' Under both Colorado and Utah
law, however, persons salvaging water do not have first claim
to the water. Such waters remain a part of the stream system
and are subject to a call on the river.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has, however, drawn a
distinction between "salvaged waters" and "developed wa27. Id.
28. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-307(5), (6) (Supp. 1976).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §75-5-25 (1953).
30. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649,
187 P. 555 (1920); Fourzon v. Curtis, 43 Ariz. 140, 29 P.2d 722 (1934).
31. Shelton Farms, supra note 11, at 1325.
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ters."32 Developed waters are those waters which are transported from another source, flood waters which are captured
and stored, or waters "which would never have reached the
river or its tributaries."" In essence, the definition of developed
waters "implies new water not previously part of the river system."34 Under the Shelton Farms rule, developed waters "are
free from the river call, and are not junior to prior decrees." '5
In the final analysis, it would appear that an individual developing waters under this rule, and in accordance with the aforementioned plans for water augmentation, would have first
claim to the water. Such issues must be resolved before private
water augmentation plans can be developed. This is particularly true when the cost of proving the quantity of water developed is considered.
VI.

POSSIBLE SYSTEM RESPONSES: PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT

If the assumption is made that an increase in the total
water supply of the Western United States is in the public
interest, then legal institutions should seek to facilitate rather
than discourage the development of potential "new" water supplies. Review of the legal institutions of the eight western states
indicates that private claims to water developed through
weather modification and watershed management techniques
are open to question and subject to the claims of existing
appropriators. A study by F. B. Jones, C. F. Leaf, and W. H.
Fischer" points out that the private concern asserting a claim
based on water augmented through weather modification has
no assurance that such a claim would not be contested by
existing appropriators. Water augmented through watershed
management techniques may also result in contested rights
under the existing systems. Assurances of ownership are
critical if private water augmentation activities are to be conducted.
In fact, it is highly unlikely that development of augmented water supplies by private concerns will occur until
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1325.
See generally F.

JONES,

C. LEAF & W. FISCHER, GENERALIZED CRITERIA FOR

PROOF OF WATER DEVELOPED THROUGH WEATHER MODIFICATION

as

GENERALIZED CRITERIA].

(1975) [hereinafter cited
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legal and institutional assurances of ownership are developed.
This is clearly apparent in light of the initial procedures and,
in some instances, expenses which would be necessary for a
private concern to prove the magnitude of the augmented
water claim. 7 These assurances must guarantee that the actions of private concerns to augment and to prove augmentation will result in a legal right to the augmented portion of the
water when adequate proof of augmentation is provided.
There are numerous legal system responses which would
facilitate private concern development of "new" water. One
option is legislation at the state level. This could be easily
implemented if "new" waters resulting from watershed management and weather modification were defined as
"developed" waters in the manner in which the Supreme Court
of the State of Colorado has defined them.3 1 In Colorado, it is
established that "one who adds to an existing water supply is
entitled to a decree affirming the use of such water." 3 Colorado
recognizes that developed water includes "water within the
system which would never have normally reached its tributaries." 4 Water created by watershed management and by
weather modification would seem to fit these criteria. A definition of this water as "developed" water is advantageous since
it is consistent with the distinction drawn between
"developed" and "salvaged" water in the Shelton Farms decision. This would allow the augmentor first claim to
"developed" waters.
Once state legislation has resolved the question of water
rights in a manner that would allow development of this resource by private concerns, a number of additional issues must
be addressed. Initially, proof of the amount and availability of
augmented water supplies, which would meet "preponderance
of evidence" requirements in judicial proceedings, must be
developed. Methods for development of this proof of water
based on weather modification have been proposed. 4 It should
be noted, that specific proof may have to be offered following
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Shelton Farms, supra note 11, at 1325.
Id. at 1324.
Id.; see notes 30-34 supra.
GENERALIZED CRITERIA, supra note 36.
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each water augmentation activity from which benefit is
claimed. If judicial notice of specific methods of proof had been
taken, however, such repetitive proofs would be economically
feasible. No example of a technique capable of proving the
magnitude of augmented water from watershed management is
available in the literature. Development of such a technique,
however, would probably be less complex than for weather
modification.
The statistical and numerical techniques proposed to
prove the amount and availability of augmented water supplies
may not conform to current evidentiary requirements. In essence, probability and fact may not be seen as synonymous.
Since statistical and numerical techniques assert proof in
terms of probabilities, their admissibility as proof of the characteristics of water augmentation activities may be questioned.
Even though readily accepted by the scientific community,
judicial acceptance of such procedures is as yet untested.2
A broad range of issues relating to the liability of individuals attempting to augment water supplies must be addressed.
Initially, the question of procedures for compensation of individuals who experience a reduction in quality of life by virtue
of their living in a treatment area is a serious one. An example
of such a reduction would be increased snowfall in a region
from wintertime orographic weather modification efforts. The
question can be raised as to whether increased snowfall, and
the resultant loss in the enjoyment of property (assuming it is
not a ski slope), would constitute a "taking. 4 3 If the assumption is made that this does constitute a "taking," a possible
solution would be to tax the concern performing the treatment
while simultaneously providing a tax benefit to those individuals adversely affected. Another possible solution would be to
make a one-time monetary compensation to those currently
owning property in the region since those that move into the
42. Fischer, Weather Modification and the Right of Capture, 8 NAT. RES. LAW.
639 (1976). If judicial notice of the statistical method is taken, then by a preponderance of the evidence it would be necessary to show that the specific statistical method
is appropriate and that it demonstrates the magnitude of the claim.
43. The question of whether the interference with private property would constitute a taking must be resolved. It would seem that minor interferences would not be a
taking. By way of analogy, zoning requirements which limit the use of private property
have not usually been seen as constituting a taking of property.
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area "post hoc" have full knowledge of the quality of life that
exists. Since the value of the water produced by water augmentation is substantially in excess of the costs of implementing
the techniques, a considerable margin exists in the cost/benefit
relationship. These revenues, which would initially accrue to
the private developer, could be tapped by the state via taxation
to compensate those adversely affected.
Liability for catastrophic occurrences resulting from water
augmentation activities must also be considered. An example
of such an occurrence, which might be construed to have resulted from these activities, would be an avalanche following
heavy snowfall during which winter orographic weather modification activities were conducted. A second example would be
a situation in which a percentage of trees in a watershed had
been removed in order to enhance streamflow where, following
the removal, heavy rainfall resulted in flooding within the watershed. In both of these examples, the legal issue which must
be resolved is whether the water augmentation activities were,
in fact, the proximate cause of the resulting damages.
If liability in such instances can be established, the legal
system must develop means to insure that compensation is
available to those injured. Two possible responses could be
developed. The water augmentor applying for a permit would
be required either to prove adequate insurance coverage or to
post a bond sufficient to cover possible damages. In the event
of an incident, either the bond or the proceeds of the insurance
policy could be administered by the state (possibly through the
office of the State Engineer) to compensate those damaged by
water augmentation activities.
A problem with water augmentation with which many
states have already dealt involves the qualification for the issuance of licenses and permits to do water augmentation. Licensing requirements are necessary to assure the state that competent individuals and firms are providing the treatment. Permits are needed to assure the state that water augmentation
activities are coordinated on a statewide basis to reduce conflicting programs. Records of these activities, already required
by some states, would be useful in providing a means of monitoring and evaluating program success. An additional use of
records might be in the determination of liability for unforeseen occurrences.
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VII. POSSIBLE SYSTEM RESPONSES: STATE DEVELOPMENT
Another approach to the question of water rights resulting
from water augmentation programs would be for the state either to carry out the program itself or to contract with firms
which would be responsible for carrying out the treatment for
the state but which would have no right to the water produced.
The additional water supplies would then go to current (and
possible future) appropriators. It is assumed that the state
would conduct such activities for the benefit of its citizens.
State funding of water augmentation activities could
evoke a variety of public and private responses. The political
feasibility of using public revenues to meet private water requirements is open to question. On the one hand, those who
would argue against the state subsidies of private enterprise
might question whether or not the use of state funds to meet
the needs of a select few (existing and potential water rights
holders) is a proper use of such funds. Under normal climatological conditions, this argument may have substantial merit.44
On the other hand, unusual climatological conditions resulting in reduced streamflow threaten the general welfare of
the state. At such times, the general economy of the region
suffers due to reduced water availability. This results in increased unemployment and reduced state revenue which, in
turn, endanger social programs. The result is that both liberal
and conservative policymakers and the general populace support efforts to enhance streamflows. In such situations, statesupported water augmentation programs have substantial
merit and a high probability of being instituted.
The liability question could be more easily resolved since
the state can exercise both taxing and eminent domain authorities. As with a private concern engaged in water augmentation
activities, the state must provide compensation to those suffering injury in a treatment area. Regardless of the nature of the
injury, be it an ongoing diminution in the quality of life resulting from water augmentation interference with the use and
enjoyment of property, or a short-term cataclysm resulting
from a catastrophic event, the liability of the state cannot be
44. It is interesting to note, however, that Utah allows only the state division of
water resources to conduct cloud seeding activities. UTAH CODE ANN. §73-15-3 (1953).
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denied. Toward this end, records, licensing, and permits would
remain valuable and should be maintained.

VIII.

POSSIBLE SYSTEM RESPONSES: MULTISTATE AND FEDERAL

Since many of the augmentation techniques could involve
a number of states, simultaneously, it is conceivable that interstate agreements would be necessary. Such agreements might
take the form of new multistate compacts or amendments to
existing compacts. Federal legislation controlling private water
augmentation programs, which would supersede state legislation, is also a possibility. The main advantage of such legislation would be its ability to control private concerns to prevent
conflicting programs without regard for state boundaries. One
issue, which would suggest substantial further research, is the
relationship of water augmentation programs to interstate
water compacts. It would appear that waters developed by private concerns would be free from "the call of the compact"
whereas such waters, if developed by the state, would not be
free from compact obligations.45
A federal program for water resource development through
weather modification and watershed management would be yet
another possible legal system response. The Bureau of Reclamation, which has been a lead agency in the development of
weather modification programs, and/or the U.S. Forest Service, which has been responsible for major advances in watershed management, are likely candidates for administration
of national programs. Under this approach, the federal government would assert a claim to all waters developed on.federal
lands or pursuant to a federal program. This situation might
well develop regardless of federal action because the multistate
nature of weather modification might well raise a "diversity of
citizenship" issue. It is possible, however, that the federal government, under the "implied reservation doctrine," already
has a valid claim to the waters produced by water augmentation activities on federal land.
IX.

CONCLUSIONS

The greatest land use value of the alpine and subalpine
45. Fischer, supra note 42, at 651-56. This article contains an excellent overview
of the problems that may emerge if the states themselves conduct water augmentation
activities. Specifically, the potential effects of existing interstate compacts are discussed.
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portions of watersheds is as an area for the collection and storage of water. While recognizing the legal, social, and technological problems implicit in water augmentation activities, it is
apparent that substantial public benefit could be derived from
such activities.
Land use regulations which protect the watershed function
of alpine and subalpine areas would not prohibit their use for
other purposes (i.e., mining, residential development, etc.).
These other land uses, however, should not be allowed to interfere with water augmentation activities. In the final analysis,
the optimal use of a watershed is to produce water." Legal and
political obstacles which impede this use must be overcome.
The possible legal system responses presented herein may provide some insight into surmounting these obstacles.
46. This point is the subject of ongoing research. Initial conclusions indicate that
the value of the water produced exceeds the value of the use of alpine and subalpine
portions of a watershed for any other purpose.

CASE STUDIES
Water and Inappropriate Technology:
Deep Wells in the Sahel*
MICHAEL

H. GLANTZ**

Science and technology represent a means of development and
emancipation for Africa, but they also harbor-technology in
particular-dangers inasmuch as they may, because of their foreign origin, become the vectors of ways of life and thought dangerous for the African personality . ...

This statement from a report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
points to an apparent growing awareness of the social implications, both positive and negative, of the transfer and the application of new technologies across cultural boundaries.
This paper discusses the societal impact of the construction of deep wells in the arid and semiarid regions of West
Africa. In order to understand that impact clearly it is important to be aware of the environmental as well as the social
setting in which the wells have been constructed. Therefore,
the following sections will examine the physical and social setting of the area, and present a case study of deep wells in the
Sahel.
I. THE SETTING
The Sahelian zone in West Africa has recently been affected by a succession of below-average rainfall years. These
years served to highlight many socio-political and economic
problems that continually confront the inhabitants and the
governments of the region.
* The research for the Study of the Social Implications of a Credible and Reliable
Long-Range Climate Forecast, of which this paper is a part, has been funded and
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the International Federation of Institutes for
Advanced Study, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.
** Visiting Scientist, Advanced Study Program, National Center for Atmospheric
Research.
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Debate on the major causes of the drought has crystallized
into two major points of view, one attributing the drought to
climatic change 2 and the other attributing the drought to normal climatic fluctuations. 3 While the two factions disagree on
conclusions, they do agree on at least two basic points. First,
climatic fluctuations are normal to the region, and in any event
the region will continue to be faced with occasional periods of
prolonged drought. The other point is the realization that
human agricultural and livestock practices have had a negative
impact on the ecologically fragile Sudan-Sahelian zone. Whatever the underlying cause or causes of the drought in the Sahel,
it has been widely acknowledged that, at the least, the impact
of harmful climatic fluctuations has been greatly exacerbated
by human misuse of the land in this region.
Some of the factors cited as having aggravated the impact
of the drought are herd size, herd composition, lack of water,
excess of tube wells, human population growth, lack of managerial skills, political rivalries (within the bureaucracy as well
as between the government and the pastoral populations, and
between the pastoralists and the cultivators), veterinary medicine, and human health care, among others. Given the interrelationship between the various parts of the fragile Sahelian
ecosystem, each of these factors has in some way played a role
in the ecological deterioration of the Sahelian rangelands.
Commenting on such interrelationships, a recent report noted
that:
It is ...

easy to see how reduction or destruction of vegetation

in one part of a nomad's yearly travels could have disastrous
consequences on other parts of the range, on the animals and on
the existence of nomadism itself.'

It is highly probable that another major factor tending to
make a bad drought situation worse was the uncoordinated
construction and unregulated use of deep wells.
2. See R. BRYSON, CLIMATE MODIFICATION BY AIR POLLUTION; II. THE SAHELIAN
EFFECT (Univ. of Wis. Inst. for Environmental Stud. Rep. No. 9, 1973); Winstanley,
Climate Changes and the Future of the Sahel, in PoLITIcs OF NATURAL DISASTER: THE
CASE OF THE SAHEL 189 (M. Glantz ed. 1976).
3. See H. LANDSBERG, DROUGHT, A REcURRENT ELEMENT IN CLIMATE 45-90 (WMO
Special Environmental Rep. No. 5, 1975).
4. FAO, FAO and Sahara Reclamation, 23 UNASYLVA 12 (1969).
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A.

The Sahel
The Sahelian zone in West Africa encompasses parts of six
states: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, and
Chad. The populations of these states total approximately 24
million inhabitants, about 6 million of whom were directly affected by the drought. It has been estimated that at least
100,000 people and up to 40 percent of the 25 million cattle
perished. A large part of those affected were herders who practiced some form of nomadism. According to Douglas Johnson,
Nomadism can best be viewed as a continuum between purely
sedentary society on the one hand and a hypothetically "pure"
nomadism that has no contact whatsoever with agriculture on the
other.'

The Sahel has been defined by various authors using variables such as precipitation,' vegetation, 7 and geography.' In this
paper it is assumed to be a climatically defined zone in the subSaharan part of West Africa which receives 200 to 600 mm. of
average annual rainfall. It is bordered to the north by subdesert
(100 to 200 mm.) and to the south by the Sudanian Zone (600
to 900 mm.). The 400 to 500 mm. isohyets (lines of equal precipitation) have generally been accepted as a boundary north
of which only irrigated crops should be grown. This guideline,
however, has often been disregarded, especially during periods
of good rainfall.'
During much of the year, precipitation is nonexistent. Yet,
a four to five month period of summer rainfall does occur between as early as June and as late as October. The social value
to the inhabitants of the rain that does fall is affected by other
factors existing at the time, such as the potential evapotranspiration, wind speed, soil porosity, runoff, and the like. In
such arid and semiarid regions precipitation variability is relatively high, and thus droughts, as well as dry spells, by most
definitions are expected to be part of the climate regime. 0
5. D. JOHNSON, THE NATURE OF NoMADisM 12 (Univ. of Chicago Dep't of Geography

Research Paper No. 118, 1969).
6. UNESCO,

REGIONAL MEETING ON INTEGRATED

REsEARCH

AND TRAINING NEEDS IN

(Man and the Biosphere Program Rep. No. 18, 1974).
7. Stebbing, The Threat of the Sahara, 36 J. ROYAL AFIcAN Soc'y 3-35 (1937).
8. Tanaka, Weare, Navato & Newell, Recent African Rainfall Patterns, 255

THE SAHELIAN REGION

NATURE 201 (1975).

9. See Figure 1. From ENVIRONMENT AND LAND
Whittington eds. 1969).
10. H. RzEHL, TROPICAL METEOROLOGY (1954).

USE IN AFRICA (M. Thomas & G.

530

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:527

Mean annual and mean monthly rainfall in West Africa. Rainfall is in millimetres.

Figure 1.

Another factor affecting the social value of the rainfall is
the geographic distribution of the rainfall that occurs in the
region. The rainfall is delivered through "rows of selfpropagating convective clouds giving showers and thunderstorms."' 1 The local, small-scale nature of the thunderstorm
activities produces widespread differences in amounts of sea2
sonal precipitation within relatively small areas.
B. PastoralNomadism
The availability, distribution, and timing of rainfall coupled with other sources of surface and groundwater have had
an important effect on the type of social systems that developed in the Sahel. Pastoral nomadism developed in arid and
semiarid regions where rainfall variability is extremely high. In
Africa, pastoral nomadism takes on many forms determined by
migratory patterns, degree of dependence on livestock, geo3
graphic location, and water availability, among other factors.
Several indigenous social systems in the Sahelo-Sudan region
11. Cocheme, FA0/UNESCO!WMO Agroclimatology Survey of a Semi-Arid Area
in West South Africa South of the Sahara,in UNESCO, AGROCLIMATOLOGICAL METHODS
(1968).
12. Horowitz, Ethnic Boundary Maintenance among Pastoralistsand Farmers in
the Western Sudan (Niger), 7 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 105-14 (1972).
13. Widstrand, The Rationale of the Nomad Economy, 4 AMBIO 146-53 (1975);
Graham, Man-Water Relations in the East-CentralSudan, in ENVIRONMENT AND LAND
USE IN AFRICA, supra note 9, at 409-45.
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have put a major emphasis on livestock for their livelihood as
well as for their survival.
While some pastoral groups keep livestock by tradition
and not necessarily for subsistence, others are dependent on
their herds for fuel, food, fertilizer, trade, and transportation.' 4
It is important to keep in mind that there are cultural as well
as economic reasons for the pastoralists to try to maintain as
large a herd as possible. On one hand, wealth and power are
often measured in terms of cattle numbers. On the other hand,
Leslie Brown has estimated that, in terms of survival, about
five cattle are required to sustain one pastoralist, an estimate
apparently considered low by pastoralists themselves.' 5 To
Brown, the current problems in the Sahel are the result of
human, not just livestock, population growth.' 6 He noted that
"where rising human population becomes too great to permit
each family to maintain this necessary minimum herd, damage
to the environment through overstocking becomes inevitable."'7
Given that there is a minimum number of cattle needed
to support one herder and that the cattle fulfill at least three
important economic objectives-milk production as cash income, large herds as insurance against the vagaries of weather,
and maximum individual gains from communal land-it appears quite difficult to reduce herd sizes below a minimum
number at which the group can survive as pastoralists. The
importance of the insurance value of cattle numbers, overshadowed by other factors, is often underrated by observers outside the pastoral system. It is often difficult, for example, for
the outside observer to understand the following response made
by a Fulani herder to a question on how he had been affected
by the recent Sahelian drought:
I had 100 cattle, but, because of the drought, I lost 50. Next time
I will have 200.

Yet, the land's carrying capacity, defined as the number of
JOHNSON, supra note 5.
15. Laya, Interviews with Farmersand Livestock Owners in the Sahel, 1 AFRMCAN

14. D.

ENVIRONMENT 49 (1975).

16. Brown, Biology of Pastoral Man as a Factor in Conservation, 3 BIoOOIcAL
CONSERVATION 93 (1971).

17. Id.

532

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:527

livestock the pasture can support without deterioration of either the pasture or the stock,1 8 will be no greater next time;
given the same circumstances again, the herder will still have
50 cattle remaining, but his losses will have been much greater.
Thus, one of the main reasons that nomadic populations are
reluctant to de-stock their herds, especially for cash, is that the
cash payment cannot fulfill the many functions that the cattle
fulfill in their societies.
While most governments in the Sahel have sought to sedentarize their nomadic populations for reasons relating to political control, economic development, or taxation, many observers agree that there is an important function that nomadism can perform. For one example, a substantial part of government foreign exchange comes from the sale of the relatively
small number of cattle the herders do part with." For another
example, it is generally acknowledged that the cattle use the
rangeland resources, resources that would otherwise be "under'20
utilized or not utilized at all."
The Process of Deterioration
In times perceived to be "normal," that is, during periods
of above-average rainfall,2 the cultivators established themselves farther north into the relatively marginal agricultural
areas. Nomadic populations were pushed even further north
and became sandwiched on extremely marginal rangelands on
the southern edge of the Sahara. Even during periods of what
was considered acceptable rainfall, some of the marginal land
that had been cleared for cultivation was later abandoned because of either low crop yields or unreliable rainfall. These
areas were then left open to deflation (wind erosion) and to
desertification. In other cases where the cultivators remained
of the nomads and
on the land, they tended to block the access
22
their herds to some of the water sources.
C.

18. Boudet, as cited in A. RAPP, A REVIEW OF DESERTIFICATION IN AFRICA 1 (1974).
19. E. Berg, The Recent Economic Evolution of the Sahel, 1975 (unpublished
thesis in Univ. of Michigan Center for Research on Economic Development).
20. J. Pino, Livestock Production in Tropical Africa (Rockefeller Foundation
1970).
21. Katz & Glantz, Rainfall Statistics, Droughts and Desertificationin the Sahel,

in

DESERTIFICATION

(M. Glantz ed. 1977).

22. Dresch, Reflections on the Future of the Semi-Arid Regions, in
ENVIRONMENT 1-8 (P. Richards ed. 1975).

AFRICAN
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During periods of extremely favorable weather, such as the
15 years preceding the onset of the drought in 1968, the pastoralists inhabited, with relatively large herds, those areas that
were classified as unreliable with respect to pasture productivity on a long-term basis. With consecutive shortfalls in precipitation in these ordinarily marginal areas the carrying capacity
of the ranges was overtaxed, resulting in the destruction of the
vegetative cover and the death of many animals. One of the end
results was that the nomads, as well as the sedentary farmers
in these marginal areas, believed themselves to be victims of a
natural disaster, when in fact there was a return to the kind of
"normal" rainfall conditions that are part of long-term average
statistics. Reports have since supported the contention that the
periodic regional droughts have only tended to aggravate a situation in which ecological deterioration was already well in
progress. Summarizing the process of deterioration, a recent
report noted that the present situation in the Sahel has been
due to the buildup over the years before the drought, of high
human (and animal) populations relative to the carrying capacity of the land. This trend has been magnified by even greater
population increases outside the range areas, leading to an expansion of cultivation and hence, a reduction of available grazing
area.n
II. DEEP WELLS

At least throughout this century it has generally been assumed that the most crucial problem facing inhabitants of the
Sahel has been the availability of water. As a direct result of
that assumption, various governments, independent as well as
colonial, have sought to make more water available to the region's inhabitants. One of the popular methods has been to tap
deep groundwater sources by constructing deep wells and boreholes. Given the existence of these wells, during favorable rainy
seasons in the Sahel (200-400 mm.) the general process of water
use by nomadic populations was reported to be as follows:
1. In the rainy season, grazing is in depressions and close to
temporary ponds of water;
2. In the beginning of the dry season, grazing is in the vicinity
of groundwater holes of shallow depth, where water is only 4-10
meters below the ground surface;
23. FAO, The Ecological Management of Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands in Africa and the Near East: An Interdisciplinary Programme, AGPC/Misc/26, 27-31 (1974).
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3. During the main part of the dry season, grazing is near rivers
or near 4deep water holes, with water 80-100 meters below the
2
surface.

With repeated shortfalls in precipitation, along with large increases in human and livestock populations, grazing pressures
sharply increased in the areas surrounding the sources of relatively permanent water, such as deep wells, as other sources of
water became less reliable, or nonexistent.
Another problem associated with the wells is that they
were often constructed with little consideration being given to
the availability of adequate pastures. Rene Dumont wrote that
the areas near the wells have been overgrazed and vegetation
much reduced. The points of water supply were set up before a
map of the pasturelands was drawn up, which would have established them on a more intelligent basis."

J.A. Pino noted that there were also similar problems during
wet periods as well:
Water utilization [was] for the most part haphazard, and stock
either had to travel too far for water or animals [were] concentrated near water to an extent that available forage [was] seriously reduced. 31

It was, however, during the succession of low rainfall years that
the lack of organization and planning with respect to well construction and herd size became apparent. As Jean Dresch recently observed:
When a series of dry years succeeded each other, after 1968, the
pressure of pastoralism became clear, particularly around wells,
more and more of which had been dug, often with the best intentions but without the organization or any discipline in their use.2

Deep Wells and Desertification
Traditionally, nomadism resulted in the use of available
water resources on a relatively rational basis. 8 This was done
by keeping water resources in balance with the condition of the
pastures. The existence of semipermanent water sources-shalA.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Boudet, supra note 18, at 45-58.
R. DumoNr, FALSE START INAFRICA 187 (2d ed. 1969).
J.Pino, supra note 20.
Dresch, supra note 22, at 6.
D. JOHNSON, supra note 5; Widstrand, supra note 13.

1976

INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY IN THE SAHEL

low water or wells that could be dug without the use of sophisticated mechanical equipment-encouraged herders to continually move their cattle from one location to another as the
sources of water dried up. The availability of these semipermanent (seasonal) watering points during the dry season determined the size of the herds that the watering points could
support.9 This led to de facto rotational grazing and to a better
distribution of grazing pressures on the vegetation. In such a
situation,
[Ilow yielding or temporary water sources are much less harmful
[to the environment] . . .;when there is no pasture, there is no
water either and hence pasture depletion is rarely acute in this
case.3

The pastoralists understood their system as one of survival.
With the construction of sources of permanent water, however,
it was no longer possible to maintain this balance. The London
Drought Symposium report cited evidence that
the availability of a more advanced technology than that of the
subsistence farmer and pastoralist can lead to abuse of the environment and to the disturbance of a previously unrecognized
3
ecological balance. '

Permanent water sources, such as deep wells, disrupted
the unrecognized balance by converting seasonal pastures into
year-round ones "with far more cattle
per area, resulting in
' 3' 2
serious deterioration of the pasture.
Soils and vegetation surrounding the wells were adversely
affected by the excessively high concentration of livestock. The
soils were affected, for example, by trampling, causing a reduction in soil porosity, and by removal of most palatable vegetation, leading to deflation and to desertification. The vegetation
was overgrazed; vegetation disappeared up to 20-30 kilometers
from the well sites, and less palatable species invaded these
areas, 33 surrounding the wells and forcing the livestock to travel
longer distances for forage.
29. J. DORST, BEFORE NATURE DIES (1970).

30. Le Houerou, Ecological Management of Arid Grazing Lands Ecosystems, in
POLITICS OF NATURAL DISASTER: THE CASE OF THE SAHEL, supra note 2,

31. DROUGHT
32. Id. at 16.

IN

at

270.

AFRICA 13 (D. Dalby & R. Harrison eds. 1973).

33. Heady, Influence of Grazingon the Composition of Themeda Trianda Grasslands, East Africa, 54 J. ECOLOGY 705-26 (1966).
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The livestock, for the most part in weakened condition,
unable to survive the trek in search of water and forage, perished. Although the actual impact of the drought on livestock
is somewhat difficult to ascertain and has, thus, remained a
controversial issue, estimates as of April 1973 of the existing
Sahelian livestock intimated that up to half of the approximate
25,000,000 cattle in the region at that time had possibly perished.3 4 Some of those cattle may have been removed from the
area through migration and through forced sales.
This situation which followed the uncoordinated and unassessed construction of wells and boreholes has been graphically
portrayed in Figure 2.35 It is interesting to note that a report of
the FAO/SIDA Study Mission in 1974 suggested that "the
cause of heavy mortality of stock in 1973 was lack of forage
' '36
much more than lack of [drinking] water.
The large number of livestock deaths resulted not so much
because the wells were constructed, but because they were
viewed apart from the ecosystem of which they were a part.
Deep wells could have been put into the fragile ecosystem with
minimal consequences to the system if, for example, their use
had been regulated. Such controls could have been used to
open and close wells in accordance with the availability of pasture, or used to distribute the grazing pressures more evenly
among the pastures. Such controls suggest the need for at least
a minimal level of planning, which in turn suggests the desirability of a systems approach to planning, given the fragile nature of the Sahelian and West African ecosystems.3 7 Similar
conclusions were also drawn for water problems caused by "an
anarchic multiplication of wells and bore holes" in the Algerian
34. Temple & Thomas, The Sahelian Drought: A Disaster for Livestock
Populations, 8 WORLD ANIMAL REV. 1-7 (1973).
35. Swift, Disasterand Sahelian Nomad Economy, in DROUGHT INAFRICA, supra
note 31.
36. FAO/Swedish International Development Agency, Report on the Sahelian
Zone: A Survey of the Problem of the Sahelian Zone with a View to Drawing Up a
Long-Term Strategy and a Programme for Protection, Restoration and Development,
FAO/SWE/TF 117 (1974).
37. Secretariat of the U.N. Conference on Desertification, Report of the First
Meeting of the Panel on Management of Livestock and Rangelands to Combat Desertification in the Sudano-Sahelian Regions (SOLAR), April 18, 1976 (UNEP unpublished
manuscript).
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Figure 2.
Relation between spacing of wells and overgrazing

A. Original situation. End of dry season 1. Herd size limited by dry
season pasture. Small population can live on pastoral economy

B. After well-digging project, but no change in traditional herding. End
of dry season 2. Large-scale erosion. Larger total subsistence herd, and
more people can live there until a situation when grazing is finished in a
drought year. Then the system collapses.
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Northeast Sahara 31 and in the Sudan."

Swift 0 and Widstrand" drew attention to the importance
of planning noting that while technology had been applied to
some parts of the system, such as tapping sources of deep
groundwater, it was not applied to other parts.
Permanent increases in production are impossible since soil and
vegetation receive no technological boost, and thus remain limiting factors. Nomad economies and societies are tightly integrated
and functional wholes, with numerous checks and balances. Proposed changes must act ecologically on the whole system, not just
isolated parts of it.' 2

A final but perhaps the most important plea for a systems
approach to Sahelian range management was made by Baker
in his article entitled The Administrative Trap.4 3 Bureaucratic
subunits within the Sahelian governments, such as veterinary,
water, agriculture, marketing, security, and health departments, often fail to perceive the total range management problem given their limited jurisdictional mandates. Baker called
for a redefining and a regrouping of such subunits based on the
range management problem. Such regroupment would be a
major step in reducing bureaucratic rivalries, jealousies, and
piecemeal approaches to the important problems of range management.
As suggested by these examples, the lack of planning for
this particular water resource and the unassessed use of it as a
technological "fix" ultimately results in the death of livestock,
but only after the vegetation cover has been totally destroyed
and the denuded surface made vulnerable to deflation and desertification.
B. "Technology is the Answer" Fallacy
Technology is viewed by this author as being valueneutral. Thus, technological developments within, as well as
technology transfer among nations, can have favorable as well
38. Achmi, Salinization and Water Problems in the Algerian Northeast Sahara,
in CARELESS TECHNOLOGY 276 (M. Farvar & R. Milton eds. 1972).

39. Graham, supra note 13.
40. Swift, supra note 35.
41. Widstrand, supra note 13.
42. Swift, supra note 35.
43. R. Baker, Administrative Trap, 1-12, April 1975 (unpublished manuscript in
the School of Development Studies, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, UK).
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as unfavorable impacts on society." Medical technology, for
example, can be used to keep more people and livestock alive
longer and in better condition; but an increase in population
may in turn create greater pressure on scarce resources such as
the rangelands in the Sahel.
The examples provided by deep well construction clearly
suggest that vegetation more often became a more limiting
factor in the Sahel than water. One can conclude that while
technology may be value-neutral, its implications-social, economic, political, and ecological-are not. Therefore, the implications of technology development and/or transfer must be assessed as much as possible before the development is undertaken, so that unexpected side effects might be anticipated and
mitigated. Failure to undertake such assessments often leads
to situations in which temporary gains might eventually be
outweighed by long-term losses of a more permanent nature.
The man who drills wells [is not taught to] ask what will happen
to all the animals which survive as a result of his activities
45

Often technological fixes do not resolve basic problems but
only tend to bypass them temporarily. For example, with respect to the misuse of wells it was suggested by one observer
that it might be better, albeit more expensive, to consider taking water to the animals and thereby avoiding overconcentration at the well sites. Technological bypasses often tend to
make "situations which are inherently bad more efficiently
bad."'i
Kenneth Boulding, commenting on the potential danger of
technology, observed:
There is a famous theorem in economics, one which I call the
dismal theorem, which states that if the only thing which can
check the growth of population is starvation and misery, then the
population will grow until it is sufficiently miserable and starving
to check its growth. There is a second, even worse theorem which
I call the utterly dismal theorem. This says that if the only thing
which can check the growth of population is starvation and misery, then the ultimate result of any technological improvement
44. CARELESS TECHNOLOGY, supra note 38.

45. R. Baker, supra note 43, at 178.
46. E. JANTSCH, TECHNOLOGICAL PLANNING AND SOCIAL FuTUREs

12 (1972).

540

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:527

is to enable a larger number of people to live in misery than
before and hence to increase the total sum of human misery."

Awareness of the problems associated with the development, transfer, and application of technology (including technical information) may not be sufficient. Often such an awareness is acknowledged but only at an abstract level. Thus, while
on the one hand the UNESCO conference representatives can
acknowledge technology assessment needs, on the other hand
the impact of any particular application of technology tends to
be overlooked by decision makers, donors, and recipients.
Often short-term expediencies overshadow relatively long-term
implications. Thus, there can be no assurance that awareness
of such problems will automatically lead to attempts at resolving them. Finally, while social assessment in itself is not sufficient to resolve the problems associated with the development,
transfer, and application of technology, it is a necessary precondition for the achievement of rational solutions.
47. K.

BOULDING,

THE

TRANSITION 127-28 (1965).

MEANING

OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:

THE GREAT

Denver's Successive Use Program
KENNETH

J. MILLER*

The Denver Water Department presently treats and delivers to the metropolitan area about 72 billion gallons of water
each year. After serving a variety of purposes, about 40 percent
of this water returns to the Platte River system through several
sewage treatment plants. Under Colorado's appropriation doctrine, part of this return flow must remain in the river. A substantial part, however, of this now-wasted resource is available
to the Department for successive uses.
Recognizing the potential of successive uses, the Denver
Water Department began several years ago to investigate profitable possibilities. The Department conducted research into
advanced wastewater treatment, investigated the economic
and legal feasibility of water reuse, and studied marketing and
public acceptance aspects of successive uses. This paper contains a summary of these studies and a description of the program developed as a result.
I. THE DENVER WATER SYSTEM
In order to understand the direction of Denver's successive
use program, it is necessary to look at the Department's current
water supply situation.
The safe annual yield of the Department's water supply
system is approximately 300,000 acre-feet per year. Approximately 40 percent of this is obtained from Eastern Slope tributaries of the South Platte River. The remaining 60 percent of
potential supply is derived from tributaries of the Colorado
River by transmountain diversion. Recent Colorado Supreme
Court decisions hold that return flow derived from the Eastern
Slope must be returned to the river, but that the
transmountain-diverted portion of Denver's supply is available
to the City for successive uses. This situation is shown, in simplified form, in Figure 1. In actuality, the system consists of
five major storage reservoirs totaling nearly one-half million
acre-feet, four major trans-Continental Divide tunnels, and
numerous canals, conduits, and intake facilities. Operation of
* Director of Planning and Water Resources Division, Denver Water Department,
Denver, Colorado.
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the system not only supplies water for the Denver metropolitan
area, but also incorporates water for fish flows, recreation, and
joint uses with other public and private agencies.

Figure 1.

Denver began operation of transmountain diversion projects in the 1930s in order to augment the Eastern Slope supply system. The most recent transmountain diversion consists of Dillon Reservoir and the 23-mile long Roberts Tunnel
along with other facilities planned for development. As part
of the court action granting Denver rights to build this project, the "Blue River Decree" effectively required that Denver
investigate the possibilities of successive uses of Western
Slope water.'
Figure 2 shows Denver's supply and demand situation.
Supplies are presently adequate. The currently available
300,000 acre-feet will not meet demands beyond about 1980,
however. Additional supplies will be needed, eventually doubling the Department's present capabilities. This water is
available to the metropolitan area, but the costs of supplying
1. In re the Adjudication of Priorities of Water Rights in Water Dist. 36

for the
Purposes of Irrigation, Civ. No. 5016 (D. Coo., Oct. 12,1955); In re the Adjudication
of Priorities of Water Rights in Water Dist. 36 for Purposes Other than Irrigation, Civ.

No. 5016 (D. Colo., Oct. 12, 1955).
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it will increase dramatically because of market factors, increasing distances from the City, lower elevations requiring pumping, and, most recently, various governmental constraints on
development.
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At some point in the future, the cost of treating sewage
effluent, even to potable quality, will be competitive with the
cost of developing new supplies. The exact date is uncertain,
because potable reuse has never been tried in this country, but
appears to be some time in the 1990s.

II.

ALTERNATIVES FOR SUCCESSIVE USES

Potable reuse is not the only form of successive use available to Denver; it is simply the most demanding and expensive
alternative. In order to place the various possible successive
uses in perspective, Figure 3 illustrates the present use of water
in the Denver system. The top figures indicate that Denver
uses about 1.3 percent of the State's water. Agriculture uses
about 94.7 percent. Unfortunately, the Blue River Decree has
been interpreted as preventing Denver from utilizing its return
flow for agricultural uses.' The middle portion of Figure 3 illustrates water use within the Denver Water Department's system. The majority of water (52.1 percent) goes to residential
customers. Industry takes 5.5 percent of the system's water,
and 7.6 percent goes to various governmental agencies for their
use, including park and lawn irrigation. These latter uses of
relatively small amounts of water are spread throughout the
metropolitan area, making a second distribution system to
serve less-than-potable-quality water economically infeasible.
Within the home, only about 7.3 percent of Denver's residential
water goes toward human consumption, while 39.8 percent is
used in landscaping. This latter figure correlates to 21 percent
of Denver's water or 27/100ths of one percent of the State's
water.
With this background, it is possible to make some choices
regarding the direction of Denver's successive use program.
The various alternatives are shown in Figure 4. Exchange, the
simplest successive use, involving no treatment and relatively
low cost, is the most attractive. Denver intends to implement
exchange, or the trading of used water at the sewage treatment
plant outfall for less polluted water at the existing intakes, in
the immediate future. Unfortunately the amount of relatively
unpolluted water available in the South Platte River is severely
limited, and exchange will not utilize all of the return flow
2.

Note 1 supra.
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resource available. Agricultural reuse may require some minimal treatment beyond that now applied depending upon the
crop to be irrigated. Unfortunately this practice appears to be
prohibited by the Blue River Decree. Industrial reuse and lawn
and golf course watering with return flows require additional
treatment and are uneconomical with the low, scattered demands found in the Denver area. Only the location of large,
water-using industries in Denver would change this situation.
Potable reuse is capable of utilizing the amounts of sewage
effluent available and, as mentioned before, may be economically competitive with more conventional supplies some time
in the future.

What isReuse?

Figure 4.

Planned, conscientious potable reuse has never been
practiced in this country. There exist many questions regarding
the safety, acceptability, and legal and economic feasibility.
Recognizing this, the Denver Water Department began investigating various aspects of potable reuse in the late 1960s. An
advanced wastewater treatment pilot plant was constructed by
a grant from the Federal Water Quality Administration (now
EPA) through cooperative agreements with the University of
Colorado. Since that time, the plant's processes have been upgraded, and it has served continuously as a laboratory for graduate student research operated jointly by the civil engineering
department at C.U. and the Denver Water Department.
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Recognizing the importance of an informed and approving
public, the Denver Water Department has conducted an extensive public information program. In order to determine the
success of this program, several surveys have been undertaken.
The results of one survey, performed by contract in 1974, are
shown in Figure 5. As with other surveys, the results indicate
that Denver residents would accept potable reuse if the quality
of the water were identical with that which they now receive.

Public Reaction to Potable Reuse

63%
Pe!cent of 452 Responding

26%''
FAVOR

NO IDEA

OPPOSED

Figure 5.

III.

DENVER'S DEMONSTRATION PLANS

Recognizing the importance of water quality in the public's mind, and noting a lack of national quality standards for
water reuse, the Department has adopted a quality goal of
equivalency with existing potable water. Advanced wastewater
treatment will have to remove the "use increment," or the
amount of each pollutant added between water supply intake
and wastewater discharge, in order to meet this goal, as shown
in Figure 6. Since no precedent exists for direct potable reuse
and since many questions remain unanswered, a 5- to -10-year
demonstration of appropriate treatment processes is planned.
Interim recreational use and extensive health and quality
testing will accompany this demonstration.
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POTABLE REUSE DEMONSTRATION PLANT
QUALITY GOALS
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BACTERIA, HARMFUL
ORGANICS

NONE PRESENT

TRACE METALS, INORGANICS,
ORGANICS, NUTRIENTS,
BACTERIA

AT OR BELOW
EXISTING POTABLE
WATER QUALITY

EXAMPLE
TDS

157

Hardness

88

Suspended Solids

0.0
<5.0

COD

0.6 units

Turbidity
Figure 6.

In December 1975, the Department hosted a one-day design seminar at which national experts of advanced wastewater
treatment and reuse health effects advised Denver and its engineering consultants on a proper process train for the demonstration project. This information was turned over to the design
firm of CHM-Hill Engineers who prepared a conceptual design
of the plant in August of 1975. As shown in Figure 7, the treatment train will link several processes in series to accomplish
the quality goal. Lime will be added to raise the pH, precipitate
phosphorus and heavy metals, and reduce suspended solids.
Following two-stage recarbonation to remove the flocculated
material and lower the pH, the water will enter a holding pond
followed by conventional multimedia filtration to finish
suspended-solids removals. Selective ion exchange and breakpoint chlorination will be utilized to reduce ammonia-nitrogen
concentrations and disinfect the water. The flow will then enter
carbon adsorption columns for organic removal. Lime, the ion
exchange regenerant, and activated carbon will all be regenerated and reused in the processes. For economic reasons, only
part of the flow stream will proceed to the remainder of the
treatment processes. Reverse osmosis, a desalting process, will
be used to reduce dissolved solids; ozonation will be utilized to
disinfect the water and polish organic removals; and chlorination will serve to provide a residual disinfectant. Extensive
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quality and health tests will then be performed with the effluent flowing to a recreational lake and eventual industrial
use.

Process Flow Diagram
Figure 7.

IV. PROGRAM
As shown in Figure 8, the Department's current plans call
for designing the demonstration plant in 1977 with construction to be complete by 1980. Operation of the plant will progress for perhaps 10 years, accompanied by extensive quality
and health testing. If all goes well, a full-scale plant could be
on line in the early 1990s.
The consultants estimate that the plant will cost 8.39 million dollars. This capital expenditure, coupled with other parts
of the successive use program will cost in excess of 100 million
dollars over the next 20 years. As shown in Figure 9, in addition
to the demonstration plant capital cost, 6.48 million dollars
will be spent on its operation and 1.1 million dollars on parts
of the program common to both reuse and exchange, such as
legal work, a quantity accounting system, and public relations.
A reservoir to facilitate exchange operations will cost about 8.7
million dollars. Depending upon the results of the demonstration, a full-scale plant of approximately 100 MGD capacity will
cost somewhere between 95 and 150 million dollars.
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DENVER REUSE PROGRAM
1975

1980

1985

1990

1. PUBLIC RELATIONS
2. DEMONSTRATION PLANT
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION
3. DEMONSTRATION PLANT
OPERATION
4. PLANT QUALITY
MONITORING
5. HEALTH EFFECTS
TESTING
6. FULL SCALE POTABLE
REUSE PLANT DESIGN
7. FULL SCALE POTABLE
REUSE PLANT OPERATION

1975

1980

1985

1990

Figure 8.

Figure 9.
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SUMMARY

In summary, the Denver Water Department has been investigating the possibility of utilizing a once wasted resource.
Extensive marketing, legal, economic, and technical investigations have led to a program which could add significant quantities of water to the Denver metropolitan area before the end of
this century. The potential of successive use is limited, however, because only return flows derived from transmountain
diversions are available for exchange or reuse. Successive use,
therefore, must be considered as part of an overall program of
water supply development including conservation and conventional supply alternatives.

Groundwater Augmentation Plans in Colorado
Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.I
Cache La Poudre Water UsersAss'n v. Glacier View Meadows2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Colorado Supreme Court recently confronted two appeals from the Water Courts of Colorado dealing with controversial issues of groundwater augmentation plans and their integration into the administration of water rights. While dealing
specifically with the applications of two Colorado land developers and their proposed uses of groundwater, these cases touch
upon issues as basic as the attributes of Colorado water rights
and the fundamentals of the priority system.
Interpreting the term "plan of augmentation," the court
found the applicants in these cases to be within the scope and
intent of the pertinent Colorado statutes. Both applicants had
requested approval of plans which equated the historic depletions of water rights with the proposed stream depletions due
to new wells in their subdivisions. In approving the concepts in
these plans, the court found the prevention of injury through
the appropriate equating of historic and proposed depletions
not to be inconsistent with the priority system. Those who
protested the applications claimed approval would permit unreasonable expansion in the use of water rights, while proponents praised the decision as a further definition of the historic
elements of a Colorado water right.
A. Water Augmentation Plans
1. Statutory Framework and History
In Colorado, the frequency, duration, and volume of
groundwater withdrawal has risen to a point where the interaction with surface water is no longer insignificant. This is particularly true in the more heavily appropriated South Platte, Arkansas, and Rio Grande basins. The inevitable result has been
that complaints, protests, and groundwater litigation have become more common in the last 10 years.
1. 550 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Kelly Ranch].
2. 550 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Glacier View].
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While Colorado in cases dating back to the turn of the
century has recognized the interaction between surface and
groundwater, the integration of ground and surface waters in
the priority system has presented an apparently insoluble
problem. Approaches to the problem have varied in method
and success.
The first significant attempt to set up statutory authority
for the regulation of groundwater was the Ground Water Act
of 1957. 3 A second and more comprehensive effort was made in
the Ground Water Management Act of 1965.1 The latter act set
up the mechanics for adjudicating and regulating groundwater
within designated groundwater basins, while impliedly providing some guidance for tributary water. To provide the State
Engineer with authority to administer groundwater, House Bill
10665 was passed in 1965. Further emphasis on a system of
administration was found in the Water Rights Determination
and Administration Act of 1969,6 a comprehensive revision of
all administrative and judicial functions concerning surface
and groundwater. In 1973, the legislature passed Senate Bill
2131 which described the authority of an appropriator to withdraw water from under his land subject to certain physical
limitations. In the following year the 1974 legislative session
passed Senate Bill 78 which set up methods for gaining temporary approval from the State Engineer of plans of augmentation. The purpose of this bill was to facilitate and expedite the
integration of surface and groundwater in the administrative
system.
A section on legislative declaration within the 1969 Act,
states the policy of Colorado with regard to the use of water
and, in particular, the use of groundwater:
It is the policy of this state to integrate the appropriation, use and
administration of underground water tributary to a stream with
the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of the stateO
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
sented

Laws of May 1, 1957, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 863 (repealed 1965).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-90-101 to -141 (1973).
Laws of May 3, 1965, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1244 (repealed 1969, 1971).
CoLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§37-92-101 to -602 (1973).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-90-137(4) (1973).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §37-92-307 (1973). Under proposed Senate Bill 4, preto the 1977 Colorado Legislature, this section may be repealed.

9. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §37-92-102(1) (1973).
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This preamble to the Act additionally states that the future welfare of the state depends upon the "sound and flexible
integrated use of all waters of the state," and that existing uses
of groundwater shall be recognized to the fullest extent possible.' Fundamental to this integration are plans of augmentation which are defined as follows:
"Plan of Augmentation" means a detailed program to increase
the supply of water available for beneficial use in a division or
portion thereof by the development of new or alternate means or
points of diversion, by pooling water resources, by water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the
development of new resources of water or by any other appropriate means."

The interpretation of this section of the Colorado water
statutes has been of interest to. all members of the Colorado
water-law community. The portion stating that the plans were
to increase the supply of water available led some individuals
to interpret the intent to be to add new water to the system.
In providing flexibility for water users with a general definition,
the legislature left open the specifics of application which became a frequent subject of discussions, conferences, and the
literature. The office of the State Engineer offered administrative guidelines for approval of temporary plans as authorized
under Senate Bill 7.2 Itwas readily apparent to the water users
that the statutes concerning plans of augmentation and the
succeeding case law would be of great importance in the future
development of Colorado water law. Since many or most of the
streams are overappropriated, applications for approval of new
surface water rights are infrequent. The advantages of groundwater usage, coupled with the requirement that wells become
integrated into the priority system in most instances, tend to
indicate that hearings on plans of augmentation may become
the major activity in the water courts.
The 1969 Act also discusses the standards to be used with
respect to the decisions of water court judges. Senate Bill 7,13
passed by the legislature as these two applicants were preparing for trial, states that the applicant for a plan of augmenta10.
11.
12.
13.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-102(2) (1973).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-103(9) (1973).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §37-92-307 (1973).
Id.
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tion may, after filing an application with the water court, submit his proposed plan to the State Engineer for temporary
approval. The bill provides that the State Engineer shall consider the depletions" from the applicant's use in quantity and
time, the amount and timing of augmentation water which
would be provided by the applicant, and the existence of injury
5
to the owners of, or other persons entitled to, a water right.'
Viewing the composite of the 1969 Act, Senate Bill 7, and
the corresponding rules of the State Engineer, it would appear
that the law encourages the adoption of augmentation plans by
allowing preliminary approval of such plans by the State Engineer. Using relatively senior water rights for augmentation,
wells may be integrated into the administration of water.
2. The Applicants
Kelly Ranch and Glacier View presented the first appellate court review of augmentation plans under the 1969 Act.
Each applicant was a developer on Colorado's Eastern Slope.
The proposed developments contemplated individual wells to
supply water for homes, with agricultural or industrial water
rights as the legal underpinning to the withdrawal of the
groundwater. While the cases involved substantially different
factual situations, both parties sought court approval of augmentation plans under the Colorado statutes. In each case the
applications were protested by other water users on the stream,
who were represented by water users' associations or conservancy districts. The complaints asserted injury to senior water
rights due to the withdrawal of groundwater by the applicants.
Engineering analyses had been conducted by the applicants to
determine the effect of well pumping on the adjacent streams.
The applicants' water rights were then used to replace the river
"depletions."
Both applicants wanted approval of plans of augmentation
for the depletions accruing to the use of domestic in-house
14. The 1969 Act does not define the word depletion. The definition probably
varies to some extent from party to party although it is generally considered to mean
a reduction in available water over some time period. The time period chosen for
analysis can be of great importance. Some operations may cause no net depletion over
a period of months but may cause significant depletions in specific weeks which are
later "compensated" by gains in subsequent weeks.
15. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-307(3) (1973).
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wells. Both envisioned a formal plan of maintaining participation and fulfillment of the requirements by the water users.
The diversions under the proposed operations could be larger
than those historically attributable to the water rights used for
augmentation. Kelly Ranch was located in the Buena Vista
area southwest of Colorado Springs, in the Arkansas drainage.
The land to be developed by Glacier View Meadows was northwest of Fort Collins and in the South Platte basin. Kelly Ranch
involved a proposed development of 312 lots while Glacier View
envisioned 1,892 single-family units. Both developers used similar methods of calculating water requirements; Kelly Ranch
estimated use of 100 gallons per day per capita, and Glacier
View predicted 100 gallons per day per capita. Losses attributable to the leaching fields were based on State Engineers' calculations for typical systems. Kelly Ranch used an 1874 agricultural right as a source of augmentation water, taking a specified acreage out of production to create the needed water.
Glacier View had acquired storage rights previously held by
industrial and municipal users.
While the cases have similar backgrounds, the conduct of
and issues raised in the two water court trials differed significantly. Glacier View was tried in Water Division 1 and the
application was opposed by the Cache La Poudre Water Users
Association and the North Poudre Irrigation Company. The
water court concluded that the plan was proper under the statutes and did not require a 100 percent replacement of water
diverted by the wells as claimed by the opposition. The application requested was granted, and the case appealed.
Kelly Ranch was heard in Water Division 2 and was opposed by the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the Division Engineer for Water Division 2. Kelly
Ranch had based the plan for augmentation upon the theory
of filling groundwater depletions using senior irrigation water
rights. The opposition had stated that this was an expansion
of the irrigation water rights allowing diversions greatly in excess of those historically experienced under the right. The court
denied the application stating that this proposal was not a plan
of augmentation. The applicant subsequently appealed.
II. MAJOR ISSUES ON APPEAL
Kelly Ranch was denied approval of the application in the
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water court because there was "no new water added" to the
water system." The court said that the State Engineer's office
had erred in granting temporary approval to the Kelly Ranch
application, since this would, in fact, allow an application
"premised upon a theory of replacement of estimated consumptive use which would ignore the priority doctrine.

. .

and

. . . create a new class of water rights .... "I'
The protestant to the plan, Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, had objected to the proposed plan as a
"ballooning of a water right," noting that the plan could convert a previously small right of less than one cubic foot per
second into a right to divert more than 10 cubic feet per second
by "augmentation."'" The District argued that neither the volume nor time of use of a water right may be enlarged by 100to 200-fold. The District also maintained that the plan would
allow a land developer to speculate in water rights by allowing
the applicant to obtain a court decree requiring the State Engineer's office to permit the wells in advance of any actual per9
mits or well drilling.
The District stated that the plan was really a change of
water right and not a plan of augmentation; the term
"augmentation," as used by the land developers, referred not
to an augmentation but rather to a system by which streams
were depleted. The Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District believed that the correct term for such a plan would
be a "change of water right," as covered by the statutes ° Like
views were expressed in a brief filed by an amicus curiae representing numerous water rights in the central and lower Arkansas basin. 2 '
In Glacier View, similar arguments were made by the protestant, the Cache La Poudre Water Users Association. The
Association stated that the plan was improper as it did not call
for replacement of 100 percent of the withdrawn water, again
Kelly Ranch at 301.
Id.
Answer Brief for Objectors-Appellees at 7.
Id. at 35.
20. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-92-103(5) (1973).
21. Brief for Arnicus Curiae at 1.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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raising the issue of whether 2or not Glacier View had applied for
a valid augmentation plan.
A. Analysis of the Court
The dispute in these cases focused on questions relating to
the attributes of water rights in Colorado and the administration of these rights in accordance with the priority system.
Advocates of a strict adherence to the priorities and flow rates
decreed, claimed that to grant approval of plans such as these
would create a new class of water rights outside the priority
system. These rights would be divertable regardless of priority,
and at almost any rate and volume, as long as consumptive use
was replaced. Advocates argued that this is not the way Colorado rivers have been administered and is a major break in the
doctrine of prior appropriation. To allow such an administrative system, it was contended, was not to create a list of water
diversion priorities, but to create a list of consumptive use
priorities.2 3 The protestants to these plans argued that these
were not augmentation plans but were really changes to water
rights, and, thus, diversions should be matched with replacement water on a gallon-for-gallon basis.
Issuing its finding in the twin cases simultaneously, the
Colorado Supreme Court first concentrated on the definition of
a plan of augmentation. Both applicants were found to be
within the purpose and intent of the statutes regarding plans
of augmentation. In analyzing the legislative intent, the supreme court in Kelly Ranch traced the evolution of the doctrine
2
through Hall,25
of "maximum beneficial use" from Fellhauer
to the present. In stressing the "dreams and hopes that future
technology would provide new methods under the doctrine of
maximum utilization," the court seemed to look to Fellhauer
as a turning point in the integration of "maximum utilization"
22. Glacier View at 293.
23. Under Colorado water laws, a listing of the relative priorities is made by the
State Engineer. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-92-401, 402 (1973). This list is generally
the basis for the day to day administration by the water commissioners. Such a listing
includes the name, location, appropriation date, and adjudication date of the water
rights in a stream system. Also included is the quantity of water which may be diverted
under that water right (a flow rate for direct flow rights and a volume for storage
rights).The argument put forward is that the approval of plans allowing diversion of
water out of priority is to destroy the ranking of water priorities and merely to create
a listing of water right depletions.
24. Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
25. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973).
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and the law of prior appropriation."6 Similarly, the court found
that "under the circumstances of both cases new water need
not be injected to give life and validity to a plan of augmentation."I 7
In response to the argument that the applicants as land
developers were not the ultimate users of waters to be diverted
under these applications, the court expressly stated in Kelly
Ranch that a "true appropriator" is not required under a proposed plan such as this one. 8
The questions of administration and administrative powers were addressed in part by each case. In Glacier View the
opposition had contended that the proposed plan would usurp
the function and duties of the State Engineer, since a permit
from him was a condition precedent to the application for approval of a plan of augmentation. In Kelly Ranch the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District felt that the plan
proposed would mandate a decree requiring the issuance of a
well permit by the State Engineer's office in perpetuity, where
the applicant had no intention of constructing the works and
applying the water himself. The water court in Kelly Ranch
concluded that domestic in-house use was not under the administration of the state engineering office.
The supreme court held in both opinions that they considered the wells to be under the administration of the state engineering office and treated as nonexempt. In Glacier View, the
court stated that while there are provisions in the statutes for
exempt wells, an examination of the statutes required that the
wells be treated as nonexempt. The court did acknowledge,
though, that under different circumstances these wells could be
29
considered as exempt.
The supreme court also held, upon a review of the applicable statutes, that the application for a well permit was not a
condition precedent to the application for an approval of a plan
of augmentation. In both cases, the court acknowledged that
the approval of such a plan by the court would eliminate some
26.
27.
28.
29.

Kelly Ranch at 304.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Glacier View at 292.
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items from the consideration of the State Engineer, but that
there were additional items remaining for state engineering
office review2
B. Compensation of Injury
1. Stream Depletion as Index of Injury
Significant in the decision was the court's treatment of the
concept of depletions and the manner in which an applicant
may prevent injury to senior water rights.
It may be argued that the concept and application of the
term "depletion" has been modified or at least updated. In
older cases where the change in water use was from agricultural
use in one location to agricultural use in another location, the
analysis of the net effect of such a change was simplified.
Where the type of crop (and therefore the consumptive use),
location with respect to the river, and soil conditions were not
significantly dissimilar, the effects of the change were negligible. The practical result was that the same amount of water
would be diverted, the same proportion would be consumed,
and approximately the same quantity would return to the
stream system in a similar time frame. The impact on downstream water users would therefore, in theory, be nil. This, of
course, assumes that there are no water users in the immediate
vicinity of the change point who could be denied the benefit of
the return flow if the location of such flow were moved to a
point downstream of their headgate.
With such changes the "depletions" due to the new use of
the water were the same as the historic "depletions" and, in
theory, there was no injury. Additionally, there was little anxiety caused by other water users, since the same quantity of
water was being diverted. While it is difficult for the associated
water user on the same stream to visualize changes in underground return flow, it is very easy for such a user to note a
change in gross diversions by another. Therefore, with the previously mentioned changes, the gross diversions and associated
return flow were the same, and this made "trading" water very
easy.
When storage water was traded for direct flow water and
the storage water had a previous similar use, the corresponding
30. Id. at 295; Kelly Ranch at 305.
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diversions and return flow were the same, and the net effect of
the trade was negligible. If a water user wished to trade from
one type of use to another, where consumptive use was proportionately higher or lower, the courts have looked to limitations
on the allowable diversions or changes in the diversion rate. For
this reason, it has been most common to look to consumptive
use as a method of determining injury.3 1Now that greater information is available with regard to the details of groundwater
hydraulics, the rate of well withdrawal and the associated return flow may be defined in greater detail. Often, in the analysis of potential injury, the timing of well withdrawals and return flows may be of greater importance than the overall
quantities consumed by the water user. This creates questions
of potential injury caused by changes of water use and plans
of augmentation more complicated than the more simplistic
changes in irrigated lands. This is particularly true when the
change in point of diversion is from a headgate to a well. Each
combination of alluvial characteristics, well location, and
pumping schedule will have an individual scenario of impact
on the river. The timing of withdrawals from the river and the
corresponding return flow must be considered in attempts to
determine the net effect of such water usage on the river.
As commonly used, the term "depletion" means the net or
aggregate effect of the water usage on the river. This would be
the change in river flows directly attributable to a specific
water diversion. In the Kelly Ranch and Glacier View applications these depletions would be those accruing to the well withdrawals compensated to the extent of the return of such water
to the stream. The difference between the withdrawal and the
return flow would be the depletions requiring augmentation.
Having identified these depletions a plan would be devised to
"fill" these depletions by proper application of a senior water
right. In replacing depletions, appropriate allocation must be
made for the portions of the senior right which would have
historically returned to the stream and upon which junior
rights may have come to rely. The consumptive use portion
may therefore be used to offset the junior depletions.
31. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 191, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
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2. Augmentation and the "Lack of Injury" Doctrine
Kelly argued that fundamental in the ownership of a water
right is the right not only to divert the decreed quantity but
also to change the use of the water right, as long as the change
does not injure other vested rights. This change may take the
form of a change from agricultural to municipal use or a change
in time or quantity of diversion. Thus, the volume and time of
diversion may be increased if this can be done without injury.2
The Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District
countered Kelly's arguments by use of many Colorado cases
emphasizing the importance of limiting gross diversion of a
fixed volume or quantity for a fixed amount of time. 33 The
District also emphasized Shelton Farms v. Southeastern Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist. where the court, denying approval of
a plan, stated that the applicants "would substitute the priority doctrine with a lack of injury doctrine . . . ."" Used in this
context, the priority doctrine would allow appropriators to divert only in accordance with the priority date of the right and
the quantity of flow decreed to that right. A "lack of injury"
approach would allow an appropriator to divert without regard
to the seniority of his right if he could prevent injury by some
means (augmenting the depletions, overpumping, etc.).
The same issues, although expressed differently, are found
in Glacier View, where the protestant argued for the diverted
water to be replaced gallon-for-gallon instead of merely to the
extent of depletions.
In ruling for both applicants the court gave approval to
plans based on filling groundwater depletions in time and location with the historic consumptive use portion of direct flow
and storage rights. The court found that at least as applied to
the facts of these cases, the lack of injury doctrine was an
adequate method of formulating the plans. Approval of this
32. Brief of Applicant-Appellant at 46-48.
33. Brief of Objector-Appellee at 15-29.
34. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 187 Colo. 181,
529 P.2d 1321 (1974).
In rationalizing the results in Kelly Ranch and Glacier View it may be necessary
to de-emphasize this statement in Shelton Farms. The unusual fact situation in
Shelton Farms involving the removal of phreatophytes may interject some policy into
the courts' denial of this method of salvaging water. Cf. Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v.
Kuiper, 169 Colo. 309, 455 P.2d 882 (1969) (salvaged water).
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measure was qualified by stating that, "under the circumstances of this case, there is no significant difference between the
'prior appropriation' doctrine and the 'lack of injury' doctrine."35 Since the taking of the water did not cause injury, the
water was deemed available for appropriation."
3. Dry Year Effects
In Glacier View the water court stated that the only thing
that might upset the plan would be a period of extended
drought. In denying the Kelly Ranch application, the water
court noted that the right used by the applicant had been
called out in past droughts. In both cases the supreme court
stated that the applicants would have to acquire water, by
lease or otherwise, or else reduce their consumptive use, so that
the water consumptively used under the plan would not exceed
that available for replacement. 7 These steps did not, however,
appear to be a condition precedent to approval of a plan of
augmentation.
A major concern of the objectors to these and future plans
is that while a surface diversion may be shut down in time of
drought call, the depletions of groundwater withdrawal are delayed and not capable of termination on demand. The result
may be that while an augmentation plan, utilizing groundwater as a source and not having sufficiently senior replacement
water for a drought, may be shut down in a dry year, the depletions from previous pumping in wet years will continue to deplete.
4. Historic Return Flow
In Glacier View, the protestants opposed the planned use
of reservoir water to offset well depletions on a gallon-for-gallon
basis. The water court found that the applicant had made an
acccounting for the portion of the reservoir water which historically returned to the river after use, in this case claimed to be
25 percent, and that the water remaining could be completely
used against well depletions. As the applicant had made provi35. Glacier View at 294.
36. The concept of "injury" and its innumerable applications may be a subject
of future cases and appeals. Similarly, while the water was deemed available for
appropriation, the court expressly stated in Kelly Ranch that a "true appropriator" is
not required under a proposed plan such as this one. Kelly Ranch at 305.
37. Glacier View at 291; Kelly Ranch at 307.
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sions with regard to the potential reliance on the return flows
from the storage water, the legal significance of such reliance
was not at issue. Future augmentation plan litigation may
determine the extent to which reservoir releases must be made
to compensate for reliance by junior rights on the return flow
resulting from historic use of such storage water.
III.

SUMMARY OF THE RULINGS

While the continued discussion of the two cases may tend
to merge and diffuse the rules of the cases, perhaps some items
of a general nature may be stated about the opinion of the
supreme court in regard to these augmentation plans, perhaps
with an eye to future applicants. The court stated that in both
of these applications the developer had met the general intent
and purpose of the applicable statute. While the wells used in
the plans may under different circumstances be exempt from
administration, in the present context they were treated as
nonexempt. In the situations presented, the use of the "no
injury" doctrine had the same result as the use of the doctrine
of prior appropriation. It appears that in the court's opinion
water was here available for appropriation and it could be appropriated if no injury were caused. While acknowledging some
form of reliance on the return flow from the applicants' surface
and storage flow, the court found that no new water need be
added to the system. Breaking from a strict application of a
doctrine requiring adherence to a list of priorities and quantities and timing of diversions, the court seems to have furthered
the goals it outlined in Fellhauer9 and Hall4 in encouraging
maximum beneficial use. Most significant, perhaps, is the approval of the court of a plan which allows diversion by junior
(out of priority) water rights if the stream depletions are compensated through the use of senior surface or storage rights.
IV. APPLICATION TO FUTURE AUGMENTATION PLAN LITIGATION
The narrow scope of these cases might limit the rule to
future applicants in physical situations closely paralleling
those of Kelly Ranch and Glacier View. The court did, however, set forth rather clear-cut rules on the central issues of the
38. Glacier View at 295.
39. Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
40. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973).
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cases. There are, of course, many yet unresolved issues with
respect to groundwater use and limitless factual situations. For
instance, would these decisions apply to the diversion of a junior surface right, a right out of priority? If the "lack of injury"
doctrine prevails, then there should be no distinction between
a junior surface and junior groundwater diverter.
Is the controversy over replacement of diversions, as opposed to depletions, then over? Perhaps not in situations where
the return of such water to the stream would take years or
decades to accomplish. The effects of withdrawal may be rapidly "felt" by the stream, while the return of the unused portions of such water may take a greater time depending on distances and alluvial characteristics. While not necessarily presenting an impediment to the application of the lack of injury
doctrine, such circumstances may present the courts with
rather knotty factual disputes.
These cases acknowledge the traditional view that some
accounting must be made for return flow, here, not only from
surface diversions but also from storage diversions. Perhaps
future litigation will determine the extent to which a storage
right must continue historic practice with regard to return flow.
Is this a green light for developers and water right
speculators? The case does seem to say that the applicant for
a plan of augmentation does not have to be the true appropriator and can be one who will never actually drill wells and use
the water. The extent of allowable remoteness of the applicant
would, at this point, be unknown.
The court said that the "lack of injury" doctrine here
brings the same result as the priority doctrine and that a right
may be expanded in terms of volume and time of diversion if
there is no injury. It would appear that the court has condoned,
at least in these situations, the "ballooning" of the right complained of by the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District, although an applicant could argue that the new
"increased" diversions are made under the priority of the more
junior groundwater right and only the depletive portions of the
senior augmenting right are being used.
The advantages of these plans would perhaps accrue
mostly to the low-consumptive user, as he may divert a large
volume of water under a right previously small in terms of
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volume and rate. Those advantaged might include manufacturing and some industrial and municipal users.
These cases may have a number of meanings of significance for the various types of water users in the state of Colorado. It appears that an individual wanting to change use of
water or bring new usages into the system, if a low consumptive
user, may be required to meet only the depletive effects of such
water use. Large, junior out-of-priority diversions may be made
without regard to the "call" on the stream, as long as depletions to the stream are made up by proper augmentation with
senior rights. Additionally, the parties may find that the courts
are looking toward the establishment of some form of historic
reliance on the return of storage water to the stream. There
may exist a portion of the storage right which must stay in the
same pattern of return to satisfy the users historically benefitted. These cases will have the greatest effect in the areas of
Colorado experiencing the greatest usage of groundwater withdrawal: the South Platte, the Arkansas, and the Rio Grande.
Noting problems of augmentation plans during dry years,
it would appear that for those plans to survive the rulings of
the court and still be able to retain the usage envisioned, the
developers will have to obtain either very secure storage rights
or very senior surface rights. The present holders of such rights
may expect that the demand for them will increase as plans
such as these become more common.
Joseph P. McMahon*
* B.S., 1966, U.S. Air Force Academy; M.S., 1973, University of Denver; J.D.
candidate, University of Denver College of Law.

IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Water for the Future: Concluding Remarks
GLENN

G.

SAUNDERS*

Contrasting viewpoints are what make workshops valuable. These should be the best workshops ever because we have
viewpoints covering the entire spectrum of opinions on water
law issues.
One of the themes of this conference seemed to be that
everything that was done in the past was all wrong-that we
had a very poor legal system to start with, and that the development was very poorly done. I am going to present a viewpoint
contrary to that.
The water law system in the State of Colorado is among
the finest in the world. Devised originally by the early miners
of California, the appropriation doctrine was brought to the
Rocky Mountains during the search for gold and silver. Only
in Colorado has this system reached its fruition.
Zebulon Pike reported to the United States Congress that
the west was an uninhabitable desert, unfit for human habitation. The legal systefn had to be strong and certain in order to
provide a structure for the determination of water rights under
the climatic and social conditions of the west. Not from the
time of Pike's report until the recent onslaught of ecological
concerns has our water law truly been challenged.
Since the signing of the Magna Carta, our legal system has
been based on the rule of law, rather than a rule of men. Law
is a rule of conduct, enforceable by an authority having power
to see that it is followed, which is known in advance so that
those who choose to can obey the law and those who choose to
disobey can be readily recognized as lawbreakers. Several proposals made at this conference would take the determination
of water rights from the rules of law and place them under the
whimsical interpretation of "public good" made by a temporary occupant of a public office.
* Member of the firm Saunders, Snyder, Dickson & Ross, P.C., Denver, Colo.
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What is this "public good" that requires the major overhaul of our water law discussed at this conference? Methods for
insuring public input constitute the basis of our governmental
system. Standards of the public good are fixed by the legislature. These standards are then applied to individual cases in
conformity with the process and purposes of the law. Finally,
we have created an independent judiciary; a judiciary so independent they even write laws nowadays. This judiciary checks
for adherence to the law by the administrator. Public input and
the rule of law are protected against encroachment by man at
all stages by our established rules and procedures.
The very things envisioned in the 1920s are happening
today. Growth, water demand, and the locations in which they
are occurring have come about much as planned and specified.
Upper basin states managed to prevent appropriations until
the completion of the Colorado River Basin Compact on the
basis of the foresight of some planners.
Certainty, as pointed out by Secretary Horton, is one of
the most necessary aspects of our water system. Two elements
are presently creating uncertainty under our laws: reserve
rights and unsettled Indian claims. Reserve rights create uncertainty because of the number of appropriators involved. On its
face these so-called reserve rights do not create uncertainty,
but recent environmental concerns may obfuscate the present
understanding of these rights.
Similarly, the problem of Indian claims remains unresolved. Either Indian rights are governed by treaty of the
United States, or they are determined under the appropriate
state system. If the rights are governed by treaty, claims for
water should be satisfied by the United States as a whole.
Claims resolved this way contribute to the certainty of our
water law system. Uncertainty is created when Indian claims
must be entirely satisfied by the State of Colorado alone.
Uncertainty also exists in the construction of our water
compacts. A good example is the Colorado River Compact.
When the Colorado River Compact was written, the drafters
thought that there was a yield of 17 to 18 million acre-feet
available per year. Accordingly, in order to apportion the water
to the upper and lower basins equally, the compact provides
that the upper basin shall not withhold 75 million acre-feet

1976

WATER FOR THE FUTURE

every 10 years from the lower basin. It turns out, though, that
the estimated yield was wrong, and that there is less water
available than originally appropriated. The lower basin states
insist on their 75 million acre-feet, but the upper basin states
assert that this would create an unequal apportionment, contrary to the purpose of the Compact. Ambiguities like this must
be resolved if we are going to be able to adequately plan our
resources.
But the greatest uncertainties arise from the increasing
demands being placed on our limited water resources. One
source of increasing demand in Colorado is the growth in population. Much has been written about the necessity for zero
population growth, and I do not intend to repeat it all here.
Nature has created all creatures so that they can overproduce.
We talk about regulating our water supply; we need to regulate
our own lives as well.
Demand is also increasing for the use of water for mineral
processing. We need to determine our priorities and allocate
the necessary water to allow for the mineral production necessary to maintain our civilization.
We have several methods and practices available by which
we can conserve and manage our water resources. These methods include transmountain diversions, water reuse, and cloud
seeding, among others.
Transmountain diversions were the subject of some discussion during this conference. Though no new transmountain diversions are now under construction, more will have to be built
in the future, as mandated by our need to conserve our water
resources. The potential for reuse of water is much greater on
the Eastern Slope than the Western, where the terrain, location
of arable land, and severe limitations on the availability of
arable land restrict water reuse. On the Eastern Slope the potential for reuse is very good. In 1912, the Army Corps of Engineers reported that the Platte River was reused 14 times between the mouth of Platte Canyon and the state boundary.
Today, estimates show five reuses from metropolitan sewage
outfalls to the border.
Transmountain diversions in the amount of 300,000 acrefeet per year help to stabilize the Platte River. Although peren-
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ially short of water, the Platte has had no substantial water
calls for the past two years, both of which were very dry.
Cloud seeding is one of the last topics discussed at this
conference. Here is a real opportunity to bolster our water supply. We have heard that by seeding we can increase our water
by 10 to 20 percent, and by putting up some proper fences in
the mountains to catch more snow we may be able to raise that
as high as 30 percent. The problem here, though, is that 10
percent of nothing is nothing. If we only have 50 percent of the
water we need, and we increase that by 10 percent, we still do
not have enough. Intelligent conservation and planning measures are still necessary.
Other methods of conservation and storage include storage
in upstream areas and the zoning of land to regulate water
distribution.
All this brings to mind one final point. How are we going
to determine our priorities on all of these different concerns?
The answer may lie in an old humorous adage that water flows
uphill to money. Money is a good criterion of the public will
and priorities, because it represents the most unprejudiced
vote that the public ever gives.
The fact is that people apparently are more willing to
spend money for other commodities than for water. This will
change as demands exceed our supplies. Every one of us uses
some 20 tons of materials from the ground each year, and every
one of those tons requires the use of water. It is time we faced
these varied water problems and resolved them so that we may
continue the kind of life we have become accustomed to in
years to come.

WORKSHOP REPORTS
Comparative Legal Systems
JOHN U. CARLSON,* MODERATOR
THOMAS OLIVER,** MODERATOR
IAN BIRD, REPORTER
JOSEPH MCMAHON, REPORTER

The workshop discussion centered on the traditional problems of limited resource allocation and the relative efficacy of
legal systems in guiding such allocation. With aridity as the
source of the problem in Colorado, the system of water allocation has its underpinning in traditional concepts of property
rights. The applicability of such a system to countries where
the ideas of individual property rights are not dominant may
be questioned. Those who would champion the attributes of the
doctrine of prior appropriation note its ability to adjust to the
times and needs of the users, when coupled with a strong judiciary. Comment was made on the fact that forces arguing for
stronger environmental control and limitation on growth may
now find some comfort in the more conservative elements of the
allocation of water by the priority system. Opposing such a
view, is the idea that the Colorado doctrine, granting such
import to the time of appropriation, has imbedded in it an
element of waste: the first user not necessarily being the most
efficient.
In countries where some form of permanent allocation of
resources is possible, the same treatment of water may result
in a system similar to prior appropriation for water distribution. The current conflicts in Colorado among water users were
seen as adjustments to various elements of the market and
reactions to governmental searching for reallocation of water.
Questions were raised as to the idea of a more rational
system, one based on economic analysis rather than legal
rights. One such concept is that of Natural Resource Units.
Other ideas included some form of quasi-governmental organi*
**

Member of the firm Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado.
Executive Director, United Nations Water Conference, at Mar del Plata, Ar-

gentina, Spring 1977.
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zations or private "corporations" with powers to allocate resources by use or need.
In viewing Colorado water problems, comment was made
that often the proper solutions have been hampered by the
parochial nature of the representation in the advocacy system
for resource allocation. The result is often treatment of the
symptoms rather than the disease. Criticisms of the advocacy
system include: (1) complete representation is often not possible; (2) settlements in these situations may compromise future
uses, often of a public nature; and, (3) the arguments are often
over factual rather than legal issues. Those in support of the
Colorado position would cite the great advantages of the alienability of a water right in letting the market make the fundamental decisions with regard to use.
Concern was expressed as to the eventual results of such a
market system. In Colorado, energy development for the needs
of the nation may require taking water used for irrigation of
crops. Indeed, some argue that Colorado is not suited for agricultural water use as better soils and situations are available
elsewhere in the United States.
With regard to international applications, discussion focused on the Sahel region's use of international corporations to
manage Senegal River water. Here relative independence of the
authority and ability to be flexible in water use tends to
mitigate nation state disputes and put water to its best use. It
was felt that this type of solution was not too dissimilar from
the interstate solutions attempted in the United States through
regional basin authorities. The problem in both situations is
seen as that of determining what the "constituency" desires
and the best method of attaining such desires. In all systems
of allocation, there is a threat that the influential or vocal
minority may have inordinate influence on decisions.
Reference was made to the concerns of the United Nations
World Habitat Conference regarding the global nature of water
supply limitations. References by Mr. Oliver to water problems
in every part of the globe indicate the vastness of the problem
and the common nature of the scarcity of useable water supplies.
Citing some examples of water problems in Mexico City,
Mr. Oliver noted the surprise with which some nations receive
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news of American-Mexican agreements on water quality measures for the Colorado River. As an example of the severity of
shortages in a developed area, the plight of Great Britain in the
last summer was discussed.
In summary comments, members of the workshop were in
agreement that water quality and supply is basic to a vast
number of global problems. In the solutions to local problems
of property rights, resource allocation, judicial as opposed to
administrative systems, and physical solutions, parties must
keep in mind the global nature of the problems. The potential
exchange of ideas at the United Nations Water Conference of
1977 may provide some movement toward realizable solutions.

Interstate Compacts and Basin Authorities
HAMLET

J.

BERRY IH,* MODERATOR

MARGIE STROOCK, REPORTER
DEBRA ROGERS, REPORTER

The workshop identified and discussed three existing
problems associated with water distribution under interstate
compacts: first, the effect of use under compact allocation;
second, the resolution of conflicts between established rights
under state law and compact requirements; and third, the effect of water quality laws on compact allocations. The common
denominator of these three problems is that all are a result of
circumstances unforeseen at the time of the compact and are
not directly addressed by the compact. These problems are
either currently being resolved by litigation or will probably be
the subject of litigation in the future. It was suggested that
such unforeseen circumstances could be handled by a permanent administrative body, such as the Delaware River Commission. However, since the problems are a result of unknown
elements at the time of the compact, such administrative body
would of necessity operate without substantial guidelines.
Whether such a body was preferable to the current method of
resolution was left unanswered.
* Director of Water Resources Projects, Colorado Department of Natural Resources.
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The discussion of the first problem-whether interstate
compact allocations can be lost through lack of use-centered
around the Colorado River Basin. While most agreed that the
purpose of the Colorado River Compact was to abolish the prior
appropriation principle, at least between states, several participants described circumstances under which use might become
a determinative factor. A fear expressed initially was that if the
compact does not hold up, then the guiding principle in interstate water decisions is based on existing uses. In response it
was stated that interstate compact allocations are established
under the doctrine of equitable apportionment, which may
consider use. However, once the compact has determined allocations, amending or rescinding the compact through litigation
is extremely difficult. This is particularly true in the Colorado
River Basin where several federal projects and other plans have
relied on the compact.
Another participant asked if use was not important in interpreting the compact. For instance, does use affect the question of whether or not the Gila River is included in the Colorado
River Compact allocations? In 1968, the Central Arizona Project (CAP) was authorized in the federal Colorado River Projects Acts, which also provided for five projects in western Colorado. The authorizing statute contemplates that these projects
will be governed by the terms of the interstate compact. However, CAP might begin to use water before the Colorado projects are completed. Furthermore, CAP might exceed Arizona's
allocation under the compact, if one assumes that the Gila
River is included in that allocation. If Arizona needs the water,
is using the water, and has developed an economy based on
that use, will not these factors be an aid to Arizona when the
time comes for a decision on whether or not the Gila actually
is included in Arizona's allocation? Similarly, will not lack of
use put the upper basin states in a poor position to argue that
the Gila River is not part of Arizona's compact allocation?
The second principal topic of discussion focused on a problem currently under litigation, involving the Rio Grande Compact. The issue is whether the compact or state law controls
when intrastate use must be curtailed in order to meet a state's
compact obligations. The 1938 Rio Grande Compact made allocations among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas based on
engineering studies conducted during the ten years prior to
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1938. During that ten-year period the system was saturated to
an extent that has not occurred since. Under the Compact,
Colorado must deliver to the New Mexican border a certain
amount of water, from the Conejos and the Rio Grande Rivers,
based on tables developed during the high water years. The
Compact contains separate tables for the Conejos and Rio
Grande but the confluence of these two rivers is within the
state of Colorado. Because there is not enough water in the
system to protect all of the uses that existed at the time of the
Compact and still meet Colorado's delivery obligation, some
Colorado uses must be curtailed. The rights along the Conejos
and the Rio Grande have developed separately but the senior
rights are on the Conejos and the junior rights are on the Rio
Grande. Holders of the junior Colorado rights argue that the
Compact is supreme over state law and as a result of the separate tables for the Conejos and the Rio Grande, Colorado must
meet its obligation by a curtailment on each river system.
Holders of the senior Colorado rights argue that, regardless of
the Compact's separate tables, the obligation to deliver is Colorado's as a unit and the junior rights on the Rio Grande must
be curtailed before any senior rights on the Conejos. Thus, does
the Compact provide that Colorado owns some of the water in
the Rio Grande and some of the water in the Conejos or merely
that Colorado must deliver a certain amount to the New Mexican border regardless of its source?
The third area of discussion focused on the effect water
quality legislation may have on compacts. Very few compacts
say anything at all about water quality, or if they do it is in
vague and general language. The question was raised whether
a state could lose its right to use its allocation as a result of an
obligation to deliver a certain quality as well as quantity of
water.
The participants cited many examples where diversion
increases salinity. If the federal quality standards are imposed
on compact delivery obligations, those allocations which increase salinity may have to be curtailed. Discussion centered
on the Colorado River Basin Compact, which makes no mention of water quality standards. Current upper river basin uses
include substantial irrigation, among other uses which increase
the salinity of the water delivered downstream. If salinity levels
must be decreased in order for the Compact to conform with
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the federal water quality statutes, such uses would either have
to be curtailed or some other method of reducing salinity employed.
Seven of the western states have already met with the EPA
and the Bureau of Reclamation to develop plans to line irrigation ditches with concrete, or implement other methods of reducing salinity. However, many methods of reducing salinity
would require federal money, which in turn requires Congressional approval. As one participant pointed out, the western
states are outnumbered in Congressional representation and
unless they join together the likelihood of obtaining federal
money to reduce salinity in any one state is slim. The possible
alternative to projects which reduce salinity is that existing
allocations be reduced in each state until water delivered at the
border meets federal water standards. This would force curtailment of use below compact allocations.
Thus, this workshop illustrated that compact provisions
are under considerable scrutiny and that uses under compacts
are subject to substantial uncertainty. The conflicts discussed
will have to be decided by applying compact provisions to situations that were not contemplated at the time of drafting. It
was suggested that the Delaware Commission could serve as a
model to be followed and that compact commissions could resolve interpretation conflicts on a regular basis. It is questionable whether the creation of such a commission is politically
feasible in the western area. It is difficult to convince state
legislatures to give their state's water control to a multistate
commission with broad authority. The Delaware Basin does
not have a water scarcity problem and thus conflict resolution
is easier. The basins discussed herein are not as fortunate.
In conclusion, the workshop raised three basic problems
which must concern holders of water rights subject to interstate
compacts. The workshop left open the question of how the
problems of compact interpretations based on use, conflict of
laws, and water quality should or can be resolved.

Allocation and Conflicting Needs
DENNIS GALLAGHER,* MODERATOR

ANTHONY TRUMBLY, REPORTER
MARK MILLER, REPORTER

Chairperson Dennis Gallagher initially asked each person
to participate in a "Water Game." This Game consisted of
listing five water-use categories (agricultural, domestic, industrial, energy, and recreation) and posing two questions: If,
due to a water crisis in Colorado, you, as a Governor's appointee, were forced to sacrifice one of these categories for one
year, which one would you choose? In what priority of use
would you rate the others? Recreation was chosen to be sacrificed by the majority of the workshop participants; domestic
and agricultural uses were given the first and second priorities;
while industrial use of water was rated lower than energy production by nearly all of those present. A post-discussion repeat
of the Game was planned but was not held because of time
constraints.
Senator Gallagher next posed several questions as a discussion guideline:
1. What is allocation?
2. What are some of the problems arising out of our current allo-

cation process as set down 100 years ago in the State Constitution
and our laws?
3. Should the current allocation process be changed to meet different demands for water?
4. If so, who should set up the allocation process? Who should
pay if we change the process? Who should set allocation priorities? What should the new process be?
5. Can we set priorities on conflicting demands?

During the workshop, there was a great deal of overlap in
the discussion of these issues. The following is a breakdown of
the various issues as they were examined.
I.

WHAT IS ALLOCATION?

Allocation was defined simply as a method for distributing
the available water. Water allocation is a property right according to the Colorado Constitution: "The right to put water
to beneficial use shall not be denied." The Constitution estab* Colorado State Senator; Professor of Classics, Regis College.
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lishes a list of use priorities: domestic first, agricultural second,
and industrial third. Though this listing has served the state
for a century, it now poses several problems. Foremost among
these problems is the emergence of recreational water use as an
entirely new category. In addition, energy production will in
the near future become a highly important concern in Colorado. Overlap between energy production and industry may
cause problems in the priority use system, such as whether
energy production should be accorded the same priority as industry or defined as a separate category.
In the current process of allocation, higher priority uses
have precedence over lower ones if a compensation requirement
is met. One remedy is that courts are available to deal with the
establishment of water rights and the process of eminent domain.
II.

PROBLEMS

OF CURRENT ALLOCATION PROCESS

The allocation process has failed to accommodate changing demands in the various priority areas and the growth of
entirely new major consumptive fields. Differences of opinion
as to the order of priorities were presented by the workshop
participants.
A major problem of the current legal allocation arrangement is the "use it or lose it" legal presumption which exists
in Colorado. This presumption dictates that allocated water
rights which are not used may be lost to a competing water
consumer. Rather than lose water rights, many individuals put
water to nonbeneficial use year after year solely in order to
maintain their claim to it. Waste. of Colorado's limited water
resources usually results.
III.

CHANGING THE CURRENT ALLOCATION PROCESS

Growth in water demand and the changing needs of the
State suggested to the workshop participants that the current
allocation process should be overhauled. Although the water
situation is not drastic at the present time, the immediate
future will place demands on the process which it may not be
able to handle adequately. Among these demands is a conflict
between the needs of upcoming energy production activities
and the more traditional needs, particularly those of industry.
A visualized need for long-range planning of water use and
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priority reassignments has been unsatisfied under the present
system. Successful planning to avoid disputes and maximize
the efficient use of Colorado's water was emphasized by several
of the participants.
IV. NATURE OF THE CHANGED ALLOCATION PROCESS
Three areas of Colorado's allocation process were the subject of suggestions for change: the austerity program, the
expanded leasing program, and the marketplace dependence
program. All three emphasized greater flexibility in legal and
distributional arrangements. As one participant pointed out,
this discussion itself was a prime example of the difficulty of
reaching a consensus on the water issue.
The proposed austerity program would ask water consumers to reduce nonessential and wasteful water use. Through
economic incentives and some form of official management,
attempts would be made to limit water usage to the most productive purposes. The first response to this proposal was an
objection that it would engender massive bureaucracy and
impersonal decisionmaking. In the alternative, the objecting
speaker suggested increased reliance on the marketplace for
allocative decisions. This dependence would be more efficient
and reduce the growth of bureaucracy. However, the probability exists that monetary concerns would overpower efficient
allocation. In addition, it is difficult to reach agreement among
interest groups as to what constitutes a marketable surplus.
Finally, the fact that an austerity program would be difficult
to implement does not necessarily mean that it should not be
attempted.
An expanded and more flexible program for short term
redistribution of water rights was brought to the attention of
the workshop. The concept received general approval with the
stipulation that some method of guaranteeing the return of
leased rights be implemented as part of the proposal.
V.

CAN WE SET PRIORITIES ON CONFLICTING DEMANDS?

. Redetermination of the use priority scale was seen as only
a small part of a large policy-planning vacuum. Other issues
such as growth, urban sprawl and the agricultura-domesticindustrial-energy production economic mix must be addressed
prior to or concurrently with the water problem. Prerequisite
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to any policy planning for the State is a growth in cooperation
and trust between interest groups.
The complexity of the allocation question was demonstrated by the discussion of the priority to be accorded to energy production. Several participants felt that energy production should be given a heightened priority. Yet, allocating more
water for this purpose would instigate demand growth in the
other use categories in some of the driest areas of Colorado. In
addition, water invested in coal and oil shale is generally exported and thus lost by the State.
The problem of long term compatibility between agricultural and other uses was addressed momentarily by the workshop participants. Agricultural needs were considered in the
context of world food shortages. Two particular topics of interest were the desirability of continuing technological research
and development and the misallocation of prime farming land
to other uses, which forces agricultural use of marginal land
and lowers productivity.
The widely varying viewpoints of the workshop participants contributed to the discussion and pointed out the need
for policy planning and development in the areas of allocation
and conflicting demands.

Water, Growth, and Planning
ROBERT C. MCWHINNIE,* MODERATOR

PETER

B.

NAGEL, REPORTER

Water has historically been a key to growth; in the East,
navigation hastened settlement, as did irrigation in the West.
Water has at the same time traditionally been free, readily
available to those first able to appropriate it. Unhampered by
those market forces which allocate scarce resources, water has
thus not functioned in the past to regulate, much less restrain,
growth. Even so, the maxim, often repeated through the Conference, that "water flows to where the money is" perhaps implicitly recognizes that our society may not be allocating its
* President, URS Co.; former Director of Planning, Denver Water Board.

1976

WORKSHOPS

adequate supplies of water to its best advantage. Accordingly,
while the participants in the Water, Growth, and Planning
Workshop reached neither consensus nor conclusions, discussion largely focused on the relative desirability and effectiveness of planning mechanisms based on water and on other devices, such as zoning, as tools for controlling growth.
Several participants observed that utilities frequently promote development in order to create customers for projects long
since planned and completed. Because those responsible for
providing water generally initiate these projects on the basis of
projected demands, cooperation with or regulation of water
utilities may lend the planner a long-range means of channeling growth into desired patterns. Zoning, by way of contrast,
is a short term mechanism, one that functions largely through
ad hoc variances.
Water management may be incapable of limiting growth
in quantitative terms. Because it is not yet a scarce resource,
regulation of water can only transfer growth from one location
or from one economic activity to another. In Boulder, Colorado,
for example, a system of tap-on fees did indeed slow the growth
of that community, but only because developers moved their
operations to more competitive communities which had not yet
imposed such a system. But to the extent that the success of
efforts designed to control growth is measured not in terms of
population increases or urban sprawl, but rather in terms of
improving the quality of life, water management may prove to
be effective. In this light, the residents of Boulder may have
considered the results of their regulatory scheme highly satisfactory; that attitude, of course, may not be shared by the
surrounding communities. Nonetheless, if it is true that water
is currently allocated between various economic sectors according to their willingness to pay, so that industry profits at the
expense of cities and cities at the expense of agriculture, then
sensitive water planning may achieve a proper balance between
industry, urban areas, agriculture, recreation, and environmental concerns.
Because water has been free and abundant, citizens may
be more willing to accept limitations on its use. Limitations on
the use of land, on the other hand, through zoning or other
means are frequently resisted, since land is acquired only with
greater effort and expense. This observation, however, serves
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two sides of the argument. First, restrictions on water may in
fact control growth with less social dissatisfaction. But secondly, such restrictions may not limit growth at all. The experience of a number of suburban communities demonstrates that
people will either pay whatever is necessary for available water
or do without when supplies are inadequate. Similarly, industries may pass on increased costs to the consumer or alter production processes. Water policies and projects stimulate public
involvement, and we, as a citizenry that expects water, may be
expected to clamor before elected officials until the tap, so to
speak, is turned back on.
Much of the effectiveness of a planning program depends
on the selection of those who are to administer it. General
agreement exists that water engineers and consultants have no
right to make planning decisions and that such decisions
should ultimately be made by the people or their elected representatives. If, as a matter of practice and convenience, planning responsibilities must be conceded to governments, then
controversy arises concerning the proper level of government.
Local governments, fearing an encroachment on their autonomy, are understandably reluctant to relinquish any control
over their water policies. Their position is justified by the fact
that it is local citizens and governments which are most acutely
affected by water projects. Yet localities tend to act in their
own self-interest; their decision makers decide in favor of their
constituencies, and broader goals may be neglected. From the
premise that water management can only distribute growth, it
follows that conflicts are best avoided and broader goals best
served through regional planning agencies. Ideally, such agencies should maintain a sensitivity to local needs and demands
and yet avoid the dangers of creeping incrementalism, a hazard
which arises when decision makers accommodate limited interests and adjust to momentary exigencies. In theory, at least,
only such an agency can formulate a coherent planning
scheme.
Clearly, any efforts designed to control growth must recognize the interrelationship between water management and land
use planning. Too often in the past planners in these two areas
have worked in isolation, if not in opposition. There was, however, a strong feeling expressed in the workshop that water
considerations should be ancillary to land use planning. Regu-
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lating growth through. zoning, for example, generally proves
more responsive to local interests. More importantly, zoning
appears to address more directly what is perceived as the principal factor responsible for growth-unrestrained use of land.
Legislative regulation of land use, integrating water policies,
promises the best means of achieving planned growth.

Water and the Environment
JOHN RAGSDALE, MODERATOR*
GILBERT D. PORTER, REPORTER
WENDY SNEFF, REPORTER

The discussion of this workshop reflected the diverse and
intangible nature of the problems presented when formulating
an economically and ecologically balanced evaluation of competing water demands.
A concern was initially expressed about the feasibility of
divesting appropriated water rights in favor of alternative uses
and needs. However, it was generally conceded that this problem was not significant, except to the extent that the method
employed weighted the costs and benefits of the various proposals. For instance, if water rights could be obtained through
condemnation proceedings, the cost of obtaining these rights
might nonetheless be prohibitive.
The primary barrier in the path of sound, environmentally-aware water management was recognized to be the ascertainment of an accurate valuation to be ascribed to the contending interests. In an effort to establish a practicable scale,
the workshop participants engaged in listing various criteria
considered relevant to any such decisions.
The workshop agreed that effective water management is
an indispensable first step in resolving conflicting demands.
Rather than attempt to save and appropriate an unnecessarily
limited water supply, the orientation must be to prevent the
waste of these resources. The tasks of allocation and determining environmental priorities should be performed after the po* Editor, Eco-Logos, Denver.
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tential of available resources is maximized. In this context, it
was noted that Colorado has delivered more water than required under the Colorado-Nebraska compact due to effective
management and efficient recycling of the waters.
Given this initial premise, the workshop attempted to establish priorities for uses. It was determined that the best
gauge by which priorities could be measured was the extent to
which such a use was essential to the life processes.
The drinking of water was listed as the most essential use.
In particular, concern was directed to the presence of refractory
organics in the drinking water supply. Thus, several speakers
during the conference had alluded to the fact that in years to
come we would be drinking our own reprocessed sewage.
Agriculture was agreed to be the second most essential use
by virtue of the importance of food production in the United
States. In this regard it was noted that in many areas in Colorado there is a lively conflict between agricultural and municipal users of limited water supplies.
However, even this fundamental approach did not simplify the problem. While the presence of refractory organics in
drinking water bothered some participants, it did not concern
others to the same extent. Several important questions remained unanswered. What quantity of refractory organics renders water undrinkable? To what degree is taste an element of
potability?
Similarly, agricultural uses are subject to numerous variables. Should a farmer be limited to growing certain crops which
require less irrigation in deference to other water needs? If so,
then which lands would be used to grow which type of crops?
How would such a rationing system affect the crop market and,
more importantly, the crucial world food supply?
In conclusion, the workshop noted the impracticability of
accurately balancing environmental concerns with existing
needs under present formulas. The prior appropriation system
of allocating water is inadequate in that it fails to account for
the environmental and practical need to save water. The system is premised on an assumption of excess water, and thus is
not suited to the present shortage. A democratic appropriation
by majority vote is dubious as to its viability since such a
system would probably conflict with the necessary manage-
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ment of the waters. Additionally, it is unclear whether majority
vote is an accurate measure of public needs and interests.
Professor Freeman's proposed method of evaluating these
many concerns was discussed briefly without the benefit of his
paper. While the method presented was of benefit in its approach, uncertainty was expressed whether the mode of analysis resolved the ambiguity present in evaluating the relative
merits of alternative uses. Rather, the ambiguity, although
lessened, was shifted to determination of the intensity of certain losses. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by Professor
Freeman did appear to discover and clarify the relation of different concerns in the decisionmaking process.
In summary, the workshop dealt with and analyzed the
inherent problems present whenever existing water needs are
in competition with the relatively intangible environmental
concerns posed by our daily water uses. The intangible nature,
and therefore uncertain valuation, of environmental concerns
and needs pose the greatest obstacle in the path of environmentally-aware water management.

Water and Technology
DAVID

W.

HENDRICKS,* MODERATOR

GERALD FISHER, REPORTER
DOUGLAS TRIGGS, REPORTER

Professor Hendricks opened the workshop by presenting
three classifications of water technology applications:
1. supply-oriented technology: for example, that relevant to
the Narrows and Two Forks dam projects;
2. treatment-oriented technology: including sewage plants
and water distribution systems; and,
3. conservation-oriented technology: for example, ditch lining and water conservation plumbing.

These classifications must not be viewed as all-inclusive
but should be noted as part of a broad framework of technology
that bears an impact on water. A number of alternative energy
systems, such as fossil fuel and nuclear or solar energy, have
radically different impacts on water use. The phrase "water
* Professor of Engineering, Colorado State University.
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and technology" includes both the traditional technology of
water movement and the multiple technologies of water use
and reuse.
A central theme of the discussion was the interface between law and the technological underpinnings of water
problems. Groundwater exhaustion through extensive well activity was the first example mentioned. An experienced
groundwater expert discussed some of the engineering complexities and alternative approaches to managing the problems. For example, extensive pumping from the South Platte
aquifer diverts water that would otherwise be available to surface water users. The legal priorities of surface Water allocation
holders creates obvious difficulties for the groundwater users.
The societal decision process that results in laws impacting on water has not only technological inputs but also social
underpinnings. These social factors include ecological disruptions, esthetic disharmony, and recreational opportunities. The
participants in the workshop stressed that good water planning
requires the factoring of social variables in engineering equations. Specific reference was made to the impact of environmental factors on decisions regarding the use of high altitude
reservoirs in Colorado and on the diversion of water from
Colorado's Western Slope. In addition, there was considerable
discussion about the impact of water on growth policies and the
converse-the impact of growth trends on water policies and
technology.
The technological availability of alternative uses of water
and the policy decisions that must precede certain water uses
were discussed extensively. Right now, for example, the technology exists for low-volume toilets that would conserve water,
yet effective use of this technology will require alteration in
both social and legal norms. Likewise, strong public commitments to present energy forms, such as nuclear reactors which
make heavy demands on water resources, and to relatively low
water rates preclude the application of presently-available
technology and conservation methods for more efficient water
use. Mention was made of the Northglenn, Colorado, project,
which is a cooperative water use project between municipal
and agricultural users. By allocating water of varying quality
to its most appropriate use, the Northglenn region is seeking
to maximize its water resource potential while avoiding poten-
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tial priority conflicts and the application of costly and redundant technologies. This is an outstanding example of what has
been termed "agripolitan" cooperation. This same agripolitan
cooperation is used in Arizona, where a different legal framework makes such cooperative endeavors easier to accomplish.
In sum, the effective application of technology to water
problems is interrelated with a host of factors-economic, social, political, and legal. The basic long-range policy choice is
whether future research and development should be concentrated on the supply side of the water equation, thereby providing more effective delivery systems, or whether emphasis
should be placed on the demand side, resulting in more efficient use of the water that can be delivered. No doubt the
ultimate solution will necessarily incorporate elements of both.

